Opinion
Civil Action No. 21-cv-00865-PAB-MEH
2023-03-27
Sherri HURT, Plaintiff, v. SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1 IN the COUNTY OF DENVER and State of COLORADO, Defendant.
Erik G. Bradberry, Euell Brian Thomas, Michelle R. Gibson, Colorado Education Association, Denver, CO, for Plaintiff. Holly Eileen Ortiz, M. Jonathan Koonce, Semple Farrington Everall & Case, P.C., Denver, CO, for Defendant.
Erik G. Bradberry, Euell Brian Thomas, Michelle R. Gibson, Colorado Education Association, Denver, CO, for Plaintiff. Holly Eileen Ortiz, M. Jonathan Koonce, Semple Farrington Everall & Case, P.C., Denver, CO, for Defendant.
ORDER
PHILIP A. BRIMMER, Chief United States District Judge
This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 25]. Plaintiff Sherri Hurt asserts claims against defendant School District No. 1 in the City and County of Denver (the "District") for denial of reasonable accommodation, retaliation, and discriminatory discharge in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. ("ADA"). Docket No. 1 at 10-11, ¶¶ 43-52. Defendant moves for summary judgment on all of plaintiff's claims. Docket No. 25. Plaintiff filed a response, Docket No. 26, and defendant filed a reply. Docket No. 30. The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to U.S.C. § 1331. BACKGROUND
The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise indicated.
The District hired plaintiff Sherri Hurt in 2007 as a secretary in the Medicaid Office. Docket No. 25 at 2, ¶ 4. In 2010, the District changed plaintiff's position to a Medicaid Technician or Office Support II. Id. Plaintiff provided general office support to the Medicaid Department and her primary job duties included performing data entry and verification, maintaining Medicaid records, and training paraprofessionals, nurses, psychologists, and social workers on how to enter student information. Id., ¶ 5.
Plaintiff's supervisor from 2010 until October 2018 was Rob Hendershot. Id., ¶ 6. Hendershot was supervised by "Student Equity and Operations Director of Operations" Thomas O'Keefe. Id. In January 2019, Rosa Melendez-Nguyen was promoted to the Medicare Supervisor position replacing Hendershot. Id. at 4, ¶ 16.
In 2008, plaintiff was diagnosed with Multiple Sclerosis ("MS"). Id. at 3, ¶ 8. In 2015, plaintiff asked Hendershot if she could work at home on an as-needed basis when her MS symptoms flared up. Id., ¶ 10. Plaintiff began working from home more frequently until she was working from home on a full-time basis. Id., ¶ 11. This informal agreement was not approved through the District's ADA accommodation process. Id. The District requires that requests for long-term accommodations go through the District's ADA accommodation process. Id., ¶ 12. By 2016, plaintiff was working from home five days a week, but was required to come into the office when necessary, with at least 24 hours notice. Id., ¶ 13. Before April 2019, plaintiff had not requested an accommodation to work from home full-time through any official channels, and no documentation of an accommodation had been submitted to the District's human resources department. Id. at 3-4, ¶ 14.
Plaintiff states it is disputed that the District did not approve of her working from home full-time given that her former supervisor Hendershot approved her request to work from home. Docket No. 26 at 2, ¶ 11 (citing Docket No. 26-7 at 1, ¶ 2). Plaintiff's affidavit states that Hendershot approved her request to work at home as needed. Docket No. 26-7 at 1, ¶ 2. Plaintiff, however, does not dispute that her working from home was not approved through defendant's ADA accommodation process. The Court will deem this fact admitted.
Plaintiff disputes this fact because "Hurt worked directly with her supervisor, following the process he described to her, to request an accommodation for her disability prior to 2019." Docket No. 26 at 3, ¶ 14. Her affidavit states that she requested to work from home as needed, but does not state that she requested to work from home full-time and does not reference any documentation. See Docket No. 26-7 at 1, ¶ 2. Plaintiff's cited materials fail to create a dispute of fact, and the Court will deem this fact admitted.
In plaintiff's 2018-2019 performance evaluation, Nguyen wrote that plaintiff had "significant issues related to general productivity of entering logs [and] ensuring that logs are entered timely" and that she hoped to see "better productivity [ ] without extra resources." Id. at 4, ¶ 17 (quoting Docket No. 25-1 at 78). The evaluation also commented that plaintiff "does receive invitations to attend meetings and could make arrangements to phone in, however, I have to follow [ up ] each time to have her participate." Id., ¶ 18. Plaintiff missed a meeting at which she was scheduled to represent the District and the meeting had to be rescheduled. Id., ¶ 19.
Plaintiff disputes that she missed multiple meetings. Docket No. 26 at 3-4, ¶ 19. Defendant's evidence only supports its claim that plaintiff missed one meeting. See Docket No. 25-1 at 40, 211:3-17.
In January 2019, when Nguyen began supervising plaintiff, Nguyen was informed that the District did not have medical or accommodation records indicating plaintiff's full-time work from home schedule was approved by a medical provider or the District. Id. at 5, ¶ 23. In April 2019, plaintiff began the District's ADA process. Id., ¶ 25. Plaintiff and her union representative, Alizay Furtado, met with O'Keefe, Nguyen, and a human resources business partner to discuss plaintiff's needs and to request that she provide updated ADA documentation. Id. Plaintiff stated that she could get an appointment with her neurologist on July 30, 2019. Id., ¶ 26.
On April 30, 2019, O'Keefe asked plaintiff to start phasing back into the office, starting with two days per week. Id. at 6, ¶ 27. Furtado emailed the District's chief human resources officer objecting to the request that plaintiff return to the office two days a week because plaintiff was unable to drive, wheelchair bound, and in need of specific accommodations for her disability. Id., ¶ 28. The District allowed plaintiff to continue working from home full-time until she could get medical documentation. Id., ¶ 29.
