Opinion
CASE NO. 08-31719 HCD, PROC. NO. 10-3045.
March 29, 2011
Joshua R. Payton, Esq., counsel for plaintiff, South Bend, Indiana. and.
Mark P. Telloyan, Esq., counsel for defendant, O'Brien Telloyan, P.C., South Bend, Indiana.
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
At South Bend, Indiana, on March 29, 2011.
Before the court is the Complaint for Damages filed by Jacqueline Sells Homann, Trustee ("Trustee") in the chapter 7 bankruptcy case of Terrence S. Archer ("debtor" or "Archer") against the defendant Deborah L. White ("defendant" or "White"). An Answer denying all material allegations in the Complaint was filed, and a trial was conducted. Following the trial, the parties filed post-trial briefs and responses. The court then took the matter under advisement.
The court has jurisdiction to decide the matter before it pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334 and § 157 and the Northern District of Indiana Local Rule 200.1. The court has determined that this matter is a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2).
BACKGROUND
The debtor filed a voluntary chapter 7 petition on June 4, 2008. Almost four years prior to the bankruptcy, on August 1, 2004, the defendant Deborah L. White leased from the debtor four properties in Miami and Cass Counties, Indiana. On that date, Archer and White entered into four written lease agreements with an option to purchase the properties. Under the terms of each of the leases, White was required to pay monthly rent of $300 for a period of 60 months.
The Trustee's Complaint alleged that White failed to pay rent when due and that, under paragraph 3 of each of the leases, Archer was entitled to late charges of $15 per day. The Complaint further alleged that White failed to make a single payment toward the balance of any of the leases and thus now owes $72,000 in back rent on the four leases. Moreover, the leases provided expenses and attorneys' fees sustained as a result of White's default or breach of the leases. The Complaint stated that the debtor's Statement of Financial Affairs, filed in the debtor's bankruptcy case, reflected a claim against White. The Trustee claimed entitlement to those damages, on behalf of Archer's bankruptcy estate, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 541.
In her Answer, the defendant denied the Complaint's material allegations and raised numerous affirmative defenses. She argued that there was no valid contract because there was no mutuality or meeting of the minds, the terms were unconscionable, and the agreement was laced with fraud. She further asserted that the contract was canceled by Archer in November 2004. For that reason, she claimed, this asset was not property of the bankruptcy estate at the commencement of the case.
At trial, both the debtor and the defendant testified. Debtor Terrence Archer, a factory worker, owned apartments and houses. He testified that he sold five properties to the defendant by written contract. He submitted four identical contracts, entitled "Residential Lease with Option to Purchase." At the top of each, he had written "5 year lease," and the address of each property covered under the lease. Except for the addresses of the properties, the leases were identical two-page contracts. For each property, the rent was $300 per month, and a late charge of $15 per day was added if the rent was not paid within five days after the due date. Each lease contained a security deposit charge of $3,000. It also set forth the terms for the option to purchase the property. At trial, Archer explained that, whenever White got the financing within the five-year period, she could pay off the leases. She could sublet the properties, too; attached to each lease was a "Permission to Sublet," signed by each party. Also attached was a form entitled "Deposit Note," signed by White. It was a promise to pay Archer $200 within thirty days after the leases were signed. Archer stated that he had been current on his mortgage payments when White signed the leases.
Archer testified as to each contract. Exhibit A was the lease for property on North Miami Street in Peru, Indiana. When White fell behind on her payments, he said, the bank started calling him. He helped her for ten months or so, collecting the rent from tenants, for example. He testified that she made a few sporadic payments of $50 per month, per property, for title and property insurance. He did not remember if she paid the "Deposit Note." He testified that she read the contracts before signing them; he explained them to her and she understood, he said.
Looking at Exhibit B, the lease for the Michigan Avenue duplex in LaPorte, Indiana, Archer testified that White made some, but not all, payments. He pointed out that she was required, under each lease, to pay $300 per month in rent and $50 per month into his personal account. He defaulted her, but he did not remember when it occurred.
