Opinion
No. COA10-1057
Filed 1 March 2011 This case not for publication
Appeal by respondent-father from order entered 18 June 2010 by Judge Regan A. Miller in Mecklenburg County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 16 February 2011.
Kathleen Arundell Widelski for petitioner-appellee, Mecklenburg County Department of Social Services, Youth and Family Services. Pamela Newell for respondent, Guardian ad Litem. Janet K. Ledbetter for respondent-appellant, father.
Mecklenburg County No. 08 JT 481.
Respondent-Father Curtis C. appeals from the trial court's order terminating his parental rights in his son, I.C. (Ian). On appeal, Respondent-Father argues that certain of the trial court's factual findings lacked adequate evidentiary support and that the trial court's factual findings did not support its determination that Respondent-Father's parental rights in Ian were subject to termination pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1), N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(2), and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(3). After careful consideration of Respondent-Father's challenges to the trial court's order in light of the record and the applicable law, we conclude that the trial court's order should be affirmed.
"Ian" is a pseudonym utilized throughout the remainder of this opinion to protect the privacy of the juvenile and for ease of reading.
I. Factual Background
Respondent-Father and Respondent-Mother Brook C. are the parents of Ian, who was born in 2006. The Mecklenburg County Department of Social Services, Youth and Family Services became involved with Ian's family on 2 June 2008, when DSS received reports that Respondents were engaging in substance abuse and had provided Ian with inappropriate care. At that time, a social worker went to the family's home and requested that Respondents obtain substance abuse assessments at the McLeod Center. On 22 June 2008, YFS received another report alleging that Ian's parents had engaged in an episode involving domestic violence in Ian's presence. More specifically, Respondent-Father grabbed Respondent-Mother during the course of an argument, resulting in bruising to Respondent-Mother's arm. Respondent-Father was charged with assault on a female and taken into custody as a result of this incident.
Respondent-Mother is not a participant in Respondent-Father's appeal from the trial court's termination order.
On 2 July 2008, YFS filed a juvenile petition alleging that Ian was a neglected and dependent juvenile. In its petition, YFS alleged that Respondents had failed to obtain substance abuse assessments as of 1 July 2008; that Ian had been present during the 22 June 2008 episode of domestic violence; that Ian would beg for food at neighbors' homes; that Respondent-Father was currently incarcerated; and that Respondent-Mother and Ian were homeless. In addition, YFS alleged that Respondent-Mother had been diagnosed as bi-polar and that her other children had been removed from her custody. As part of its response to the 22 June 2008 incident, DSS took nonsecure custody of Ian.
The court held an adjudication and dispositional hearing on 8 September 2008. Respondent-Father did not attend the hearing because he was still incarcerated. Respondent-Mother did not attend the 8 September 2008 hearing either. At that time, Ian was adjudicated a neglected and dependent juvenile as to Respondent-Mother. The court found that the issues that needed to be addressed in order to achieve reunification related to domestic violence and substance abuse. The court prohibited visitation between Ian and Respondent-Mother until she made an appearance in court and prohibited visitation between Ian and Respondent-Father until the latter's release from jail.
After Respondent-Father was released from jail in September 2008, he entered into a case plan with YFS and began to engage in supervised visits with Ian. In his case plan, Respondent-Father agreed to (1) submit to a substance abuse assessment provided by Families in Recovery to Stay Together and comply with any treatment recommendations; (2) obtain a mental health assessment from Access and comply with any treatment recommendations; (3) complete and actively participate in parenting education classes; (4) obtain stable permanent employment; and (5) obtain suitable permanent housing. Respondent-Father completed F.I.R.S.T.'s substance abuse, mental health, and domestic violence screening process on 20 November 2008. At the conclusion of the screening process, the program coordinator recommended that Respondent-Father participate in random drug testing, referred Respondent-Father to New Options for Violent Actions for domestic violence counseling, and referred Respondent-Father to Carolinas Medical Center or Access for the purpose of obtaining a mental health assessment.