In September 2019, plaintiff submitted a form requesting to work from home full-time. Id., ¶ 30. Plaintiff also submitted a medical verification from her doctor that stated her medical restrictions as "work from home, permanent" and stated that plaintiff "should work from home when possible due to MS symptoms." Id., ¶ 31. On September 23, 2019, Hurt met with O'Keefe, Nguyen, human resources director of benefits Adam Barnett, and human resources business partner Melissa Gerity for an interactive discussion regarding her position, her medical verification, and her accommodations. Id., ¶ 32. Hurt requested that she be allowed to work from home five days per week and to be provided 24 hours notice if she needed to be at work in person. Id. at 7, ¶ 33. Barnett approved plaintiff's request for current Office Support II position. Id., ¶ 35. At the September 23, 2019 meeting, the District informed plaintiff that the State Medicaid rules required the District to reclassify plaintiff's position and to revise her essential duties and that this change to her position would be made in October 2019. Id., ¶¶ 32-34.
The State of Colorado amended its Medicare plan by opening its coverage to include free care to all qualified students, as opposed to limiting care to special education students, thereby increasing the volume of claims that the District could submit. Id., ¶¶ 37-38. In October 2019, plaintiff's position was reclassified into a Medicaid Coordinator. Id., ¶ 36. The new Medicaid Coordinator position required traveling to over 200 schools within the District to provide free "care trainings" to providers. Id. at 8, ¶ 40. Medicaid Coordinators were required to schedule and deliver onsite training materials and to represent Denver Public Schools at various events and meetings. Id., ¶ 41. The Medicaid Coordinator role could not be performed at home. Id., ¶ 44. Plaintiff never performed the role of Medicaid Coordinator and did not know how much travel it required. Id., ¶ 42.
Plaintiff states this fact is disputed because the role of Medicaid Coordinator was performed remotely in March 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Docket No. 26 at 7, ¶ 44. The circumstances surrounding the pandemic are extraordinary and are not indicative of the job requirements as they existed at the time of plaintiff's request in a way that creates a factual dispute. The Court will deem this fact admitted.
On January 24, 2020, the District's Leave and Disability Accommodations Supervisor Kim Crouch contacted plaintiff and asked her whether she had any updated medical information in support of her accommodation request for the new Medicaid Coordinator position and asked to set up an interactive discussion on the position's requirements. Id. at 9, ¶ 47. On January 27, 2020, plaintiff confirmed that her medical documentation had not changed and a meeting was set for January 28, 2020. Id., ¶ 48. Crouch, O'Keefe, Nguyen, and Gerity met with plaintiff via telephone. Id., ¶ 49. The District told plaintiff that the role of Medicaid Coordinator required a significant amount of travel and in-person work and that the District was unable to provide plaintiff with the same accommodations. Id., ¶ 51. Plaintiff stated that the added travel requirement would not stop her from doing the position as long as she had 24 hours notice. Id., ¶ 52. Crouch stated that Hurt, if she felt she could travel, needed to provide updated medical documentation given that the documentation she had provided stated that her restriction to working from home was permanent. Id. at 10, ¶ 53. Plaintiff did not provide any new documentation to the District. Id.
Plaintiff states it is disputed whether her medical documentation stated that she was restricted to working from home. Docket No. 26 at 8, ¶ 53. Plaintiff does not dispute that this is what Crouch communicated to plaintiff. See id.
The District required Medicaid Coordinators to have reliable transportation to attend trainings in order for the Medicare program to be successful. Id., ¶ 57. The District determined that allowing plaintiff to work remotely would be an undue hardship on the District because the Medicare department needed someone "in building" to do the training. Id., ¶ 58. The District also determined that providing plaintiff 24 hours notice would also constitute an undue burden. Id. at 11, ¶ 59. The District determined plaintiff could not perform the essential functions of her position with or without a reasonable accommodation. Id., ¶ 60. The District placed plaintiff on administrative leave for thirty days beginning February 3, 2020. Id., ¶ 61. On February 2, 2020, plaintiff expressed her disagreement with the District's decision. Id., ¶ 63. Crouch responded that plaintiff did not provide updated medical documentation that supported plaintiff ability to travel and gave plaintiff an opportunity to provide updated medical documentation. Id., ¶ 64. Plaintiff did not provide updated documentation. Id. The District searched for vacant positions that plaintiff could fill while she was on administrative leave. Id., ¶ 62. On February 10, 2020, Crouch sent plaintiff's resume to the District Senior Talent Acquisition Manager Lacey Nelson to inquire whether any positions were available. Id. at 12, ¶ 67. Nelson responded that no positions were available. Id., ¶ 68. If a position became available while plaintiff was on leave, someone from the recruiting department was to notify Crouch. Id., ¶ 66.
Plaintiff disputes the accuracy of this assessment, but does not dispute that the District made the assessment that allowing plaintiff to work from home would constitute an undue burden. Docket No. 26 at 9, ¶ 59.
Plaintiff disputes the accuracy of this assessment, but does not dispute that the District made the assessment that allowing plaintiff 24 hours notice to work in person would constitute an undue burden. Docket No. 26 at 9, ¶ 60.
Plaintiff denies this fact arguing that the District's efforts were de minimis, but does not dispute that a search was made. Docket No. 26 at 10, ¶ 62.
On March 3, 2020, Crouch issued a formal accommodation denial letter to plaintiff stating that the District could not locate a position plaintiff was qualified for and provided plaintiff with the option to resign or have her employment terminated. Id., ¶ 69. On March 14, 2020, plaintiff stated that she would not resign and requested a review of the District's denial of plaintiff's request for accommodation. Id., ¶ 70.
Barnett handled plaintiff's appeal. Id., ¶ 71. On March 27, 2020, Barnett issued plaintiff a final determination letter upholding the District' decision. Id., ¶ 72. Barnett determined that plaintiff was unable to perform the essential functions of the Medicaid Coordinator position based on her medical documentation. Id. at 13, ¶ 73. Barnett reiterated that the District was unable to find a vacant position that would allow plaintiff to work from home on a full-time basis. Id., ¶ 74. On April 6, 2020, the District issued a notice of dismissal to plaintiff stating that her termination was effective April 6, 2020. Id., ¶ 75.
