Opinion
No. COA10-41
Filed 1 June 2010 This case not for publication
Appeal by respondent from order entered 1 October 2009 by Judge Christopher B. McLendon in Martin County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 10 May 2010.
J. Edward Yeager, Jr. for petitioner-appellee Martin County Department of Social Services. Betsy J. Wolfenden for respondent-appellant mother.
Martin County Nos. 08 JA 43-44.
Respondent-mother ("respondent") appeals the 1 October 2009 order that allowed the Martin County Department of Social Services ("DSS") to cease reunification efforts and gave legal custody of her two children to a paternal relative. For the reasons stated below, we affirm.
Respondent is the biological mother of the minor children, K.Q.R. and S.R. ("the juveniles"). Shortly after the birth of K.Q.R., respondent tested positive for marijuana, and K.Q.R. tested positive for opiates and marijuana. In response to the positive drug tests, DSS filed juvenile petitions on 4 June 2008, alleging that S.R. was a neglected juvenile and K.Q.R. was a dependant juvenile. The trial court granted DSS non-secure custody of the juveniles.
After an adjudicatory hearing, the trial court entered an order on 22 October 2008, concluding that both of the juveniles were dependant juveniles. The trial court continued custody of the juveniles with DSS and released the guardian ad litem and the attorney advocate from further responsibility as to either of the juveniles. The trial court granted respondent supervised visitation with the juveniles and further ordered that respondent cooperate with DSS; obtain a psychological evaluation and substance abuse evaluation; seek mental health care; follow any treatment recommendations; participate in parenting skill classes; provide financial support for the juveniles; and cooperate with Intensive Family Preservation Services.
Over the next year the trial court entered several review orders, each concluding that the best interests of the juveniles were served by remaining in DSS custody. By order entered 4 August 2009, the trial court found that respondent had stable housing but noted that she had been provided housing support services, which helped respondent maintain her housing stability, and that those services were no longer being funded. The trial court again continued custody of the juveniles with DSS, finding that DSS desired to monitor respondent's stability during the next month when she was no longer receiving housing support services.
After a review and permanency planning hearing, the trial court entered an order on 1 October 2009 ceasing reunification efforts and giving legal guardianship of the juveniles to the paternal aunt of S.R. The trial court found that respondent had shown "a lack of stability in her own life which would indicate an inability to provide a stable environment for her children." The trial court further found that respondent: (1) had not provided any support for the juveniles, although ordered to do so; (2) had not provided any documentation as to her current mental health status or involvement in ongoing mental health therapy; and (3) "had continuous problems managing her finances" such that she required financial assistance from the Martin County Community Action Intensive Home Preservation Program and the Salvation Army in order to pay her rent. Respondent filed notice of appeal from this order on 5 October 2009.
Respondent now argues that the trial court erred and abused its discretion in ceasing reunification efforts, because competent evidence did not support its findings of fact and the findings of fact are insufficient to comply with the mandate of North Carolina General Statutes, section 7B-907(b). We disagree.
When we review a permanency planning order, "[c]onclusions of law are upheld when they are supported by findings of fact." In re C.E.L., 171 N.C. App. 468, 479, 615 S.E.2d 427, 432 (2005) (citation omitted). "A trial court's findings of fact in a permanency planning order are conclusive on appeal when they are supported by competent evidence." Id. at 474, 615 S.E.2d at 430 (citation omitted). At a permanency planning hearing, competent evidence includes "any evidence, including hearsay . . ., that the court finds to be relevant, reliable, and necessary to determine the needs of the juvenile and the most appropriate disposition." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-907(b) (2009). Moreover, while a written DSS summary cannot be the sole evidentiary basis for the trial court's findings, In re D.L., A.L., 166 N.C. App. 574, 582-83, 603 S.E.2d 376, 382 (2004), "[t]he written reports of social workers and psychiatrists, and other written material in the court's file are competent evidence in a dispositional or review hearing in juvenile cases." In re Shue, 63 N.C. App. 76, 79, 303 S.E.2d 636, 638 (1983), aff'd as modified by, 311 N.C. 586, 319 S.E.2d 567 (1984).
Respondent argues that the trial court's findings of fact involving her financial stability and receipt of assistance to pay her rent are not supported by competent evidence. Respondent contends that the current findings of fact are contradicted by previous court reports by the social worker and by respondent's own testimony at the hearing, wherein she testified that she received a disability check for $674.00 each month, that her monthly rent was $192.00, and that she had received rent assistance from the Martin County Community Action Intensive Home Preservation Program only once. Respondent's arguments are misplaced.
