Opinion
No. 13–P–318.
2013-10-2
ADOPTION OF HAMAL (and a companion case ).
By the Court (KANTROWITZ, SIKORA & HINES, JJ.).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
The mother appeals from the decision of the Juvenile Court to terminate her parental rights to her two children. She claims that (1) termination was not in the best interests of the son as she agreed with the placement of the son with his father and termination of her rights in this situation served no purpose; and (2) the judge failed to conduct an even-handed assessment of the alternative placement plan for the daughter.
Sara's father's rights were also terminated; he is not involved in this appeal.
“Parental unfitness means more than ineptitude, handicap, character flaw, conviction of a crime, unusual life style, or inability to do as good a job as the child's foster parent. Rather, the idea of parental unfitness means grievous shortcomings or handicaps that put the child's welfare much at hazard. A judge's subsidiary findings must be supported by a preponderance of evidence, and those findings will not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous. Taken together the judge's findings must prove clearly and convincingly that a parent is currently unfit to further the welfare and best interests of a child. Appellate courts give deference to a trial judge's determinations of credibility and of the weight given to the evidence.” Care & Protection of Amalie, 69 Mass.App.Ct. 813, 817–818 (2007) (citations and quotations omitted). This case presents yet another sad situation of a parent unable to adequately and consistently care for her children. To her credit, the mother recognizes her shortcomings and agreed with the judge's findings on the issue.
The record indicates that the mother's deficiencies were clearly evident shortly after the birth of the son in March, 2000, and continued beyond the birth of the daughter in 2005. The litany of problems, as thoroughly outlined in the judge's comprehensive findings of fact, is long, including, among other things, physical and mental health issues (including psychiatric hospitalizations), domestic violence (in which the mother describes herself as addicted to domestic violence), and an inability to benefit from the numerous programs and service plans set up by the Department of Children and Families (department). The children were often kept in unsanitary conditions and left unattended and unsupervised and the mother was indifferent to meeting with their counselors and medical professionals. Of concern also was the mother's criminal history, which included shoplifting in the presence of the son. In the end, she simply was unable and incapable of adequately caring for the children.
The mother was also unable to adequately address the son's mental health issues and special needs.
The mother claims that termination did not serve the son's best interests as she supported placing the son in the permanent custody of his father. We disagree. First, we note that a judge may terminate the rights of one parent without terminating the rights of the other parent. Adoption of Willow, 433 Mass. 636, 645–647 (2001). Second, the mother may change her mind at a future date. Last, and most important, a child needs stability and permanence. The judge found that the mother's unfitness “is likely to continue into the indefinite future to a near certitude.” To allow the mother to come back into court every six months, which would be her right if her rights were not terminated, G.L. c. 119, § 26( c ), would serve no purpose other than to conflict with the son's need for stability and permanence. “Stability in the lives of children is important, particularly in a case that has continued for a long period of time in the hope that the [mother] could and would successfully rehabilitate [herself].” Adoption of Nancy, 443 Mass. 512, 517 (2005).
As for not placing the daughter with the maternal grandmother, the judge at length explained her reasons for not doing so. She reviewed the plans being offered and determined that the one proffered by the department was superior to that of the mother. Our reading of the record indicates that she did not err in either her findings or conclusions. See Adoption of Hugo, 428 Mass. 219, 234–235 (1998), cert. denied sub nom. Hugo P. v. George P., 526 U.S. 1034 (1999).
For these reasons, as well as for substantially the reasons stated in the briefs of the department and the children, we affirm the decrees.
So ordered.