Plaintiff disputes this fact because "Barnett was poised to approve Hurt's accommodation until Crouch convinced him to deny the appeal." Docket No. 26 at 11, ¶ 73 (citing Docket No. 26-4). Plaintiff's denial is unsupported. The email chain she attaches shows Barnett had a question about plaintiff's request that Crouch answered. This email chain does not contradict defendant's statement of fact. The Court will deem this fact admitted.
Plaintiff admits the District could not find a position, but "denies the insinuation that the District made any meaningful efforts to do so." Docket No. 26 at 11, ¶ 74. This does not raise a disputed issue of fact, and the Court will deem this fact admitted.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is warranted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 when the "movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A disputed fact is "material" if, under the relevant substantive law, it is essential to proper disposition of the claim. Wright v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 259 F.3d 1226, 1231-32 (10th Cir. 2001). Only disputes over material facts can create a genuine issue for trial and preclude summary judgment. Faustin v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 423 F.3d 1192, 1198 (10th Cir. 2005). An issue is "genuine" if the evidence is such that it might lead a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the non-moving party. Allen v. Muskogee, 119 F.3d 837, 839 (10th Cir. 1997).
Where "the moving party does not bear the ultimate burden of persuasion at trial, it may satisfy its burden at the summary judgment stage by identifying a lack of evidence for the nonmovant on an essential element of the nonmovant's claim." Bausman v. Interstate Brands Corp., 252 F.3d 1111, 1115 (10th Cir. 2001) (quotations omitted). "Once the moving party meets this burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to demonstrate a genuine issue for trial on a material matter." Concrete Works of Colo., Inc. v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 36 F.3d 1513, 1518 (10th Cir. 1994). The non-moving party may not rest solely on the allegations in the pleadings, but instead must designate "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (quotations omitted). "To avoid summary judgment, the nonmovant must establish, at a minimum, an inference of the presence of each element essential to the case." Bausman, 252 F.3d at 1115. When reviewing a motion for summary judgment, a court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id.
III. ANALYSIS
Plaintiff brings claims under the ADA for denial of a reasonable accommodation, retaliation, and discriminatory discharge. Docket No. 1 at 10-11, ¶¶ 43-52. The District moves for summary judgment as to each of plaintiff's claims. Docket No. 25.
A. Failure to Accommodate
Defendant argues plaintiff cannot make out a prima facie case for her failure to accommodate claim because plaintiff was not qualified for her position and, alternatively, any accommodation plaintiff requested was not reasonable. Docket No. 25 at 13-17. An employee asserting a failure-to-accommodate claim "must make an initial showing that (1) she is disabled; (2) she is 'otherwise qualified'; and (3) she requested a plausibly reasonable accommodation." Punt v. Kelly Servs., 862 F.3d 1040, 1050 (10th Cir. 2017). Failure-to-accommodate claims do not require a showing that the employer's actions were motivated by discriminatory animus, as "the failure to provide a reasonable accommodation to a qualified employee with a disability is inherently 'on the basis of the disability,' regardless of the employer's motivation." Id. at 1048 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)). A reasonable accommodation can include accommodating an individual in her position or "reassignment to a vacant position." 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B).
The District admits plaintiff can establish she is disabled based on having MS. Docket No. 25 at 18.
1. Qualifications
The District argues plaintiff was unqualified for her position. Docket No. 25 at 14. Under the ADA, a " 'qualified individual' is 'an individual who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires.' " Adair v. City of Muskogee, 823 F.3d 1297, 1307 (10th Cir. 2016) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8)). Plaintiff "bears the burden of showing that she is able to perform the essential functions of her job, with or without reasonable accommodation." Hennagir v. Utah Dep't of Corr., 587 F.3d 1255, 1262 (10th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). To determine if an individual is qualified, first, the Court must ask whether the employee can perform the essential functions of the job, and second, if the employee cannot, the Court asks if any reasonable accommodation by the employer would enable the employee to perform the essential functions of the job. Adair, 823 F.3d at 1307.
Defendant argues that, because the new Medicaid Coordinator position required travel, plaintiff could not perform the essential functions of the job. Docket No. 25 at 14. Plaintiff responds that she could perform the travel that the job required with the reasonable accommodation of 24 hours notice for any required trips. Docket No. 26 at 13. The District has demonstrated there is no dispute about the fact plaintiff could not perform an essential function of her job, namely, traveling to schools. The remaining question is whether plaintiff could complete the essential functions of the job with reasonable accommodation. Adair, 823 F.3d at 1307.
The District argues that plaintiff's medical documentation required that plaintiff work from home and therefore plaintiff could not perform the essential function of traveling to schools in person. Docket No. 25 at 14. Plaintiff argues that the documentation required that she work from home as much as possible without limiting her to only working from home. Docket No. 26 at 13. It is undisputed that the documentation plaintiff submitted from her doctor says that her work restrictions were "work from home, permanent," but also stated that plaintiff "should work from home when possible due to MS symptoms." Docket No. 25 at 6, ¶ 31 (quoting Docket No. 25-1 at 113-14). Additionally, plaintiff presents evidence that she had appeared in person for work several times with notice in the past. Docket No. 26 at 4, ¶ 20 (citing Docket 26-7 at 2, ¶ 7). Drawing inferences in favor of plaintiff, a reasonable juror could find that the note did not implicitly prevent plaintiff from working outside her home or from traveling to schools, especially since the District knew plaintiff could come into the District offices when asked. Accordingly, what plaintiff's documentation indicated and whether she could travel for work with notice are disputed facts. If plaintiff could travel to trainings and meetings with a reasonable accommodation, the question of whether she was qualified for the new position is not undisputed since the District does not identify any other essential functions of the Medicaid Coordinator position plaintiff could not complete. The Court will deny summary judgment as to this aspect of plaintiff's reasonable accommodation claim.
2. Reasonable Accommodation
The District argues that plaintiff did not request a reasonable accommodation because working from home is unreasonable, plaintiff's request for 24 hours notice would have caused an undue administrative burden, and plaintiff failed to provide documentation supporting her request. Docket No. 25 at 14-17.
