Opinion
No. COA09-208.
Filed August 18, 2009.
Lee County Nos. 05J08-10.
Appeal by respondent from order entered 20 October 2008 and corrected 22 May 2009 by Judge Addie Rawls in Lee County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 20 July 2009.
Elizabeth Myrick Boone for petitioner-appellee Lee County Department of Social Services. Sofie W. Hosford for respondent-appellant.
Respondent-mother appeals from an order entered in Lee County District Court terminating her parental rights to minor children C.N.P., born in 1998; A.M.P., born in 2000; and P.D.P., born in 2001 (the children). For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the order of the trial court.
The order also terminated the parental rights of the respondent-father; however, he is not a party to this appeal.
FACTS
The Lee County Department of Social Services (petitioner) became involved with respondent's family in 2004. Several referrals were made to petitioner regarding alleged drug use, inadequate supervision by the parents, and dangerous conditions in the home. Upon the filing of juvenile petitions in January 2005, the children were adjudicated neglected on 8 March 2005. Petitioner worked with respondent on a case plan which included obtaining appropriate housing and employment. In August 2006, the trial court approved placing the children with respondent on a trial basis. Respondent regained physical and legal custody in January 2007. The trial court ordered respondent to maintain a safe and drug-free home for the children.
In February 2007, petitioner received reports of inadequate supervision. Petitioner worked with the family from February to June 2007. In May 2007, respondent's vehicle was impounded, and respondent lost her job. On 18 June 2007, petitioner received a call that a domestic violence incident had occurred at the home between respondent and respondent's boyfriend in front of the children and that respondent and her boyfriend were using drugs and alcohol. The condition of the home was filthy, with days-old food in pans on the stove, trash and clothes all over the floor, and used feminine products on the bathroom floor and counter tops. Respondent was arrested for assault, and the children were taken to live with their maternal grandmother for the short term.
Petitioner filed petitions on 20 June 2007 alleging neglect in that the children lived in an environment injurious to their health. Petitioner took the children into custody and obtained a non-secure custody order. The case was continued on 26 June 2007, 3 July 2007, 24 July 2007, 7 August 2007, and 21 August 2007. An adjudication hearing was held on 4 September and 18 September 2007. The trial court adjudicated the children neglected and ceased reunification efforts. Respondent was allowed supervised visitation. At a permanency planning hearing held on 23 October 2007, the trial court ordered visitation between respondent and the children to cease.
Petitioner filed a motion to terminate respondent's parental rights on or about 25 January 2008, alleging as grounds: (1) neglect, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1)(2007); (2) dependency, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(6) (2007); (3) wilful abandonment for six months prior to the filing of the petition, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(7)(2007); and (4) wilfully leaving the children in foster care for more than twelve months without making reasonable progress to correct the conditions which led to the removal of the children from the home, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(2)(2007). On 31 December 2007, petitioner filed a motion to terminate respondent's parental rights. Respondent filed an answer on 25 February 2008 denying the material allegations of the motion to terminate parental rights and requesting that the motion be denied. On 19 February 2008, the guardian ad litem for the children filed a reply joining in petitioner's request for termination of parental rights. On 25 April 2008, respondent filed a motion to dismiss the motion to terminate parental rights on the basis that the hearing was not timely held in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1109 (2007). In an order entered 22 July 2008, the motion was denied.
The matter came on for a special setting on 2 September, 3 September, and 4 September 2008. Respondent, who was represented by counsel, did not attend the hearing due to lack of transportation from South Carolina where she was then living. At the start of the termination hearing, the trial court addressed petitioner's motion to quash a subpoena issued by respondent's counsel for the three minor children. Petitioner contended that the children would offer little, if any, information, and that testifying in front of their mother would negatively impact their emotional well-being and result in a serious regression of behaviors. After hearing arguments, the trial court allowed the motion to quash the subpoena.
Evidence was presented in the form of the DSS file and testimony from the DSS foster care social worker Kelly Cobb, psychologist Melanie Crumpler, DSS supervisor Lisa Shearer, DSS in-home service worker Diana Suave, and DSS employee Alicia Adams. At the close of the hearing, the trial court found clear, cogent and convincing evidence of abandonment, neglect, and failure to make reasonable progress as grounds for termination. The trial court also determined that termination of respondent's parental rights was in the best interests of the children. The trial court's order was entered on 20 October 2008. By leave of this Court, on 22 May 2009, the trial court amended the order to correct a clerical mistake regarding an omission of language from the decretal portion of the 20 October 2008 order and added that the parents' rights were terminated. Respondent appeals.