Exhibit C was the contract for the Race Street triplex in LaPorte. Once she took over, he said, very few payments were made, and none of the $50 payments to him. He defaulted her and repossessed the real estate. Exhibit D was the contract on two New Waverley homes on Main and Church Streets which were connected by the same yard. For the two single-family units, she paid one rent of $300 (plus $50 to his account). White lived in the Church Street house. Archer testified that he proceeded with the default process, sued for immediate possession, and had her evicted through small claims court. He testified that he had received $3,000 as a down payment from White for all the properties, and that she told him to take that amount as damages.
Exhibit E was a document he said he drafted to explain all the terms of the agreements between him and White. It was titled, "Sale-Purchase Layout." He testified that she read it and fully understood it. It stated that "Debbie is purchasing 4 properties from Terrence on a 2 part lease option." It summarized the lease contract provisions. On page 2, it listed the balances due if she refinanced the properties and paid off the mortgages. However, he testified, she did not refinance any of the properties. He insisted that White understood that she was buying the four properties.
Archer described the damage that had occurred to the properties while White was in possession of them; he testified that he spent about $1,500 in repairs. He added that the banks foreclosed on the four properties.
On cross-examination, Archer admitted that White was not listed as a creditor in his bankruptcy schedules or on the matrix. When asked if he believed White owed him any money in this bankruptcy, he said that he was not trying to pursue her for money she may have owed him, because she had less than he did. He also stated that the small claims action was filed only to evict her. He acknowledged that the Notice of Claim, which he filled out, signed, and filed in Cass County Superior Court, included a demand for back rent and late fees. Nevertheless, Archer testified that he never intended to collect from her, only to evict her.
When he entered into the contracts with White in August 2004, he owned the five properties White took and two other properties, one of which he lived in. He didn't remember whether the advertisement in the paper stated "houses for sale," but he acknowledged that Exhibit E, his handwritten explanation or summary of the four contracts signed by White, was titled "Sale-Purchase Layout." He did not bring to court any evidence that he owned the real estate or that the mortgages had been current in August 2004. When shown the mortgage statement on the house on Miami Street in Peru, Indiana, however, he admitted that, on September 1, 2004, $1,473.00 was past due and $2,226.74 was due in total. He therefore agreed that, according to the mortgage statement, he was delinquent on that mortgage. He did not know if his property taxes were in arrears.
Exhibit E stated that White was purchasing, not leasing, four properties from Archer. He read through all the provisions of Exhibit E. The document listed the payments that White was to make: the mortgage payments to lenders, taxes, insurance, interest, escrow, flood insurance, and any other changes made by the lender. She also was responsible for finding tenants and for making repairs. Under the contracts, she had five years to finance the properties. If she made all the payments required for five years but did not refinance in five years, the properties would default back to him, he explained. When asked whether that sounded fair to him, Archer responded, "It's the contract that she entered." Exhibit E also stated that White must pay $200 per month to Archer as "free and clear profit." In addition, she made the $3,000 down payment, he said. Archer agreed that White was required under the contracts to pay the mortgages, taxes, and insurance on his properties, to find tenants and make repairs, and to pay him $200 per month and the $3,000 down payment — but he added that she could collect and keep the profits.
Part 2 of Exhibit E established how White would pay off the remaining balance. It required a $1,000 insurance deposit, to be turned over by White to Archer at the time of signing. No deposits would be transferred from Archer to White, it stated. On the second page, the four houses were listed, and the balances due on each. White was to make monthly payments of $300 for each of the properties. For the Miami Street property in Peru, she was to make the payments for 24 months; for the New Waverly properties, she would pay for 44 months; for the Race Street property, she would pay for 20 months; and the Michigan Avenue property, for 40 months. Archer was unable to explain why every payment was for $300 a month. When asked whether the "Lease Option" contracts he and White signed actually were "option purchases" at the end of the five-year term, he did not know.
In August 2004, Archer testified, White probably made all the payments. In September or October 2004, he had no idea how many payments she made or whether she made the $200 per month profit payments to him. He did not remember the amounts of his actual mortgage payments. Archer was asked whether the monthly payments were more than $300 per month and, if so, whether White would have been in default after the first month. He had no answer to the questions.
