Opinion
23-CV-4378 (LTS)
08-28-2023
YESSUH SUHYES HUSSEY, Plaintiff, v. GRACIE SQUARE HOSPITAL PSYCHOLOGIST DAVID ROSEN; FIRE DEPARTMENT OF NEW YORK AMBULANCE DRIVER JOHN/JANE DOE; NYPD ARRESTING OFFICER JOHN DOE, Defendants.
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge:
Plaintiff, who is currently detained in the Otis Bantum Correctional Center on Rikers Island, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.Named as Defendants are Gracie Square Hospital Psychologist David Rosen; Fire Department of New York ambulance driver John/Jane Doe; and New York City Police Department (“NYPD”) arresting officer John Doe. Plaintiff originally filed this action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. See Hussey v. Gracie Square Hosp. Psychologist David Rosen, No. 23-CV-2183 (PKC) (LB) (E.D.N.Y. May 16, 2023). This case is one of 60 cases Plaintiff filed in the Eastern District in recent months, including 43 cases filed on the same day. On May 16, 2023, the Eastern District transferred this action to this court. (ECF 5.) By order dated August 16, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees.For the reasons set forth below, the Court dismisses the complaint, but grants Plaintiff 60 days' leave to replead his claims in an amended complaint.
Plaintiff was detained in the Anna M. Kross Center on Rikers Island at the time he filed this action.
Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). Plaintiff did not submit a prisoner authorization with the complaint. By order dated May 31, 2023, the Court directed Plaintiff to either pay the $402.00 in fees or submit a prisoner authorization. (ECF 7.) The Court received Plaintiff's prisoner authorization on July 18, 2023.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a prisoner's IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint if the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3).
While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits -to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.
Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible - not merely possible - that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff alleges that, on August 31, 2019, he was “physically abused by NYPD officers” and “unlawfully arrested for nothing.” (ECF 1, at 2.)The officers “had [Plaintiff] transported to Gracie Square Hospital where for the 1st time in [his] lifetime . . . [he] was wrongfully hospitalized & diagnosed . . . with psychosis” by Defendant Rosen. (Id.) Plaintiff asserts that he does “not have a mental illness or impaired abilities.” (Id.)
Plaintiff writes using irregular capitalization. For readability, the Court uses standard capitalization when quoting from the complaint. All other grammar, spelling, and punctuation are as in the original unless otherwise indicated.
Plaintiff seeks money damages.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege both that: (1) a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the right was violated by a person acting under the color of state law, or a “state actor.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988).
A. Timeliness
It appears that Plaintiff's claims are time-barred. The statute of limitations for Section 1983 claims is found in the “general or residual [state] statute [of limitations] for personal injury actions.” Pearl v. City of Long Beach, 296 F.3d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-50 (1989)). In New York, that period is three years. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5). Section 1983 claims generally accrue when a plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury that is the basis of the claim. Hogan v. Fischer, 738 F.3d 509, 518 (2d Cir. 2013). Here, Plaintiff alleges that he was arrested and taken to the hospital on August 31, 2019. He did not file the complaint in this action until January 21, 2023, more than three years and four months after his claims accrued.
The doctrine of equitable tolling permits a court, “under compelling circumstances, [to] make narrow exceptions to the statute of limitations in order ‘to prevent inequity.'” In re U.S. Lines, Inc., 318 F.3d 432, 436 (2d Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). The statute of limitations may be equitably tolled, for example, when a defendant fraudulently conceals from a plaintiff the fact that the plaintiff has a cause of action, or when the plaintiff is induced by the defendant to forego a lawsuit until the statute of limitations has expired. See Pearl, 296 F.3d at 82-83. In addition, New York law provides that where a person “is under a disability because of . . . insanity at the time the cause of action accrues,” the applicable statute of limitations will be tolled. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 208; Gardner v. Wansart, No. 05-CV-3351, 2006 WL 2742043, at *5 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2006) (although mental illness is on its own insufficient for equitable tolling purposes, tolling is appropriate if a plaintiff is insane at the time the cause of action accrues and is “unable to protect [his] legal rights because of an overall inability to function in society”). New York also provides by statute for other circumstances in which a limitations period may be tolled. See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 204(a) (where commencement of an action has been stayed by court order), id. at § 204 (where a dispute has been submitted to arbitration but is ultimately determined to be non-arbitrable), id. at § 207(3) (defendant is outside New York at the time the claim accrues), id. at § 208 (plaintiff is disabled by infancy or insanity), id. at § 210 (death of plaintiff or defendant).
