Opinion
No. COA10-1380
Filed 19 April 2011 This case not for publication
Appeal by respondent-mother from order entered 18 May 2010 by Judge William Leavell in Madison County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 21 March 2011.
Jennifer W. Moore, for respondent-appellee father. Charlotte Gail Blake, for respondent-appellant mother. Pamela Newell, for guardian ad litem.
Madison County Nos. 08 JA 29, 30.
Respondent-mother appeals from a permanency planning review order in which guardianship of her two children, K.R. and M.R., was granted to the paternal grandparents. Because several of the trial court's findings of fact are not supported by competent evidence, we conclude the trial court abused its discretion by awarding guardianship to the paternal grandparents. Accordingly, we reverse the permanency planning review order and remand for a continuation of the permanent plan of reunification with respondent-mother.
On 25 August 2008, the Madison County Department of Social Services ("DSS") filed a petition alleging that on 15 August 2008, it had
received a Child Protective Services report alleging that the respondent mother gave the prescription drug Abilify to [M.R.]. Upon investigation the respondent mother admitted to a Social Worker with the Moore County Department of Social Services that she had Abilify in her place of residence. The respondent mother was the primary custodian at the time when the drug was found in the juvenile's system. The Department has received information from the juvenile's primary medical provider that the juvenile has not been prescribed the prescription Abilify. The juvenile was seen on or about 8-1-08 by Dr. Janice Coverdale. Dr. Coverdale confirmed that the juvenile had been given the prescription antipsychotic drug, Abilify. The amount of the drug in the juvenile's system was that of a therapeutic range for an adult. This prescription is a serious detriment to the juvenile's health, safety, and well[-]being. The prescription can cause drowsiness, agitation, dangerous sedation, headache, anxiety, dizziness, nausea, and fatigue.
Based on the above allegation, DSS alleged that M.R. was an abused, neglected and dependent juvenile. On the same date, DSS also filed a petition alleging that M.R.'s sibling, K.R., was a neglected and dependent juvenile based on the same facts alleged in the M.R. petition. DSS obtained non-secure custody of the juveniles. On 27 February 2009, nunc pro tune 27 October 2008, the juveniles were adjudicated neglected, and custody was granted to DSS.
On 23 February 2009, nunc pro tune 15 December 2008, the trial court entered its disposition order. The stated plan for the juveniles was reunification with respondent-mother. To achieve reunification, the court approved a case plan which required respondent-mother to: (1) receive a mental health assessment and follow the recommendations of the assessment; (2) complete an approved parenting class and practice skills learned; and (3) participate in counseling and undergo a psychological evaluation. Additionally, the juveniles were to be evaluated by a child psychologist. Custody of the juveniles remained with DSS. Initially, DSS placed the juveniles with their father, who then resided with the paternal grandparents. The father later left the home, but the children remained in the home with the paternal grandparents, and the legal placement was changed from the father to the paternal grandparents.
On 5 October 2009 and 10 March 2010, the trial court held permanency planning review hearings, and the court entered its order from those hearings on 18 May 2010. The trial court determined that the respondent-mother could not provide a safe permanent home for the juveniles, nor would she be able to do so within six months. The court further found that the paternal grandparents had done an "excellent job" of "caring for the minor children." The court stated that the children were thriving in their placement with the paternal grandparents, and that the paternal grandparents' home was a "safe, dependable and loving home placement." The court concluded "[t]hat it is not possible, safe or in their best interests" for the children to be returned to respondent-mother within six months. Thus, the court determined it was in the juveniles' best interests to be placed in the guardianship of their paternal grandparents. Respondent-mother appeals.
On appeal, respondent-mother argues, and the guardian ad litem agrees, that several of the trial court's findings of fact in the permanency planning review order were based on incompetent evidence or were contrary to the evidence presented at the hearing. Based on these incompetent findings, respondent-mother claims that the trial court abused its discretion when it awarded guardianship to the paternal grandparents. We agree.