At some time after September, October, or November, of 2004, Archer testified that White stopped making payments and that the banks start calling him. He then wrote her a letter stating that he was placing her in default and canceling her contract to purchase. See Def. Ex. 1. The letter (which was not dated) notified White that Archer was taking legal action to evict her, to collect, and to take possession of the properties on Monday, November 13, 2004. He demanded that she turn over "all keys and or items" to him by November 11, 2004, and that he would "inlist [ sic] aid to help me retrieve them" if she did not comply. He said he might have collected a couple of the rents afterwards, but he actually told the renters not to worry about the rents, because he was going into foreclosure quickly. He admitted that he did not mitigate his damages, but said it would have been pointless to try to collect the rents.
On redirect, Archer stated that he had mentioned these contracts to the Trustee at the § 341 meeting. He further said that White could have refinanced the houses at any time, throughout the five-year period. It would have been to her advantage to refinance right away, he added, so that she could stop paying the $200 monthly payments to Archer. Archer agreed with the Trustee that, because White did not refinance, did not pay Archer after he started the eviction process, and did not exercise the option to purchase the properties, she owed him for all the years of the contracts.
On re-cross, Archer read into the record paragraph 26 of the lease contracts (Exhibits A through D), which required White to exercise her option to purchase the properties before its expiration at midnight on August 15, 2004. He admitted that the deadline gave White only two weeks, after signing the contracts, to decide that she could purchase the properties. Archer argued, nevertheless, that White had read the contract and knew what it said.
Jacqueline Sells Homann, chapter 7 Trustee, then took the witness stand. She acknowledged that her Complaint stated that "Archer's statement of financial affairs filed in the Bankruptcy Estate reflected a claim against White." R. 1, p. 4, ¶ 31. When she reviewed the debtor's Statement of Financial Affairs, however, she admitted that there was no claim against White reflected in it. Nor was White listed anywhere in the debtor's schedules, she testified. The Trustee described the misstatement in paragraph 31 of the Complaint as "a miss on our part." She also acknowledged that the Complaint had not been amended.
After the Trustee's testimony on this point, counsel for the defendant moved to dismiss the Complaint based on a material misstatement in the Complaint. The court denied the motion on the ground that it was not an error so grave as to require dismissal.
When asked whether she had contacted White about making payments to the Trustee, she testified that it was her standard practice to do so. She did not know whether she would have asked White to pay the $72,000 in back rent specified in the Complaint or whether she would have included the possibility of late charges and attorney fees. The Trustee, not remembering what she did in this case, suggested that she might have made a demand for payment generally. She was asked whether she took into account the lessor's duty to mitigate damages. The Trustee responded that she would have made her demand for payment in accord with the terms of the contract. She also explained that her Complaint alleged that White failed to make the lease payments and that the damages sought were based on those leases.
The defendant Deborah L. White next testified. She is a resident of Peru, Indiana, who works at Tyson's packing fresh meats and earning $12.65 per hour. She is married and has seven children. She testified that she did not understand why she was here, because Archer had sued her in 2005 in the Cass County Superior Court. At the end of that state court hearing, White said, she understood that she did not owe Archer any money and that he was required to allow her thirty days to move out.
White testified that, in June 2004, she saw Archer's ad for "houses for sale" in the paper. She knew she could not get a loan to buy the houses, because she did not qualify for credit and had not been working at her job long enough to qualify. White understood that, under the four residential lease contracts and one sale-purchase contract, she was to make the payments on the mortgages to the banks or mortgage companies, in Archer's name, for five years. In addition, she was to pay taxes and insurance, fix up the properties for tenants (with her husband's help), run ads to get tenants for properties, and pay Archer $200 a month, which was profit in his pocket. Although the contracts required monthly payments of $300, she had to pay the actual amounts of the mortgages to the banks, and so she made payments of $323, $350, and more than $500 a month, and she couldn't remember the amount of the fourth mortgage. Also, she paid Archer the down payment of $3,000. She never got a receipt for her payments.
White admitted that she was inexperienced in these matters. She did not have the houses inspected, did not hire legal counsel, did not check whether the titles were clear. Archer told her that, if she spoke with someone at the bank, she should say she was a friend of Archer's, just helping him out; she should not say anything about paying the mortgages or signing the agreements. After she took over the properties, however, she found out that Archer was behind on the mortgage payments and that one property had taxes in arrears.