Respondent-Father obtained the recommended NOVA assessment on 12 February 2009. On 16 February 2009, the NOVA case coordinator wrote social worker Takima Nelson and informed her that NOVA did not believe that Respondent-Father was an appropriate candidate for NOVA's domestic violence program given that he denied having engaged in domestic violence. Instead, NOVA referred Respondent-Father to the Behaving Responsibly and Healthy Emotional Expression Program.
The court held an adjudication and permanency planning hearing on 9 March 2009. At that time, Ian was adjudicated a neglected juvenile as to Respondent-Father. In an order entered as a result of the 9 March 2009 hearing, the court found that Respondent-Father had attended "the majority of his visits" with Ian; that Respondent-Father had temporary employment; and that Respondent-Father "must be more diligent in addressing issues" relating to substance abuse, mental health, housing stability, and domestic violence. Although the court found that reunification with Respondents was still the primary goal, adoption was listed as a concurrent plan for Ian. The court ordered Respondents to "submit to drug screens after [the] hearing today." According to Ms. Nelson, Respondent-Father submitted to the required drug test. In addition, the court found that Respondent-Father had engaged in an act of domestic violence against Respondent-Mother on or about 22 June 2008 at a time when Ian was present, in that Respondent-Father had grabbed Respondent-Mother "with enough force to leave marks." As a result, the court ordered Respondent-Father to "reappear at NOVA and tell them what occurred on June 22, 2008, as it relates to [Respondent-Father] grabbing [Respondent-Mother] and leaving marks." The court further authorized Respondents to participate in supervised visitation with Ian in the event that they provided negative drug screens and complied with their case plans.
After holding a permanency planning hearing on 10 June 2009, the court found that Respondents "have made some progress but there are still concerns regarding the length of time it has taken them to get to this point." The court ordered Respondent-Father "to go back to CMC Randolph and secure an assessment" and approved a permanent plan listing reunification or adoption as concurrent goals.
Another permanency planning hearing was held on 9 September 2009. By means of an order entered on 23 October 2009, the court found that Respondent-Mother had been incarcerated for noncompliance with drug court requirements; that Respondent-Father did not have employment; and that Respondent-Father had not complied with the trial court's order to "reappear at NOVA." As a result, the court approved the cessation of reunification efforts and made the permanent plan for Ian one of adoption.
On 24 November 2009, YFS filed a Motion in the Cause to Terminate Parental Rights in which it sought entry of an order terminating Respondent-Father's parental rights in Ian based upon neglect pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1); willfully leaving Ian in foster care without making reasonable progress toward eliminating the conditions that led to his removal from the home pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(2); and failure to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of Ian's care pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(3). YFS sought the termination of Respondent-Mother's parental rights as well.
After conducting a permanency planning hearing on 4 January 2010, the court found that Respondent-Mother had not addressed her substance abuse, mental health, and housing issues. In addition, the court found that Respondent-Father lacked both stable housing and employment. Finally, the court found that the issues which had necessitated Ian's removal from the home had not been resolved and that termination of Respondents' parental rights would be in Ian's best interest.
The trial court held a hearing on the YFS termination motion on 22 April 2010. At the conclusion of the termination hearing, the trial court found that Respondent-Father's parental rights in Ian were subject to termination for neglect pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1), for willfully leaving Ian in foster care for more than twelve months without making reasonable progress toward correcting the conditions that led to his removal from the home pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(2), and failing to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of Ian's care pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(3). At the dispositional stage of the proceeding, the trial court concluded that it was in Ian's best interest that Respondent-Father's parental rights be terminated. The trial court terminated Respondent-Mother's parental rights in Ian as well. Respondent-Father noted an appeal to this Court from the trial court's termination order.
II. Legal Analysis A. Standard of Review
A termination of parental rights proceeding is conducted in two phases: (1) an adjudication phase that is governed by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1109 and (2) a disposition phase that is governed by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110. See In re Shepard, 162 N.C. App. 215, 221, 591 S.E.2d 1, 5, disc. review denied, In re D.S., 358 N.C. 543, 599 S.E.2d 42 (2004). During the adjudication phase, the petitioner has the burden of proving by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that one or more of the statutory grounds for termination set forth in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a) exist. Id. The standard of review utilized in reviewing the trial court's adjudication decision in a termination of parental rights case is whether the trial court's findings of fact are supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence and whether the findings of fact support the trial court's conclusions of law. See In re Oghenekevebe, 123 N.C. App. 434, 439-41, 473 S.E.2d 393, 397-99 (1996). If the petitioner meets its burden of proving the existence of at least one ground for termination, the trial court must proceed to the dispositional phase and determine whether termination is in the child's best interest. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110(a); In re Shermer, 156 N.C. App. 281, 285, 576 S.E.2d 403, 406 (2003). In the event that the trial court concludes that terminating a parent's parental rights would be in the child's best interest, it may end the existing parent-child relationship. Id. at 285, 576 S.E.2d at 406-07.