"Appellate review of a permanency planning order is limited to whether there is competent evidence in the record to support the findings and whether the findings support the conclusions of law." In re J.V., 198 N.C. App. 108, 112, 679 S.E.2d 843, 845 (2009) (quotation marks and citation omitted). "Where the trial court's findings are supported by competent evidence, they are binding on appeal, even if there is evidence which would support a finding to the contrary." In re J.S., 165 N.C. App. 509, 511, 598 S.E.2d 658, 660 (2004). A trial court's conclusion that the best interests of the child would be served by establishing guardianship as the permanent plan for the child and naming a guardian for the child is reviewed only for an abuse of discretion, and will be overturned only upon a showing that the decision was so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision. See In re D.S.A., 181 N.C. App. 715, 720, 641 S.E.2d 18, 22 (2007) (stating that "[w]e review a trial court's determination as to the best interest of the child for an abuse of discretion") (citation omitted).
Respondent-mother challenges findings of fact numbers 7, 9, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, and 25 in the permanency planning order as not supported by competent evidence. We will address the findings of fact in turn.
Respondent-mother first challenges the trial court's findings of fact regarding its prior orders. Specifically, respondent-mother argues the trial court incorrectly found that (1) respondent-mother gave her child Abilify to quiet her, and (2) the juveniles were placed in the paternal grandparents' home at the time of the initial non-secure order.
In finding of fact number 9, the trial court summarized the adjudication order and found in part that "[respondent-mother] either was negligent in allowing the minor child access to [A]bilify, a dangerous prescription drug, or gave the adult drug to the minor child in an attempt to quiet her." Respondent-mother asserts that the trial court made no findings or conclusions in its original adjudicatory order that she gave her child Abilify to try to quiet her. We agree. Nowhere in the adjudicatory order did the trial court find that respondent-mother intentionally gave M.R. Abilify. Additionally, at the permanency planning hearing, Dr. Jennifer Zeisz, a clinical psychologist who was treating the juveniles, agreed that respondent-mother "certainly didn't admit" to giving Abilify to the child. Therefore, that part of finding of fact number 9 is not supported by competent evidence.
Respondent-mother also challenges findings of fact numbers 7, 23, and 25, contending the trial court incorrectly found that the juveniles were placed in the paternal grandparents' home at the time of the initial non-secure order. In finding of fact number 7, the trial court found that "[t]he minor children were placed in the home of their paternal grandparents at the time of the entry of the non-secure custody order." In finding of fact number 23, the trial court found that "the children have been placed with [the paternal grandparents] since August of 2008[.]" Similarly, in finding of fact number 25, the trial court found that the juveniles and the grandparents "have been a familial unit since August of 2008."
The evidence shows that the juveniles were initially placed with the father, not the paternal grandparents. The father, however, lived with his parents at the time of placement. The father later moved out of his parent's home, leaving the juveniles in the care of the paternal grandparents. Subsequently, the juveniles' legal placement was changed to match their actual placement. Accordingly, the evidence shows that the juveniles were living in the home of the paternal grandparents since August 2008. Thus, the trial court's findings of fact numbers 7, 23, and 25 are supported by competent evidence.
Next, in finding of fact number 13, the trial court found:
That the testimony for the Department of Social Services was provided by Social Worker Donna Penland. During the course of this case Social Worker Penland became an advocate for the [respondent-mother], and this error [a]ffected her interactions with other persons within the case, her judgment and her testimony in Court while under oath. The Court finds that neither she nor her testimony during the hearing of this matter was credible.
Respondent-mother argues this finding was erroneous. We agree in part and disagree in part.
It is the trial court's duty in a non-jury proceeding to "weigh and consider all competent evidence, and pass upon the credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given their testimony and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom." In re Whisnant, 71 N.C. App. 439, 441, 322 S.E.2d 434, 435 (1984). All of the findings of fact regarding in-court demeanor, attitude, and credibility of a witness are left to the trial judge's discretion, since he or she has the opportunity to observe the witness. In re Oghenekevebe, 123 N.C. App. 434, 440-41, 473 S.E.2d 393, 398-99 (1996).