In August 2004, she moved into one house and started working on the others. She thought she made mortgage payments on all five properties and made the $200 monthly payment to Archer that month. In September 2004, the houses weren't all rented and there wasn't enough money from the rents to make the payments. In October, she still didn't have enough to pay the mortgages. In November, Archer sent her the letter stating that he would take back the properties. It was her understanding that, with that letter, the contracts were canceled. She did not talk to Archer, because the tenants told her that he was taking the properties back. She understood that the tenants started paying him. Then, in December, she was laid off. In 2005, she received the notice from the court evicting her.
On cross-examination, White admitted that she signed the contracts and was required to make monthly payments. She testified that she was unable to make them all, but made as many of the payments as she could; she made the payments from all that she collected. She also stated that she did not exercise her option to purchase by August 15, 2004. She said she did pay Archer the $200 in September, and paid him in January as well. She could not remember which payments she made each month, however.
Janet Benedict then took the stand. She testified that the she had been living in the duplex on Michigan Avenue and had paid rent to Terrence Archer until White became her landlady. Benedict said she made payments to White for more than four months, she thought. One day Archer told her that he was taking back the apartments. She paid him for one month, and then he never came around again to get the rents. Benedict moved out in January or February of 2005. She knew nothing about the agreements between Archer and White.
Counsel presented strong closing arguments. The court raised questions about the November 2004 cancellation letter from Archer to White, the eviction process, and possible foreclosures on the properties. The parties requested time to file findings of fact and conclusions of law. The court set time periods for initial and response briefs and took the matter under advisement thereafter.
DISCUSSION
The Trustee filed her Complaint for Damages generally under 11 U.S.C. § 541. She demanded from the defendant payments of back rent on four leases, plus late charges, expenses, and attorneys' fees. The defendant argued that the lease and sale contracts between Archer and White were invalid because they lacked definiteness and clarity in their terms, because White was fraudulently induced into the contracts, and because the terms of the contracts were unconscionable. She also asserted that she was released from the contracts when Archer wrote her the November 2004 letter, placing her in default and canceling her contract to purchase. Finally, the defendant contended that any damages charged against her were limited by his election of remedies and his duty to mitigate.
Section 541(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a bankruptcy estate is formed upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition, and that the estate is comprised of "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case." 11 U.S.C. § 541(a).
The question whether an interest claimed by the debtor is "property of the estate" is a federal question to be decided by federal law; however, courts must look to state law to determine whether and to what extent the debtor has any legal or equitable interests in property as of the commencement of the case.
In re Yonikus, 996 F.2d 866, 869 (7th Cir. 1993). A trustee succeeds to the rights of the debtor, including the rights that the debtor has against a third party who may have injured the debtor. See Koch Refining v. Farmers Union Central Exchange, Inc., 831 F.2d 1339, 1348 (7th Cir. 1987) ("It is axiomatic that the trustee has the right to bring any action in which the debtor has an interest."); In re Marston, 417 B.R. 766, 770 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2009) (stating that a trustee may bring any action the debtor could have brought under state law at the commencement of the case). The trustee, as the party seeking to recover the damages, bears the burden of proving that the back rent and other amounts are in fact § 541(a) property. See In re Dunn, 436 B.R. 744, 747 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2010) (citing Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 56, 126 S. Ct. 528, 534, 163 L.Ed.2d 387 (2005)).
In this case, the debtor himself has not claimed any interest in the rental income. He did not list White as a creditor in his schedules or on the matrix. Contrary to the Trustee's allegation in the Complaint, the debtor's Statement of Financial Affairs did not reflect a claim against White. In addition, the debtor did not list the rental properties as assets in his estate. In fact, the Trustee stated in her Reply Brief that the properties were repossessed by the bank shortly after White's default. See R. 32, p. 8. It appears, therefore, that, as of the commencement of Archer's case, the debtor himself did not think he had a legal or equitable property interest against White. Nor did the defendant understand the Trustee's claim, after Archer had written the November 2004 cancellation letter, had sued her in small claims court, and had evicted her and taken possession of the leased properties.
In the Trustee's Response brief, the Trustee addressed White's charge that the Trustee "mistakenly alleged in her Complaint" that there was a claim against White in Archer's statement of financial affairs. The Trustee then responded that "[t]his issue was raised at trial and the Court specifically ruled that the mistake in the complaint was irrelevant and immaterial to the outcome of the trial." R. 32 at 2.