Plaintiff does not provide any facts suggesting that the statute of limitations should be equitably tolled in this case. Because the failure to file an action within the limitations period is an affirmative defense, a plaintiff is generally not required to plead that the case is timely filed. See Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 640 (2d Cir. 2007). Dismissal is appropriate, however, where the existence of an affirmative defense, such as the statute of limitations, is plain from the face of the pleading. See Walters v. Indus. & Com. Bank of China, Ltd., 651 F.3d 280, 293 (2d Cir. 2011) (“[D]istrict courts may dismiss an action sua sponte on limitations grounds in certain circumstances where the facts supporting the statute of limitations defense are set forth in the papers plaintiff himself submitted.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Pino v. Ryan, 49 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1995) (affirming sua sponte dismissal of complaint as frivolous on statute of limitations grounds); see also Abbas, 480 F.3d at 640 (concluding that district court should grant notice and opportunity to be heard before dismissing complaint sua sponte on statute of limitations grounds).
The Court therefore grants Plaintiff 60 days' leave to replead his claims in an amended complaint alleging facts showing that his claims are timely or that equitable tolling should apply. B. Claims against Rosen
A claim for relief under Section 1983 must allege facts showing that each defendant acted under the color of a state “statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Private parties therefore generally are not liable under the statute. Sykes v. Bank of America, 723 F.3d 399, 406 (2d Cir. 2013) (citing Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001)); see also Ciambriello v. Cnty. of Nassau, 292 F.3d 307, 323 (2d Cir. 2002) (“[T]he United States Constitution regulates only the Government, not private parties.”). Gracie Square Hospital is a private hospital, and its employees generally cannot be held liable under Section 1983. See McGugan v. Aldana-Bernier, 752 F.3d 224, 229 (2d Cir. 2014) (finding that a private hospital and its staff are not state actors under Section 1983 when they involuntarily commit a plaintiff to a psychiatric hospital under New York's Mental Hygiene Law); White v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 369 Fed.Appx. 225, 226 (2d Cir. 2010) (summary order) (noting that private institutions, such as hospitals, generally do not act under color of state law); Johnson v. City of New York, No. 20-CV-3083, 2021 WL 4896477, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2021) (“Although private hospitals are regulated by the state and required to obey state laws, they ‘are generally not proper § 1983 defendants because they do not act under color of state law.'” (citation omitted)), report & recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 4479384 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2021). Because Rosen is a private party who is not alleged to work for any state or government body, the Court dismisses Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims against this defendant. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
C. False Arrest
Plaintiff's allegations that he was arrested and taken to a hospital where he was diagnosed with psychosis suggest that he may be attempting to assert a claim that he was falsely arrested and taken to a mental health facility. “A [Section] 1983 claim for false arrest, resting on the Fourth Amendment right of an individual to be free from unreasonable seizures, including arrest without probable cause, is substantially the same as a claim for false arrest under New York law.” Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 852 (2d Cir. 1996) (citations omitted); Manuel v. City of Joliet, Ill., 137 S.Ct. 911, 925 (2017) (“[T]o flesh out the elements of [a] constitutional tort, we must look for ‘tort analogies.'”).
Under New York law, a plaintiff claiming false arrest must prove four elements: “(1) the defendant intended to confine [the plaintiff], (2) the plaintiff was conscious of the confinement, (3) the plaintiff did not consent to the confinement, and (4) the confinement was not otherwise privileged.” Ackerson v. City of White Plains, 702 F.3d 15, 19 (2d Cir. 2012) (citing Broughton v. New York, 37 N.Y.2d 451 (1975)).
