Both courts and commentators agree that sanctions may be imposed for a party's unexcused failure to comply with a Rule 16 order, even if that failure was not made in bad faith. See id.; Ayers v. City of Richmond, 895 F.2d at 1270 (9th Cir.1990) (affirming sanction of lawyer for failure to attend settlement conference because "the date 'slipped by him'"); Ford v. Alfaro, 785 F.2d 835, 839-40 (9th Cir. 1986) (upholding sanction imposed for failure to file a pretrial statement and to attend a pretrial hearing); Ikerd v. Lacy, 852 F.2d 1256, 1258-59 (10th Cir. 1988) ("Neither contumacious attitude nor chronic failure is a necessary threshold to the imposition of sanctions."); Harrell v. United States, 117 F.R.D. 86, 88 (E.D.N.C. 1987) ("Improper motive, bad-faith, even reckless behavior, is not a prerequisite for finding a violation of [a] Rule [16 order]"); William W. Schwarzer, et al., California Practice Guide: Federal Civil Procedure Before Trial § 15:81 (TRG 1994) ("Negligent failure to comply with Rule 16 justifies imposition of appropriate sanctions.") (emphasis in original); 6A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1531 (1990) ("The fact that a pretrial order was violated is sufficient to allow some sanction"). The Court may issue sanctions pursuant to Rule 16(f) for failure to comply with an order scheduling an ENE.

Dr. Rains argues that the court "lacked the authority" to enter default judgment on the full amount of liability for failure to comply with the terms of the settlement agreement. A court's determination to enter default judgment is reviewed for abuse of discretion. National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 642, 96 S.Ct. 2778, 2780, 49 L.Ed.2d 747 (1976); Ikerd v. Lacy, 852 F.2d 1256, 1258 (10th Cir. 1988). Abuse of discretion will be found only if the reviewing court has "a definite and firm conviction that the court below committed a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached upon a weighing of the relevant factors."

We contrast these cases and our own case with those in which other circuits have affirmed dismissals. See Ikerd v. Lacy, 852 F.2d 1256 (10th Cir. 1988) (not abuse of discretion to dismiss without prejudice and to fine attorney $500 if case refiled for failure to appear at pretrial conference); Sherman v. United States, 801 F.2d 1133 (9th Cir. 1986) (not abuse of discretion to dismiss where party disregarded court order actively to prosecute related case pending in tax court where action would have resolved dispute in district court case); Goforth v. Owens, 766 F.2d 1533 (11th Cir. 1985) (dismissal appropriate under both 41(b) and 16(f) where there were repeated delays and failures to appear at conference, submit preliminary statement and appear at trial); Bomate v. Ford Motor Co., 761 F.2d 713 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (affirming dismissal where plaintiff failed to appear at pretrial conference after repeated delays in discovery, explicit warnings by court and earlier motions for dismissal); Callip v. Harris County Child Welfare Dept., 757 F.2d 1513 (5th Cir. 1985) (dismissal proper where there was a clear record of delay and where there was

Movant-appellant John Claro, an attorney, challenges the district court's sua sponte imposition of sanctions upon him for violating Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 16(f) during trial of a legal malpractice action. Reviewing the district court's determination under an abuse of discretion standard, Cooter Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., ___ U.S. ___, 110 S.Ct. 2447, 2461, 110 L.Ed.2d 359 (1990) (Rule 11 standard); Ikerd v. Lacy, 852 F.2d 1256, 1258 (10th Cir. 1988) (Rule 16(f) standard), we sustain the Rule 16(f) sanction as lawfully imposed, but vacate the Rule 11 sanction for want of procedural due process. As a preliminary matter, before us is Claro's motion to supplement the record on appeal with the deposition testimony of his client, Glenn Beadle, taken on April 15 and June 3, 1988.

In re Baker, 744 F.2d at 1442. See also Ikerd v. Lacy, 852 F.2d 1256, 1259 (10th Cir. 1988). However, in the absence of a finding of bad faith, there must be a sufficient nexus between noncompliance with the rules and the amount of fees and expenses awarded as a sanction.

