Opinion
Case No. 1:17-cv-01594-CL
08-08-2018
NANCY CAROL HUTCHISON, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF OREGON, et al, Defendants.
Report and Recommendation
Plaintiff Nancy Hutchison seeks to proceed in forma pauperis ("IFP") in this action. Her initial Complaint (#1) was dismissed without prejudice and with leave to refile an Amended Complaint (#7). On February 13, 2018, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint (#11), as well as a motion for Injunctive Relief (#12). On February 27, the District Court denied Plaintiff's motion. The case now comes before the Court on review of the Amended Complaint, as Plaintiff continues to seek to proceed in forma pauperis. For the reasons below, the Amended Complaint should be dismissed and the IFP request should be denied.
LEGAL STANDARD
Generally, all parties instituting any civil action in United States District Court must pay a statutory filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). However, the federal IFP statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), provides indigent litigants an opportunity for meaningful access to the federal courts despite their inability to pay the costs and fees associated with that access. To authorize a litigant to proceed IFP, a court must make two determinations. First, a court must determine whether the litigant is unable to pay the costs of commencing the action. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Second, it must assess whether the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
In regard to the second of these determinations, district courts have the power under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) to screen complaints even before the service of the complaint on the defendants, and must dismiss a complaint if it fails to state a claim. Courts apply the same standard under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) as when addressing a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). To survive a motion to dismiss under the federal pleading standards, the complaint must include a short and plain statement of the claim and "contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard . . . asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. The Court is not required to accept legal conclusions, unsupported by alleged facts, as true. Id.
Pro se pleadings are held to less stringent standards than pleadings by attorneys. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-521 (1972). That is, the court should construe pleadings by pro se plaintiffs liberally and afford the plaintiffs the benefits of any doubt. Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted). Additionally, a pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the deficiencies in the complaint and the opportunity to amend, unless the complaint's deficiencies cannot be cured by amendment. Id.
DISCUSSION
On November 15, 2017, the Court entered an Order dismissing Plaintiff's initial Complaint. Plaintiff then filed an Amended Complaint, and a motion for a preliminary injunction. On February 27, 2018, the District Court denied Plaintiff's injunctive motion (#13). The case now comes before the Court to screen Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (#11) as part of the evaluation of her IFP request. Because Plaintiff has not cured any of the deficiencies of the original Complaint, and the Amended Complaint cannot be cured with further amendment, the IFP request should be denied, and the case should be dismissed with prejudice.
In the Order dismissing Plaintiff's original Complaint, the Court included a detailed analysis of Plaintiff's asserted allegations and a thorough explanation of why the Complaint failed to state cognizable claims for federal court. While Plaintiff has amended to include much more detail regarding the alleged facts and events surrounding her citation for disorderly conduct and her experience in Curry County Circuit Court, none of her claims have substantively changed as far as their legal or factual basis.
Plaintiff continues to assert claims against Judge Beaman. The previous Order clearly stated that claims against Judge Beaman for actions taken in the courtroom would not be allowed, based on absolute judicial immunity. The deficiencies of these claims cannot be cured by amendment, and they should be dismissed with prejudice.
Plaintiff continues to base all of her claims on the treatment she received during court proceedings, or relating to court procedures. The previous Order clearly stated that any claims arising out of her criminal conviction of the Plaintiff in Curry County Circuit Court would not be allowed, based on the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine. The deficiencies of these claims cannot be cured by amendment, and they should be dismissed with prejudice. As stated previously, Plaintiff may pursue her appeals through the Oregon Appellate Courts if she believes the Court did not grant her due process or if she believes she was wrongly convicted.
Plaintiff continues to claim that the Court violated her rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act, yet the facts she alleges regarding these causes of action do not state a claim for relief under either statute. The most the facts allege is that Judge Beaman refused to reschedule Plaintiff's trial from morning to afternoon to accommodate Plaintiff's alleged lung condition and the other court staff did not handle or file her motions the way she requested. Courts have regularly held that trial schedules and court procedures are discretionary matters given absolute judicial or quasi-judicial immunity. See Phiffer v. Shirtcliff, No. CV-10-1120-SU, 2011 WL 2314153, at *7 (D. Or. Apr. 14, 2011), report and recommendation adopted, No. 10-CV-1120-SU, 2011 WL 2292294 (D. Or. June 9, 2011) ("even assuming [defendant] played a role in conspiring to 'make Plaintiff's filing and hearing of his motion as difficult as possible' and in setting [Plaintiff's] hearing date, such actions are entitled to quasi-judicial immunity."). See also In re Castillo, 297 F.3d 940, 952 (9th Cir. 2002), as amended (Sept. 6, 2002) at 952-53 (holding bankruptcy trustee's clerk was entitled to complete quasi-judicial immunity with respect to the scheduling of a hearing and failing to give notice of a hearing because both constituted judicial actions involving control of the docket and exercise of discretionary judgment). Therefore none of Plaintiff's claims are cognizable as to Judge Beaman or other court staff, including Thomas Lankford and Holly Halcomb, and they should be dismissed. The same reasoning applies to all of Plaintiff's claims regarding the "Rocket Docket" policy allegedly implemented by the Curry County Circuit Court. The Court has discretion to manage its docket however it sees fit. The deficiencies of these claims cannot be cured by amendment; therefore they should be dismissed with prejudice.
Plaintiff's claims against the Consortium Lawyers, the public defenders appointed to her case, are essentially negligence or legal malpractice claims brought under state law. These claims should be dismissed for the same reasons given in the Court's previous Order. While these claims may be pursued in state court, they should be dismissed with prejudice as to this Court.
Finally, the Court did not previously address Plaintiff's assertion that the conditions of confinement, if she were to be incarcerated in Curry County, would exacerbate her lung condition and threaten her life. Certainly a person who is subject to dangerous and unlawful conditions of confinement has every right to seek redress in the courts. Such a claim is not ripe for judicial review, however, until Plaintiff is actually subject to such conditions. "To meet the ripeness standard, petitioner must demonstrate a specific present harm, or the threat of specific future harm. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 14 (1972). A claim is not ripe for adjudication if it rests upon some contingent future event. Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300 (1998). The ripeness doctrine seeks "to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative policies, and also to protect the agencies from judicial interference until an administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties." Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967), overruled on other grounds, Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1972). In this case, Plaintiff does not know whether she will actually be incarcerated or whether the conditions of that incarceration will actually be harmful. Without a current harm to adjudicate, the Court would be entangled in an abstract disagreement over a potential harm that rests on pure conjecture. Therefore these claims should be dismissed with prejudice, unless and until Plaintiff suffers an actual harm.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint (#11) should be dismissed and her IFP application should be denied. The dismissal of these claims should be with prejudice as to this Court, as discussed above.
This Report and Recommendation will be referred to a district judge. Objections, if any, are due no later than fourteen (14) days after the date this recommendation is filed. If objections are filed, any response is due within fourteen (14) days after the date the objections are filed. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72, 6.
Parties are advised that the failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).
DATED this 8 day of August, 2018.
/s/_________
MARK D. CLARKE
United States Magistrate Judge