As a preliminary matter, we note that petitioner has filed a motion to dismiss respondent's appeal on the basis that respondent failed to timely file a signed notice of appeal pursuant to N.C. R. App. P. 3A(a) (2008). A notice of appeal signed only by respondent's attorney was filed on 19 November 2008 from the trial court's 20 October 2008 order terminating parental rights. A corrected notice of appeal signed by both respondent and her attorney was filed on 24 November 2008. On 20 April 2009, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss for failure to timely file a proper notice of appeal.
Petitioner, in its motion to dismiss, argues that the notice of appeal filed 19 November 2008 failed to comply with Rule 3A of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure which requires that both trial counsel and the appellant sign the notice of appeal. N.C. R. App. P. 3A(a) (2008). Petitioner argues that the notice of appeal filed 24 November 2008 was filed over thirty days after the order terminating respondent's parental rights, which is outside of the time frame prescribed by Rule 3. N.C. R. App. P. 3 (2008). For these reasons DSS argues that respondent's appeal should be dismissed.
Respondent concedes that the 19 November notice of appeal was not signed in compliance with Rule 3A and that the 24 November 2008 notice of appeal was filed outside of the thirty day time frame for filing a notice of appeal from a civil action as required by Rule 3. However, on 27 April 2009, respondent filed a petition for writ of certiorari to review the merits of the appeal pursuant to Rule 21 of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure which "permit[s] [this Court's] review of the judgments and orders of trial tribunals when the right to prosecute on appeal have been lost by failure to take time action. . . ." N.C. R. App. P. 21(a) (2008).
In In re A.S., ___ N.C. App. ___, 661 S.E.2d 313 (2008), a respondent filed a notice of appeal from an order adjudicating her child neglected. The notice had not been signed by the respondent, and the child's guardian ad litem filed a motion to dismiss for failure to comply with Rule 3A. Id. at ___, 661 S.E.2d at 316. Subsequently, the respondent filed a petition for writ of certiorari seeking review despite the defective notice of appeal. Id. We exercised our discretion and granted the respondent's petition for writ of certiorari. We reasoned that "[g]iven the serious consequences of the adjudication order, the lack of any evidence that [the] respondent contributed to the error, and the need to resolve the ambiguity in the order's disposition . . . we believe that review pursuant to a writ of certiorari is appropriate." Id.
Here, respondent appeals from an order for termination of parental rights. Given the seriousness of such an order and the lack of any evidence respondent contributed to the error, in accordance with In re A.S. we will allow respondent's appeal. We note that petitioner has not filed a response to respondent's petition for writ of certiorari and has fully briefed all the issues raised by respondent. Therefore, although we grant petitioner's motion to dismiss respondent's appeal for failure to timely file proper notice, we elect to exercise our discretion pursuant to Rule 2 of our Rules of Appellate Procedure, and grant respondent's petition for writ of certiorari to review her arguments on appeal. N.C. R. App. P. 2 (2008).
Respondent raises the following six issues on appeal: whether the trial court erred by concluding that grounds existed to terminate respondent's parental rights based on (I) neglect, (II) abandonment, (III) respondent's failure to make reasonable progress, and (IV) concluding that the termination of respondent's parental rights was in the best interest of the children, (V) making findings of fact contrary to evidence presented at trial, and (VI) failing to conduct the termination hearing within ninety days of the filing of the termination petition.
I, II, and III
Respondent contends the trial court erred in finding neglect, abandonment, and failure to make reasonable progress. She asserts that the evidence shows she remained involved in her children's lives and there were changed conditions by the time of the termination hearing that the trial court did not properly consider. She states that at the time of the hearing she had gotten her life together by finding employment, had left her abusive boyfriend, sent gifts, and otherwise remained involved in the children's lives. We disagree.
