Because it is a question of law, we review de novo whether the evidence presented at trial sufficed to meet the threshold requirement for punitive damages under section 1983. Powell, 391 F.3d at 15 (citing Marcano-Rivera v. Pueblo Int% Inc., 232 F.3d 245, 254 (1st Cir. 2000)); Iacobucci v. Boulter, 193 F.3d 14, 25 (1st Cir. 1999). In Smith v. Wade, the Supreme Court held that punitive damages were proper in a section 1983 suit only "when the defendant's conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others."

When a defense of qualified immunity is pressed after a jury verdict, we have determined that "the evidence must be construed in the light most hospitable to the party that prevailed at trial." Iacobucci v. Boulter, 193 F.3d 14, 23 (1st Cir.1999); see also Borges Colón v. Román-Abreu, 438 F.3d 1, 18 (1st Cir.2006) (citing Iacobucci). In such an analysis, "deference should be accorded to the jury's discernible resolution of disputed factual issues."

When a defense of qualified immunity is pressed after a jury verdict, we have determined that "the evidence must be construed in the light most hospitable to the party that prevailed at trial." Iacobucci v. Boulter, 193 F.3d 14, 23 (1st Cir.1999); see also Borges Colón v. Román-Abreu, 438 F.3d 1, 18 (1st Cir.2006) (citing Iacobucci). In such an analysis, "deference should be accorded to the jury's discernible resolution of disputed factual issues."

While Kolstad addressed a claim for punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1981a, we consider " Kolstad's teachings [to be] fully applicable to punitive damages under section 1983." Iacobucci v. Boulter, 193 F.3d 14, 25 n. 7 (1st Cir. 1999). We have interpreted Kolstad as distinguishing between a defendant's "intent to do [an] act" and her intent "to effect a civil rights violation" as a consequence of that act.

. It reasoned that the meeting did not occur in a "public space," its attendees were not included under the definition of "public officials" as the term was used in Glik and a related case, Iacobucci v. Boulter, 193 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 1999), and it was unclear whether a right to record public officials existed without a corresponding intent to disseminate the recording, which it found Pitta did not allege. See Pitta, 2023 WL 3572391, at *7-8.

One difference [from a motion for summary judgment] is that, in such an exercise, deference should be accorded to the jury's discernible resolution of disputed factual issues.Iacobucci v. Boulter, 193 F.3d 14, 23 (1st Cir.1999) (citations omitted). The First Circuit has not addressed the appropriate standard of review when, as here, the jury returned only a partial verdict and neither party prevailed at trial.

Id. Overall, the applicable standard for addressing qualified immunity after a jury verdict entails construing the evidence “in the light most hospitable to the party that prevailed at trial,” Iacobucci v. Boulter, 193 F.3d 14, 23 (1st Cir.1999), “giving ‘deference to the jury's discernible resolution of disputed factual issues.’ ” Raiche v. Pietroski, 623 F.3d at 35 (quoting Iacobucci v. Boulter, 193 F.3d at 23);accord Guillemard–Ginorio v. Contreras–Gomez, 585 F.3d 508, 525 (1st Cir.2009) (when qualified immunity arises after trial, “evidence is ‘construed in the light most hospitable to the party that prevailed at trial,’ and deference is ‘accorded the jury's discernible resolution of disputed factual issues' ”).

Moreover, even if a court, in studied retrospect and further reflection, should conclude that that stated to the issuing magistrate fell short of probable cause within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, qualified immunity clearly protects defendant Dolan in the circumstances of this case. Under settled principles in this Circuit and elsewhere (lacobucci v. Bolter, 193 F.3d 14, 21-22 (1st Cir. 1999)): Qualified immunity is a medium through which "the law strives to balance its desire to compensate those whose rights are infringed by state actors with an equally compelling desire to shield public servants from undue interference with the performance of their duties and from threats of liability which, though unfounded, may nevertheless be unbearably disruptive." Buenrostro v. Collazo, 973 F.2d 39, 42 (1st Cir. 1992)

Under § 1983, a jury may levy punitive damages when a defendant's conduct is "shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others." Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56, 103 S.Ct. 1625, 75 L.Ed.2d 632 (1983); see also Iacobucci v. Boulter, 193 F.3d 14, 25-26 (1st Cir. 1999). In Iacobucci, we emphasized that the "evil motive," "intent," or "reckless or callous indifference" pertains to the " defendant's knowledge that [he] may be acting in violation of federal law."

A district court's denial of qualified immunity is a legal question that we review de novo. See Iacobucci v. Boulter, 193 F.3d 14, 22 (1st Cir. 1999). When a court grants or denies qualified immunity before trial, we "align the evidence most favorably to the non-movant and draw all reasonable inferences in his favor."