Opinion
No. COA10-1139
Filed 5 April 2011 This case not for publication
Appeal by respondent-parents from orders entered 7 July 2010 by Judge William F. Southern, III, in Stokes County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 21 March 2011.
J. Tyrone Browder for Stokes County Department of Social Services petitioner-appellee. Janet K. Ledbetter for respondent-father appellant. Jeffrey L. Miller for respondent-mother appellant. Pamela Newell for guardian ad litem.
Stokes County Nos. 08 JT 17-19, 09 JT 13.
T.D.B.L. ("respondent-mother") and E.T.L. ("respondent-father," collectively "respondents") appeal from orders terminating their parental rights to their minor children, P.C.L., H.D.E.L., D.T.L., and D.D.D.L. ("the juveniles"). For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the orders of the trial court.
I. Background
The Stokes County Department of Social Services ("DSS") became involved with respondents and their children on 19 October 2007, when it received a report alleging neglect and improper supervision of P.C.L. DSS received two further reports on 18 December 2007 and 1 January 2008, both of which alleged respondents' children were exposed to instances of domestic violence. On 14 March 2008, DSS filed petitions alleging P.C.L., H.D.E.L., and D.T.L. were neglected juveniles. DSS took custody of the three children that same day. At the time of the filing of the petitions, D.D.D.L. had not yet been born.
On 19 March 2008, respondents entered into a voluntary "Memorandum of Agreement and Order" with DSS, wherein they agreed that DSS would continue to have custody of the three children and that the three children would remain placed in foster care. Respondents also agreed to complete mental health and substance abuse evaluations and follow all recommendations arising out of the evaluations. Respondents further agreed to attend and complete parenting classes and a domestic violence program and follow all recommendations of the program. In addition, respondents were granted supervised visitation with the three children.
At a hearing on 3 July 2008, respondents stipulated that they committed an act of domestic violence in their home when the three children were present. The trial court entered an adjudication order from the hearing on 30 July 2008, in which it concluded P.C.L., H.D.E.L., and D.T.L were neglected juveniles because they lived in an injurious environment due to the domestic violence between respondents. The matter came before the trial court for a disposition hearing on 4 September 2008, and the trial court entered an order setting the permanent plan for the three children as reunification with respondents. The court kept custody of the three children with DSS and granted respondents supervised visitation with the children. The court further ordered respondents to comply with the family services case plan. By order entered 6 November 2008, the trial court changed respondents' visitation with the three children to include two hours per week of unsupervised visitation.
On 12 January 2009, the trial court entered a permanency planning order in which it continued reunification as the permanent plan for P.C.L., H.D.E.L., and D.T.L. The court authorized a trial placement of the children with respondents on condition that respondents schedule domestic violence treatment, immediately submit to a substance abuse assessment, and obtain clean drug test results. The trial court further authorized DSS to suspend the trial placement if respondents missed a domestic violence treatment class.
In March 2009, respondent-mother gave birth to D.D.D.L. DSS took non-secure custody of D.D.D.L. shortly after his birth and filed a juvenile petition alleging D.D.D.L. was a neglected and dependent juvenile due to respondents' failure to comply with their family services case plan. DSS stated that respondents did not have stable housing, had not completed a mental health assessment, and had not begun attending recommended domestic violence classes. DSS further alleged that respondent-father had completed a substance abuse assessment, but had been asked to complete a second one due to a Driving While Impaired ("DWI") charge and automobile accident on 17 December 2008. Respondent-father's second substance abuse assessment was scheduled for 24 February 2009, but he missed his appointment. On 1 April 2009, with leave of the trial court, DSS filed an amended juvenile petition which included allegations that D.D.D.L. tested positive for opiates and cocaine at his birth. By order entered 19 May 2009, the trial court found D.D.D.L. to be a neglected juvenile, but the court dismissed the allegation of dependency. In a separate disposition order, the trial court continued custody of D.D.D.L. with DSS, set the permanent plan as reunification with respondents, and ordered respondents to comply with their family services case plan.
Throughout the summer of 2009, DSS continued to work with respondents on their case plan. The permanent plan for the juveniles remained reunification with respondents, although in a permanency planning order entered 16 September 2009, the trial court added a concurrent plan of custody with a relative or other court-approved person for P.C.L., H.D.E.L., and D.T.L. On 22 September 2009, DSS filed a motion for review in the juveniles' cases. DSS alleged respondents had been involved in additional incidents of domestic violence and substance abuse and had missed all of their visits with the juveniles in August 2009 and their first scheduled visit on 1 September 2009. Respondents did visit with the juveniles on 8 September 2009, but at the conclusion of that visit, respondents were arrested. Respondent-father was subsequently released from custody on 22 September 2009, and respondent-mother was released on 8 October 2009.
After a hearing on 29 October 2009, the trial court entered a permanency planning and review order in which it continued the permanent plan for the juveniles as reunification with respondents with a concurrent plan of custody with a relative or other court-approved person. The court found respondent-mother had attended four of the past twelve weekly visits and respondent-father had attended five of the past twelve weekly visits. The court further found that respondents had not been keeping DSS informed of their addresses and that they had no safe home to which the juveniles could return. Additionally, while respondents had completed domestic violence assessments, which had recommended classes for both respondents, respondent-father had not attended any domestic violence classes and respondent-mother had only attended one class. Respondent-father had yet to obtain a psychological examination and had only attended one session of outpatient treatment for substance abuse. Neither respondent was found to have demonstrated an ability to care for the juveniles. By order entered 18 December 2009, the trial court released DSS from reunification efforts with respondents and changed the permanent plan for the juveniles to adoption, with a concurrent plan of custody with a relative or other court-approved person.
On 19 March 2010, DSS filed individual motions to terminate respondents' parental rights to each of the juveniles. In each of the motions, DSS alleged grounds existed to terminate respondents' parental rights because they: (1) neglected the juveniles pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1); (2) failed to make reasonable progress pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(2); and (3) failed to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of care for the juveniles pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(3). After a hearing on 26 May 2010, which neither parent attended, the trial court entered separate adjudication orders and disposition orders for each of the juveniles on 7 July 2010, terminating respondents' parental rights. The court concluded each of the alleged grounds existed to terminate respondents' parental rights and that it was in the best interest of each of the juveniles to terminate respondents' parental rights. Respondent-mother filed notice of appeal from the trial court's orders on 26 July 2010, and respondent-father filed notice of appeal from the orders on 6 August 2010.
II. Judicial notice
We first address respondent-mother's argument that the trial court erred in taking judicial notice of the case file as it existed at the conclusion of the hearing to terminate respondents' parental rights. Respondent-mother contends the trial court failed to comply with the requirements of Rule 201 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence when it took judicial notice of the underlying case files. Respondent-mother also argues the trial court erred when it failed to specify the matters or facts of which it took judicial notice. Additionally, respondent-mother argues the trial court erred in taking judicial notice of the entire contents of the case files because the files contained documents and orders which contained evidence that was inadmissible at the termination hearing. Respondent-mother's arguments are misplaced.
Pursuant to Rule 201 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence, a trial court may take judicial notice of facts which are "not subject to reasonable dispute[.]" N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 201(b) (2009). A fact is not subject to reasonable dispute when "it is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." Id. When a trial court takes judicial notice of adjudicative facts, the court must, upon timely request, offer a party "an opportunity to be heard as to the propriety of taking judicial notice and the tenor of the matter noticed." Id., Rule 201(3).