Proceedings to terminate parental rights are conducted in two parts: (1) the adjudication phase, governed by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1109 (2007), and (2) the disposition phase, governed by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110 (2007). In re Blackburn, 142 N.C. App. 607, 610, 543 S.E.2d 906, 908 (2001). Upon review of an order terminating parental rights, this Court must determine (1) whether the trial court's findings of fact are supported by clear, cogent and convincing evidence, and (2) whether the trial court's findings of fact support its conclusions of law that one or more statutory grounds for termination exist. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111 (a) (2007); see also In re Huff, 140 N.C. App. 288, 291, 536 S.E.2d 838, 840 (2000), appeal dismissed and disc. review denied, 353 N.C. 374, 547 S.E.2d 9 (2001). Findings of fact supported by competent evidence are binding on appeal even though there may be evidence to the contrary. State v. Buchanan, 353 N.C. 332, 336, 543 S.E.2d 823, 826 (2001), appeal after remand, 355 N.C. 264, 559 S.E.2d 785-86 (2002), reconsideration denied, 355 N.C. 495, 563 S.E.2d 187 (2002); see also In re Williamson, 91 N.C. App. 668, 674, 373 S.E.2d 317, 320 (1988).
Once a trial court has determined at the adjudication phase that at least one ground for termination exists, the case moves to the disposition phase where the trial court decides whether a termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the child. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110(a) (2007); see also Blackburn, 142 N.C. App. 607, 543 S.E.2d 906. The trial court is not required to terminate parental rights but has the discretion to do so. In re Tyson, 76 N.C. App. 411, 419, 333 S.E.2d 554, 559 (1985). Upon review, this Court determines whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding termination to be in the best interest of the child. Blackburn, 142 N.C. App. at 614, 543 S.E.2d at 911.
We turn first to the ground of neglect. A trial court may terminate parental rights upon finding that a parent has neglected the minor child. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1) (2007). A child is neglected if he or she
does not receive proper care, supervision, or discipline from the juvenile's parent, guardian, custodian, or caretaker; or who has been abandoned; or who is not provided necessary medical care; or who is not provided necessary remedial care; or who lives in an environment injurious to the juvenile's welfare; or who has been placed for care or adoption in violation of law.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(15) (2007). In determining neglect, the court must consider "the fitness of the parent to care for the child at the time of the termination proceeding." In re Ballard, 311 N.C. 708, 715, 319 S.E.2d 227, 232 (1984) (emphasis in original). Although evidence of past neglect is admissible, "[t]he trial court must also consider any evidence of changed conditions in light of the evidence of prior neglect and the probability of a repetition of neglect." Id. This is especially true where the parent has not had custody of the child for quite some time. Id. at 714, 319 S.E.2d at 231.
Although the prior adjudications in the instant case burden to show that a reasonable probability existed that neglect established the existence of past neglect, petitioner had the would most likely be repeated if the child was returned to respondent's care. The trial court made the following pertinent findings of fact:
12. LCDSS [Lee County Department of Social Services] had been working with the family since 2002. There were five referrals alleging drug use and inadequate supervision. A petition was filed in December 2004 alleging that the house in which she and the children resided was filthy and that there were drugs and domestic violence in the home. The children were adjudicated neglected in February 2005. The allegations in that petition were very similar to those in the new petition filed in June 2007.
13. LCDSS worked with the mother under that petition. The mother had cooperated and LCDSS social worker Lisa Shearer had assisted the mother in obtaining housing and furnishings for the house. Once that was accomplished and the mother had arrangements for the minor children the physical custody of the juveniles were returned to her in October, 2006. The legal custody of the minor children were [sic] returned to her in January 2007.
14. As early as February 2007 LCDSS began receiving reports of inadequate supervision in that the minor children were playing in the roadway. An investigation was begun and services for in home services were put in place. [Respondent] worked for some period during this time. She maintained housing and the juveniles attended school and day care on a consistent basis.
15. In May 2007 [respondent] was arrested on several traffic violations, her car was impounded and she lost her job.
16. LCDSS received a call on June 18, 2007 that [respondent] was being arrested and someone needed to come take the children. The home was filthy. Days old food was in pans on the stove. The bathroom had used feminine products littering the floor and countertops in addition to other trash. The kitchen floor was littered with cigarettes, beer cans and other trash. A juvenile's bedroom had a mattress on the floor and trash and clothes covered the floor. A bag of tobacco laid [sic] on the bed. In the master bedroom the bed was covered in clothes.
