Opinion
519058.
03-03-2016
Marita E. HYMAN, Appellant, v. Arthur SCHWARTZ et al., Respondents.
Marita E. Hyman, West Edmeston, appellant pro se. Advocates for Justice, Chartered Attorneys, New York City (Arthur Schwartz of counsel), for Arthur Schwartz and another, respondents. Lichten & Bright, P.C., New York City (Daniel R. Bright of counsel), for Stuart Lichten and another, respondents.
Marita E. Hyman, West Edmeston, appellant pro se.
Advocates for Justice, Chartered Attorneys, New York City (Arthur Schwartz of counsel), for Arthur Schwartz and another, respondents.
Lichten & Bright, P.C., New York City (Daniel R. Bright of counsel), for Stuart Lichten and another, respondents.
Opinion
McCARTHY, J.P.
Appeals (1) from an order of the Supreme Court (Faughnan, J.), entered May 20, 2014 in Madison County, which granted a motion by defendants Arthur Schwartz and Schwartz, Lichten & Bright, P.C. to dismiss the complaint against them, and (2) from an order of said court, entered December 19, 2014 in Madison County, which, among other things, granted a motion by defendants Stuart Lichten and Daniel Bright to dismiss the complaint against them.
Defendant Arthur Schwartz, an attorney, represented plaintiff in two unsuccessful matters (Matter of Hyman v. Cornell Univ., 82 A.D.3d 1309, 918 N.Y.S.2d 226 2011; Hyman v. Cornell Univ., 834 F.Supp.2d 77 [N.D.N.Y.2011], affd. 485 Fed.Appx. 465 2d Cir.2012, cert. denied ––– U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 1268, 185 L.Ed.2d 184 2013 ). Plaintiff then commenced an action against Schwartz and defendant Schwartz, Lichten & Bright, P.C., his former law firm, as well as defendants Stuart Lichten and Daniel Bright, Schwartz's former partners. Ultimately, and as is relevant here, the complaint against Lichten and Bright was dismissed for a lack of personal jurisdiction, and plaintiff's legal malpractice cause of action against Schwartz and the law firm was dismissed for failure to state a cause of action (Hyman v. Schwartz, 114 A.D.3d 1110, 1110–1112, 981 N.Y.S.2d 468 2014, lv. dismissed 24 N.Y.3d 930, 993 N.Y.S.2d 541, 17 N.E.3d 1137 2014 ).
Schwartz also made a counterclaim in the action. Plaintiff commenced another action alleging that Schwartz had intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon her by making that counterclaim. The appeal from Supreme Court's dismissal of that action is decided herewith (
Thereafter, plaintiff commenced this action, again alleging legal malpractice and breach of contract by defendants based on the same events. Supreme Court thereafter granted a motion by Schwartz and the law firm dismissing the complaint against them. Subsequently, Lichten and Bright moved to dismiss the complaint and plaintiff moved, among other things, for leave to amend the complaint. Supreme Court granted the motion to dismiss the complaint against Lichten and Bright and denied plaintiff's motion. Plaintiff now appeals from both orders, and we affirm.
Although plaintiff's previous dismissal for a failure to state a cause of action was not on the merits and, therefore, has no res judicata effect (see generally Maitland v. Trojan Elec. & Mach. Co., 65 N.Y.2d 614, 615–616, 491 N.Y.S.2d 147, 480 N.E.2d 736 1985 ), plaintiff's complaint suffers a similar defect as her previous complaint. Even when viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff and granting her the benefit of every reasonable inference, plaintiff fails to allege facts that could support a reasonable conclusion that Schwartz or the law firm's alleged negligence were a but-for cause of the failure of plaintiff's underlying claims (see Hyman v. Schwartz, 114 A.D.3d at 1112, 981 N.Y.S.2d 468; Siwiec v. Rawlins, 103 A.D.3d 703, 704, 959 N.Y.S.2d 516 2013 ). Plaintiff's breach of contract claim is duplicative of the malpractice claim because it arises from the same factual allegations, and it is therefore subject to dismissal (see Hyman v. Burgess, 125 A.D.3d 1213, 1215, 4 N.Y.S.3d 645 2015 ). Otherwise, to state a viable malpractice cause of action against Lichten and Bright, plaintiff was required to allege facts sufficient to support a conclusion that an attorney-client relationship was established (see generally Sucese v. Kirsch, 199 A.D.2d 718, 719, 606 N.Y.S.2d 60 1993 ). Plaintiff alleged facts directly to the contrary, stating that Lichten and Bright refused her requests for legal representation. Accordingly, plaintiff's complaint was properly dismissed.
In addition, Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's motion for leave to amend the complaint given that plaintiff neither submitted a proposed amended pleading nor established that any such amended pleading would not be plainly without merit (see Dinstber v. Allstate Ins. Co., 110 A.D.3d 1410, 1412, 974 N.Y.S.2d 171 2013; Boyce v. Vazquez, 249 A.D.2d 724, 727, 671 N.Y.S.2d 815 1998 ). Plaintiff's remaining arguments are also unavailing.
ORDERED that the orders are affirmed, without costs.
GARRY, ROSE and DEVINE, JJ., concur.
Hyman v. Schwartz, ––– A.D.3d ––––, ––– N.Y.S.3d ––––, 2016 WL 819007 [appeal No. 520432] ).