Opinion
No. COA10-1581
Filed 19 July 2011 This case not for publication
Appeal by respondent from orders entered 3 June 2010 and 20 September 2010 by Judge Jeanie R. Houston in Yadkin County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 27 June 2011.
James N. Freeman, Jr. for petitioner-appellee. Richard Croutharmel for respondent-appellee mother. Appellate Defender Staples Hughes, by Assistant Appellate Defender Annick Lenoir-Peek, for respondent-appellant custodian. Murray C. Greason, III for guardian ad litem.
Yadkin County Nos. 08 JT 16, 08 JT 17, 08 JT 18.
Respondent-custodian Gail W. ("Ms. W."), the maternal step-grandmother and legal custodian of A.H. ("Amy"), H.G. ("Hannah"), and C.H. ("Chelsea"), appeals the trial court's orders adjudicating the juveniles as neglected, ordering the cessation of reunification efforts with respect to her, and continuing custody of the children with Yadkin County Department of Social Services ("DSS"). After careful review, we affirm.
The pseudonyms "Amy," "Hannah," and "Chelsea" are used throughout this opinion to protect the juveniles' privacy and for ease of reading.
Facts
Respondent-mother Susanna H. ("Ms. H." or "mother") is the biological mother of Amy (born May 1998), Hannah (born July 2001), and Chelsea (born April 2004). Amy and Hannah have lived with Ms. W. in Yadkin County, North Carolina since they were infants. Chelsea has lived with her mother in South Carolina, but has had "extended stays" with Ms. W. All three girls were living with Ms. W. in March 2008, when they first came into DSS custody due to "deplorable conditions" in Ms. W.'s home. Ms. H. failed to make progress toward having her daughters reunited with her. Ms. W., however, cooperated with DSS by completing classes, removing animals from her house, hiring an exterminator, and keeping her house clean. The children were placed in Ms. W.'s home for trial placement in July 2008, but were removed in October 2008 when Ms. W.'s home was found to have reverted back to its poor condition.
The children were eventually returned to Ms. W.'s home, with DSS ordered to monitor. By order filed 28 September 2009, the trial court awarded Ms. W. Chapter 50 custody of the children. The trial court also ordered Ms. W. to "continue to employ a pest control service to keep insects [and] vermin away from her home" and to "not allow indoor pets that have the run of the house or might tend to make the house dirty." The trial court granted Ms. H. visitation with the minor children.
On 31 December 2009, DSS filed a juvenile petition alleging that the children were neglected juveniles. DSS specifically alleged that DSS had visited Ms. W.'s home on 29 December 2009 to investigate an allegation of abuse. Although DSS did not substantiate the abuse allegation, DSS did find Ms. W.'s home in an unsanitary condition. DSS observed rodent droppings in the children's rooms and kitchen cabinets, trash throughout the home and yard, and dog feces on the sun porch floor. DSS obtained non-secure custody of the children on 31 December 2009.
After conducting an adjudicatory hearing in January, February, and May 2010, the trial court entered an order on 3 June 2010 adjudicating the juveniles as being neglected. The trial court subsequently held a disposition hearing in June and August 2010. In its resulting disposition order, the court ordered DSS to cease reasonable efforts to return the children to Ms. W.'s home, ordered DSS to continue its reunification efforts with Ms. H., and ordered custody of the children to continue with DSS. Ms. W. timely appeals to this Court.
Reunification
Ms. W. first challenges the trial court's disposition order, arguing that the trial court erred in: (1) "finding that DSS has used reasonable efforts with regards to Ms. W[.]"; (2) "finding that reasonable efforts would be futile or inconsistent with the children's health and safety"; and (3) "ordering that reunification efforts continue with Ms. H[.]" We do not agree.
The trial court may "order the cessation of reunification efforts when it finds facts based upon credible evidence presented at the hearing that support its conclusion of law to cease reunification efforts." In re Weiler, 158 N.C. App. 473, 477, 581 S.E.2d 134, 137 (2003). Consequently, "[t]his Court reviews an order that ceases reunification efforts to determine whether the trial court made appropriate findings, whether the findings are based upon credible evidence, whether the findings of fact support the trial court's conclusions, and whether the trial court abused its discretion with respect to disposition." In re C.M., 183 N.C. App. 207, 213, 644 S.E.2d 588, 594 (2007). Pertinent here, the trial court may direct DSS to cease "reasonable efforts to eliminate the need for placement of the juvenile" when the court determines that "[s]uch efforts clearly would be futile or would be inconsistent with the juvenile's health, safety, and need for a safe, permanent home within a reasonable period of time[.]" N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-507(b)(1) (2009).