In termination of parental rights cases, this Court has expanded the scope of judicial notice, such that a trial court may take judicial notice of the court file in the case. In re J.W., 173 N.C. App. 450, 456, 619 S.E.2d 534, 540 (2005) (holding it was not error to admit into evidence at a termination of parental rights hearing, through the taking of judicial notice, "previous order[s] of adjudication, review orders, and permanency planning orders"); see also In re Byrd, 72 N.C. App. 277, 279, 324 S.E.2d 273, 276 (1985) (holding the court file was properly admitted into evidence at a hearing on termination of parental rights because "a court may take judicial notice of earlier proceedings in the same cause"). In fact, "this Court repeatedly has held that a trial court may take judicial notice of earlier proceedings in the same case." In re W.L.M., 181 N.C. App. 518, 523, 640 S.E.2d 439, 442 (2007). Further, a respondent is not inherently prejudiced by the admission of a case file which contains documents that do not meet the clear, cogent, and convincing standard at the adjudication phase of a hearing to terminate parental rights, because "the trial court in a bench trial `is presumed to have disregarded any incompetent evidence.'" In re J.B., 172 N.C. App. 1, 16, 616 S.E.2d 264, 273 (2005) (quoting In re Huff, 140 N.C. App. 288, 298, 536 S.E.2d 838, 845 (2000)).
Here, at the request of counsel for DSS and over the objection of respondents' counsel, the trial court took judicial notice of the juvenile case files "in existence" at the time of the hearing. The court gave respondents' counsel the opportunity to be heard regarding the court's taking of judicial notice. Respondent-mother's counsel objected to the court's taking judicial notice of the case files both at the hearing and in writing prior to the court's entry of its adjudication and disposition orders. We find nothing in the record before us to indicate the trial court failed to disregard incompetent evidence when making its ultimate findings of fact. Accordingly, we find no error in the trial court's taking judicial notice of the underlying case files in the instant case.
Respondent-mother also asks this Court to reconsider its holdings regarding the taking of judicial notice of case files in termination of parental rights cases, arguing they are based on a misapplication of governing case law. This we cannot do. "Where a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided the same issue, albeit in a different case, a subsequent panel of the same court is bound by that precedent, unless it has been overturned by a higher court". In the Matter of Appeal from Civil Penalty, 324 N.C. 373, 384, 379 S.E.2d 30, 37 (1989).
III. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
Next, both respondent-mother and respondent-father argue the trial court's findings of fact are not supported by competent evidence and do not in turn support the court's conclusions of law that grounds existed to terminate respondents' parental rights. We disagree and hold the trial court did not err in concluding grounds existed to terminate respondents' parental rights in that they neglected the juveniles pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1). Because we affirm the trial court's order on the basis of neglect, we only address the challenged findings of fact necessary to support this ground.
"Termination of parental rights is a two-step process. In the first phase of the termination hearing, the petitioner must show by clear, cogent and convincing evidence that a statutory ground to terminate exists." In re S.N., 194 N.C. App. 142, 145-46, 669 S.E.2d 55, 58 (2008) (citation omitted), aff'd, 363 N.C. 368, 677 S.E.2d 455 (2009).
If the petitioner succeeds in establishing the existence of any one of the statutory grounds listed in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111, the trial court moves to the second, or dispositional, stage, where it determines "whether it is in the best interests of the child to terminate the parental rights."
In re Shepard, 162 N.C. App. 215, 221, 591 S.E.2d 1, 5 (2004) (quoting In re Young, 346 N.C. 244, 247, 485 S.E.2d 612, 615 (1997)) (emphasis added). "On appeal, [o]ur standard of review for the termination of parental rights is whether the [trial] court's findings of fact are based upon clear, cogent and convincing evidence and whether the findings support the conclusions of law." In re Baker, 158 N.C. App. 491, 493, 581 S.E.2d 144, 146 (2003) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). "Findings of fact supported by competent evidence are binding on appeal, even though there may be evidence to the contrary." In re J.A.P., 189 N.C. App. 683, 688, 659 S.E.2d 14, 18 (2008). However, "[t]he trial court's conclusions of law `are fully reviewable de novo by the appellate court.'" In re S.N., 194 N.C. App. at 146, 669 S.E.2d at 59 (quoting Mann Contr'rs, Inc. v. Flair with Goldsmith Consultants-II, Inc., 135 N.C. App. 772, 775, 522 S.E.2d 118, 121 (1999)).