B. Lawfulness of Trial Court's Termination Decision
On appeal, Respondent-Father contends that the trial court erred by concluding that his parental rights in Ian were subject to termination pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(2). We disagree.
A parent's parental rights may be terminated when "[t]he parent has willfully left the juvenile in foster care or placement outside the home for more than 12 months without showing to the satisfaction of the court that reasonable progress under the circumstances has been made in correcting those conditions which led to the removal of the juvenile." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(2). The "willfulness" required for a determination that a parent's parental rights are subject to termination pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(2) does not necessarily require proof of fault on the part of the parent. Oghenekevebe, 123 Nc. Apt. at 439, 479 S.E.2d at 398. Instead, the necessary "willfulness" may be established "`when the respondent had the ability to show reasonable progress, but was unwilling to make the effort.'" In re O.C. O.B., 171 N.C. App. 457, 465, 615 S.E.2d 391, 396 (quoting In re McMillon, 143 N.C. App. 402, 410, 546 S.E.2d 169, 175, disc. review denied, 354 N.C. 218, 554 S.E.2d 341 (2001)), disc. review denied, 360 N.C. 64, 623 S.E.2d 587 (2005). Even if a parent makes some effort to address the problems that led to the child's removal from his or her custody, a trial court may still find that the parent's parental rights are subject to termination pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(2) in the event that the parent's progress is not "reasonable." See id. "Extremely limited progress is not reasonable progress." In re Nolen, 117 N.C. App. 693, 700, 453 S.E.2d 220, 225 (1995). For that reason, "a [parent's] prolonged inability to improve [his or her] situation, despite some efforts in that direction, will support a finding of willfulness regardless of [his or her] good intentions." In re B.S.D.S., 163 N.C. App. 540, 546, 594 S.E.2d 89, 93 (2004).
Ian was removed from Respondents' care based on drug use and domestic violence concerns. In order to support its determination that Respondent-Father willfully left Ian in foster care for more than twelve months without making reasonable progress toward correcting the conditions that led to his removal from the family home, the trial court found, in pertinent part, that:
16) The respondent-father was released from incarceration after the dispositional hearing. He began residing at a men's homeless shelter upon his release. Around October of 2008, he met with the permanency planning social worker to develop a Family Services Agreement. The agreement included the following components: Complete a F.I.R.S.T. assessment and comply with recommendations; Complete a mental health assessment and follow recommendations; Complete parenting education; Obtain permanent, stable employment; Obtain suitable, permanent housing. The Department provided bus passes to assist with transportation. The permanency planning worker explained to the respondent-father that since he and the respondent-mother are married and intend to remain together, both parties must be successful with the Family Services Agreement in order to achieve reunification.
17) The respondent-father completed a F.I.R.S.T. assessment on November 20, 2008. The program recommended that the Department request random drug screens and refer the respondent-father back to F.I.R.S.T. if the results are positive. The program also recommended a mental health assessment and domestic violence counseling.
18) The first review hearing in this case occurred on December 18, 2008. Neither the respondent-mother nor respondent-father was present for the hearing. The Court received into evidence and considered the YFS Summary, Reasonable Efforts Report, and Guardian ad Litem Report The respondent-father had obtained a F.I.R.S.T. assessment and attended some visits with the juvenile. He had not initiated recommended mental health services. The respondent-father maintained weekly contact with the permanency planning social worker. The Court ordered the parents to comply with their case plans and continued the goal of reunification.
. . . .