With respect to the cessation of reunification efforts with Ms. W., the trial court found:
9. [Ms. W.] has demonstrated a pattern of not being able to sustain a clean and safe home for the minor children. This is the fourth report involving deplorable conditions in her residence and the third time the children have been removed from her home. Since the children have again come into the custody of the Yadkin Co. DSS, Ms. W[.] has corrected the conditions of the home that led to the children's removal. This is the same pattern of behavior she has exhibited on each occasion of the children being removed. She does not unequivocally accept responsibility for the conditions of her home, often transferring the blame onto others or onto circumstances she believes are beyond her control.
10. There is no doubting the bond and love that exist between Ms. W[.] and [Amy] and [Hannah]. . . . There is much to doubt about Ms. W[.]'s ability to maintain a clean and safe environment for the children while in her home. . . .
11. The Yadkin County DSS has throughout the history of this case made all reasonable efforts to avoid placing the minor children in foster care but no alternative to foster placement has been appropriate to meet the needs of the minor children. The reasonable efforts made regarding the minor children since 2004 include: 1) implementing safety plans to permit cleaning up of [Ms. W.]'s home, 2) placing the children in foster care on three occasions, 3) trial placements of the children with [Ms. W.], 4) Medicaid for the children, 5) parenting classes for the mother, 6) in-home aide for Ms. W[.], 7) pest control services for Ms. W[.], 8) substance abuse counseling for the mother, 9) counseling for [Amy] to address behavioral problems after visits with her mother, 10) psychological evaluations for Ms. W[.] and the mother, 11) family therapy for Ms. W[.], 12) counseling for Ms. W[.], 13) food stamps for Ms. W[.], 14) financial assistance for Ms. W[.], and 15) a home study of the mother's residence as well as the maternal grandfather and a maternal uncle.
Based on these findings, the trial court concluded: "That the Yadkin Co. DSS should no longer be required to use reasonable efforts aimed at reunification with the grandmother, [Ms. W.], as continued efforts would be futile or inconsistent with the children's welfare and need for a permanent home within a reasonable time."
Finding of fact nine shows Ms. W.'s pattern of behavior of temporarily correcting the "deplorable" living conditions in her home, only to backslide and permit her home to once again become an "[un]clean and [un]safe home for the minor children." Finding of fact 11, moreover, outlines the abundant efforts that DSS has taken to eliminate the need for placement outside Ms. W.'s home. These findings are supported by DSS' 25 January 2010 court report, prior court orders, and testimony from a DSS investigator. These findings, grounded in competent evidence, support the trial court's conclusion that DSS had made reasonable reunification efforts. See In re A.R.H.B., 186 N.C. App. 211, 220, 651 S.E.2d 247, 254 (2007), appeal dismissed, 362 N.C. 235, 659 S.E.2d 433 (2008).
These findings further support the trial court's conclusion, contrary to Ms. W.'s contention, that continued efforts would be futile or inconsistent with the juveniles' safety and welfare. As the court observed, the children have been removed from Ms. W.'s home on three previous occasions based on reports of deplorable living conditions; that DSS worked with Ms. W. on each occasion to assist her in cleaning her home in addition to providing other services; and that, despite DSS' intervention, unhealthy and unsafe conditions have been reported a fourth time. These events, the trial court found, demonstrate a pattern of behavior by Ms. W. of not maintaining a safe and sanitary home for the children and not taking responsibility for the conditions of her home. Accordingly, we conclude that these findings support the court's conclusion that continued reunification efforts as to Ms. W. would be futile or inconsistent with the health and safety of the juveniles. See In re N.G., 186 N.C. App. 1, 11, 650 S.E.2d 45, 52 (2007), aff'd per curiam, 362 N.C. 229, 657 S.E.2d 355 (2008).