Grounds exist to terminate parental rights where the parent has neglected the juvenile such that the court finds the juvenile to be a neglected juvenile within the meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1) (2009). A "neglected juvenile" is defined as:
A juvenile who does not receive proper care, supervision, or discipline from the juvenile's parent, guardian, custodian, or caretaker; or who has been abandoned; or who is not provided necessary medical care; or who is not provided necessary remedial care; or who lives in an environment injurious to the juvenile's welfare; or who has been placed for care or adoption in violation of law.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(15) (2009). "To prove neglect in a termination case, there must be clear, cogent and convincing evidence of (1) neglect and (2) as a consequence of the neglect, `the juvenile has sustained "some physical, mental, or emotional impairment . . . or [there is] a substantial risk of such impairment. . . ."'" In re Ore, 160 N.C. App. 586, 589, 586 S.E.2d 486, 488 (2003) (quoting In re Reyes, 136 N.C. App. 812, 815, 526 S.E.2d 499, 501 (2000) (quoting In re Safriet, 112 N.C. App. 747, 752, 436 S.E.2d 898, 901-02 (1993))).
Further, "[i]n deciding whether a child is neglected for purposes of terminating parental rights, the dispositive question is the fitness of the parent to care for the child `at the time of the termination proceeding.'" In re L.O.K., 174 N.C. App. 426, 435, 621 S.E.2d 236, 242 (2005) (quoting In re Ballard, 311 N.C. 708, 715, 319 S.E.2d 227, 232 (1984)). However, "[w]here, as here, a child has not been in the custody of the parent for a significant period of time prior to the termination hearing, the trial court must employ a different kind of analysis to determine whether the evidence supports a finding of neglect." In re Shermer, 156 N.C. App. 281, 286, 576 S.E.2d 403, 407 (2003). "[A] prior adjudication of neglect may be admitted and considered by the trial court in ruling upon a later petition to terminate parental rights on the ground of neglect." Ballard, 311 N.C. at 713-14, 319 S.E.2d at 231. Where a trial court considers a prior adjudication of neglect, the court "must also consider any evidence of changed conditions in light of the evidence of prior neglect and the probability of a repetition of neglect." Id. at 715, 319 S.E.2d at 232; see also Shermer, 156 N.C. App. at 286, 576 S.E.2d at 407.
In assessing changed conditions, the trial court may consider whether the parents have "made any meaningful progress in eliminating the conditions that led to the removal of [the] children." In re Leftwich, 135 N.C. App. 67, 72, 518 S.E.2d 799, 803 (1999). A trial court may terminate parental rights based upon a prior adjudication of neglect if "the trial court finds by clear and convincing evidence a probability of repetition of neglect if the juvenile were returned to her parents." Reyes, 136 N.C. App. at 815, 526 S.E.2d at 501. "Termination may not, however, be based solely on past conditions that no longer exist." In re L.O.K., 174 N.C. App. at 435, 621 S.E.2d at 242 (citing In re Young, 346 N.C. 244, 248, 485 S.E.2d 612, 615 (1997)).
In the present case, the trial court concluded grounds existed to terminate respondents' parental rights because they had neglected all four juveniles. The court found there had been a prior adjudication of neglect for each of the juveniles, and there was a substantial likelihood of repetition of neglect if custody of the juveniles were returned to respondents. The trial court based its finding of likelihood of repetition of neglect upon respondents' "fail[ure] to complete their case plans and correct the conditions that constituted the neglect." After careful review of the record, we agree that grounds existed to terminate respondents' parental rights based on their neglect of the juveniles.