In the mental health context, New York law provides that a police officer “may take into custody any person who appears to be mentally ill and is conducting himself or herself in a manner which is likely to result in serious harm to the person or others.” N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law § 9.41.15. Probable cause to believe that the criteria for a mental health arrest under Section 9.41 has been met is a defense to a false arrest claim arising from such an arrest. Kerman v. City of New York, 261 F.3d 229, 235 n.8 (2d Cir. 2001) (“We interpret [N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law § 9.41] consistently with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment and therefore assume that the same objective reasonableness standard is applied to police discretion under this section.”); Tsesarskaya v. City of New York, 843 F.Supp.2d 446, 455-56 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). For a mental health arrest, “police officers must have ‘reasonable grounds for believing that the person seized is dangerous to herself or others.'” Guan v. City of New York, 37 F.4th 797, 805 (2d Cir. 2022) (quoting Anthony v. City of New York, 339 F.3d 129, 137 (2d Cir. 2003)); see Heller v. Bedford Cent. Sch. Dist., 144 F.Supp.3d 596, 621-22 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (“[A] showing of probable cause in the mental health seizure context requires only a probability or substantial charge of dangerous behavior, not an actual showing of such behavior.” (citation omitted)), aff'd, 65 Fed.Appx. 49 (2d Cir. 2016).
New York's mental health statute defines the phrase “likely to result in serious harm” as:
(a) a substantial risk of physical harm to the person as manifested by threats of or attempts at suicide or serious bodily harm or other conduct demonstrating that the person is a danger to himself or herself, or (b) a substantial risk of physical harm to other persons as manifested by homicidal or other violent behavior by which others are placed in reasonable fear of serious physical harm.N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law § 9.01.
If “the facts known by the arresting officer at the time of the arrest objectively provided probable cause to arrest,” the arrest is privileged, and the plaintiff cannot state a claim for false arrest. Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152 (2004). “Probable cause can exist even where it is based on mistaken information, so long as the arresting officer acted reasonably and in good faith in relying on that information.” Bernard v. United States, 25 F.3d 98, 102 (2d Cir. 1994); Curley v. Vill. of Suffern, 268 F.3d 65, 70 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that a police officer is “not required to explore and eliminate every theoretically plausible claim of innocence before making an arrest”). Where the facts surrounding the arrest are uncontroverted, the determination whether probable cause existed may be made by the court as a matter of law. Weyant, 101 F.3d at 852. Even where factual disputes exist, a Section 1983 claim may fail if the plaintiff's version of events is sufficient to establish probable cause to arrest. Mistretta v. Prokesch, 5 F.Supp.2d 128, 133 (E.D.N.Y. 1998).
Here, Plaintiff's bare allegation that NYPD officers unlawfully arrested him and brought him to a hospital is insufficient to state a plausible Section 1983 claim for false arrest. Plaintiff provides no context for his arrest and subsequent hospitalization, nor does he allege any facts suggesting that the arresting officer or officers lacked probable cause for the arrest. The Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint alleging additional facts in support of his claim for false arrest.
D. Claims under State Law
A district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when it “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Generally, “when the federal-law claims have dropped out of the lawsuit in its early stages and only state-law claims remain, the federal court should decline the exercise of jurisdiction.” Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988). Having dismissed the federal claims of which the Court has original jurisdiction, the Court declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction of any state law claims Plaintiff may be asserting. See Kolari v. New York-Presbyterian Hosp., 455 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Subsection (c) of § 1367 ‘confirms the discretionary nature of supplemental jurisdiction by enumerating the circumstances in which district courts can refuse its exercise.'” (quoting City of Chicago v. Int'l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 173 (1997))).
