On appeal, we review the trial court's division of community property for an abuse of discretion. Murff v. Murff, 615 S.W.2d 696, 698 (Tex. 1981); Iliff v. Iliff, 339 S.W.3d 126, 133 (Tex. App.—Austin 2009), aff'd, 339 S.W.3d 74 (Tex. 2011); Knight v. Knight, 301 S.W.3d 723, 728 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.). Legal and factual sufficiency are relevant factors, rather than independent bases for reversal, in determining whether the trial court abused its discretion.
Tex. Fam. Code § 153.002; Brook v. Brook, 881 S.W.2d 297, 298 (Tex. 1994). The determination of such issues is "intensely fact driven," Lenz v. Lenz, 79 S.W.3d 10, 19 (Tex. 2002), and we will not disturb a trial court's decisions unless the record shows that the court clearly abused its discretion, Gillespie v. Gillespie, 644 S.W.2d 449, 451 (Tex. 1982); Iliff v. Iliff, 339 S.W.3d 126, 133 (Tex. App.—Austin 2009), aff'd, 339 S.W.3d 74 (Tex. 2011); In re J.R.D., 169 S.W.3d 740, 743 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, pet. denied). We will not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court, Iliff, 339 S.W.3d at 133-34, which is in "a better position to determine what will be in the best interest of the child since it faced the parties and their witnesses, observed their demeanor, and had the opportunity to evaluate the claims made by each parent," J.R.D., 169 S.W.3d at 743.
When reviewing the trial court's modifications, we consider (1) whether the trial court had sufficient information upon which to exercise its discretion, and (2) whether the trial court erred in its application of its discretion based on the evidence before it. See Iliff v. Iliff, 339 S.W.3d 126, 134 (Tex. App.-Austin 2009) aff'd, 339 S.W.3d 74 (Tex. 2011); see Zeifman v. Michels, 212 S.W.3d 582, 588 (Tex. App.-Austin 2006, pet. denied); Echols, 85 S.W.3d at 477-78.
Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 372 (Tex. 1976); Fish v. Lebrie, No. 03-09-00387-CV, 2010 WL 5019411, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin Dec. 10, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.); Harris v. Texas Dep't of Fam. & Protective Servs., 228 S.W.3d 819, 828 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007, no pet.). Best interest and the determination of issues of access to and possession of a child are "intensely fact driven," Lenz v. Lenz, 79 S.W.3d 10, 19 (Tex. 2002), and we will not disturb a trial court's decision unless the record shows that the court clearly abused its discretion, Gillespie v. Gillespie, 644 S.W.2d 449, 451 (Tex. 1982); Iliff v. Iliff, 339 S.W.3d 126, 133 (Tex. App.—Austin 2009), aff'd, 339 S.W.3d 74 (Tex. 2011); In re J.R.D., 169 S.W.3d 740, 743 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, pet. denied). Thus, we uphold a ruling unless the appellant can demonstrate that the trial court acted arbitrarily or unreasonably or without reference to guiding rules and principles.
In cases involving mixed questions of law and fact, we apply a hybrid standard that incorporates elements of both factual and legal standards of review. Delfingen U.S.-Tex., L.P. v. Valenzuela , 407 S.W.3d 791, 799 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2013, no pet.) ; see also , Iliff v. Iliff , 339 S.W.3d 126, 133–34 (Tex. App.—Austin 2009), aff'd , 339 S.W.3d 74 (Tex. 2011) (holding that in considering "issues of child support, division of the marital estate, and child custody, possession, and visitation," appellate courts "employ a hybrid analysis"). Under this standard,
In a divorce, the trial court shall divide the estate of the parties "in a manner that the court deems just and right, having due regard for the rights of each party and any children of the marriage." Tex. Fam. Code § 7.001. We review a trial court's division of the marital estate for abuse of discretion, and the trial court has broad discretion in making its division. See Penick v. Penick, 783 S.W.2d 194, 198 (Tex. 1988); Murff v. Murff, 615 S.W.2d 696, 698 (Tex. 1981); Iliff v. Iliff, 339 S.W.3d 126, 133 (Tex. App.-Austin 2009), aff'd, 339 S.W.3d 74 (Tex. 2011); O'Carolan v. Hopper, 71 S.W.3d 529, 532 (Tex. App.-Austin 2002, no pet.) (O'Carolan I)
The trial court is given "wide latitude" in determining best interest, and its judgment will be reversed only when it appears from the record as a whole that it has abused its discretion. Gillespie v. Gillespie, 644 S.W.2d 449, 451 (Tex. 1982); Iliff v. Iliff, 339 S.W.3d 126, 133 (Tex. App.—Austin 2009), aff'd 339 S.W.3d 74 (Tex. 2011). "There is no abuse of discretion if some probative and substantive evidence supports the trial court's order."
In cases involving mixed questions of law and fact, we apply a hybrid standard that incorporates elements of both factual and legal standards of review. Delfingen U.S.-Tex., L.P. v. Valenzuela , 407 S.W.3d 791, 799 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2013, no pet.) ; see alsoIliff v. Iliff , 339 S.W.3d 126, 133-34 (Tex. App.—Austin 2009), aff'd , 339 S.W.3d 74 (Tex. 2011) (holding that in considering "issues of child support, division of the marital estate, and child custody, possession, and visitation," appellate courts "employ a hybrid analysis"). Under this standard,
A trial court must make a just and right division of the marital estate upon divorce. See Tex. Fam. Code § 7.001; Iliff v. Iliff, 339 S.W.3d 126, 133 (Tex. App.—Austin 2009), aff'd, 339 S.W.3d 74 (Tex. 2011). We review a trial court's division of the marital estate for an abuse of discretion.
Findings of fact issued by the trial court in a bench trial have the same force and dignity as a jury's verdict upon special issues; but the findings are not conclusive when a complete statement of facts appears in the record. Middleton v. Kawasaki Steel Corp., 687 S.W.2d 42, 44 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Iliff v. Iliff, 339 S.W.3d 126, 134 (Tex. App.—Austin 2009), aff'd, 339 S.W.3d 74 (Tex. 2011) ("In an appeal after a bench trial in which the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court's findings have the same weight as a jury verdict . . . . When challenged, we review the trial court's findings for legal and factual sufficiency."); see also Gordon v. Gordon, No. 14-10-01031-CV, 2011 WL 5926723, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Nov. 29, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.). Therefore, we apply the same standards when reviewing the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court's findings of fact as we do when reviewing the evidence supporting a jury's answer to a special issue.