First, the trial court's findings of fact state that the prior adjudications of neglect for P.C.L., H.D.E.L., and D.T.L. were entered on 3 July 2008 based on respondents' stipulations that the three children lived in an injurious environment due to a domestic violence incident between respondents, and that the prior adjudication of neglect for D.D.D.L. was entered on 23 April 2009 based on respondent-mother's stipulation that she had not completed her case plan addressing substance abuse and domestic violence. The record reveals the primary concerns of DSS upon filing the petitions alleging neglect centered on respondents' domestic violence and substance abuse and that the primary components of the case plan addressed these issues.
Respondent-mother first challenges the wording of the trial court's finding of fact regarding the prior adjudications of neglect in each of the adjudication orders for P.C.L., H.D.E.L., and D.T.L. Respondent-mother contends that the wording used by the trial court suggests the three children were injured in an incident of domestic violence. In each of the adjudication orders for P.C.L., H.D.E.L., and D.T.L., the trial court found:
19. On March 14, 2008 the Stokes County Department of Social Services . . . filed a petition alleging that the minor juvenile was neglected in that [the child] lived [in] an environment injurious to the juvenile's welfare due to repeated incidents of substance abuse and domestic violence in the presence of the juvenile and the parents' other children. . . .
. . . .
21. On July 3, 2008, the juvenile was adjudicated to be a neglected juvenile in Stokes County District Court by stipulation of the mother and the father that the juvenile was in an injurious domestic violence incident between the mother and the father on January 1, 2008.
We agree that there is no evidence to support that any child was physically injured due to a domestic violence incident. Nonetheless, we find it is clear from the trial court's findings that the prior adjudications of neglect were based upon the fact that the three children were present in the home during an incident of domestic violence between respondents which resulted in injury to one or both respondents. Accordingly, this argument is overruled.
Next, the trial court found that pursuant to the adjudications of neglect for P.C.L., H.D.E.L., and D.T.L., respondents entered into case plans with DSS on 9 April 2008, in which they agreed to:
a. Maintain safe and stable housing for a minimum of three months.
b. Locate and arrange transportation for each of their children to and from appointments.
c. Attend and complete a mental health assessment and follow all recommendations.
d. Complete a substance abuse assessment and follow all recommendations.
e. Submit to random drug screens.
f. Remain drug-free for three consecutive months.
g. Schedule, attend and complete a domestic violence assessment and follow all recommendations.
h. Attend and complete parenting classes and demonstrate an understanding by providing appropriate care and supervision for their children at all times.
The trial court also found that the adjudication of neglect for D.D.D.L. was based on respondent-mother's stipulation that she had failed to complete the requirements of the 9 April 2008 case plan. Neither respondent challenges the court's findings regarding the terms of their case plans, and these findings are thus binding on appeal. In re M.M., ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 684 S.E.2d 463, 469 (2009) ("[U]nchallenged findings of fact are binding on this Court on appeal."), disc. review denied, 364 N.C. 241, 698 S.E.2d 401 (2010).
In addition, the trial court made the following relevant findings of fact:
The trial court entered four separate adjudication orders finding grounds existed to terminate respondents' parental rights. The orders contain many identical findings of fact, and the numbering cited relates to the orders entered with regard to P.C.L., H.D.E.L. and D.T.L.
23. On December 4, 2008, a review hearing was held at which both parents were present. Both parents tested positive on their drug screens on this date.
24. The parents' last known residence was [address] King, North Carolina; however, neither parent has lived there since around June, 2009. Neither parent has established safe and stable housing for a minimum of three months. The Department has been unable to verify any permanent residence for either parent since June, 2009.
. . . .
26. The mother completed a Psychological Parenting Assessment with Dr. Thomas Holm. The father has failed to complete any mental health assessment.
27. The father completed a substance abuse assessment and was referred to Insight Human Services for substance abuse treatment with an appointment scheduled for April 30, 2009. He was referred for intensive outpatient substance abuse treatment. The father attended only one of thirty[-]six recommended therapy sessions on May 11, 2009, and did not return and complete the treatment program.