First, the District argues that working from home is not a reasonable accommodation as a matter of law. Id. at 14-15. The Tenth Circuit has ruled that "a request to work at home is unreasonable if it eliminates an essential function of the job; however, summary adjudication may be improper when the employee has presented evidence she could perform the essential functions of her position at home thereby making the at-home accommodation request at least facially reasonable." Mason v. Avaya Communications, Inc., 357 F.3d 1114, 1124 (10th Cir. 2004). In Mason, the Court cautioned that the "determination of whether a request for an at-home accommodation is reasonable must [ ] be made on a case-by-case basis." Id. If plaintiff requested to work from home at all times, that request would be unreasonable based on the requirement of traveling to different schools to provide trainings, but plaintiff requested to work at home or be given 24 hours notice when she needed to appear in-person at work or at school. Docket No. 25 at 7, ¶ 33. Defendant does not argue physical presence was required to perform any essential functions other than traveling to schools within the District to perform trainings and to hand out computers. Id. at 8, ¶¶ 40-41. As it is disputed whether plaintiff could travel, it is similarly disputed whether plaintiff's request to work from home or be given 24 hours notice is unreasonable.
Courts examining the reasonableness of working from home as an accommodation consider whether physical presence is an essential function of plaintiff's job. See Becerra v. EarthLink, Inc., 421 F. Supp. 2d 1335, 1345-46 (D. Kan. 2006) (ruling a request to work from home was not a reasonable accommodation where physical attendance was an essential feature of plaintiff's job); Goodwin v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., No. 16-cv-02830-PAB-SKC, 2018 WL 4300519, at *6 (D. Colo. Sept. 10, 2018) (ruling that working from home on a temporary basis was not a reasonable accommodation where in-person dealership visits in the Denver area were an essential function of plaintiff's position); Unrein v. PHC-Fort Morgan, Inc., No. 17-cv-02846-REB-SKC, 2020 WL 2465719, at *15 (D. Colo. May 13, 2020), aff'd, 993 F.3d 873 (10th Cir. 2021) (finding that physical presence for at least four hours a day was required to complete the essential functions of a clinical dietician job, and a request for a flexible work from home schedule was unreasonable because it failed to result in plaintiff consistently appearing in person at least four hours a day).
Defendant argues that plaintiff's request for 24 hours notice was "impractical" because, in the past, Hurt missed work with 24 hours notice and because it would cause an undue administrative burden on the District to provide notice because of how frequently Medicaid Coordinators travel. Docket No. 25 at 16. Plaintiff responds that her request for notice was not unreasonable because it would not cost the District anything and because it would merely have consisted of a continuation of the status quo. Docket No. 26 at 14.
The District provides the following undisputed facts in support of its assertion that plaintiff regularly missed work when she was provided 24 hours notice. First, that in Nguyen's performance review of plaintiff she wrote that plaintiff "does receive invitations to attend meetings and could make arrangements to phone in, however, I have to follow [ up ] each time to have her participate." Docket No. 25 at 4, ¶ 18. Plaintiff responds that, although this comment appears in her review, plaintiff participated in meetings without oversight by Nguyen. Docket No. 26 at 3, ¶ 18. Second, plaintiff missed one meeting and the meeting had to be rescheduled. Docket No. 25 at 4, ¶ 19. Third, plaintiff "had a history of failing to come in when requested, missing trainings, team meetings, and even some of her accommodation meetings." Id. at 4-5, ¶ 20. The District cites O'Keefe's deposition in which he testified that plaintiff missed two meetings, Docket No. 25-1 at 46, 44:18-25, and an email dated August 15, 2018 indicating plaintiff was not able to attend one in-person meeting. Id. at 90. Plaintiff responds the issue of her missing meetings is disputed because plaintiff complied with requests to come in, attended "Medicaid-related meetings" in-person at different locations in the Denver area, and, at least once, Plaintiff and her supervisor agreed that she would not attend a meeting based on uncertainty regarding whether the meeting venue was wheelchair accessible. Docket No. 26 at 4, ¶ 20. Finally, plaintiff attended the in-person meeting on January 28, 2020 by telephone. Docket No. 25 at 9, ¶ 49. Plaintiff cites evidence that Crouch agreed that she did not need to attend in person. Docket No. 26 at 8, ¶ 49. The Court finds that evidence that plaintiff missed four meetings between 2018 and 2020, that she had to be encouraged to participate in meetings during which she could make arrangements to appear by telephone, and that she did not attend one meeting in-person but participated by telephone with permission from Crouch does not show that it is undisputed that plaintiff "regularly missed work" when the District did give her 24 hours notice. Docket No. 25 at 16.
Next, defendant argues that plaintiff's request for accommodation was not reasonable because it would cause an undue burden to the District to provide notice to plaintiff based on how frequently Medicaid Coordinators were required to travel. Id. This claim is not supported by undisputed facts. The District has shown it is undisputed that it required the Medicaid Coordinator to travel to over 200 schools within the District, schedule and deliver onsite training materials, and represent Denver Public Schools at various events and meetings. Id. at 8, ¶ 41. Plaintiff introduces evidence that O'Keefe testified that plaintiff, in the role of Medicaid Coordinator, would be able to schedule her own trainings, Docket No. 26 at 9, ¶ 59 (citing Docket No. 26-6 at 3, 94:15-23), and that "there would have been definitely way more than 24-hour notice" for trainings. Docket No. 26-6 at 3, 94:22-23. Although defendant introduces facts to show that the Medicaid Coordinator position would require attending meetings and trainings, the District has not shown that it would cause any burden to provide 24 hours notice of the additional meetings.
Finally, the District argues that plaintiff has not supported her request for 24 hours notice before traveling through documentation, which prevents plaintiff from maintaining a failure to accommodate claim. Docket No. 25 at 15-16. Plaintiff does not respond to the District's contention that plaintiff needed to provide documentation in support of her request, arguing instead that the District improperly construes her medical documentation as preventing her from working outside the house. Docket No. 26 at 13. As discussed above, the proper interpretation of her medical documentation is disputed, but nothing in the documentation explains plaintiff's capacity to travel, for example, by providing how often plaintiff could travel or by explaining that 24 hours notice would allow plaintiff to meet travel obligations. See Docket No. 25-1 at 113-14.