17. While speaking with the social worker the mother admitted that a fight had occurred in front of the children. This fight was with Woody Jackson, who was the gentleman she was involved with at the time of the earlier petition.
. . .
19. The Court ordered that the father have no more contact with the minor children during the earlier period when the children were in care.
20. Once full custody was returned to the mother and LCDSS was no longer involved, the mother began to have the father assist her in picking the minor children up from day care when she worked late.
21. Since the minor children were removed from the mother's care at the time of this petition, she lost her residence. She moved in with the father, [W.E.P.], for a period of time.
22. The mother then moved to a local motel, Regal Inn, and lived there for a period of time. The mother cleaned rooms for her rent. She stated she could not find work in Sanford, North Carolina. However, she worked at a horse farm from February to April 2008. In May 2008, the mother moved to Myrtle Beach, South Carolina to live and work at the Best Western motel. She is still residing there based upon conversations she had with the social worker. She has not established a residence apart from the motel. She still has no car.
23. The mother was to participate in Mental Health services and attended sessions in Sanford, North Carolina in February, March and April 2008. There have been no reports received since she moved to South Carolina in May 2008. The mother has been diagnosed with bi-polar disorder and has been given medications. There was no information whether the mother was continuing to take medication.
. . .
27. DSS had discussed the mother's need to obtain a domestic violence order to protect her and the children from Woody Jackson. The mother had informed DSS that Woody Jackson was coming to her home when she wasn't there. The mother did not take any steps to protect the children from Woody Jackson. She did not pursue a domestic violence protective order.
28. The mother initially denied any drug use but then admitted to DSS that she did use drugs. The minor children were present when Woody Jackson entered the house and threw trash around and held a knife to the mother's throat. The mother's story changed from his attempting to gain entrance to her meeting him outside.
29. The court finds by clear, cogent and convincing evidence that the conditions set out above constitute neglect. The respondent mother is incapable of providing appropriate care for the minor children and there is a reasonable probability that she wouldn't be able to provide such care in the future. This is based upon the prior incidents, the extensive training and assistance to the mother. Lisa Shearer assisted and offered support to the mother even on weekends when she needed a ride. The mother was informed to contact her if things were getting out of hand. For the home to be in the condition it was on June 18, 2007 as well as it had been set up [,] is neglectful conduct.
The trial court concluded that grounds existed for termination based on neglect, and that "[n]eglect of the juvenile by the mother has continued to the present and is likely to continue if the children were returned or placed in her custody." Of the findings listed above, respondent has assigned error only to finding No. 29.
The remaining findings of fact are not challenged by respondent. Therefore those findings are deemed to be supported by competent evidence and are binding on appeal. Koufman v. Koufman, 330 N.C. 93, 97, 408 S.E.2d 729, 731 (1991); see also In re S.N.H., 177 N.C. App. 82, 83, 627 S.E.2d 510, 512 (2006). Moreover, finding No. 29 is more properly considered a conclusion of law, as the trial court determined that based on the previous findings, petitioner proved its burden by clear, cogent and convincing evidence that respondent neglected the minor children.
The unchallenged findings show that respondent has been unable to maintain a clean and safe home for the children. She has not maintained steady employment; she has not adequately addressed mental health or substance abuse issues; and she disobeyed court orders by allowing the children's father to take care of them after he was ordered to have no contact. Despite efforts by petitioner, respondent has shown an inability to properly care for the children and such neglect will likely continue if the children are returned to her care. The aforementioned findings of fact are sufficient to establish neglect under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(2007) (providing that "[t]he court may terminate the parental rights upon a finding of one or more [grounds]"); therefore, the trial court did not err in finding neglect as a ground for termination.
"Where a trial court concludes that parental rights should be terminated pursuant to several of the statutory grounds, the order of termination will be affirmed if the court's conclusion with respect to any one of the statutory grounds is supported by valid findings of fact." In re D.B., 186 N.C. App. 556, 561, 652 S.E.2d 56, 60 (2007), aff'd per curiam, 362 N.C. 345, 661 S.E.2d 734 (2008). Because we hold that the trial court's conclusion of neglect was properly supported by its findings of fact, we need not address the remaining grounds for termination in Issues II and III. In re B.S.D.S., 163 N.C. App. 540, 546, 594 S.E.2d 89, 93-94 (2004). Accordingly, this assignment of error in Issue I is overruled.