In this case, the trial court found that Ms. Penland's advocacy for respondent-mother affected both "her interactions with other persons within the case" and "her judgment and her testimony in Court while under oath." We conclude that the trial court's finding regarding Ms. Penland's "interactions with other persons within the case" is not supported by competent evidence. There is no evidence in the record that Ms. Penland's interactions with other persons involved in this case were compromised in any way. Furthermore, there is no evidence in the record that Ms. Penland engaged in any impropriety, acted outside the scope of her duties, or perpetuated any falsehoods in relation to this case. The trial court's findings regarding Ms. Penland's credibility at the hearings, however, are within the discretion of the trial judge because he had the opportunity to observe Ms. Penland in court. See id. at 441, 473 S.E.2d at 399 (holding that "any of the findings of fact regarding the demeanor of any of the witnesses are properly left to the determination of the trial judge, since she had the opportunity to observe the witnesses"); see also State v. Harvey, 78 N.C. App. 235, 239, 336 S.E.2d 857, 860 (1985) (citation omitted) ("The principle is well-settled that evaluating the credibility and demeanor of a witness is a matter peculiarly reserved to the trier of fact.").
In her next argument, respondent-mother challenges several of the trial court's findings of fact regarding her ability to parent her children. The trial court made the following findings regarding respondent-mother's ability to parent:
16. That the biological mother experiences anxiety, depression and panic attacks and meltdowns and cannot function without help from others. She has significant mental health issues and exhibits at least some degree of limited mental capacity. She has no personal transportation and lives half a days drive away from the paternal grandparent's home.
. . .
18. That the biological mother has continued to expose the minor children to unsafe conditions. Photographic evidence was presented to this Court and is accepted as true showing the biological mother drinking and partying in the presence of the minor children. She has exposed the minor children to a kerosene heater stowed and/or used in a hazardous manner and drinks and parties around other minor children, and makes gang symbols with these children. The biological mother shows much more interest in living a wild lifestyle than in parenting her minor children.
. . .
20. That the minor children have been left with the paternal grandparents for so long primarily due to the fact that the biological mother has not gotten involved with or showed interest in the minor children. Long periods of time have elapsed without her visiting or even calling the minor children, even when she was made aware that the minor children required medical attention. The biological mother has shown little interest in being a parent to these children.
21. . . . With her significant mental limitations, it is unlikely that the minor children could be placed with the biological mother within six months. She has shown by her actions that she is not capable of caring for the minor children beyond short periods of visitation and has exhibited continued bad judgment regarding the minor children.
22. That given her lack of interest in the minor children, her continued poor judgment regarding the minor children, her cognitive limitations, her continued involvement with [J.R.] despite being aware of his dangerous actions towards women and children, and her failure to properly attend to the minor children's medical needs during her visitations, there remains a high order of probability of future neglect by the respondent mother towards these minor children should they be exposed to her beyond short term visitation.
Respondent-mother first challenges the trial court's findings regarding her mental health. Respondent-mother contends the trial court incorrectly found in finding of fact number 16 that she "experiences anxiety, depression and panic attacks and meltdowns and cannot function without help from others."
"The written reports of social workers and psychiatrists, and other written material in the court's file are competent evidence in a dispositional or review hearing in juvenile cases." Matter of Shue, 63 N.C. App. 76, 79, 303 S.E.2d 636, 638 (1983), aff'd as modified, 311 N.C. 586, 319 S.E.2d 567 (1984). Here, the record shows that respondent-mother was tested by psychologist Bert A. Lucas, Ph.D., on 10 December 2008. In his report, Dr. Lucas stated that respondent-mother "reports symptoms of anxiety, has difficulty sleeping and feels depressed without her children. She reports panic symptoms that occur spontaneously at any time day or night." Additionally, the guardian ad litem's report to the court dated 15 September 2009 stated that respondent-mother "still has `melt downs' which she is still under therapy for[,]" and "has emotional breakdowns where she must rely on someone else to tell her what to do[.]"
Although the record contains evidence that shows that respondent-mother's anxiety, depression, and meltdowns have improved, "[t]his Court is bound by the trial court's findings of fact where there is some evidence to support those findings, even though the evidence might sustain findings to the contrary." In re S.J.M., 184 N.C. App. 42, 47, 645 S.E.2d 798, 801 (2007) (quotation marks and citation omitted), aff'd, 362 N.C. 230, 657 S.E.2d 354 (2008). Accordingly, we conclude the record contains sufficient evidence to support finding of fact number 16 regarding respondent-mother's anxiety, depression, panic attacks, and meltdowns.
