Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County No. DP01615, Carolyn Kirkwood and Salvador Sarmiento, Judges.
Leslie A. Barry, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Vanessa B.
Nicole Williams for Defendant and Appellant Mark B.
Benjamin P. de Mayo and Nicholas S. Chrisos, County Counsel, Karen L. Christensen and Jeannie Su, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
SILLS, P. J.
Vanessa B. appeals from the termination of her parental rights to her daughter, A.B. She raises a notice violation of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) as the sole error. We affirm.
FACTS
A.B. was detained in October 2007 when her mother broke into the home of the maternal grandmother and maternal step grandfather and assaulted the maternal step grandfather. The mother had a history of drug use and erratic behavior; the father was incarcerated for petty theft. In the detention report, the social worker stated she “was unable to interview the child’s parents in order to ascertain information related to this child’s possible American Indian heritage.”
The detention hearing was held four days later. Both parents had been released from custody, and counsel was appointed for each of them. The father appeared and denied “any American Indian heritage”; the mother did not appear. At the jurisdiction and disposition hearing on December 17, 2007, the parents pleaded nolo contendere to an amended petition, and the child was declared a dependent of the juvenile court, removed from parental custody, and placed with the maternal grandparents. The court asked, “And, mother, are you aware of any American Indian heritage in your family?” The mother replied, “Cherokee.” The following exchange ensued:
“The court: All right. And on which side? Your mother’s side or your father’s side?
“The mother: I guess on my father’s.
“The court: Is your father still alive?
“The mother: Yeah.
“The court: All right. Do you think he might have some more information about possible Indian heritage?
“The mother: I don’t know. He’s the only one with Indian heritage.
“The court: Well, just what I asked, is there any possibility that there is Indian heritage that a relative of the child’s was enrolled in a tribe or eligible to be enrolled in a tribe?
“The mother: No, your Honor. I’m sorry. I thought you meant like something different. Like if there was like....
“The court: All right. Well, this is important. I’m going to ask you to think about it. All right? And if you have any information that there could be Indian heritage on your side of the family, please let the social worker know; will you do that?
“The mother: Yes.
“The court: Mr. B[.], are you aware of any American Indian heritage in your family?
“The father: No, Ma’am.
“The court: All right. So mother, I just want to return to you for a moment because you did say Cherokee, and you thought maybe on your father’s side. What I’m asking you is are you aware of any American Indian blood or heritage in the child’s family?
“The mother: No, your Honor.
“The court: All right. Court finds, based on the information available to the court today, that the Indian Child Welfare Act does not apply.”
The parents received reunification services. They did not comply with their case plans and failed to visit the child consistently. At the six-month review hearing, the juvenile court terminated reunification services to both parents and set a permanent plan selection hearing. At that hearing, the court terminated parental rights. Both parents appealed; the father joined in the mother’s brief.
DISCUSSION
The mother contends her original assertion of Indian ancestry was sufficient to trigger the notice requirements under ICWA and, therefore, the termination of parental rights must be reversed. We disagree.
“ICWA was enacted ‘to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and families by establishing minimum standards for removal of Indian children from their families and placement of such children “in foster or adoptive homes which will reflect the unique values of Indian culture....”’ [Citations.]” (In re Jeremiah G. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1514, 1520.) An Indian child is defined by ICWA as “any unmarried person who is under age eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe....” (25 U.S.C.A. § 1903(4).)
If the juvenile court “knows or has reason to know that an Indian child is involved,” the social worker must “make further inquiry regarding the possible Indian status of the child” and must send notice of the pending dependency proceedings to the identified tribe or to the Bureau of Indian Affairs. (25 U.S.C.A. § 1912(a); Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.2, subd. (a), § 224.3, subds. (c) & (d).) The juvenile court may have reason to know that the dependency proceedings involve an Indian child if, inter alia, “[a] person having an interest in the child, including the child, an officer of the court, a tribe, an Indian organization, a public or private agency, or a member of the child’s extended family provides information suggesting the child is a member of a tribe or eligible for membership in a tribe or one or more of the child’s biological parents, grandparents, or great-grandparents are or were a member of a tribe.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.3, subd. (b)(1).)
Here, when questioned, the mother first said her father had Indian heritage, then changed her mind. On appeal, she claims “the context of the inquiry shows that [she] answered this way because she believed she somehow had to prove membership [in a tribe] to answer any other way.” The record does not compel that conclusion as a matter of law. After inquiring about a relative being enrolled in a tribe, the court charged her to “think about it,” and, after questioning the father, the court asked her again if she was “aware of any American Indian blood or heritage in the child’s family.” She said no. The juvenile court observed the demeanor and credibility of the mother and her interaction, if any, with her trial counsel. It decided she was not confused and accepted her final answer. This assessment was within the exclusive province of the juvenile court. (See Hitz v. First Interstate Bank (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 274, 290.)
Furthermore, the court encouraged the mother to tell the social worker if she had any information that the child could have Indian heritage. She did not. Neither does she make any representation on appeal to that effect. Thus, the mother has failed to demonstrate a miscarriage of justice requiring reversal. (In re Rebecca R. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1431.) “The ICWA is not a ‘get out of jail free’ card dealt to parents of non-Indian children, allowing them to avoid a termination order by withholding secret knowledge, keeping an extra ace up their sleeves.” (Ibid. See also In re N.E. (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 766, 769-771.) Where, as here, there is nothing more than a hint of Indian heritage, the interest of the child in a prompt resolution of her dependency status controls.
DISPOSITION
The termination of parental rights is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: FYBEL, J., IKOLA, J.