IV and V
Respondent next challenges the trial court's determination that termination of her parental rights is in the best interest of the children. Respondent argues that she demonstrated continued interest in staying involved in the children's lives and that the trial court could have ordered guardianship or custody with the foster parents instead of terminating her rights. In a related argument, respondent assigns error to the following findings of fact regarding the best interest of the children as being contrary to the evidence presented:
37. During the course of the time the mother had the children returned to her she instilled in the children a fear of court and the social workers. The children are reluctant to speak of their mother. [A.P.] was sad about her mother, [P.P.] felt he had to protect his mother, [C.P.] scared and shy. At a tender age the children have experienced a lot of disruption and inappropriate care by the respondent mother.
. . .
44. The children are in a stable environment and are doing well. They have expressed no further desire to see their mother and no desire to see their father. When asked what three wishes they would want [C.P.] wanted to go to Chucky Cheese, [A.P.] wanted to visit with her mom, [P.P.] wanted a radio clock and to see his mommy at day care. None of the children expressed a desire to go live with their mother. They have expressed no further interest in seeing their mother or their father.
45. The children are in need of stability. Their lives have been disrupted and unstable. The mother did not protect the children. The children need continuity. The only time they have had stability was when they were in foster care. The bond with the mother and children has significantly diminished. The children speak of their maternal grandmother but not of their mother or their father.
Respondent contends these findings are based on impermissible hearsay statements by the children, which should not have been allowed at the hearing. The trial judge allowed petitioner's motion to quash the subpoenas for the children, thereby preventing respondent from cross-examining the children regarding statements attributed to them by other witnesses. She also contends that the lack of an audio recording of the third day of the hearing violates her constitutional right to an appeal. We disagree.
We begin by addressing respondent's argument about the lack of an audio recording. The termination hearing lasted three days, and according to a letter from the transcriptionist, the audio recording for the third day, 4 September 2008, was unavailable for transcription. It appears that the third day involved the best interest phase of the termination hearing. According to our Rules of Appellate Procedure, the record on appeal must contain "so much of the evidence, set out in the form provided in Rule 9(c)(1), as is necessary for an understanding of all errors assigned, or a statement specifying that the verbatim transcript of proceedings is being filed with the record pursuant to Rule 9(c)(2), or designating portions of the transcript to be so filed." N.C. R. App. P. 9(a)(1) (2008).
Where a verbatim transcript is not available, Rule 9(c)(1) permits presentation of testimonial evidence and other proceedings in a narrative form. It is appellant's responsibility to ensure that the record on appeal is complete. See State v. Berryman, 360 N.C. 209, 216, 624 S.E.2d 350, 356 (2006). Where a respondent makes no attempt to reconstruct the missing material or shows that she was unable to do so, she fails to show she was prejudiced from the flawed recording. In re L.O.K., 174 N.C. App. 426, 437, 621 S.E.2d 236, 243 (2005).
Here, it was respondent's responsibility to provide a narrative form of the evidence presented on the third day of the hearing since a verbatim transcript was not available. Respondent has failed to demonstrate any prejudice from the lack of a recording.
A trial court's determination that termination is in the best interests of the children is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Tyson, 76 N.C. App. at 419, 333 S.E.2d at 559. Here, the trial court found that out of the previous forty-one months, the children have been in petitioner's care for thirty-seven months. The trial court also found that the children experienced a lot of disruption and inappropriate care and were in need of stability. Respondent did not protect the children, the bond between respondent and the children had diminished greatly, the children were reluctant to speak of their mother, and they had not expressed an interest in seeing her. Further, the children were currently in a stable environment, had made great progress in their placement, and were adoptable.
With regard to respondent's argument that the challenged findings are based on impermissible hearsay, we note that respondent did not assign error to these findings on the basis they relied on or constituted impermissible hearsay. Rather, respondent assigned error to the findings on the basis they are contrary to the evidence presented.
