The court there held that the second note (due ninety days after date) was at least an implied contract to forbear for a period of ninety days and that alone constituted a sufficient consideration to support the instrument. To the same effect are General v. Anthony, 38 Cal.App. (2d) 321 [ 100 P.2d 1087]; Hammond Lumber Co. v. Cravens, 82 Cal.App. 685 [ 256 P. 428]; Lincoln Holding Corp. v. Levering, 219 Cal. 427 [ 27 P.2d 74]; Tripler v. MacDonald Lumber Co., 173 Cal. 144, 148 [ 159 P. 591]; Miller v. Roach, 15 Cal.App. (2d) 427 [ 59 P.2d 418]; Shlaudeman v. Grubel, 15 Cal.App. (2d) 499 [ 59 P.2d 873]; Hutchon v. Rose, 130 Cal.App. 735 [ 20 P.2d 357]; Parrino v. Rallis, 116 Cal.App. 364 [ 2 P.2d 515]; State Loan etc. Co. v. Cochran, 130 Cal. 245 [ 62 P. 466, 600]; Vassere v. Joerger, 10 Cal. (2d) 689 [ 76 P.2d 656], and Woollomes v. Gomes, 26 Cal.App. (2d) 461 [ 79 P.2d 728]. This same principle is enunciated in the late case of Easton v. Ash, 18 Cal. (2d) 530 [ 116 P.2d 433], decided August 28, 1941.