” Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit has stated that channels of interstate commerce include “highways, railroads, navigable waters, and airspace." United States v. Ballinger, 395 F.3d 1218, 1225-26 (11th Cir. 2005) (emphasis added); see also Ickes v. F.A.A., 299 F.3d 260, 263 (3d Cir. 2002) (“It is beyond dispute that Congress's power over interstate commerce includes the power to regulate use of the nation's navigable airspace, which is a channel of interstate commerce.").

See, e.g ., Brendlin v. California , 551 U.S. 249, 253, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007) ("unlawful operation of the car"); Kansas v. Colorado , 533 U.S. 1, 7, 121 S.Ct. 2023, 150 L.Ed.2d 72 (2001) ("improper operation" of "drainage ditches"); Jeffers v. United States , 432 U.S. 137, 149, n. 14, 97 S.Ct. 2207, 53 L.Ed.2d 168 (1977) (plurality opinion) ("unlawful operation of motor carriers"); Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Willard , 220 U.S. 413, 424, 31 S.Ct. 460, 55 L.Ed. 521 (1911) ("unlawful operation of a railway"); United States v. Medford , 661 F.3d 746, 747 (CA4 2011) ("unlawful operation of video poker machines"); In re Dillon , 138 Fed.Appx. 609, 611 (CA5 2005) ("unlawful operation of public water utilities"); Cadillac/Oldsmobile/Nissan Center, Inc. v. General Motors Corp. , 391 F.3d 304, 311 (CA1 2004) ("unlawful operation of [auto dealership]"); Ickes v. FAA , 299 F.3d 260, 265–266 (CA3 2002) (per curiam ) ("unlawful operation of [airplane]"); Williams v. Panetta , 70 F.3d 110, 1995 WL 686128, *1 (CA1 1995) (per curiam ) ("unlawful operation of a ‘megawatt’ CB radio"); Cox Cable Tucson, Inc. v. Ladd , 795 F.2d 1479, 1485 (CA9 1986) ("unlawful operation of its CATV cable systems" (internal quotation marks omitted)). If cars, trucks, railroads, water utilities, drainage ditches, auto dealerships, planes, radios, video poker machines, cable TV systems, and many other things can be unlawfully or improperly operated, it is not apparent why the same cannot be said of a statute.

The Third Circuit has held: "It is beyond dispute that Congress's power over interstate commerce includes the power to regulate use of the nation's navigable airspace, which is a channel of interstate commerce." Ickes v. FAA, 299 F.3d 260, 263 (3d Cir. 2002) (rejecting petitioner's challenge that "his flights [were] purely an intrastate recreational activity"); see also Gorman v. Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., 558 F.3d 580, 586 (D.C. Cir. 2009). We conclude the same.

When courts do review such orders, the findings of fact made by the TSA are conclusive, if supported by substantial evidence. 49 U.S.C. § 46110(c) ; Ickes v. F.A.A. , 299 F.3d 260, 264 (3d Cir. 2002). Another reason to believe that Congress may have thought about whether to permit suits against TSA employees and chose not to do so is because it decided to insulate from review personnel decisions regarding those employees.

"Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion . . . taking into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight." Ickes v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 299 F.3d 260, 264 (3d Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). "The agency's factual findings 'may be supported by substantial evidence even though a plausible alternative interpretation of the evidence would support a contrary view.'"

The face of the statute expressly provides that `air commerce' includes 'any operation or navigation of aircraft which directly affects, or which may endanger safety in, interstate, overseas, or foreign air commerce.'") (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 1301(4)) (emphasis by Hill court); Ickes v. FAA, 299 F.3d 260, 263 (3d Cir. 2002) (rejecting Commerce Clause challenge to regulation of purely recreational and intrastate flights on grounds that "Congress's power over interstate commerce includes the power to regulate use of the nation's navigable airspace, which is a channel of interstate commerce" and "because airplanes constitute instrumentalities of interstate commerce, any threat to them . . . is properly subjected to regulation even if the threat comes from a purely intrastate activity") (internal citations omitted). The language "may endanger" also makes clear that to come within the regulation, it is not necessary that an airplane actually pose a demonstrable threat, as Gorman suggests.

"Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion . . . taking into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight." Ickes v. F.A.A, 299 F.3d 260, 264 (3d Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), see also Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y v. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197, 217, 59 S.Ct. 206, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938). Furthermore, "we must rely on the ability of the hearing officer to make judgments on witnesses' credibility."

Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613 n. 5, 120 S.Ct. 1740 (quoting United States v. Lankford, 196 F.3d 563, 571-572 (5th Cir. 1999)). These channels include highways,see, e.g., Pierce County v. Guillen, 537 U.S. 129, 147, 123 S.Ct. 720, 154 L.Ed.2d 610 (2003); United States v. Pappadopoulos, 64 F.3d 522, 527 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. New BuffaloAmusement Corp., 600 F.2d 368, 391 n. 4 (2d Cir. 1979), railroads, navigable waters, and airspace, see, e.g., Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508, 516-18, 61 S.Ct. 1050, 85 L.Ed. 1487 (1941); Escanaba Lake Mich. Transp. Co. v. City of Chicago, 107 U.S. 678, 682, 17 Otto 678, 2 S.Ct. 185, 27 L.Ed. 442 (1883); United States v. Ho, 311 F.3d 589, 597 (5th Cir. 2002); Ickes v. FAA, 299 F.3d 260, 263 (3d Cir. 2002); Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 490-91 (4th Cir. 2000), as well as telecommunications networks, see, e.g., Ho, 311 F.3d at 597; Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 490-91, and national securities markets, see, e.g., Riley v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner Smith, Inc., 292 F.3d 1334, 1347 (11th Cir. 2002). We characterize highways as channels of commerce, since they are routes for the interstate transportation of people and goods.

The Airlines emphasize that they are instrumentalities of interstate commerce and therefore should not be subject to local regulation. See Ickes v. F.A.A. , 299 F.3d 260, 263 (3d Cir. 2002). But such instrumentalities are not automatically beyond the reach of all state regulation.

With respect to the second prong, "Congress regulates the ‘instrumentalities’ of commerce when it passes legislation that directs or inhibits the vehicles of economic activity—e.g., airplanes, steamships, automobiles, trains—or interstate means of communication—e.g., mail and wires." Reed , 2017 WL 3208458, at *8 (citing Hous.E. & W. Tex. Ry. v. United States , 234 U.S. 342, 353–54, 34 S.Ct. 833, 58 L.Ed. 1341 (1914) ; Ickes v. FAA , 299 F.3d 260, 263 (3d Cir. 2002) (per curiam) ). The government argues that Park's U.S. passports and temporary visas are "instrumentalities" of commerce and that he utilized "interstate means of communication" to obtain these documents.