Assignments of error "shall state plainly, concisely and without argumentation the legal basis upon which error is assigned." N.C. R. App. P. 10(c)(1) (2008). Therefore, we review this issue to determine whether the findings of fact are supported by the evidence. See In re Huff, 140 N.C. App. at 291, 536 S.E.2d at 840.
Our review of the available material reveals that the challenged findings are supported by testimony from social worker Kelly Cobb and psychologist Melanie Crumpler. Ms. Cobb testified that the children do not talk about their mother even when given the opportunity. Ms. Crumpler testified that the children talked about hiding information from the social worker and that respondent had told the children to be afraid of the court. She also testified that A.P. was worried and sad about her mother, that P.P. felt he had to protect his mother and siblings from Woody Jackson, and that C.P. felt scared about her mother and worried about whether she could protect her siblings. She stated that in recent months the children would not talk about their mother, and that in her opinion, the children needed stability and a stable environment, which they had not had with all the disruption to their lives. Ms. Crumpler also talked about how the children responded to a question about what their wishes were, and that even though they expressed a desire to visit with their mother, they did not express a desire to live with her. We find that the evidence is sufficient to support the findings challenged by respondent.
In light of the trial court's findings, which we determine are based on competent evidence, respondent's arguments fail to show an abuse of discretion by the trial court in determining that termination is in the best interest of the children. Accordingly, these assignments of error are overruled.
VI
Finally, respondent contends the trial court committed reversible error because the termination hearing was not held within the time limit set by section 7B-1109(a), which provides in relevant part,
[t]he hearing on the termination of parental rights shall be conducted by the court sitting without a jury and shall be held in the district at such time and place as the chief district court judge shall designate, but no later than 90 days from the filing of the petition or motion unless the judge pursuant to subsection (d) of this section orders that it be held at a later time.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1109(a) (2007). "The court may for good cause shown continue the hearing for up to 90 days from the date of the initial petition in order to receive additional evidence including any reports or assessments that the court has requested, to allow the parties to conduct expeditious discovery, or to receive any other information needed in the best interests of the juvenile." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1109(d) (2007).
In this case, petitioner filed its motion for termination of parental rights on 25 January 2008, and the case was continued until the hearing began on 2 September 2008. The trial court in the termination order found that the continuances were "the result of good cause and orders entered by the Court on each occasion justifying the necessary continuance." Respondent concedes that two of the continuances were at her own request, but she argues that two continuances does not account for the seven month delay. Respondent contends that since the hearing did not begin until September the delay prejudiced both her and the children because no visitation was allowed during this time. We do not agree.
Violation of the time limit in section 7B-1109 does not render the trial court without jurisdiction. In re Dj.L., 184 N.C. App. 76, 84, 646 S.E.2d 134, 139 (2007). As discussed above, "[f]ailure to comply with a time limitation in the Juvenile Code is not reversible error unless the appellant shows `prejudice resulting from the time delay.'" Id. at 84, 646 S.E.2d at 139-40 (quoting In re C.L.C., 171 N.C. App. at 443, 615 S.E.2d at 707). In Dj.L., this Court held that six months was not such an extraordinary delay that it constituted prejudice per se and held that since the respondent had not shown actual prejudice from the delay the error was not reversible. Id. at 84, 646 S.E.2d at 140. Moreover, this Court has held that not only must a respondent show prejudice resulting from a delay in holding the hearing, the respondent must also show that, but for the delay, the result of the termination hearing would have been different. In re D.B., 186 N.C. App. 556, 560-61, 652 S.E.2d 56, 59 (2007), aff'd per curiam, 362 N.C. 345, 661 S.E.2d 734 (2008).
Here, respondent has not shown that she suffered actual prejudice, particularly where she filed two motions to continue the hearing, nor has she demonstrated that, but for the delay, the outcome of the termination hearing would have been different. We have determined that the trial court properly found at least one ground for termination, and that it did not abuse its discretion in deciding that termination is in the best interest of the children. Since respondent failed to adequately articulate prejudice arising from the delay in holding the hearing, we hold the delay is not reversible error. Accordingly, we overrule this assignment of error.
Respondent's remaining assignments of error not brought forth and argued in the brief are deemed abandoned. N.C. R. App. P. 28(b)(6)(2008).
Affirmed.
Judges WYNN and STEELMAN concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).