20) During the review period following the December 2008 hearing, the respondent-father maintained weekly contact with the permanency planning social worker and provided updates regarding his status. The respondent-father began working with CATS completing surveys. He worked about four hours per week and earned $10.00 per hour.
21) The permanency planning social worker requested that the respondent-father submit to a random drug test on January 13, 2009. He did not submit to the test. The permanency planning social worker requested a second random drug test for January 30, 2009. The respondent-father did not submit to that test.
22) On February 12, 2009, the respondent-father completed a N.O.V.A assessment (New Options for Violent Actions). Based upon the information that the respondent-father provided, he was referred-out of the N.O.V.A. assessment. The respondent-father denied ever using power and control over a victim. During the assessment, the respondent-father appeared not to display any characteristics of a batterer.
23) The N.O.V.A. program is an offender's educational program exploring ways to end violence between intimate partners. Due to the respondent-father's denial of inflicting domestic violence upon a victim, he was deemed an inappropriate candidate for the N.O.V.A. program's offender services. He was referred to B.R.H.E.E., (Behaving Responsibly Healthy Emotional Expression) — an educational program instead.
26) For the permanency planning hearing, the court received into evidence and considered: YFS Summary; Reasonable Efforts Report; Guardian ad litem report; F.I.R.S.T. report; N.O.V.A. letter. The Department recommended that the Court add a concurrent goal of adoption to the primary goal of reunification. The Department's grounds for recommending the concurrent goal included that the juvenile had been in custody for over eight months; the respondent-mother and respondent-father remained involved in a romantic relationship; the respondent-mother had not engaged in any case plan services; the respondent-father had engaged in some services but not all; and neither parent had a home in which the juvenile could be placed.
27) At the permanency planning hearing, the Court added the concurrent goal of adoption to the primary plan of reunification. Further, the Court ordered that both the respondent-mother and respondent-father submit to a random drug screen immediately following the hearing and that the respondent-father submit a plan of care for the juvenile to the Court at the next hearing.
28) Neither the respondent-mother nor the respondent-father submitted to the court-ordered requested random drug test.
. . . .
30) On June 10, 2009, a permanency planning review hearing occurred. The Court received into evidence and considered the YFS Summary; Reasonable Efforts Report; Guardian ad Litem Report; F.I.R.S.T. report; Women's Commission report; and Letter from Behavioral Health Center regarding parenting capacity evaluation. The respondent-mother and respondent-father had made some progress; however, concerns existed regarding the length of time it had taken them to reach the point of progress. The Court ordered that the respondent-father go to Carolinas Medical Center-Randolph to complete a mental health assessment. Further, the Court ordered that the respondent-father submit a plan of care for the juvenile to the Court at the next hearing.
. . . .
35) During the review period, the respondent-mother relapsed and was incarcerated for noncompliance with Drug Court. The respondent-father had not participated in domestic violence counseling or education. The issues identified in the initial juvenile petition had not been addressed. As a result, the Court ceased reasonable efforts toward reunification and ordered that the goal be adoption for the juvenile.
. . . .
52) The respondent-father currently resides with his cousin, Samuel. He has resided there about two weeks. The respondent-father has periodically resided with his cousin at various times during this case. Before returning to his cousin's home, from about December 2009 to April 2010, the respondent-father and the respondent-mother spent nights together at Rooms at the Inn which was run by various churches to provide evening shelter to the homeless. Prior to Rooms at the Inn, the respondent-father resided at a men's homeless shelter. He has not established or maintained housing since the juvenile entered the Department's custody.
53) The respondent-father decided about three months prior to this hearing that he would separate from the respondent-mother and that he would not allow her to make him lose custody of the juvenile.
54) The respondent-father smokes about seven cigarettes per day. He purchases about two packs per week. He pays about $3.00 per pack of cigarettes. He has smoked cigarettes at least since the juvenile has been in the Department's custody.
55) The respondent-father most recently worked for a staffing company in August 2009. He worked for about 30 hours per week and earned $7.00 per hour. In January of 2009, he worked with Metro Staffing. He worked about 20 hours per week and earned about $10.00 per hour. The respondent-father last held fulltime employment in 2006. At that time, he worked about 40 hours per week for 9 months. The respondent-father has not contributed any money toward the juvenile's cost of care.