The ADA's implementing regulations state that, in order to "determine the appropriate reasonable accommodation it may be necessary for the covered entity to initiate an informal, interactive process with the individual with a disability in need of the accommodation. This process should identify the precise limitations resulting from the disability and potential reasonable accommodations that could overcome those limitations." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3). The Tenth Circuit has ruled an "employee's failure to provide medical information necessary to the interactive process precludes her from claiming that the employer violated the ADA by failing to provide reasonable accommodation." Templeton v. Neodata Servs., Inc., 162 F.3d 617, 619 (10th Cir. 1998). An employee has a duty to "notify the employer of the nature of her disability." Id. n.3 (quoting Woodman v. Runyon, 132 F.3d 1330, 1345 (10th Cir. 1997)).
In Templeton, plaintiff's treating physician sent a letter to plaintiff's employer in August, 1995 indicating that she expected plaintiff to return to work on October 2, 1995, but that her return may be delayed based on upcoming treatments. Id. at 618. On October 16, 1995, plaintiff's employer sent a letter to plaintiff's treating physician indicating that she had not yet returned to work and requesting a medical status update by October 23, 1995. Id. Plaintiff admitted that she refused to authorize her physician to provide the requested information. Id. The court ruled that plaintiff could not support a claim for failure to accommodate under the ADA because "of her refusal to provide medical information that was reasonably requested by her employer." Id. at 619. The Court found that the employer's request was reasonable based on the physician's letter from August 1995. Id. Courts in the Tenth Circuit applying the court's ruling in Templeton that "[a]n employer cannot be expected to propose reasonable accommodation absent critical information on the employee's medical condition and the limitations it imposes," id., have dismissed ADA failure to accommodate claims where an employer made a reasonable request for information that an employee failed or refused to respond to. See, e.g., Turner v. City and Cnty. of Denver, No. 10-cv-00583-PAB-KMT, 2011 WL 1595981, at *3 (D. Colo. Apr. 27, 2011) (granting summary judgment where plaintiff failed to respond to employer's request for documentation clarifying when plaintiff could return to work and under what limitations); McFarland v. City and Cnty. of Denver, No. 15-cv-01258-KMT, 2017 WL 3872639, at *7 (D. Colo. Sept. 5, 2017) (granting summary judgment where plaintiff failed to give employer information on why a provided accommodation was insufficient); Norwood v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 2021 WL 3022315, at *22 (D. Kan. July 16, 2021) (granting summary judgment on an accommodation claim where plaintiff failed to provide information her employer requested about her accommodation).
Compare Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1173 (10th Cir. 1999) (declining to grant summary judgment where employer failed to request a medical release clarifying what is required for an employee to be reassigned); Nguyen v. City and Cnty. of Denver, Colorado, 286 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1189-90 (D. Colo. 2017) (declining to grant summary judgment where employee never failed to provide medical information requested by employer); Donlin v. Petco Animal Supplies Stores, Inc., 2021 WL 534609, at *12 (D.N.M. Feb. 12, 2021) (distinguishing a case from Templeton where "there [was] a dispute of fact as to whether the employer already had the critical information" to determine whether plaintiff could perform the essential tasks of his job); Purewal v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 2019 WL 4805994, at *11 (D. Kan. Oct 1, 2019) (denying summary judgment where employer did not inform employee that it required further information or clarification).
Here, plaintiff provided documentation of her disability in September 2019. Docket No. 25 at 6, ¶¶ 30, 31. Based on this documentation, the District granted plaintiff the accommodation of working from home five days a week and being given 24 hours notice if she needed to be at the office for her Office Support II position. Id. at 7, ¶ 35. On January 24, 2020, after plaintiff's position was reclassified to Medicaid Coordinator, the District asked plaintiff if she wanted to update her medical documentation. Id. at 9, ¶¶ 46-47. On January 27, 2020, plaintiff confirmed her medical documentation had not changed. Id., ¶ 48. At an interactive meeting on January 28, 2020, the District informed plaintiff that the new position of Medicaid Coordinator would require significantly more travel and in-person work than the role of Office Support II. Id., ¶¶ 50-51. Plaintiff stated that she could meet the additional travel requirements with an accommodation of 24 hours notice. Id., ¶ 52. Crouch stated that, if plaintiff felt she could travel, she would need updated medical documentation because her current documentation stated that her work from home restriction was permanent. Id. at 10, ¶ 53. Plaintiff did not provide any new or additional medical documentation. Id. After the District determined plaintiff could not perform the essential functions of the job of Medicaid Coordinator, plaintiff expressed her disagreement to Crouch. Id. at 11, ¶ 63. Crouch then gave plaintiff another opportunity to provide updated medical information. Id., ¶ 64. Plaintiff did not provide any updated documentation. Id.
Plaintiff argues that she was able to travel with 24 hours notice and that her medical documentation did not prohibit travel, but plaintiff does not dispute that, when Crouch asked her for medical documentation of her ability to travel to meet the job requirement, she did not provide such information, despite the District's repeated requests. See Docket No. 26 at 14. In Steffes v. Stepan Co., 144 F.3d 1070, 1072 (7th Cir. 1998), the court ruled plaintiff could not maintain a disability discrimination claim because her employer "had a difficult time clarifying the nature and extent" of plaintiff's restrictions given the "blanket nature" of the statements in the documentation plaintiff provided and her failure to respond to her employer's inquiries. Here, given plaintiff's previous requests to work from home, the ambiguity in her medical documentation, and the significantly increased travel requirement in the new position, the District reasonably asked plaintiff to provide documentation of her ability to travel, which plaintiff failed to provide. See id. at 1073. ("Because [plaintiff] failed to hold up her end of the interactive process by clarifying the extent of her medical restrictions, [defendant] cannot be held liable for failing to provide reasonable accommodations."). In Templeton, a request for updated information was reasonable based on the indication that plaintiff may or may not be able to return to work. 162 F.3d at 618-19. Here, it is undisputed that plaintiff failed to provide the documentation needed for her requested accommodation, resulting in "a breakdown in the interactive process." Id. at 617. The Court will grant defendant's motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's claim for failure to provide reasonable accommodation because plaintiff did not provide documentation to support her requested accommodation.
