Proof of those allegations would establish a conversion. ( Lewis v. Ocean Navigation Pier Co., 125 N.Y. 341; Reich v. Cochran, 114 App. Div. 141; Ide v. Finn, 196 App. Div. 304. ) In Lewis v. Ocean Navigation and Pier Company ( supra) the tenant had the right to remove certain buildings after the expiration of his lease.

Where the landlord elects to have the tenant's property removed from the premises and the property is capable of being moved, the marshal must hire a bonded moving company licensed by the New York State Department of Transportation to move the property to a bonded warehouse at the landlord's expense (id.). In that instance, the landlord is entitled to recover reasonable expenses incurred from the tenant (see Ide v Finn, 196 AD 304 [1st Dept 1921]). A marshal is not permitted to remove any property attached to the realty that would cause damage to the realty if removed (see New York City Marshals Handbook of Regulations, Chap IV, § 6-6[d]).

In the cases cited by plaintiff on this issue, the tenant was under an express duty to remove possessions from the property. Abrams v. Sherwin, 86 Pa. Super. 189 (1925); Ide v. Finn, 196 App. Div. 304, 187 N.Y.S. 202 (1921); Mott. Pipe Supply Corp. v. Blue Ridge Coal Corp., 208 Misc. 601, 146 N YS.2d 607 (N.Y.Mun.Ct. 1955). In the case at bar, defendant had no express obligation to remove the debris; rather, Schiavo had only an implied duty with which, we have found, it complied.

However, if the landlord actively participates in removing the tenant's property from the premises, or if he assumes possession or control of the tenant's property after the writ of restitution has been executed, a bailment is created between the landlord and the tenant which may subject the landlord to liability for damage to the tenant's property. See Ide v. Finn, 196 A.D. 304, 187 N.Y.S. 202 (1921) III.

Neither the landlord nor the law firm could be held liable for any damage caused by the marshal who executed the repossession. "Generally, a landlord `is not responsible for the manner in which an officer executes a valid process duly issued . . . the officer only becomes his agent where the process is irregular, unauthorized or void'" ( Mayes, 280 AD2d at 157, quoting Ide v. Finn, 196 App Div 304, 314-315). Nor could the law firm be held liable for the acts of the marshal on the theory that the marshal was acting on its behalf.

Whether plaintiffs' eviction on an invalid warrant was deliberate or inadvertent, there is no question that neither the landlord nor its attorneys can evade responsibility for the wrongful eviction. Generally, a landlord "is not responsible for the manner in which an officer executes a valid process duly issued * * * the officer only becomes his agent where the process is irregular, unauthorized or void" (Ide v. Finn, 196 App. Div. 304, 314-315; see also, Campbell v. Maslin, 91 A.D.2d 559, 560, affd 59 N.Y.2d 722 for reasons stated below). Civil Court has ruled that plaintiff tenant was wrongfully evicted from her apartment based upon a void warrant.

Pursuant to a November 1990 stipulation of settlement in a summary proceeding, plaintiff tenant agreed to the entry of a judgment of possession in exchange for a stay of that judgment's execution until March 1991. While plaintiff vacated in early 1991, it chose, for reasons not reflected in the record, not to take its personal property, office equipment and files, which plaintiff now claims, in this action to recover for the loss of the property left at the premises, commenced more than seven years subsequent to plaintiff's vacatur, to be worth more than $200,000. Inasmuch as plaintiff's eviction was undisputedly carried out in accordance with a duly issued warrant, defendant, as landlord, is not liable to plaintiff tenant for damage, if any, caused by the marshal (Campbell v. Maslin, 91 A.D.2d 559, affd 59 N.Y.2d 722; see also, Ide v. Finn, 196 App. Div. 304). Accordingly, plaintiff's complaint fails to state a cause of action against defendant. Additionally, defendant was not and could not have been deemed a constructive bailee of plaintiff's property.

1876 CCP § 2251. In Ide v Finn, 196 App. Div. 304 (1st Dept 1921), the Court advised that with respect to a warrant issued in a summary proceeding pursuant to 1876 CCP § 2251 (the provisions of which are nearly identical to the provisions of RPAPL § 749), a marshal is authorized and required to effect the removal of the personal property of a tenant. Ide, at pp 310-312.

Regrettably, it failed to do so. When an eviction is carried out in accordance with a duly issued warrant, a landlord is not liable to the tenant for any damage caused by the marshal ( Ide v Finn, 196 App. Div. 304). At pages 314-315 of the Ide decision this court unanimously held: "It is the general rule that a party [landlord] is not responsible for the manner in which an officer executes a valid process duly issued and * * * the officer only becomes his agent where the process is irregular, unauthorized or void." In the instant case it is undisputed by plaintiff that the marshal executed a validly obtained warrant of eviction.

The process was valid, and the defendant is not responsible for the manner of its execution by the city marshal. ( Ide v. Finn, 196 App. Div. 304.)