At the permanency planning review hearing, Dr. Zeisz testified that respondent-mother had addressed her issues with depression, and that while she suffered from "some anxiety[,] [i]t's extremely prevalent in the general population. So that's nothing in and of itself." Additionally, the guardian ad litem's report to the court dated 4 February 2010 stated that she had seen respondent-mother "grow from an unsure, anxious person to a capable, decisive mother" who "deserves and has earned the right" to be reunified with the juveniles.
Respondent-mother also contends the trial court incorrectly found that she "has significant mental health issues and exhibits at least some degree of limited mental capacity," in finding of fact number 16; that "[w]ith her significant mental limitations, it is unlikely that the minor children could be placed with the biological mother within six months[,]" in finding of fact number 21; and that she has "cognitive limitations" in finding of fact number 22. We find no evidence in the record to support these findings.
In contrast to the trial court's findings, the record contains no evidence that respondent-mother's intellectual or cognitive capacity was limited. In fact, Dr. Lucas' report states that respondent-mother did not present with any digressions, irrelevancies, or a disturbance of logic; her stream of thought was logical and orderly; her memory was intact; her attention was easily gained, held and directed; and her judgment appeared adequate and her insight fair. Furthermore, Dr. Zeisz testified as follows at the permanency planning hearing:
Q. Doctor, from a psychological perspective, based on your interaction with the mother and based on your interaction with the children, is there any reason or any statements that you would make that would indicate that the minor children could not be returned to the care, custody, and control of the mother in the next six months?
A. If we consider simply the mother, her parenting ability, the way she's worked with me, and her interactions with the child, I would think that the children would be fine with their mother.
Thus, we find no competent evidence to support the trial court's findings that respondent-mother has "significant mental health issues," "cognitive limitations," "limited mental capacity," or "significant mental limitations" that make it "unlikely that the minor children could be placed with the biological mother within six months."
Respondent-mother next challenges finding of fact number 18, which was based on photographs of respondent-mother. At a permanency planning review hearing, "[t]he court may consider any evidence, including hearsay evidence as defined in G.S. 8C-1, Rule 801, that the court finds to be relevant, reliable, and necessary to determine the needs of the juvenile and the most appropriate disposition." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-907(b) (2009) (emphasis added).
Here, the photographs were never entered into evidence, and they are not a part of the record on appeal. Furthermore, no testimony was presented concerning when, where, or under what circumstances the photographs were taken. Without determining, at a minimum, when the photographs were taken, it was not possible for the court to determine that the photographs were relevant or reliable evidence that respondent-mother "has continued to expose the minor children to unsafe conditions." Accordingly, the photographs did not constitute competent evidence to support finding of fact number 18.
Respondent-mother next challenges findings of fact numbers 20 and 22, which state that she "has not gotten involved with or showed interest in the minor children[,]" and exhibited a "lack of interest regarding the minor children[.]" Here, there is some evidence in the record that, at one point, respondent-mother was not taking full advantage of her opportunities to visit with the juveniles. In its report to the court on 1 December 2009, the guardian ad litem stated that it was "unsure why [respondent-mother] has not taken advantage of the time allotted her for unlimited supervised visits with the girls and [they] feel sad that they sometimes seem to be an afterthought of the parents." We note that respondent-mother's contact with the juveniles increased after this report, and in the 3 January 2010 report to the court, the guardian ad litem stated that respondent-mother "sees the girls monthly and speaks to them via the phone several times." By March 2010, the guardian ad litem reported that respondent-mother was "getting the girls sometimes twice a month for weekly visits." Despite evidence of respondent-mother's increased visitation, the guardian ad litem's 1 December 2009 report to the court constitutes competent evidence to support the trial court's finding that respondent-mother lacked contact with and interest in the juveniles. See In re S.J.M., 184 N.C. App. at 47, 645 S.E.2d at 801 (stating that "[t]his Court is bound by the trial court's findings of fact where there is some evidence to support those findings, even though the evidence might sustain findings to the contrary").
In findings of fact numbers 14, 17, and 21 the trial court made findings concerning respondent-mother's relationship with her fiancée, J.R., and a Moore County court order filed 6 January 2009 concerning J.R. The Moore County order, which was attached and incorporated by reference in the permanency planning review order, found that J.R. had a "history of violence." Among the Moore County District Court's findings were that J.R. had once held a knife to his former wife's throat, had punched holes in the walls of his house, and had punched out the windshield of a van. The Moore County order further stated that "[m]any of these acts took place in the presence of [his] children, causing emotional harm to the children."