56) After the Department filed the Motion in the Cause to Terminate Parental Rights, the respondent-father completed the B.R.H.E.E. program and paid about $120.00 in fees for [the] program. He was able to receive monetary assistance to satisfy those fees from Urban Ministry.
. . . .
58) The respondent-father is unable to meet the basic needs of the juvenile.
Based upon its factual findings, the trial court concluded that Respondent-Father's parental rights were subject to termination pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(2).
1. Sufficiency of the Evidence to Support the Trial Court's Findings of Fact
In his first challenge to the trial court's termination order, Respondent-Father contends that several of the trial court's findings of fact are not supported by clear, cogent and convincing evidence. We conclude that the challenged factual findings either have adequate record support or their removal from the trial court's order would not have invalidated its decision to find the existence of the ground for termination set out in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(2).
In challenging Findings of Fact Nos. 21, 27, and 28, which address the drug use component of his case plan, Respondent-Father argues that these findings are negated by evidence that he "took random drug screens which were all negative throughout the course of the case[.]" After carefully reviewing the record, we conclude that Finding of Fact 21 is supported by testimony given at the termination hearing and that Finding of Fact 27 is supported by one of the permanency planning orders. At the termination hearing, Ms. Nelson testified that, on 13 January 2009, she "asked [Respondent-Father] to do a drug screen at McLeod" and that, to her knowledge, he never complied with this request. In addition, Ms. Nelson testified that she "advised [Respondent-Father] to get a drug screen by noon on January 30th" and that he failed to do so. In the 9 March 2009 permanency planning order, the court ordered Respondents to submit to a drug screen after the conclusion of the hearing held on that date. However, we agree with Respondent-Father that Finding of Fact 28 lacks adequate evidentiary support given Ms. Nelson's testimony that Respondent-Father submitted to the required drug screen after the 9 March 2009 hearing. As a result, most, but not all of the challenged factual findings relating to the drug testing of Respondent-Father are supported by the record evidence.
In challenging the second sentence of Finding of Fact 35, which addresses the domestic violence component of his case plan and states, "[t]he respondent-father had not participated in domestic violence counseling or education," Respondent-Father asserts that the language in question is negated by Findings of Fact Nos. 22, 23 and 56, which indicate that Respondent-Father was referred to the BRHEE program and completed it after the filing of the termination motion. In advancing this argument, however, Respondent-Father takes the second sentence of Finding of Fact 35 out of context. The first sentence of Finding of Fact 35 indicates that this particular finding relates to "the review period," which, for purposes of this case, consisted of the time from 10 June 2009 through 9 September 2009. When the second sentence of Finding of Fact 35 is read in context with the entire finding, it is clear that the trial court found that Respondent-Father had not participated in domestic violence counseling or education "[d]uring the review period" and was not, contrary to Respondent-Father's suggestion, addressing events that occurred after the review period ended. In addition, Respondent-Father's own testimony shows that he did not complete domestic violence education through the BRHEE program until April 2010, which was a considerable time after the review period had ended.
Finally, Respondent-Father challenges Finding of Fact 26, which addresses the relationship between Respondent-Father and Respondent-Mother and indicates that YFS sought approval of a concurrent goal of adoption at the time of an earlier permanency planning hearing based on the fact that Respondents "remained involved in a romantic relationship." In disputing the adequacy of the record support for this factual finding, Respondent-Father asserts that he and Respondent-Mother were not involved in a romantic relationship at the time of the termination hearing. Although Respondent-Father testified at the termination hearing that he and Respondent-Mother were no longer a couple, the record contains ample evidence tending to show that Respondents "remained involved in a romantic relationship" as of the 9 March 2009 permanency planning hearing. At the termination hearing, Ms. Nelson was asked if, at the time of the March 2009 "Permanency Planning Hearing, [Ian] had been in custody for about eight months?," and she responded in the affirmative. In addition, Ms. Nelson was asked, "Is it also accurate that in that eight months, the mother and father continued as a couple and in a relationship?" Once again, Ms. Nelson responded, "Yes." Thus, Ms. Nelson's testimony clearly supports the trial court's finding that Respondents were still involved in a romantic relationship at the time of the 9 March 2009 permanency planning hearing. As a result, we conclude that, with one exception, the findings of fact that Respondent-Father has challenged on appeal have adequate support in the evidentiary record.