It is firmly established that sanctions may be imposed for a party's unexcused failure to comply with a Rule 16 order, even if that failure was not made in bad faith. See id.; Ayers v. City of Richmond, 895 F.2d at 1270 (9th Cir. 1990) (affirming sanction of lawyer for failure to attend settlement conference because "the date 'slipped by him'"); Ford v. Alfaro, 785 F.2d 835, 839-40 (9th Cir. 1986) (upholding sanction imposed for failure to file a pretrial statement and to attend a pretrial hearing); Ikerd v. Lacy, 852 F.2d 1256, 1258-59 (10th Cir. 1988) ("Neither contumacious attitude nor chronic failure is a necessary threshold to the imposition of sanctions."). The Court may issue sanctions pursuant to Rule 16(f) for failure to comply with a settlement conference order.

Both courts and commentators agree that sanctions may be imposed for a party's unexcused failure to comply with a Rule 16 order, even if that failure was not made in bad faith. See id.; Ayers v. City of Richmond, 895 F.2d at 1270 (9th Cir.1990) (affirming sanction of lawyer for failure to attend settlement conference because "the date 'slipped by him'"); Ford v. Alfaro, 785 F.2d 835, 839-40 (9th Cir. 1986) (upholding sanction imposed for failure to file a pretrial statement and to attend a pretrial hearing); Ikerd v. Lacy, 852 F.2d 1256, 1258-59 (10th Cir. 1988) ("Neither contumacious attitude nor chronic failure is a necessary threshold to the imposition of sanctions."); Harrell v. United States, 117 F.R.D. 86, 88 (E.D.N.C. 1987) ("Improper motive, bad-faith, even reckless behavior, is not a prerequisite for finding a violation of [a] Rule [16 order]"); William W. Schwarzer, et al., California Practice Guide: FederalCivil Procedure Before Trial § 15:81 (TRG 1994) ("Negligent failure to comply with Rule 16 justifies imposition of appropriate sanctions.") (emphasis in original); 6A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1531 (1990) ("The fact that a pretrial order was violated is sufficient to allow some sanction."). The Court may issue sanctions pursuant to Rule 16(f) for failure to comply with a settlement conference order.

Both courts and commentators agree that sanctions may be imposed for a party's unexcused failure to comply with a Rule 16 order, even if that failure was not made in bad faith. Id .; citing Ayers v. City of Richmond, 895 F.2d 1267, 1270 (9th Cir.1990) (affirming sanction of lawyer for failure to attend settlement conference because "the date slipped by him'"); Ford v. Alfaro, 785 F.2d 835, 839-40 (9th Cir.1986) (upholding sanction imposed for failure to file a pretrial statement and to attend a pretrial hearing); Ikerd v. Lacy, 852 F.2d 1256, 1258-59 (10th Cir. 1988) ("Neither contumacious attitude nor chronic failure is a necessary threshold to the imposition of sanctions"); Harrell v. United States, 117 F.R.D. 86, 88 (E.D. N.C. 1987) ("Improper motive, bad-faith, even reckless behavior, is not a prerequisite for finding a violation of [a] Rule [16 order]").

Sanctions may be imposed for a party's unexcused failure to comply with a Rule 16 order, even if that failure was not made in bad faith. See Ayers v. City of Richmond, 895 F.2d 1267, 1270 (9th Cir. 1990) (affirming sanction of lawyer for failure to attend settlement conference because "the date 'slipped by him'"); Ikerd v. Lacy, 852 F.2d 1256, 1258-59 (10th Cir. 1988) ("Neither contumacious attitude nor chronic failure is a necessary threshold to the imposition of sanctions."); Harrell v. United States, 117 F.R.D. 86, 88 (E.D.N.C. 1987) ("Improper motive, bad-faith, even reckless behavior, is not a prerequisite for finding a violation of [a] Rule [16 order])"). Here, FRT was legally prohibited, pursuant to California Revenue and Taxation Code § 23301, from proceeding to trial as set by court order issued on November 15, 2013.

That said, the fact remains that plaintiff has not filed his PNS and that the trial is scheduled for July 1, 2014. Also relevant is plaintiff's failure to offer a satisfactory reason as to why he did not submit and, to this date, has not submitted his PNS. See Ikerd v. Lacy, 852 F.2d 1256, 1259 (10th Cir. 1988) ("[B]eing busy in another case does not justify missing a scheduled [deadline]."). The warning as to the consequences of plaintiff's failure to file a PNS could not have been more explicit: