Opinion
No. 04-03-00917-CV
Delivered and Filed: June 15, 2005.
Appeal from the 224th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas, Trial Court No. 1990-CI-16034, Honorable John Specia, Jr., Judge Presiding.
Affirmed.
Sitting: Alma L. LÓPEZ, Chief Justice, Sarah B. DUNCAN, Justice, Phylis J. SPEEDLIN, Justice.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Gwendolyn Y. Treadwell appeals the trial court's judgment dismissing her motion seeking to modify the order setting child support for her daughter, V.C.T., because V.C.T. had reached the age of majority before her father, Tracy T. Treadwell, was served or appeared. We affirm the trial court's judgment. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 156.401(b) (Vernon Supp. 2004) ("A support order may be modified only as to obligations accruing after the earlier of (1) the date of service of citation or (2) an appearance in the suit to modify."). Since Tracy was not served until July 10, 2003, after Victoria had achieved the age of majority on June 27, 2003, the trial court had no jurisdiction over her and no authority to modify the support order.
To support her argument to the contrary, Gwendolyn relies upon cases decided under a previous version of the statute, which permitted modification retroactive to the date a motion to modify was filed, and cases decided under the current statute but mistakenly relying upon caselaw decided under the previous version of the statute. Compare, e.g., Ewing v. Holt, 835 S.W.2d 274, 275 n. 1 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1992, no writ) ("[Section 156.401's predecessor] provides in pertinent part that `a support order may be modified only as to obligations accruing after the earlier of the date of service of citation or an appearance on the motion to modify.'") (citing Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 14.08(c)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1992)) with Willis v. Willis, 826 S.W.2d 700, 702 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no writ) (noting that in 1985, section 14.08(c)(2) provided that a court could "modify an order . . . that . . . provides for the support of a child . . . except that a support order may be modified only as to obligations accruing subsequent to the motion to modify; . . . (emphasis supplied)"). Opinions relying, rightly or wrongly, upon a previous version of the statute or caselaw decided under a previous version of the statute are inapposite. Gwendolyn also cites In re A.L.O., 2003 WL 21773840 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2003, no pet.). However, in that case, the child support obligor agreed the trial court could modify his child support obligation retroactively to the date he became employed. Id. at *6. Section 156.401 therefore did not apply.
See In re H.S.N., 69 S.W.3d 829 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.); Rocha v. Villarreal, 766 S.W.2d 895 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1989, no writ); In re J.G.Z., 963 S.W.2d 144 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1998, no pet.); Holley v. Holley, 864 S.W.2d 703 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied); Klaver v. Klaver, 764 S.W.2d 401 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1989, no writ).
Because the trial court correctly interpreted and applied section 156.401, its judgment is affirmed.