Plaintiff argues that on January 24, 2020 she was not asked for new documentation, but instead was asked if she had any changes to her documentation. Docket No. 26 at 7, ¶ 46. While undisputed, plaintiff has not controverted the fact that she failed to respond to defendant's requests after January 24, 2020.
Plaintiff argues the District did not make a good faith attempt to reassign plaintiff to another position she was qualified for because the District only looked for fully remote jobs instead of jobs that could be done "from home or in a cubicle located inside some District building." Docket No. 26 at 15. Plaintiff fails to identify any reason why the District needed to search for positions that required some in-person work when plaintiff had not provided documentation in support of that portion of her request for accommodation.
B. Discrimination
Plaintiff alleges she was terminated because of her disability in violation of the ADA. Docket No. 1 at 11, ¶¶ 50-52. To survive summary judgment on a disability discrimination claim, a plaintiff must raise a genuine issue of disputed fact for each element of a prima facie case. Herrmann v. Salt Lake City Corp., 21 F.4th 666, 678 (10th Cir. 2021). A prima facie case of discrimination has three elements: " '(1) he was a disabled person as defined by the [ADA]; (2) he was qualified, with or without reasonable accommodation, to perform the essential functions of his job; and (3) he was fired because of his disability.' " Id. (quoting Hawkins v. Schwan's Home Serv., Inc., 778 F.3d 877, 883 (10th Cir. 2015)); see also McGeshick v. Principi, 357 F.3d 1146, 1150 (10th Cir. 2004).
The District argues that plaintiff's claim for disability discrimination fails because she was not qualified for her job. Docket No. 25 at 17-18. Plaintiff argues that it is disputed whether she was qualified for her job. Docket No. 26 at 16. For the reasons described above, the Court finds material disputes of fact concerning whether plaintiff was qualified for her job. Neither party addresses whether a discriminatory discharge claim may continue where a failure to accommodate claim based on the same request for accommodation fails. See id. at 15-17; Docket No. 25 at 17-18.
In Stewart v. Happy Herman's Cheshire Bridge, Inc., 117 F.3d 1278, 1287 (11th Cir. 1997), the Seventh Circuit ruled that "[l]iability simply cannot arise under the ADA when an employer does not obstruct an informal interactive process; makes reasonable efforts to communicate with the employee and provide accommodations based on the information it possesses; and the employee's actions cause a breakdown in the interactive process." For a disability discrimination claim, the Tenth Circuit has ruled that a plaintiff "is obligated to show that he was otherwise qualified for the benefits he sought and that he was denied those solely by reason of disability." Doe v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Payne Cnty., Okla., 613 F. App'x 743, 746 (10th Cir. 2015) (unpublished) (quoting Fitzgerald v. Corrections Corporation of America, 403 F.3d 1134, 1144 (10th Cir. 2005)). Defendant's reasonable denial of plaintiff's request for accommodation can be understood as at least part of the reason for her termination. The Court will grant summary judgment on plaintiff's discrimination claim on the grounds that defendant reasonably denied plaintiff's request for accommodation request and plaintiff cannot show that she was terminated solely because of her disability.
Plaintiff argues that the Court should use a "motivating factor" standard for ADA claims based on the Ninth Circuit's ruling in Dark v. Curry Cnty., 451 F.3d 1078, 1085 (9th Cir. 2006). However, in Doe, the Tenth Circuit ruled that, despite disagreement on the causation standard for ADA claims from other circuits, Fitzgerald is controlling precedent in the Tenth Circuit and requires that a plaintiff show disability as the sole reason for an employment action. Doe, 613 F. App'x at 747 & n.3. The Court will decline to apply the motivating factor standard.
C. Retaliation
Plaintiff brings a claim of retaliation under the ADA based on the District allegedly retaliating against her after she made requests for accommodation. Docket No. 1 at 10-11, ¶¶ 47-49. The District argues that plaintiff's retaliation claim fails because plaintiff cannot establish a causal connection between a protected activity and her termination or show that the District's reasons for denying her request for an accommodation were pretextual. Docket No. 25 at 18-20.
Neither party addresses whether a retaliation claim based on a request for accommodation survives dismissal of a claim for failure to accommodate on the same facts. See Docket No. 25 at 18-20; Docket No. 26 at 17-20. Because a retaliation claim can be based on a request for accommodation as protected activity, Foster v. Mountain Coal Co., LLC, 830 F.3d 1178, 1187-88 (10th Cir. 2016), as opposed to completion of the interactive process, the Court presumes plaintiff's claim for retaliation survives dismissal of her claim for failure to accommodate because the Court did not find that plaintiff never made a request.
The ADA prohibits retaliation based on a protected activity in Section 12203(a). 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a). When a plaintiff does not present direct evidence of retaliation, a court applies the burden-shifting framework from McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), to evaluate retaliation claims arising under the ADA. See Reinhardt v. Albuquerque Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 595 F.3d 1126, 1131 (10th Cir. 2010). The first step of that framework "requires the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of discrimination." Lincoln v. BNSF Railway Co., 900 F.3d 1166, 1192 (10th Cir. 2018). If this showing is made, "the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for the adverse employment action. Id. at 1193 (internal quotation marks omitted). If the employer offers a legitimate nondiscriminatory justification, the plaintiff can prevail on her discrimination claim only by showing that the employer's stated reason for the employment action is pretextual. Reinhardt, 595 F.3d at 1131.
Both parties apply the burden-shifting test to plaintiff's retaliation claims without stating whether plaintiff offers direct evidence of discrimination or directly stating that the McDonnell Douglas test applies in this case. See Docket No. 25 at 18-20; Docket No. 26 at 17-20. The Court will assume the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting test applies to plaintiff's retaliation claim.