In finding of fact number 14, the trial court found:
That Dr. Zeis[z], therapist for the minor children, was heard on the viability of placing the minor children with [respondent-mother]. Although Dr. Zeis[z] reported some positive prospects in that regard, she testified that her opinion was contingent upon the findings of fact found in the Moore County Order regarding [J.R.] being false and incorrect and asserted that it would not be appropriate or safe to return the minor children to [respondent-mother] if said findings of fact were true.
In finding of fact number 21, the trial court also found that "[i]t is not safe to return the minor children to the custody of the biological mother within the next six months, particularly given her continued romantic involvement with [J.R.], a man found to violently abuse women and children."
Even though respondent-mother did not specifically raise this issue, we note that there is no evidence in the record that J.R. was found to violently abuse children. The Moore County order found that J.R. had engaged in violent acts "in the presence of [his] children," but did not state that he ever violently abused children. Moreover, there is no evidence in the record that J.R. was charged with or convicted of any crime of violence against children. In fact, DSS's report to the court dated 8 March 2010 states that regarding J.R. and his biological children "[t]here have been no charges resulting in conviction, no substantiated reports for neglect or abuse of his children, nor any entry in the North Carolina Responsible Individual List regarding [J.R.]."
Respondent-mother argues that Dr. Zeisz did not condition her opinion that the children could be reunited with respondent-mother on the falsity of the Moore County order. She also contends the trial court's findings contradict Dr. Zeisz testimony that the children could be safely returned to respondent-mother. We agree and find insufficient evidence in the record to support these findings of fact.
At the permanency planning hearing, Dr. Zeisz testified that she did not necessarily believe the allegations concerning J.R. being violent to be true. Dr. Zeisz based her opinion on testimony she heard at the hearing, as well as her personal observation of J.R. Nevertheless, when asked to assume that the findings in the order were true, Dr. Zeisz agreed that "no one in that position would be appropriate to be around the children" and that "[t]he children should not be exposed to violence." Dr. Zeisz did not testify, however, that it "would not be appropriate or safe to return the minor children to [respondent-mother] if said findings of fact were true." Neither did Dr. Zeisz, nor anyone else, state that "[i]t is not safe to return the minor children to the custody of the biological mother within the next six months, particularly given her continued romantic involvement with [J.R.]." Rather, Dr. Zeisz testified as follows:
Q. Do you have any concerns right now about [respondent-mother's] ability to independently parent these two girls?
A. Directly related to [respondent-mother]? No.
Q. Do you feel that she is presently, not just in the next six months, but presently able to independently parent her children?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. Would you see — do you see any reason why it would be detrimental for these two girls to be returned to her care full-time relatively immediately?
A. My only reservation does not relate to [respondent-mother] directly.
Q. Okay, tell us what that is.
. . . .
A. In terms of, obviously, the relationship that was brought up yesterday with [J.R.], things like that. So, again, if we — if it's just [respondent-mother] and her children, I do not have concerns.
Q. So if it is [respondent-mother] and her children as well as [J.R.], what's your opinion?
A. I would say, "[J.R.], move out of the home. Work a case plan. Upon the successful completion of that to everyone's [satisfaction] — then you will have contact, whatever, with the children."
In its 8 March 2010 report to the court, DSS stated that respondent-mother "does not feel [J.R.] is a threat to herself or her children[,]" but "is willing to have [J.R.] move out of her home, if necessary, to regain custody of her children."
When asked if she had any concerns about J.R. having supervised contact with the children at the present time, Dr. Zeisz stated:
A. From what I have seen and how I've seen him interact with the children, I would think that supervised visits would be acceptable. I would find that acceptable.
Q. And do you have a specific opinion as to who might be adequate to supervise those visits?
. . . .
A. In this case, honestly, I would prefer maybe like Moore County DSS do it so that it is officially supervised by a person who is a qualified supervisor and who would document and be objective.
Q. But if that were the case, you would be content for him to have supervised contact with the children?
A. Yes, I would.
Moreover, DSS's report to the court dated 8 March 2010 states that there were no substantiated reports of neglect or abuse of by J.R. toward his biological children and that Moore County DSS workers expressed no concerns as to J.R. having contact with his children. We conclude that finding of fact number 14, and the portion of finding of fact number 21 that states it is not safe to return the minor children to respondent-mother within the next six months, given her continued romantic involvement with J.R., are not supported by competent evidence.