The Trustee has misstated the judge's conclusion. At the trial, the court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the Complaint based upon the Trustee's material misstatement. The judge ruled that the Trustee's misstatement was "not an error that is so grave that it deserves that the whole matter be dismissed at this point."
However, the court certainly finds that the Trustee's misstatement was a material one; it was not "just a miss on our part," as Trustee Homann testified at trial. Trustee's counsel also misstated the law when he asserted that it was immaterial whether the debtor asserted his claim in the § 341 meeting of creditors or in his statement of financial affairs. If material facts emerge at the § 341 meeting which are not disclosed in the debtor's schedules, amended schedules must be filed to reflect those differences. The court does not expect to find it necessary to question or to check a trustee's allegations in pleadings, particularly to verify a fact validating her authority to bring the claim before the court.
Nevertheless, the Trustee claimed an interest under § 541. The Trustee's position was straightforward: After breaching each of the four leases after three months, White owed the debtor all the amounts still due and owing under the terms of those five-year leases. White was contractually bound to make all the monthly payments under each of the leases for the 57 remaining months, for a total payment of $68,400. Moreover, the Trustee asserted, she as Trustee was entitled to collect the judgment on behalf of Archer's bankruptcy estate. She cited to no authority when making her legal arguments.
At trial, the court had questioned the impact of the debtor's "cancellation letter," Defendant's Exhibit 1, and the eviction proceeding in Cass County Superior Court. Both the debtor and the defendant testified that White was evicted from the properties by the decision of the small claims judge. The Trustee argued, in her brief, that White was required to provide a copy of the Cass County Superior Court's order and that White's understanding of the judge's ruling was irrelevant without the state court decision. See R. 32 at 10. However, this court recognizes that courts are simply unable to produce written rulings on all the matters before the courts. In this case, there is no dispute whatsoever about White's eviction.
The court found both the debtor and the defendant credible when they testified. Archer's testimony was impeached on several points, and he was defensive when unable to explain the contracts' contradictory and confusing provisions; nevertheless, his statements consistently validated White's testimony in demonstrating the ending of their contractual relationship with the cancellation letter and eviction proceedings.
The court finds that credible testimony from both the debtor and the defendant made clear the sequence of events. Archer and White entered into the contracts on August 1, 2004, and, according to both their testimonies, White probably made all the payments due in August. Neither one knew exactly how many payments White made under the lease contracts in September or October, but in November Archer wrote White a letter stating the default and canceling the contract. Archer testified that he proceeded with the default process, sued for immediate possession, and had White evicted through small claims court. He also identified the Notice of Claim, which was presented to him in court, as the document he filed in the Cass County Superior Court, and in which he demanded her eviction, back rent, and late fees. Nevertheless, he insisted at trial that he never intended to collect money from her, since she had less than he did. He acknowledged, as well, that he had received $3,000 as a down payment from White for all the properties and that she had told him to keep that amount as damages. He testified that he spent about $1,500 on repairs to the properties. These statements against interest by Archer were credible and dependable, in the view of the court, and they corresponded with the equally believable testimony of the defendant.
White testified that she did not know why she was charged with this debt, since Archer had sued her in state court. After the hearing in the Cass County Superior Court, she understood that she had been evicted (but had 30 days to move) and that she did not owe Archer any money. Archer's recollection was that the judge allowed him to try to collect; nevertheless, he said, he did not sue White for money and wanted only to evict her. There is no doubt that White was evicted from the premises and that the properties she leased under the four contracts were repossessed by the debtor and, shortly thereafter, by the banks. The court finds, after reviewing all the evidence before it, that Archer clearly intended to cancel and did cancel all the contracts, the residential leases and "sale-purchase layout," signed by White. He then carried out the intentions expressed in that August 2004 letter: He repossessed the properties, collected rents from tenants for a time, and evicted White.