As for Ms. W.'s third argument, she contends that the trial court abused its discretion in continuing reunification efforts between the juveniles and their mother. At the disposition stage in abuse, dependency, and neglect proceedings, the "facts found by the trial court are binding absent a showing of an abuse of discretion." In re Dexter, 147 N.C. App. 110, 114, 553 S.E.2d 922, 924-25 (2001). A trial court may be reversed for abuse of discretion only upon a showing that the court's ruling is "manifestly unsupported by reason" or "so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision." White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 777, 324 S.E.2d 829, 833 (1985).
With respect to reunification efforts as to Ms. H., the trial court found:
2. The mother is [Ms. H.] She resides in Lancaster, South Carolina. She is not married and lives alone, working approximately 40 hours per week as a CNA providing in-home care. A home study of her residence was admitted into evidence that did not approve the mother's home for immediate placement of the minor children due to the lack of a suitable fire extinguisher and a working smoke alarm in the home as well as the need for the mother to successfully complete an approved parenting program and anger management program. There were also concerns about the mother's criminal history and recent involvement in criminal activities, often as an alleged victim. Later testimony confirmed that the mother completed the parenting program and had acquired the fire extinguisher and smoke alarm. The mother has a history of instability in employment and housing.
. . . .
10 There is no doubting the bond and love that exist between the mother and [Chelsea]. . . . There is much to doubt about [Ms. H.]'s ability to sustain her present effort at regaining the custody of her daughters although she has shown her best effort to date.
These unchallenged findings show Ms. H.'s recently improved stability with respect to employment, as well as her progress in providing a suitable home for her daughters and completing the parenting and anger management courses. While the trial court noted its "concerns" regarding Ms. H.'s history of criminal involvement and unstable employment and housing, the court also recognized that Ms. H. "ha[d] shown her best effort to date" to regain custody of her children. We cannot conclude, in light of these uncontested findings, that the trial court abused its discretion in continuing reunification efforts between Ms. H. and her daughters. Ms. W.'s arguments regarding reunification are overruled.
Custody
Ms. W.'s final argument on appeal is that the trial court abused its discretion by continuing custody of the children with DSS rather than placing the children with her. The purpose of conducting dispositional hearings is to "design an appropriate plan to meet the needs of the juvenile. . . ." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-900 (2009). The trial court is given "broad discretion to fashion a disposition from the prescribed alternatives in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-903(a), based upon the best interests of the child." In re B.W., 190 N.C. App. 328, 336, 665 S.E.2d 462, 467 (2008); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-903 (2009). Here, the trial court ordered that custody be continued with DSS, rather than returning the children to Ms. W., pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-903(a)(2)(c), which permits the court to place juveniles with DSS when the juveniles "need[] more adequate care or supervision or . . . need[] placement. . . ."
In support of her argument that the court abused its discretion, Ms. W. points to evidence of the bond between the children and herself and her claim that she has corrected the unsanitary conditions of her home. With respect the bond between Ms. W. and the juveniles, this Court has held that such a bond is important, but not determinative of placement. See In the Matter of Shue, 63 N.C. App. 76, 81, 303 S.E.2d 636, 639 (1983) ("The evidence of the strong emotional bonding between the father and child is critically important. It is not, however, determinative."), aff'd as modified, 311 N.C. 586, 319 S.E.2d 567 (1984). Rather, it is simply "one factor the trial court must consider in determining what is in the best interest of the child." Id. Indeed, although the trial court acknowledged the "bond and love" between Ms. W. and the children, it expressed serious concern regarding Ms. W.'s ability to consistently maintain a safe and sanitary home for the children, particularly in light of her refusal to take responsibility for the "deplorable" conditions found in her home. As the trial court observed, it was Ms. W.'s pattern of cleaning up her home when the children were removed and then letting the living conditions deteriorate again after the children were placed back in her home that led the court to order placement with DSS. Given the historical facts of this case, Ms. W.'s failure to accept responsibility for the poor conditions of her home, her failure to maintain a clean and safe home despite DSS' efforts, and the trial court's conclusion that reunification efforts should cease, we hold that the trial court's decision to continue custody of the children with DSS was not manifestly unsupported by reason. Accordingly, the trial court's adjudication and disposition orders are affirmed.
Affirmed.
Judges CALABRIA and ELMORE concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).