In Matter of H.W.

Full title: IN THE MATTER OF H.W., Appellant

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas, Second District, Fort Worth

Date published: Oct 9, 2003

No. 02-02-381-CV (Tex. App. Oct. 9, 2003)

Opinion

No. 02-02-381-CV.

Delivered: October 9, 2003.

Appeal from the 323rd District Court of Tarrant County.

Attorney for Appellant: Law Office of Wes Dauphinot, P.C.; Wes Dauphinot, Fort Worth, Texas.

Attorneys for Appellee: Tim Curry, District Attorney; Charles M. Mallin, Chief, Appellate Section; Sharon A. Johnson, Asst. D.A.; and Rebecca McIntire, Asst. D.A. of Tarrant County, Ft. Worth, Texas.

PANEL A: CAYCE, C.J.; DAY and GARDNER, JJ.

MEMORANDUM OPINION^_

_ See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.

SAM J. DAY, Justice.

The trial court adjudicated seventeen-year-old appellant H.W. delinquent for aggravated sexual assault and placed him on probation. In his sole point, appellant claims that the State's petition is fundamentally defective because it fails to allege that appellant acted with the specific intent "to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person" when committing aggravated sexual assault.

The elements of the offense of aggravated sexual assault applicable here are: a person commits an offense if the person (1) intentionally or knowingly (2) causes the mouth of a child under age fourteen (3) to contact the sexual organ of another person, including the actor. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.021(a)(1)(B)(v), (a)(2)(B) (Vernon 2003). The specific intent appellant asserts is not a required element of the offense of aggravated sexual assault and need not be alleged. Buckner v. State, 719 S.W.2d 644, 647 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1986, pet. ref'd); Pierce v. State, 733 S.W.2d 314, 319 (Tex.App.-Tyler 1987, no pet.). We overrule appellant's sole point. Having overruled appellant's point on appeal, we affirm the trial court's judgment.