The Tenth Circuit has held that the elements of a prima facie ADA retaliation claim are that plaintiff show "(1) that she engaged in protected activity; (2) that she suffered a materially adverse action . . . either after or contemporaneous with her protected activity; and (3) a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action." Id. "A causal connection between a protected action and a subsequent adverse action can be shown through evidence of circumstances that justify an inference of retaliatory motive, such as protected conduct closely followed by adverse action." E.E.O.C. v. C.R. England, Inc., 644 F.3d 1028, 1051 (10th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Temporal proximity alone may sometimes be sufficient to establish causation. See Foster, 830 F.3d at 1191.
Plaintiff began the ADA accommodation process in April 2019. Docket No. 25 at 5, ¶ 25. Plaintiff was allowed to continue working from home until she could provide medical documentation. Id. at 6, ¶ 29. She made a formal request for accommodation in September 2019. Id., ¶¶ 30-31. Plaintiff's request for accommodation was granted for her Office Support II position. Id. at 7, ¶ 35.
In October 2019, plaintiff's job was reclassified to the position of Medicaid Coordinator. Id., ¶ 36. On January 24, 2020, the District asked if plaintiff had updated medical documentation for her new position. Id. at 9, ¶ 47. On January 28, 2020, the District and plaintiff had an interactive meeting to discuss accommodations for her new position. Id., ¶ 48. The District determined plaintiff could not perform the essential functions of her position and placed her on administrative leave for thirty days effective February 3, 2020. Id. at 11, ¶ 61. On March 3, 2020, plaintiff received a final determination letter denying her request for accommodation and giving her the option of resignation or termination. Id. at 12, ¶ 69. Plaintiff requested an appeal on March 14, 2020. Id., ¶ 70. Her appeal was denied on March 27, 2020. Id., ¶ 72. On April 6, 2020, the District terminated plaintiff's employment. Id. at 13, ¶ 75.
Defendant argues that, because plaintiff's request for accommodation was initiated in April 2019 and she was terminated in April 2020, plaintiff cannot show a causal connection between her request for accommodation and her termination based only on temporal proximity. Id. at 18-19. Additionally, the District argues that the reclassification of plaintiff's position constitutes an intervening circumstance demonstrating a lack of causal connection. Id. at 19. Plaintiff responds that she continued to engage in protected activity from April 2019 to March 2020, showing temporal proximity. Docket No. 26 at 18.
A request for accommodation is protected activity for the purposes of an ADA retaliation claim. Foster, 830 F.3d at 1187-88. Each instance of protected activity, or a combination of multiple instances, can support a retaliation claim, but where there is only one adverse action, there can only be one retaliation claim. Id. at 1187. Termination is an adverse employment action. Daniels v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 701 F.3d 620, 635 (10th Cir. 2012).
Reassignment of job duties with "significantly different responsibilities" can constitute an adverse employment action. Daniels, 701 F.3d at 635 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Piercy v. Maketa, 480 F.3d 1192, 1203 (10th Cir. 2007)). Here, plaintiff only argues that her termination was an adverse employment action. Docket No. 26 at 17. Accordingly, the Court will decline to address the District's arguments on the decision to reclassify plaintiff's position, which reassigned her job duties, as an adverse action. See Docket No. 25 at 19.
Plaintiff's requests for accommodation in April 2019 and September 2019 can be considered protected activity. Plaintiff also argues that she engaged in protected activity at the meeting in January 2020 and when she requested to appeal the decision to deny her an accommodation in February 2020 and March 2020. Docket No. 26 at 17-18. In each instance, plaintiff either requested that the District provide the accommodation of working from home full-time and being provided 24 hours notice when she needed to work in person or requested reconsideration of the decision not to provide these accommodations. The District does not disagree, Docket No. 30 at 10, and the Court will consider each instance as protected activity.
The District argues that there is no temporal proximity between plaintiff's protected activity and her termination. Docket No. 25 at 18-19. The District granted plaintiff's request for accommodation on a temporary basis twice, but did not reject her request until January 2020. Id. at 6, 7, 11 ¶¶ 29, 35, 60-61. Plaintiff requested an accommodation on January 28, 2020 in the interactive meeting. Id. at 9, ¶ 50. She was put on administrative leave for 30 days within a week of her request at the meeting. Id. at 11, ¶ 61. On February 2, 2020, plaintiff requested to appeal the accommodation decision, and she received a denial of her accommodation on March 3, 2020, stating that she needed to resign or be terminated. Id. at 11, 12, ¶¶ 63, 69. On March 14, 2020, plaintiff responded, refusing to resign and requesting a review of the District's accommodation denial. Id. at 12, ¶ 70. Barnett handled plaintiff's appeal and, on March 27, 2020, he issued a final determination letter upholding the District's decision to deny plaintiff an accommodation. Id., ¶¶ 71-72. On April 6, 2020, the District issued a notice of dismissal to plaintiff, id. at 13, ¶ 75, less than one month after plaintiff requested to appeal the accommodation in March 2020. The temporal proximity between plaintiff's request in March 2020 for an appeal of the accommodation decision and her termination in April 2020 is sufficient to show a causal connection for the purpose of plaintiff making a prima facie retaliation. See Foster, 830 F.3d at 1191.
The District does not state when the decision to place plaintiff on leave was made; it states that the decision was made effective on February 3, 2020, but also that plaintiff expressed her disagreement with the decision on February 2, 2020. Docket No. 25 at 11, ¶¶ 61, 63. The Court will assume the decision was made at some point between the meeting on January 28, 2020 and plaintiff's email disagreeing with the decision on February 2, 2020.
The District argues that plaintiff's job reclassification was an "intervening circumstance" that prevents an inference of causal connection and in support cites a case involving whether an employee had established that protected speech was a substantial motivating factor behind the decision to take an adverse action against the employee. Docket No. 25 at 18 (citing Maestas v. Segura, 416 F.3d 1182, 1187-88 (10th Cir. 2005)). The District provides no reason why the substantial motivating factor from First Amendment cases would apply to a prima facie retaliation claim under the ADA, and the Court finds no reason to apply this standard.
