Opinion
No. 12–P–1532.
2013-05-2
ADOPTION OF BRIGITTE.
By the Court (RUBIN, FECTEAU & HINES, JJ.).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
On October 25, 2011, a Juvenile Court judge issued a decree terminating the mother's and father's parental rights and approving the adoption plan of the Department of Children and Families (department) placing Brigitte with her preadoptive foster mother. The father appeals, claiming that the judge erroneously rejected his proposed alternative plan to place the child with her paternal grandparents. We affirm.
The mother and father entered into a written stipulation, approved by the judge, on October 5, 2011, that Brigitte was in need of care and protection, that custody would be transferred to the department, and that a decree would enter dispensing with their rights to receive notice or consent to any legal proceeding affecting her custody, guardianship, or adoption. The father, however, reserved his right to a hearing to present an alternative adoption plan. The mother is not a party to this appeal.
Background. Brigitte, born in October of 2009, was removed from her home when she was ten months old and placed with the preadoptive mother. A hearing was held on October 17, 2011, at which the judge heard testimony from the social worker, the father, and the paternal grandmother regarding the alternative placement plans. The judge issued supplemental findings of fact and conclusions of law again finding the department's plan to be in Brigitte's best interests. Discussion. The ultimate issue before a trial judge on the question of adoptive placement is the best interests of the child. See Adoption of Hugo, 428 Mass. 219, 225, 700 N.E.2d 516 (1998); Adoption of Peggy, 436 Mass. 690, 704–705, 767 N.E.2d 29 (2002). In making that determination, neither plan is afforded special weight or consideration. Adoption of Hugo, supra at 226 & n. 8, 700 N.E.2d 516. A judge may consider a wide range of evidence, and it is for the judge to determine how to weigh various factors. Id. at 229 n. 17, 700 N.E.2d 516. We accord a trial judge substantial deference, and reverse only for abuse discretion or clear error of law. Id. at 225, 700 N.E.2d 516.
Here, the judge weighed several factors in reaching his decision. He found that the child's only “truly significant bond” is with her preadoptive mother, that she has grown attached to her foster siblings, and that her preadoptive family is the only family that she knows. Although Brigitte had sporadic contact with her paternal grandparents during the first ten months of her life, she has had no contact with them since then. The judge further found that if Brigitte were placed with her paternal grandparents, her father “would know her whereabouts, and his future conduct and behavior could be detrimental to Brigitte's best interests and dangerous to her well-being.” Lastly, the judge found that if placed with the preadoptive mother, Brigitte would be more likely to have visitation with her sisters.
At the time of the hearing, the father was incarcerated. He has a history of homelessness, drug abuse, violent crime, and domestic abuse. The judge accordingly found that despite the paternal grandmother's testimony that she would only allow the father to visit Brigitte “as long as he is doing things right,” there were still valid concerns about where the father would go upon his release from prison. The judge also expressed concern about an incident in which the father and his brother came to the grandparents' home and collapsed from drug use, observing that “[t]here is no way to ever prevent this from happening in the future.”
Brigitte has had previous visitation with two sisters who reside in a kinship placement with the maternal grandmother. She has a third sister, the oldest among the siblings, who lives with the paternal grandparents with whom she has had no contact.
On appeal, the father argues that under Adoption of Rhona, 57 Mass.App.Ct. 479, 492, 784 N.E.2d 22 (2003), the judge failed to make the requisite findings as to bonding, and erroneously reached his decision without the assistance of expert testimony. See ibid. (holding that where traumatic severance of bonds with a substitute caretaker is decisive to the ruling, the judge must make detailed findings as to bonding and psychological harm). The father's reading of Rhona is incorrect. First, expert testimony and detailed findings are required only where the child's bond with the preadoptive parents is a determinative factor. See Adoption of Daniel, 58 Mass.App.Ct. 195, 203, 788 N.E.2d 998 (2003). As detailed above, the judge in this case relied on multiple factors independent of bonding in reaching his decision, in particular the danger that the father posed should the child reside with the paternal grandparents. Second, Rhona was a termination case where the liberty interests of the child's biological parents were implicated. See ibid. There is no such interest held by the adoptive candidates in the present case. As we have noted, the ultimate issue before the trial court on the question of adoptive placement is the best interests of the child. There was no abuse of discretion.
Decree affirmed.