Respondent-Father also argues that the trial court's factual findings are deficient because they do not explicitly state that Respondent-Father's conduct was "willful" or that Respondent-Father acted "willfully." However, given that the trial court explicitly states that "Respondent-father willfully left the juvenile in the Department's custody for more than 12 months without showing to the satisfaction of the Court that reasonable progress has been made in correcting the conditions that led to the removal of the child," we believe that the termination order adequately finds and concludes that Respondent-Father's lack of progress was "willful." See In re T.M.H., 186 N.C. App. 451, 455, 652 S.E.2d 1, 3, disc. review denied, 362 N.C. 87, 657 S.E.2d 31 (2007) (reversing a termination order because "[t]he order before us contains no findings of willfulness").
2. Sufficiency of the Trial Court's Findings of Fact to Support Termination of Respondent-Father's Parental Rights
Next, Respondent-Father contends that the trial court erred by concluding that he "willfully" failed to make reasonable progress toward eliminating the conditions that led to Ian's removal from the family home. At various points in his brief, Respondent-Father points to his completion of the BRHEE program, the fact that he was no longer in a relationship with Respondent-Mother, and the fact that his drug screens were consistently negative. In essence, Respondent-Father contends that the trial court's findings of fact do not support its conclusion that his parental rights in Ian were subject to termination pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(2). We disagree.
The record clearly establishes that Ian was removed from Respondents' care as the result of domestic violence and drug use. According to his case plan, Respondent-Father was required to complete a F.I.R.S.T. assessment, obtain a mental health assessment, complete parenting classes, and comply with the recommendations resulting from those assessments and classes. Respondent-Father obtained his F.I.R.S.T. assessment in November 2008. The F.I.R.S.T. assessment recommended that Respondent-Father submit to random drug screens and receive domestic violence counseling through NOVA. NOVA, in turn, referred Respondent-Father to BRHEE on 12 February 2009. In support of its conclusion that Respondent-Father did not make reasonable progress toward achieving the goals set out in his case plan, the trial court found that Respondent-Father failed to submit to drug testing twice in January 2009. Despite being referred to BRHEE in February 2009, Respondent-Father did not complete the BRHEE program until 11 April 2010. some five months after the filing of the termination motion and some ten days before the termination hearing was held. As we understand the record, Respondent-Father never returned to NOVA for the purpose of reporting the nature of the 22 June 2008 domestic violence incident and did not, for that reason, adequately address the domestic violence issues that helped precipitate Ian's placement in foster care. In addition, Respondent-Father had not obtained stable housing or employment as of the time of the termination hearing, facts which may have led to his admission that he was unable to care for Ian at that time. Taken in their entirety, the trial court's findings clearly indicate that Respondent-Father had only made limited progress toward eliminating the conditions that led to Ian's removal from the family home and that the amount of progress that he had made, some of which appeared to be last-minute in nature, was not reasonable under the circumstances. As a result, even after removing the trial court's erroneous finding that Respondent-Father had failed to submit to a drug screen as required by the trial court at the 9 March 2009 permanency planning hearing from consideration, the trial court had ample basis for concluding that Respondent-Father had not made reasonable progress during the time that Ian was in foster care. Thus, the trial court's findings of fact adequately supported its conclusion that Respondent-Father's parental rights were subject to termination pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(2). In light of our determination that the trial court did not err by concluding that Respondent-Father's parental rights in Ian were subject to termination pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(2), we need not address his challenges to the remaining grounds for termination set out in the trial court's order. See Shermer, 156 N.C. App. at 285, 576 S.E.2d at 406.
III. Conclusion
As a result, we find that the factual findings that Respondent-Father has challenged on appeal, with one exception that does not necessitate reversal of the trial court's order, have adequate evidentiary support and that the trial court's properly-supported factual findings adequately support its determination that Respondent-Father's parental rights were subject to termination pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(2). Thus, the trial court's termination order should be, and hereby is, affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
Judges STROUD and ROBERT N. HUNTER, JR. concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).