Opinion
Case No. 01 C 8507.
February 12, 2002
ORDER
Plaintiffs, Illinois District Council No. 1 of the International Union of Bricklayers and Allied Craftworkers (the "Union"), as well as Masonry Institute and Local 21 Pension Fund (together, the "Funds"), filed suit against defendant Acuity, A Mutual Company ("Acuity") as surety for Zepeda Construction Services, Inc. ("Zepeda"). Acuity has moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). For the reasons set forth below, Acuity's motion is granted.
Background
The court assumes the following facts to be true. On or around February 3, 1999, the Union and Zepeda entered into a collective bargaining agreement ("CBA"). On or around September 17, 1999, Heritage Mutual Insurance Company ("Heritage") provided a $15,000 bond on behalf of Zepeda to guarantee some of Zepeda's obligations under the CBA. Acuity is a successor to the interests and obligations of Heritage. After a hearing on October 25, 2000, an arbitration panel ruled that Zepeda was liable to, inter alia, the Funds and the Union pursuant to the labor agreement, for $34,969. In or around April 2001, the Union and Zepeda entered into a settlement agreement. When Zepeda violated that agreement, the Union sued and obtained an order on August 24, 2001 that held Zepeda liable. The Union has been unsuccessful in collecting the amounts owed by Zepeda.
On or around July 26, 2001, the Union filed a claim, on behalf of Plaintiffs, with Acuity to recover the amounts owed by Zepeda, based on the bond issued by Heritage. Plaintiffs claim that Acuity is liable for payment to, inter alia, the Funds in the amount of $10,512 and to the Union in the amount of $1,657. However, Acuity has refused to make any payment. Plaintiffs claim that this refusal is a breach of Acuity's contractual obligation under the bond.
Discussion
Acuity has asked this court to dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint on two grounds. First, Acuity argues that this court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to decide this case. Specifically, Acuity argues that jurisdiction cannot be based on § 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 ("LMRA"), because it is not a party to the CBA, nor is it an "employer" within the meaning of the Act. Second, Acuity argues that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Because the court agrees with Acuity on its first ground for dismissal, it need not address whether Plaintiffs have, in fact, stated a cause of action.
Section 301(a) of the LMRA states:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.29 U.S.C. § 185(a). Acuity points to Seventh Circuit case law that states that § 301(a) "does not provide the basis for an LMRA claim against a nonparty to the underlying collective bargaining agreement." Loss v. Blankenship, 673 F.2d 942, 946 (7th Cir. 1982). However, subsequent Supreme Court decisions reveal that the provision creates federal jurisdiction over all claims that are substantially dependent upon analysis of a collective bargaining agreement. Allis-Chalmers v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985). Nevertheless, in numerous cases courts in this district have relied on Loss to dismiss § 301 complaints against non-parties. See Amp-Rite Elec. Co. v. IBEW, 1999 WL 33896, at *3, No. 97-8973 (N.D.Ill. Jan. 15, 1999) (collecting cases). Thus, the issue in this case, where the defendant is not a party to the CBA, is whether the alleged wrongdoing was related to a provision of the collective bargaining agreement. Id. at *3.
In a similar case in this district, the court found it lacked § 301 jurisdiction for the plaintiff union's claim against the employer's surety, which was not a party to the collective bargaining agreement. Chicago Dist. Council of Carpenters Pension Fund v. Safeco Ins. Co., 1995 WL 599059, No. 95 C 369 (N.D.Ill. Oct. 5, 1995). In so holding, the court rejected the union's argument that the court must interpret the collective bargaining agreement.
This court agrees with the holding in Safeco. In this case, it is undisputed that Acuity is not a party to the CBA. In addition, interpretation of the CBA is unnecessary in this case, where an arbitration panel has already held that Zepeda is liable to the Union and the Funds. Instead, the only issue to be resolved in Plaintiffs' claim is whether Acuity is also liable pursuant to the bond agreement. While this determination requires interpretation of the bond agreement, it does not require interpretation of the CBA. Greenblatt v. Delta Plumbing Heating Corp., 68 F.3d 561, 572 (2d Cir. 1995) ("New York Surety's duty to pay upon the bond was a creature of that instrument alone, and thus the district court had no jurisdiction under § 301 to hear this claim."); cf. Amp-Rite, 1999 WL 33896 (holding that national union, which was not a signatory to the collective bargaining agreement, was so closely related to the local union, which was a signatory, that it was a party to the agreement); Sprinkler Fitters Local Union No. 692 v. First Indemnity Ins. Co., 840 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Penn. 1993) (holding that union's claim against surety required interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement where the employer's liability under the agreement had not yet been determined). Unless Plaintiffs can show that Acuity has breached some duty or obligation as required by the CBA, or that Acuity is so closely related to Zepeda that it must be considered a party to the agreement, this court lacks jurisdiction under § 301.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, defendant Acuity's motion to dismiss is granted and plaintiffs' complaint is dismissed without prejudice.