28. The father tested positive for benzodiazepines on March 25, 2008; May 22, 2008;
December 4, 2008; December 11, 2008; April 1, 2009; April 17, 2009; May 19, 2009; July 7, 2009; and October 13, 2009. He tested positive for opiates on December 11, 2008 and April 1, 2009, and positive for marijuana on April 15, 2009. . . . The father refused to take a drug test on April 21, 2009. The father had a prescription for benzodiazepine and alprazolam.
29. The mother tested positive for benzodiazepines on December 4, 2008 and May 19, 2009. She tested positive for amphetamines on March 6, 2008; and for opiates on April 1, 2009. . . . The mother refused to take a drug test on July 7, 2009. On December 4, 2008, the mother stated she had been taking prescribed valium and pain medication for five years.
30. The mother and father completed a domestic violence assessment at the Stokes County Day Reporting Center in December 2008. Domestic Violence classes were recommended for both parents; however, neither parent started the classes. Another domestic violence assessment was completed by the mother at Family Services in May 2009, and classes were recommended. The mother attended only one class and did not return to complete the classes.
Both respondents challenge the trial court's findings of fact regarding their drug use, arguing they had prescriptions for benzodiazepines. Respondent-father further argues he had a prescription for methadone and hydrocodone. At the termination hearing, a social worker assigned to the four juvenile cases testified as to the results of all of respondents' drug screens, as reflected in the trial court's findings of fact. In addition, the social worker testified that both respondents did have a prescription for benzodiazepine and that respondent-father had a prescription for methadone and hydrocodone. However, there is no evidence in the record indicating whether or not respondents had these prescriptions during the time of the drug screens, and the burden is on respondents to produce valid prescriptions for the drugs they were taking. Moreover, there was no evidence respondent-mother had a prescription for amphetamine or opiates when she tested positive for these drugs on 6 March 2008 and 1 April 2009, respectively. Similarly, respondent-father's positive drug screen for marijuana on 15 April 2009 cannot be excused. Therefore, the record reveals competent evidence that respondents continued to use drugs throughout 2008 and 2009 and thereby failed to address their substance abuse issues. We hold the trial court's findings of fact regarding respondents' continuous positive drug screens therefore support its conclusion that respondents had not made reasonable progress toward the requirement of their case plans that they complete substance abuse assessments and follow all recommendations.
Additionally, respondent-father challenges the findings of fact regarding his failure to: (1) complete a mental health assessment; (2) attend all but one of the recommended substance abuse therapy sessions; and (3) complete any domestic violence classes. Respondent-father asserts that none of these factual findings are supported by clear and convincing evidence. However, all of these findings of fact are adequately supported by the testimony of the social worker at the termination hearing. Respondent-father also argues these findings do not contain the words "willful," or "willfulness," and therefore they cannot support an adjudication order for termination of parental rights. However, termination of parental rights on the ground of neglect pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1) does not require a finding of willfulness and thus the lack of such a finding is not error. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1) (stating as grounds to terminate parental rights a finding that "[t]he parent has abused or neglected the juvenile," not that the parent has willfully done so).
Respondent-father and respondent-mother also argue no competent evidence exists to support the trial court's finding of fact that they failed to establish safe and stable housing for a minimum of three months. Respondent-mother relies on the argument that at some point in the past, she had lived at the same address for at least three months. Nonetheless, it is clear from the record before this Court that respondents had not lived at the address which they claimed was their home since at least June 2009 and had not maintained a stable residence since June 2009. Moreover, even after the social worker assigned to this case confirmed with the owner of the home that respondents were not living in the home, respondents continued to give that address as their home address. At the time of the hearing, respondents' actual place of residence was unknown, and the social worker testified that, despite receiving updates from both respondents regarding a mailing address, she had been unable to verify any physical address for either respondent since June 2009. Accordingly, we hold the trial court's finding of fact that respondents failed to establish safe and stable housing for a minimum of three months is supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence.