In finding of fact number 17, the trial court found:
That during the course of this case the [respondent-mother] has been romantically linked to and has been living with [J.R.], and has exposed the minor children to him. An Order of the Moore County, North Carolina District Court, dated 22 December, 2009, regarding [J.R.] is attached hereto and incorporated into this Order as if set forth in full herein. The [respondent-mother] was aware of this Order and the findings of fact contained therein, but continued to expose the minor children to [J.R.] and did not disclose the existence of this order to the Department of Social Services or the Guardian Ad Litem. When confronted about this Order and counseled regarding the facts contained in this Order by the social worker, the [respondent-mother] not only continued her association with [J.R.] but engaged in a marriage ceremony with him.
Respondent-mother asserts that there is no evidence she was aware of the Moore County order prior to being informed of it by DSS; that she allowed the children around J.R. once she became aware of the order; or that she engaged in a marriage ceremony with J.R. We agree in part and disagree in part.
There is no evidence in the record that respondent-mother knew of the order before being informed of it by DSS. There is also no evidence in the record that respondent-mother exposed the juveniles to J.R. once she was informed of the Moore County order. At the hearing, when asked how she knew the children had not had contact with J.R., Dr. Zeisz explained, "I asked the kids directly, and they both, on each of the occasions coming back from their mother, have told me they haven't [seen him]." Moreover, DSS's report to the court dated 8 March 2010 notes that Moore County DSS had made unannounced visits to respondent-mother's home during her unsupervised visitation with the children, and J.R. "was not found at the residence at any time."
The primary evidence presented at the hearings that respondent-mother "engaged in a marriage ceremony" with J.R. was photographs of respondent-mother in a white formal dress dancing and cutting a wedding cake with J.R. The photographs were never entered into evidence and are not a part of the record on appeal. The only description of the photographs is from Ms. Penland's testimony, which the trial court found to be not credible. The trial court may, however, consider "any evidence . . . that the court finds to be relevant, reliable, and necessary[.]" N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-907(b); see also In re Ivey, 156 N.C. App. 398, 402-03, 576 S.E.2d 386, 390 (2003) (stating that "[i]n juvenile proceedings, trial courts may properly consider all written reports and materials submitted in connection with said proceedings[,]" and holding that the trial court did not err in considering the DSS and guardian ad litem reports which were not admitted into evidence but complied with the local rules for submitting reports) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Thus, we find that the photographs are sufficient evidence that respondent-mother "engaged in a marriage ceremony" with J.R. In sum, the trial court's finding of fact number 17, so far as it stated that respondent-mother was previously aware of the Moore County order and that she continued to expose the children to J.R. is unsupported by the evidence. That part of the trial court's finding of fact, however, in which the trial court found respondent-mother had a romantic relationship with J.R. and "engaged in a marriage ceremony" with him was supported by competent evidence.
We note that the trial court did not find, and there is no evidence in the record, that respondent-mother and J.R. were legally married. Dr. Zeisz explained the photographs as follows:
A. Oh, [the photographs] reminded me of my own wedding which took place with a minister who is not yet ordained, because my wedding and legal marriage took over the span of two months and 1,000 miles difference.
. . . A. My wedding fooled a lot of people including myself.
Q. But doesn't that show a significant degree of commitment that these people would go through with a — at least a faux wedding ceremony?
A. My understanding was that they held a celebration; that that was not indeed a wedding; that [respondent-mother] chose not to be legally married.
Additionally, the guardian ad litem stated in her 8 March 2010 report to the court that she "told [respondent-mother] that if she went through with the marriage to [J.R.] . . . with the documents we saw and the findings of the court, that she would most likely not gain custody of her children. [Respondent-mother] chose then not to marry [J.R.], that her girls were more important."
In conclusion, several of the trial court's findings of fact were either unsupported by the evidence or contrary to the evidence. We hold that there was not enough competent evidence upon which the trial court could award guardianship of the juveniles to the paternal grandparents without abusing its discretion. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's order and remand for a continuation of the permanent plan of reunification with respondent-mother.
Reversed and remanded.
Judges BEASLEY and McCULLOUGH concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).