There was vigorous debate between counsel about the statement in Archer's letter that he was "canceling your contract to purchase." Def. Ex. 1. The Trustee argued that Archer was canceling the option to purchase within the contracts only, and not the entire lease contracts. Thus, she insisted, White was still obligated under them. However, the defendant pointed out that Archer's letter then notified White that eviction papers would follow the contract cancellation and that he would "take possession of all properties on Monday (11-13-04)." Id. The language of this document, like the language in the residential leases and sale-purchase layout, is fraught with ambiguity. The court interpreted the letter by considering all its provisions as a whole and by examining the practical construction placed on it by the parties, as manifested by their acts and by their testimony at trial. It noted that Archer, throughout his testimony, acknowledged that he "defaulted White," canceled the contracts, and repossessed the properties. Both White and Jane Benedict testified that he took possession of the premises, collected some rents, and carried out the state court eviction process.
Under Indiana law, White's eviction was actual, not constructive; she was deprived of the occupancy of some part of the demised premises. The Indiana Supreme Court, in Talbott v. English, 156 Ind. 299, 59 N.E. 857 (1901), set forth that distinction and further explained the effects of eviction on the obligations of a tenant. The Indiana Court of Appeals reiterated the rule again recently:
It may be said that in every lease there is an implied covenant that the tenant shall have the right of possession, occupancy, and beneficial use of every portion of the leased premises. The tenant is regarded as having hired the use of the property as an entirety, and therefore if the landlord, after the grant, deprives the tenant of the possession and enjoyment of any part of the premises, the landlord shall not be entitled to any part of the rent during the time he thus deprives the tenant of his rights. The landlord may not apportion the rent by his own wrong.
Talbott, 59 N.E. at 859 ( quoted in Village Commons, LLC, v. Marion Cty. Prosecutor's Office, 882 N.E.2d 210, 216 (Ind. App. 2008)). Village Commons also approved the more recent articulation of the general concept presented in Gigax v. Boone Village Ltd. P'ship, 656 N.E.2d 854 (Ind. App. 1995):
The general rule is that a tenant will be relieved of any obligation to pay further rent if the landlord deprives the tenant of possession and beneficial use and enjoyment of any part of the demised premises by actual eviction. Stated differently, after termination the lease and all liability under it for future rent are extinguished.
Gigax, 656 N.E.2d at 858 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original) ( quoted in Village Commons, 882 N.E.2d at 217). Whether the eviction is actual or constructive, it is the lessor's or landlord's own act or omission that ends the lessee's obligation to pay rent. See Village Commons, 882 N.E.2d at 217.
The highly regarded treatise of Milton Friedman, Friedman on Leases, presents a clear explanation of the general rule concerning the type of act a lessor may take to terminate a tenant's rent obligation:
[I]f landlord . . . elects to cancel because of the tenant's default, the result is [that] [t]he relation of landlord and tenant is annulled and the end of the lease ends liability under the covenant to pay rent, but not for any liability theretofore accrued nor for any liability then or thereafter accrued for damages for breach of the lease.
Practicing Law Institute, Friedman on Leases, PLIREF-Leases § 16:3.1 at 16-53 (Nov. 2010) (citing Gigax).
Based upon the evidence and testimony presented in this proceeding, the court finds that the debtor-lessor intended an actual eviction of the defendant from all the properties covered under the leases, as evidenced in the November 2004 cancellation letter. He succeeded in the actual eviction before the small claims court at some point in early 2005. He received damages of $3,000 from White, and spent only half that amount to repair the premises. The law of Indiana is clear, however, that once Archer deprived White of her possession of the properties through the eviction, she was no longer obligated to pay rent. The Trustee, who stands in the shoes of Archer, therefore has no claim to a right to post-eviction rents.
In addition, the Trustee failed to demonstrate any right to recover any amounts under the contracts during the few months White possessed and occupied the properties. Nor does the record support such a claim. The Complaint contained no citation to a Bankruptcy Code section giving the Trustee the jurisdiction and authority to seek the turnover of rents and damages perhaps owed to the debtor between September and November 2004, almost four years prior to Archer's bankruptcy filing. It is clear, and has been for over one hundred years, that under Indiana law the lessor-debtor Archer had no right to the amounts now claimed by the Trustee in the Complaint as property of the estate.
The court concludes that the Trustee has failed in her burden of proving that the back rents and other damages itemized in her Complaint are property of the debtor's estate under § 541(a). Only those interests in property that the debtor held when he filed bankruptcy can be claimed by the Trustee. The Complaint cannot be sustained.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth in the Memorandum of Decision, the relief requested in the Trustee's Complaint for Damages under 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) is denied.
SO ORDERED.