Here, the trial court's findings of fact involving respondent's financial stability and receipt of assistance to pay her rent are supported by competent evidence from testimony presented at the permanency planning hearing and from the most recent court report by DSS. At trial, Ms. Mandy Dupree, a social worker employed by DSS, testified as follows:
Q. Okay; and, [respondent] was receiving help from some agency to keep [her housing] going; was she not?
A. Martin County Community Action.
Q. And — and that program has since ended; is that right?
A. Yes.
. . . .
Q. Why [has DSS sought to cease reunification efforts with respondent]?
A. Well, recently our report from the Martin County Community Action is that they had to help her with her rent for the last several months when they were involved. Last month — she had to be taken to — to the Salvation Army to be helped with her rent. At this point she's not taking control of her financial — you know, got her finances in — in place, you know and everything. She's been threatened, you know like, Martin County said with maybe being evicted from her apartment if they didn't help her with her rent and everything. And we're not exactly sure what — what is the difficulties; why she's not been able to, you know, to pay her rent.
. . . .
Q. And didn't — I — I take it [respondent's inability to manage her finances and show that she can keep a house] has been an ongoing situation ever since you have known her?
A. Well, from — from when Martin County Community Action's been involved with her as well as Social Services, you know. At first we didn't realize, you know, that this was going on until we got the report from them saying that they had been paying her — her rent `cause we assumed that she was paying it, but we found out that she wasn't.
Additionally, according to DSS's court report filed 1 September 2009 and considered by the court in making its ruling,
[Respondent] continues to have problems managing her finances. Her rent has been late every month and MCCA intensive home preservation program have [sic] paid her rent on several occasions to keep her from being evicted. Last month she had to seek help from the Salvation Army in Washington for help with her rent. The agency has concerns about [respondent's] ability to provide a stable environment for her children when she's having such a hard time providing for herself.
Accordingly, we hold that the trial court's findings of fact as to respondent's financial stability and receipt of assistance to pay her rent are supported by competent evidence. We note that respondent did present some testimony at the permanency planning hearing tending to rebut DSS's evidence as to her financial stability. However, findings of fact supported by competent evidence "are binding on appeal, even if there is evidence which would support a finding to the contrary." In re J.S., 165 N.C. App. 509, 511, 598 S.E.2d 658, 660 (2004) (citation omitted).
Within her sole argument, respondent's next contention is that the trial court erred by failing specifically to address whether the juveniles could return home in six months as required by North Carolina General Statutes, section 7B-907(b). We disagree.
The North Carolina Juvenile Code requires that when a trial court does not return a juvenile to the parental home at the conclusion of a permanency planning hearing, it must consider and make written findings of fact as to several criteria, including "[w]hether it is possible for the juvenile to be returned home immediately or within the next six months, and if not, why it is not in the juvenile's best interests to return home[.]" N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-907(b)(1) (2009). The trial court's findings of fact "must be sufficiently specific to enable an appellate court to review the decision and test the correctness of the judgment." In re J.S., 165 N.C. App. at 511, 598 S.E.2d at 660 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). However, a permanency planning order is not required "to contain a formal listing of the § 7B-907(b)(1)-(6) factors, as long as the trial court makes findings of fact on the relevant § 7B-907(b) factors[.]" In re L.B., 181 N.C. App. 174, 190, 639 S.E.2d 23, 31 (2007) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, the trial court's findings indicate that it considered: (1) the lack of stability of respondent's home life, including her problems managing her finances such that her rent was late "every month" and that she continually needed outside support to keep from being evicted; (2) the presumed impact of the stability of respondent's home life upon the juveniles should they be returned to her; (3) respondent's lack of any showing regarding her mental health status or involvement in mental health therapy; (4) respondent's failure to provide any support for the juveniles; and (5) DSS's difficulty in contacting respondent to discuss a case plan or even to set up a schedule for visitation with the juveniles. Although the trial court's findings do not specifically address whether the juveniles could return home in six months, the findings demonstrate that returning the juveniles to respondent was not possible and that awarding legal guardianship of the juveniles to the paternal aunt of S.R. was in their best interests. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err by failing to address the statutory requirements of section 7B-907(b) specifically. We affirm the order of the trial court.
Affirmed.
Chief Judge MARTIN and Judge STROUD concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).