Opinion
No. 05-10-00131-CV
Opinion Issued April 14, 2010.
On Appeal from the 219th Judicial District Court, Collin County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 219-51950-2008.
Before Chief Justice WRIGHT and Justices O'NEILL and MYERS.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Cale Matthew Spencer filed a notice of appeal from the trial court's October 29, 2009 orders terminating his parental rights to D.L.S. and granting the petition for the adoption of D.L.S. filed by Miranda Lewis and Alan Lewis. The Court now has before it appellee Miranda Lewis's February 25, 2010 motion to dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. Although this Court requested that appellant respond to the motion, no response was filed. We conclude we lack jurisdiction over the appeal.
An appeal from an order terminating parental rights is an accelerated appeal under the Texas Family Code. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 109.002(a) (Vernon 2008). A notice of appeal in an accelerated appeal is due within twenty days of the date the trial court's order is signed. See Tex. R. App. P. 26.1(b). A motion for new trial is not an instrument that may be considered a bona fide attempt to invoke an appellate court's jurisdiction, nor does it extend the time for filing a notice of appeal in an accelerated appeal. See In the Interest of K.A.F., A Child, 160 S.W.3d 923, 927-28 (Tex. 2005).
In this case, the trial court's order terminating appellant's parental rights was signed on October 29, 2009. Therefore, appellant's notice of appeal was due by November 18, 2009. See Tex. R. App. P. 26.1(b). Appellant's notice of appeal was filed on January 22, 2010, which is not only untimely as to the November 18, 2009 deadline, but is also outside the fifteen-day period provided by rule 26.3. See Tex. R. App. P. 26.3.
Absent a timely notice of appeal, we have no jurisdiction over the appeal. See In the Interest of K.A.F., A Child, 160 S.W.3d at 928. Accordingly, we grant appellee's motion to dismiss.
The adoption order followed the termination of appellant's parental rights; thus, the initial issue would be the propriety of the termination order. Because we conclude the notice of appeal is untimely as the termination order, we need not address appellant's "standing" to challenge the adoption order.
We dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.