We note also that respondent-mother does not challenge the trial court's findings that she did not attend any classes recommended based upon her December 2008 domestic violence assessment and that she only attended one class of twenty-eight recommended classes based upon her May 2009 domestic violence assessment. Because these findings of fact are unchallenged on appeal, they are also binding on this Court on appeal. In re M.M., ___ N.C. App. at ___, 684 S.E.2d at 469.
Based on the above findings of fact, we hold the trial court properly concluded there was a significant probability of a repetition of neglect if the juveniles were returned to respondents. At the time of the termination proceeding, there existed competent evidence that respondents had failed to address their substance abuse issues and remain drug-free, could not demonstrate any safe or stable housing or residence, and had failed to address their domestic violence issues by attending the required classes. Further, respondents' failure to make meaningful progress to address or eliminate their issues of domestic violence and substance abuse, incidents of which led to the initial removal of the juveniles from the home, is sufficient to establish there is a substantial risk of future physical, mental, or emotional impairment should the juveniles be returned to respondents' custody, because such conditions have not been eliminated or improved. See Ore, 160 N.C. App. at 589, 586 S.E.2d at 488 (holding that "an express finding of fact regarding impairment is not required where the evidence supports such a finding"); see also Leftwich, 135 N.C. App. at 72, 518 S.E.2d at 803. "`Where the evidence shows that a parent has failed or is unable to adequately provide for [his or her] child's physical and economic needs . . . and it appears that the parent will not or is not able to correct those inadequate conditions within a reasonable time, the court may appropriately conclude the child is neglected.'" In re Allred, 122 N.C. App. 561, 568, 471 S.E.2d 84, 88 (1996) (quoting In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 109, 316 S.E.2d 246, 252 (1984)). Accordingly, we overrule respondents' arguments that the trial court's findings of fact do not support its conclusion of law that grounds existed to terminate their parental rights because they neglected the juveniles.
Because we hold these findings support the trial court's conclusion of law that grounds exist to terminate respondents' parental rights based on neglect, we need not address respondents' additional arguments on the trial court's findings of fact related to the other grounds for termination. See In re T.M., 180 N.C. App. 539, 547, 638 S.E.2d 236, 240 (2006) (stating that, where there are ample other findings of fact to support a particular conclusion, "erroneous findings unnecessary to the determination do not constitute reversible error"). Moreover, "where the trial court finds multiple grounds on which to base a termination of parental rights, and `an appellate court determines there is at least one ground to support a conclusion that parental rights should be terminated, it is unnecessary to address the remaining grounds.'" In re P.L.P., 173 N.C. App. 1, 8, 618 S.E.2d 241, 246 (2005) (quoting In re Clark, 159 N.C. App. 75, 78 n. 3, 582 S.E.2d 657, 659 n. 3 (2003)), aff'd, 360 N.C. 360, 625 S.E.2d 779 (2006). We, therefore, do not address respondents' arguments regarding the trial court's conclusions that grounds to terminate their parental rights also existed under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(2) and (3). Since respondents have not challenged the dispositional ruling that termination of their parental rights was in the best interests of the juveniles, we affirm the trial court's orders terminating respondents' parental rights to the juveniles P.C.L., H.D.E.L., D.T.L., and D.D.D.L.
IV. Conclusion
We hold that there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court's findings that respondents had failed to complete their case plans and address the issues of substance abuse, safe and stable housing, and domestic violence. Because of their failure to address these issues, there was a substantial likelihood of repetition of neglect if custody of the juveniles were returned to respondents. We further hold that the trial court's findings were sufficient to support its conclusion that respondents' failure to correct the substance abuse and domestic violence issues addressed by their case plans coupled with a prior adjudication of neglect for each of the juveniles justified termination of their parental rights under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1). The trial court's termination of respondents' parental rights is thereby affirmed.
Affirmed.
Judges BEASLEY and THIGPEN concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).