Opinion
CIVIL NO. 98-2307 (JBS).
December 30, 1998
Robert F. O'Brien, Esq., Patricia A. Barasch, Esq., TOMAR, SIMONOFF, ADOURIAN, O'BRIEN, KAPLAN, JACOBY GRAZIANO Cherry Hill, New Jersey, Attorneys for Plaintiffs.
Peter A. Gold, Esq., Jonathan M. Korn, Esq., BLANK ROME COMISKY MCCAULEY LLP, Woodland Falls Corporate Park, Cherry Hill, New Jersey, Attorneys for Defendant.
O P I N I O N
Plaintiffs, the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local Union No. 351 and William Hosey, filed this action in lieu of prerogative writs pursuant to the New Jersey Right to Know Act, N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1, et seq., and New Jersey common law, to obtain access to and copies of certified payroll records relating to certain construction work being carried out by defendant, the Delaware River Port Authority, for the PATCO High Speed Line project. Plaintiffs filed their Complaint on March 25, 1998, in New Jersey Superior Court, Law Division, Camden County. Defendant removed the case to this Court on May 13, 1998, claiming original federal question jurisdiction. Now before the Court are three motions: plaintiffs' motion to remand the case back to state court for lack of federal jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), plaintiffs' motion for reasonable attorneys' fees and costs "incurred as a result of the removal" pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), and defendant's motion for summary judgment. For the reasons stated herein, plaintiffs' motion for remand will be granted, but their motion for fees and costs will be denied. As this Court finds that it lacks jurisdiction over the case, defendant's motion for summary judgment is not properly addressable by this Court.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Parties
Defendant, the Delaware River Port Authority ("DRPA"), is a Congressionally-approved bi-state public corporate instrumentality of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the State of New Jersey. (Def.'s Br. Opp'n Remand at 2.) It was created as the Delaware River Joint Commission in 1931 pursuant to the Compact Clause of Article I of the United States Constitution, and it was approved by Congress in 1932. (Id.) Its name changed to the Delaware River Port Authority in 1951, but its authorization — to build bridges, establish connecting roads, and provide transportation services within the Delaware River port district — remained the same. (Id. at 3.)
Many of the facts in this case are in dispute. However, for the purposes of this Opinion, the Court will assume the facts as plead in the Complaint to be true. While a summary judgment decision is made on the basis of affidavits and other evidence, a decision to remand is based upon a finding that, on the face of a plaintiff's well-pleaded complaint, there are no grounds for federal court jurisdiction. Because I find that remand is proper and thus do not reach the merits of defendant's summary judgment motion, it is sufficient to rely on the facts as plead in the Complaint. Where necessary to elucidate certain aspects of this case's background, the facts as plead in the complaint will be supplemented by facts about which the parties have agreed in their briefs supporting and opposing remand. Nothing in this Opinion shall be deemed to establish conclusive findings of fact.
Plaintiffs in this case are the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local Union No. 351 ("Local 351") and William R. Hosey. Local 351 is an unincorporated labor organization representing members throughout Southern New Jersey. (Compl. ¶ 3.) Hosey, an individual who resides in Camden County, New Jersey, is a member of Local 351. (Id. at ¶ 4.)
B. The Underlying Facts
The facts giving rise to this lawsuit arise from the DRPA's construction and renovation work on the PATCO High Speed Line that runs through Camden County, extending from Philadelphia to Lindenwold, New Jersey, which was scheduled to take place between April 1997 and August 1998. (Compl. ¶¶ 6-7.) Plaintiffs requested from DRPA access to and copies of the certified payroll records of contractors performing construction work on the PATCO High Speed Line Project, as well as copies of the prevailing wage rates established for the project and the bid proposals received from contractors. (Id. at ¶ 10.) According to plaintiffs, they requested this information for the purpose of ensuring compliance with the New Jersey Prevailing Wage Act, N.J.S.A. 47:14-1, et seq., and other relevant state and federal statutes. (Id. at ¶ 11.) Defendant has denied plaintiffs' requests for this information and records. (Id. at ¶ 12.)
According to plaintiffs, defendant is obligated to maintain and make available to the public these records due to the New Jersey Prevailing Wages Act, N.J.S.A. 47:14-1, et seq., and the regulations promulgated thereunder at N.J.A.C. 12:60-6.1. (Pls.' Br. Supp. Remand at 3-4.) On March 25, 1998, plaintiffs filed a Complaint in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Camden County, charging that defendant's denial of their requests for these alleged public records violated both the New Jersey Right to Know Act, N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1, et seq., and New Jersey common law. (Compl. ¶¶ 13, 16.) The Complaint seeks an order compelling DRPA to turn over to plaintiffs all public records relating to the PATCO High Speed Line Project, including bid proposals, certified payroll records submitted by contractors, and the prevailing wage determination for the project, as well as the costs of suit and reasonable attorneys' fees. (Compl. at 4, 5.)
On May 31, 1998, defendant removed the case to this Court, claiming original federal question jurisdiction over this matter. Defendant claims that DRPA, as a bi-state instrumentality created by interstate compact, is immune from the constitutional, statutory, and common law burdens and obligations of either New Jersey or Pennsylvania unless provided by the Compact, or unless both states consent to the application thereof by enacting similar laws imposing such an obligation. (Notice of Removal ¶ 6.) According to defendant, an interpretation of the language of the DRPA Compact would be "crucial to answer the threshold federal question of whether the United States Congress has approved of, and New Jersey and Pennsylvania have consented to, the production by DRPA of the information and records in dispute." (Id. at ¶ 7.) In June 1998, plaintiffs filed a motion seeking remand to the Superior Court of New Jersey, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447, for lack of federal court jurisdiction. Plaintiffs also seek reasonable fees and expenses incurred as a result of removal. The remand and fee motions are now before this Court, as is defendant's motion for summary judgment, filed in November 1998.
II. DISCUSSION
Defendants removed this matter to the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b), claiming federal subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 on the grounds that the plaintiffs' complaint states claims "arising under" Art. I., § 10, cl. 3 of the United States Constitution (the Compact Clause). Defendants argue that resolution of plaintiffs' New Jersey state law claims will necessarily require the Court to interpret the DRPA Compact between New Jersey and Pennsylvania, and thus there is federal question jurisdiction over this matter. Defendants are incorrect. As explained below, the Court finds that an interpretation of the Compact is not necessarily a part of the plaintiff's cause of action, even if such interpretation is likely to occur as a result of defenses raised by DRPA, and thus no federal question jurisdiction exists.
A. Whether a Federal Question Jurisdiction Exists
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), a plaintiff may move to have a case remanded to the state court from which it was removed on the basis of lack of subject matter jurisdiction at any time before final judgment. Where removal is predicated on federal question jurisdiction, remand is proper where the plaintiff's claim does not "arise under" federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
To determine whether a case "arises under" federal law, a court must look to the allegations on the face of the plaintiff's "well pleaded complaint." Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63 (1987) ; Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 10 (1983). Lower federal courts have jurisdiction to hear "only those cases in which a well-pleaded complaint establishes either that federal law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff's right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law." Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 27-28. Further, the federal law under which a claim arises must be a direct and essential element of the cause of action in order to establish federal question jurisdiction. Id. at 10-11. A case may not be removed to federal court on the basis of a federal defense, even if the defense is anticipated and discussed in the plaintiff's complaint, and even if both parties concede that the federal defense is the only question truly at issue. See Rivet v. Regions Bank of Louisiana, 522 U.S. 470, 118 S.Ct. 921, 925 (1998); Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 393 (1987); Louisville Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908); Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 12.
Although the court should look to the complaint in determining whether the claim arises under federal law, a plaintiff should not be permitted to use "artful pleading" to close off a defendant's right to a federal forum where the real nature of the claim is federal. See Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 397 n. 2 (1981). Otherwise, the plaintiff is the "master of the claim" and can avoid federal jurisdiction by "exclusive reliance on state law." Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 392. "[A] defendant cannot, merely by injecting a federal question into an action that asserts what is plainly a state-law claim, transform the action into one arising under federal law, thereby selecting the forum in which the claim shall be litigated." Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 399.
The burden of proving federal jurisdiction rests on the party asserting it, here, the defendants. See Abels v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 770 F.2d 26, 29 (3d Cir. 1985) (citing Pulman Co. v. Jenkins, 305 U.S. 534, 537, 540 (1939)). The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has cautioned that "[b]ecause lack of jurisdiction would make any decree in the case void and the continuation of the litigation in federal court futile, the removal statute should be strictly construed and all doubts should be resolved in favor of remand." Id. at 29 (citing 14 C. Wright, A. Miller E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3642, at 149 (2d ed. 1985)). This Court, applying the well-pleaded complaint rule, finds that defendants have not met their burden of establishing federal question jurisdiction, since the relief requested by plaintiffs in their complaint does not necessarily depend upon the resolution of a substantial question of federal law, but rather involves pure state law causes of action. That federal questions are almost certain to be the primary source of debate in this case due to anticipated defenses is of no matter.
In this case, plaintiffs' claims arise under New Jersey state law: the New Jersey Right to Know Act, N.J.S.A. 47-1A-1, et seq., and New Jersey common law. Defendant argues that federal question jurisdiction exists because the DRPA, as a Congressionally-approved bi-state entity established pursuant to a Compact between Pennsylvania and New Jersey, "is immune from the constitutional, statutory and common law burdens and obligations of either New Jersey or Pennsylvania unless provided for by the Compact, or unless both states consent to the application thereof." (Notice of Removal ¶ 6.) According to defendant, the Court must necessarily analyze "the federal compact to determine if there is an exception to the prohibition of the unilateral application of laws adopted by only one of the creator states." (Def.'s Br. Opp'n Remand at 4-5.) In short, defendant contends that it is plaintiffs' burden to prove that the DRPA may be held liable to following the New Jersey Right to Know Act and related state common law because either the Compact requires it, or because both states have consented to such a waiver of immunity.
Defendant's belief that an interpretation of the DRPA Compact raises a federal question is correct, and, indeed, plaintiffs do not quarrel with defendant's recitation of the law in this regard. In creating the DRPA Compact, both creator States' statutes authorized the DRPA to undertake only those activities and operations which have been approved by both States in their enabling and effecting legislation. The Compact states that "[t]he Commission shall also have such additional powers as may herefore be delegated to or imposed upon it from time to time by the action of either State concurred in by legislation of the other." N.J.S.A. 32:3-5 and Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 36, § 3503 (emphasis added). To a large extent, the DRPA's defense in this case is that the DRPA Compact did not obligate it to make the requested information public, and that Pennsylvania did not consent to the unilateral application of New Jersey law in this regard by passing its own similar legislation. (Def.'s Br. Supp. Summ. J. at 11-39.) For a court to determine if this defense is correct, the court must necessarily interpret the Compact. As congressional consent transforms an interstate compact into a law of the United States, Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 438 (1981), and as the construction of an interstate compact approved by Congress presents a federal question under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, see id.; Petty v. Tennessee Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275, 278 (1959) ; Pievsky v. Thomas R. Ridge, 98 F.3d 730, 733 (3d Cir. 1996) (specifically extending this analysis to the DRPA), this would necessarily present a federal question.
However, though an interpretation of this Compact necessarily would raise a federal question, that interpretation is not a necessary part of the plaintiffs' causes of action. Plaintiffs are not arguing that the Compact obligates defendant to give them access to the payroll, prevailing wage, and bid proposal information; rather, they are arguing that New Jersey law does. The need to interpret the Compact arises only because of the defenses raised, and not on the face of the plaintiffs' well pleaded complaint.
This would be a different situation if the plaintiffs were claiming that the Compact itself requires defendant to take certain actions. See, e.g., Cuyler, 449 U.S. 433 (plaintiff claimed civil rights violations during transfer of prisoners from Pennsylvania to New Jersey pursuant to the Interstate Agreement on Detainers; thus, an interpretation of Interstate Agreement was necessarily a part of plaintiff's cause of action) ; Pievsky, 98 F.3d 730 (DRPA commissioner plaintiff sought to enjoin governor from dismissing him from his position prior to the expiration of his term; as plaintiff's claim itself, rather than defendant's defense, depended on contention that the Compact did not allow such an action, it was plaintiff's burden to prove that Compact prohibited this). In that situation, a federal question would be presented by the complaint itself. Here, however, plaintiffs have stated two state law claims. Those state law claims do not depend on an interpretation of federal law.
To win their Right to Know Act claim, plaintiffs must prove that they requested to "inspect copy or purchase records `required by law to be made, maintained, or kept on file'" by a public body or official. Home News v. State, Department of Health, 144 N.J. 446, 453 (1996) (quoting N.J.S.A. 47-1A-2). Elements of this cause of action include proving that: the plaintiffs are New Jersey citizens, that they made a request, that the request was denied by a public body or official, and that the records which they requested were required to be kept by law. To win their New Jersey common law claim, plaintiffs must prove: (1) that they requested documents "made by public officers in the exercise of public functions," State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 273 (1997) (quoting Nero v. Hyland, 76 N.J. 213, 222 (1978)); (2) that they have the requisite interest in those documents; and (3) that their interest is stronger than the DRPA's interest in preventing disclosure. See Higg-A-Rella, Inc. v. County of Essex, 141 N.J. 35, 46 (1995);Shuttleworth v. City of Camden, 258 N.J. Super. 573, 582 (App.Div.),cert. denied, 133 N.J. 429 (1992). Proving that no other compact, statute, or case law prevents the requested relief is not an element of either of these two state causes of action. Rather, the converse — proof that some compact, statute, or case law does prevent the sought relief — is one of the defenses available to the DRPA. That may well be a crucial issue in this case, but it is nonetheless only a defense and not an element of what are clearly state causes of action.
Plaintiffs' New Jersey Prevailing Wages Act, N.J.S.A. 47:14-1, et seq . , argument is a subset of this argument; essentially, plaintiffs contend that it is this Act which shows that the records which they requested are public records required to be kept.
This Opinion makes no determination of whether plaintiffs can meet the elements of those two causes of action.
Because no federal question exists on the face of plaintiffs' well pleaded complaint, and because there is no other basis for federal district court jurisdiction over this case, removal of this action to this Court was improper. Accordingly, plaintiffs' motion to remand this case to the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Camden County, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) will be granted.
B. Plaintiffs' Request for Reasonable Fees and Costs
The plaintiffs also request that this Court award it costs and fees pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Section 1447(c) provides in pertinent part that "[a]n order remanding the case may require payment of just costs and any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the removal." The statute gives this Court broad discretion to determine when such an award is appropriate. See Mints v. Educational Testing Service, 99 F.3d 1253, 1260 (3d Cir. 1996); Newton v. Tavani, 962 F. Supp. 45, 48 (D.N.J. 1997).
An award of fees is appropriate when the basis for the removal pe tition is insubstantial, see, e.g., Mints, 99 F.3d at 1261, or where the nonremovability of the action is fairly obvious or would be after minimal research. Newton, 962 F. Supp. at 48; Little League Baseball, Inc. v. Welsh Publishing Group, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 648, 656 (M.D.Pa. 1995);Ingemi v. Pelino Lentz, 866 F. Supp. 156, 163 (D.N.J. 1994). However, where a matter raises "difficult legal issues involving complex statutory parameters," for example, an award of attorneys' fees is not warranted.Newton, 962 F. Supp. at 48.
Here, while defendant was incorrect to remove the case to this Court, its argument that federal question jurisdiction exists is not irrational. A number of DRPA cases have held that removal was proper because the case would necessarily involve interpretation of the DRPA Compact. While I find that these cases are distinguishable and that federal question jurisdiction is thus not warranted, defendant's argument is not implausible or insubstantial. Accordingly, plaintiffs' motion for costs and fees incurred as a result of removal will be denied.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs' motion for remand pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) will be granted. Accordingly, defendant DRPA's motion for summary judgment is not properly before this Court, and that motion is dismissed as moot. Moreover, plaintiffs' motion for payment of fees and costs pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) will be denied. The accompanying Order is entered.
ORDER FOR REMAND
This matter having come before the Court upon the motions of plaintiffs, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local Union No. 351 and William Hosey, for remand to state court and for payment of fees and costs "incurred as a result of the removal" pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447, and upon the motion of defendant, Delaware River Port Authority, for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56, Fed.R.Civ.P.; and the Court have considered the parties' submissions; and for the reasons stated in the Opinion of today's date;
IT IS this 30th day of December, 1998, hereby
ORDERED that plaintiffs' motion for remand to state court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447 be, and hereby is, GRANTED, and this case is remanded to the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Camden County, Docket No. CAM-L-2482-98; and it is
ORDERED that plaintiffs' motion for attorneys fees and expenses "incurred as a result of the removal" be, and hereby is, DENIED; and it is
ORDERED that defendant's motion for summary judgment be, and hereby is, DISMISSED AS MOOT without prejudice to renewal in the Superior Court of New Jersey.