E. Leave to Amend
Plaintiff proceeds in this matter without the benefit of an attorney. District courts generally should grant a self-represented plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to cure its defects, unless amendment would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). Indeed, the Second Circuit has cautioned that district courts “should not dismiss [a pro se complaint] without granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999)). Because Plaintiff may be able to allege additional facts to state a valid Section 1983 claim for false arrest, the Court grants Plaintiff 60 days' leave to file an amended complaint to detail his claims.
Plaintiff must name as the defendant(s) in the captionand in the statement of claim those individuals who were allegedly involved in the deprivation of his federal rights. If Plaintiff does not know the name of a defendant, he may refer to that individual as “John Doe” or “Jane Doe” in both the caption and the body of the amended complaint.The naming of John Doe defendants, however, does not toll the three-year statute of limitations period governing this action and Plaintiff shall be responsible for ascertaining the true identity of any “John Doe” defendants and amending his complaint to include the identity of any “John Doe” defendants before the statute of limitations period expires. Should Plaintiff seek to add a new claim or party after the statute of limitations period has expired, he must meet the requirements of Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The caption is located on the front page of the complaint. Each individual defendant must be named in the caption. Plaintiff may attach additional pages if there is not enough space to list all of the defendants in the caption. If Plaintiff needs to attach an additional page to list all defendants, he should write “see attached list” on the first page of the Amended Complaint. Any defendants named in the caption must also be discussed in Plaintiff's statement of claim.
For example, a defendant may be identified as: “Correction Officer John Doe #1 on duty August 31, 2010, at Sullivan Correctional Facility, during the 7-3 p.m. shift.”
In the “Statement of Claim” section of the amended complaint form, Plaintiff must provide a short and plain statement of the relevant facts supporting each claim against each defendant. If Plaintiff has an address for any named defendant, Plaintiff must provide it. Plaintiff should include all of the information in the amended complaint that Plaintiff wants the Court to consider in deciding whether the amended complaint states a claim for relief. That information should include:
a) the names and titles of all relevant people;
b) a description of all relevant events, including what each defendant did or failed to do, the approximate date and time of each event, and the general location where each event occurred;
c) a description of the injuries Plaintiff suffered; and d) the relief Plaintiff seeks, such as money damages, injunctive relief, or declaratory relief.
Essentially, Plaintiff's amended complaint should tell the Court: who violated his federally protected rights and how; when and where such violations occurred; and why Plaintiff is entitled to relief.
Because Plaintiff's amended complaint will completely replace, not supplement, the original complaint, any facts or claims that Plaintiff wants to include from the original complaint must be repeated in the amended complaint.
Plaintiff may consult the legal clinic in this District that assists people who are parties in civil cases and do not have lawyers. The Clinic is run by a private organization called the New York Legal Assistance Group (“NYLAG”); it is not part of, or run by, the court (and, among other things, therefore cannot accept filings on behalf of the court, which must still be made by any pro se party through the Pro Se Intake Unit).
To receive limited-scope assistance from the Clinic, Plaintiff may mail a signed retainer and intake form to the NYLAG Pro Se Clinic at 40 Foley Square, LL22, NY, NY 10007. Once the paperwork is received, the Clinic will coordinate contact with the litigant. Once the paperwork is received, it may take up to two weeks for the Clinic to contact the litigant. Copies of the Clinic's flyer, retainer, and intake form are attached to this order.
CONCLUSION
The Court dismisses the complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted and as untimely. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
The Court grants Plaintiff 60 days' leave to file an amended complaint that complies with the standards set forth above. Plaintiff must submit the amended complaint to this Court's Pro Se Intake Unit within 60 days of the date of this order, caption the document as an “Amended Complaint,” and label the document with docket number 23-CV-4378 (LTS). An Amended Civil Rights Complaint form is attached to this order. No summons will issue at this time. If Plaintiff fails to comply within the time allowed, and he cannot show good cause to excuse such failure, the Court will direct the Clerk of Court to enter judgment consistent with this order.
Copies of the NYLAG Clinic's flyer, retainer, and intake form are attached to this order.
The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).
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