Opinion
No. 01-02-00361-CV.
July 10, 2003.
Appeal from the 308th District Court, Harris County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 99-55555.
Ralph Shepherd, 14015 Park Drive Ste 100, Tomball, TX, 77377, for Appellant.
Karen L. Marvel, Law Offc of Sinkin Baretto, 105 W. Woodlawn, San Antonio, TX 78212, for Appellee.
Panel consists of Justices HEDGES, NUCHIA, and KEYES.
OPINION
This is an appeal from a cumulative money judgment for child-support arrearages in the amount of $276,450.85 entered against, Roger K. Glass, appellant, in favor of Pat I. Williamson, appellee. In three points of error, appellant contends that the trial court erred because (1) it did not issue findings of fact and conclusions of law, (2) it enforced a decree that was ambiguous, and (3) it awarded child support in the amount of $43 per week per child. We reverse and render judgment that appellee take nothing.
It was also ordered that the judgment would bear 12 percent simple interest per year until the date the judgment is paid.
Background
On April 7, 1980, a final decree of divorce was entered in Wayne County, Michigan dissolving the marriage between appellant and appellee and ordering appellant to pay appellee child support for his three children. The support order states the following:
[Appellant] shall pay the sum of [f]orty-three ($43.00) [d]ollars, per week, in advance, to the Office of the Friend of the Court, as and for the support and maintenance of each of the minor children until the children shall respectively attain the age of eighteen (18) years or until the further [o]rder of the Court.
On December 21, 2001, appellee filed a supplemental motion for cumulative judgment of child support arrears and petition for suspension of licenses for failure to pay child support. On December 31, 2001, the trial court entered a cumulative money judgment in the amount of $276,450.85 against appellant.
Ambiguous Decree
In his second point of error, appellant contends that the support order is unenforceable because it is vague, ambiguous, and indefinite. Specifically, appellant makes two arguments: the support order is ambiguous as to (1) the amount and (2) when the payments were to commence. Because we conclude that the second issue is dispositive, we address it first.
Ambiguous as to the Start Date
Appellant contends that the support order is ambiguous because it does not provide the date the payments are to begin. A child support order must be "sufficiently definite and certain" to be enforceable by a money judgment. Office of the Att'y Gen. v. Wilson, 24 S.W.3d 902, 905 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2000, no pet.) (quoting Villanueva v. Office of the Att'y Gen., 935 S.W.2d 953, 955 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1996, writ denied); Gross v. Gross, 808 S.W.2d 215, 219 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no writ). In Ex parte Payne, the relator argued that a divorce decree that does not specify the date for the first payment is ambiguous and as such is unenforceable. Ex parte Payne, 598 S.W.2d 312, 317 (Tex.Civ.App.-Texarkana 1980, orig. proceedings). The Texarkana Court of Appeals held that even if the decree is ambiguous, the judgment is enforceable by contempt. Id.
The Texas Supreme Court has held that a divorce decree that specifies the month and day that an insurance obligation begins, but does not specify a year, is too vague to enforce by contempt. Ex parte Acker, 949 S.W.2d 314, 316-17 (Tex. 1997). In that case, the divorce decree ordered the mother to pay the father $50 per month, beginning June 1, for health insurance for the child, and in a separate provision, ordered her to pay him $500 per month, beginning June 1, 1990, as child support. The decree was not signed until November of 1990. Id. at 317. The Court stated that "while one may infer that the `June' commencement date for the insurance payments was intended to be June 1990, interpretation of the decree `should not rest upon implication or conjecture.'" Id. The Court concluded that the trial court rendering the decree could have intended to order one parent to bear the entire cost of insurance for a period of time, with the other parent taking over the obligation in June of some future year. Id. The Court distinguished the facts of Payne from the facts in Acker, explaining that the Payne court rejected the relator's argument because the relator had made child support payments for four years before defaulting, while the relator in Acker never made any of the payments. Id.
In this case, the relevant language of the support order is as follows:
[Appellant] shall pay the sum of [f]orty-three ($43.00) [d]ollars, per week, in advance, to the Office of the Friend of the Court, as and for the support and maintenance of each of the minor children until the children shall respectively attain the age of eighteen (18) years or until the further [o]rder of the Court.
It does not provide the day, month, or year that the first payment is due. Appellant never made support payments during the period he was allegedly obligated to do so. Under these facts, we will not infer that the trial court intended the first payment to be due immediately. See id. Accordingly, the support order was not sufficiently definite and certain to be enforceable.
We sustain appellant's second point of error. Because this holding is dispositive of the case, we decline to address appellant's other points of error.
Conclusion
We reverse and render judgment that appellee take nothing.