Opinion
J-S92030-16 No. 1202 WDA 2016
01-23-2017
IN RE: R.A.W. APPEAL OF: M.W., FATHER
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Order Entered July 18, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County
Civil Division at No(s): No. 2015 AD 60 BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., MOULTON, J., and STRASSBURGER, J. MEMORANDUM BY MOULTON, J.:
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
M.W. ("Father") appeals from the order entered July 18, 2016 in the Blair County Court of Common Pleas denying Father's petition to involuntarily terminate the parental rights of K.H. ("Mother") to their child R.A.W. ("Child"), born in July 2006. We affirm.
On December 4, 2015, Father filed the instant petition for involuntary termination of Mother's parental rights. Father and Mother are Child's biological parents. A hearing on Father's petition was held on April 13, 2016. At the hearing, the trial court heard testimony from Father, Father's wife J.W., and Mother. On July 18, 2016, the trial court denied Father's petition. On August 11, 2016, Father filed a timely notice of appeal.
The trial court thoroughly set forth its factual findings, which we adopt and incorporate herein. See Trial Court Op., 7/18/16, at 2-9, 17-24.
We note that on p. 3 of the trial court's opinion, the court twice uses the initials "M.H." After review of the record, we conclude that this was a typographical error, and that this refers to Child's Father, M.W. See Trial Court Op. at 3.
Father raises the following issue on appeal:
Whether or not the Termination Court erred by determining that the Appellee has not evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or failed to perform parental duties[.]Father's Br. at 3.
We consider Father's appeal mindful of our well-settled standard of review:
[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion standard when considering a trial court's determination of a petition for termination of parental rights. As in dependency cases, our standard of review requires an appellate court to accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the record. In re: R.J.T., 608 Pa. 9, 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (2010). If the factual findings are supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law or abused its discretion. Id.; [ In re R.I.S., 36 A.3d 567, 572 (Pa. 2011)]. As has been often stated, an abuse of discretion does not result merely because the reviewing court might have reached a different conclusion. Id.; see also Samuel-Bassett v. Kia Motors America , Inc., [613] Pa. [371], 34 A.3d 1, 51 (2011); Christianson v. Ely , 575 Pa. 647, 838 A.2d 630, 634 (2003). Instead, a decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. Id.
As we discussed in R.J.T., there are clear reasons for applying an abuse of discretion standard of review in these cases. We observed that, unlike trial courts, appellate courts are not equipped to make the fact-specific determinations on a cold record, where the trial judges are observing the parties during the relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous other hearings regarding the child and parents. R.J.T., 9 A.3d at 1190. Therefore, even where the facts could support an opposite result, as is often the case in dependency and termination cases, an appellate court must resist the urge to second guess the trial court and impose its own credibility determinations and judgment; instead we must defer to the trial judges so long as the factual findings are supported by the record and the court's legal conclusions are not the result of an error of law or an abuse of discretion. In re Adoption of Atencio , 539 Pa. 161, 650 A.2d 1064, 1066 (1994).In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-27 (Pa. 2012).
Termination of parental rights is governed by section 2511 of the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511, which requires a bifurcated analysis. We have stated:
Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parent's conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court determines that the parent's conduct warrants termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests of the child.In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007) (citations omitted). The petitioner has the burden "to prove by clear and convincing evidence that [the] asserted [statutory] grounds for seeking the termination of parental rights are valid." In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa.Super. 2009). "Clear and convincing evidence is defined as testimony that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitation, of the truth of the precise facts in issue." In re R.I.S., 36 A.3d 567, 572 (Pa. 2011).
Father focuses on Mother's history of drug use and incarceration in support of his claim that he established, by clear and convincing evidence, the statutory grounds for termination of her parental rights to Child under sections 2511(a)(1) and (2). In particular, Father contends that Mother's sporadic contact with Child during her incarceration reflected both "a settled purpose of relinquishing her parental claim to the child" and a "fail[ure] to perform her parental duties," and that her "repeated incapacity and incarceration has caused the child to be without essential parental care, and it does not seem to be able to be remedied by the parent." Father's Br. at 8; see 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2). The trial court carefully and thoroughly addressed these claims in its opinion, not only applying the relevant law but also making credibility determinations concerning Mother's efforts to remain in contact with Child while incarcerated as well as Mother's ability to remedy her prior incapacity. While Father argues for a different reading of the facts, we will not disturb the trial court's findings, as they are fully supported by the record. In sum, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Father "failed to establish by 'clear and convincing evidence' that the termination of [Mother's] parental rights is warranted." Trial Ct. Op. at 17. We agree with and adopt its reasoning. Id. at 17-24.
Sections 2511(a)(1) and (2) provide:
(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following grounds:23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2).
(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or failed to perform parental duties.
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.
We note that because the trial court determined that Father failed to prove that Mother's conduct satisfied the statutory grounds for termination in section 2511(a), it was not required to and, accordingly, did not address the considerations set forth in section 2511(b).
Order affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 1/23/2017
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