Next, the District argues plaintiff cannot show pretext. Docket No. 25 at 19-20. The District's proffered reason for plaintiff's termination is that she could not perform the essential functions of her job. Id. at 20. "A plaintiff demonstrates pretext by showing either that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence." Foster, 830 F.3d at 1194 (quoting Zamora v. Elite Logistics, Inc., 478 F.3d 1160, 1166 (10th Cir. 2007) (brackets omitted)). Such a showing requires a plaintiff to present "evidence of such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer's proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder" could find those reasons unworthy of belief. Proctor v. United Parcel Serv., 502 F.3d 1200, 1209 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Argo v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan., Inc., 452 F.3d 1193, 1203 (10th Cir. 2006)).
Defendant argues that, based on plaintiff's medical documentation, she could not travel and therefore plaintiff cannot show pretext. Docket No. 25 at 20. Plaintiff argues that several facts show that defendant's proffered reason is unworthy of belief: (1) plaintiff could travel and had traveled in the past, (2) the District mischaracterized her medical documentation as prohibiting travel as opposed to recommending plaintiff maximize her time working from home, (3) the District's statement of how much travel was required for the Medicaid Coordinator position frequently changed, ranging from 40% of the time to 80% of the time, (4) the District's contention that providing plaintiff with notice would cause an undue burden is contradicted by O'Keefe's testimony, (5) the District removed plaintiff's work equipment before looking for a remote job she could complete, and (6) that the District's conversion to fully remote operations in March 2020 demonstrated that plaintiff could have worked remotely. Docket No. 26 at 18-19. The Court addresses each of plaintiff's arguments in turn.
Plaintiff provides evidence that defendant's conclusion that plaintiff could not travel with notice is incorrect. Plaintiff states that she had been able to travel and work in-person with notice in the past. Id. at 8, ¶ 54. Plaintiff also states that the District mischaracterized her medical documentation. Id. at 19, ¶ 2. Both of these arguments fail to show pretext because they attack the truth of whether plaintiff could perform the essential functions of her job instead of the District's motivation for terminating plaintiff. "[I]n the context of a retaliation claim, the crucial question is not whether [plaintiff] can in fact perform the essential functions of [her] job. The relevant question is whether [plaintiff] can show that [defendant's] 'motive for taking adverse action was its desire to retaliate for the protected activity.' " Proctor v. United States Parcel Serv., 502 F.3d 1200, 1210-11 (10th Cir. 2007). Even if plaintiff shows she could have traveled, she must also show that the District believed she could travel. The District asserts that it reads plaintiff's documentation to prohibit travel and expressed this belief to plaintiff. Docket No. 25 at 20. As discussed above, plaintiff argues that she does not believe the District's reading of her documentation is correct, but admits she did not provide any new documentation to disabuse the District of its understanding of her restrictions. See Docket No. 26 at 18-19. Accordingly, evidence plaintiff could not travel is not evidence of pretext.
To the extent that plaintiff argues her attendance at past in-person meetings for the Office Support II position shows that the District believed she could travel to schools in the Medicaid Coordinator position, id. at 6, ¶ 40, the Court finds Proctor instructive. In that case, the Tenth Circuit opined that an employer's decision to temporarily allow an employee to return to work did not have any bearing on the employer's decision to terminate the employee because "a temporary accommodation" was not evidence supporting a permanent accommodation. Proctor, 502 F.3d at 1210. Here, plaintiff's ability to attend infrequent meetings in-person was not dispositive on plaintiff's ability to frequently travel with a permanent accommodation. This is not evidence of pretext.
Plaintiff presents evidence that defendant's reason for restructuring plaintiff's position and explanations of the restructured position's requirements were inconsistent or unjustified. Docket No. 26 at 18-19, ¶ 1, 3. After plaintiff made a formal request for an accommodation in September 2019, the District decided to restructure her position. Docket No. 25 at 6-7, ¶¶ 30-36. Plaintiff identifies facts to show that Medicaid constantly changed without requiring that her position be restructured, Docket No. 26 at 6, ¶ 36, that plaintiff had provided trainings virtually in the past, id. at 6-7, ¶ 40, and that defendant's claim that more students were being served under the new rules is undercut by evidence that in the past the program had served more students without requiring restructuring. Id. at 6, ¶ 39. Additionally, plaintiff points out that the District's description of the amount of travel time for the Medicaid Coordinator position kept changing, going from 40%, to 60%, and eventually to 80%. Id. at 19, ¶ 3 (citing Docket No. 26-9 at 2; Docket No. 26-5 at 4, 86:10-13; Docket No. 25 at 8, ¶ 40). Plaintiff cites the job description for the Medicaid Coordinator position to argue that travel was expected 40% of the time. Id. (citing Docket No. 26-9). Although the job description does state that trainings at school sites would constitute 40% of the Medicaid Coordinator position, it also references other portions of the job which could require travel like delivering materials and representing the District at meetings. See Docket No. 26-9 at 2. Crouch testified that no less than 60% of the time a Medicaid Coordinator would need to travel. Docket No. 26-5 at 4, 86:10-13. The District's motion for summary judgment, states that a Medicaid Coordinator could travel up to 80% of the time. Docket No. 25 at 8, ¶ 40. Although these statements are arguably inconsistent, they do not call into question the District's belief travel was essential or the District's concerns about whether plaintiff could satisfy the travel requirement. For example, plaintiff introduces no evidence that the District thought plaintiff could travel 40% of the time and therefore raised the estimate to 60% of the time. Regarding plaintiff's arguments on how the Medicaid Coordinator position could be designed to avoid travel, the Court "will not second guess the employer's judgment when its description is job-related, uniformly enforced, and consistent with business necessity." Adair, 823 F.3d at 1308 (quoting Mason, 357 F.3d at 1119). Even if plaintiff is correct that that the job could be completed differently, a business decision that is not wise or correct is not necessarily discriminatory. See Stover v. Martinez, 382 F.3d 1064, 1076 (10th Cir. 2004). Even if plaintiff offers evidence that the position could be defined differently or performed more efficiently, see Docket No. 26 at 6-7, ¶ 40, without evidence linking the decision to plaintiff's protected activity is not evidence of pretext.
Additionally, plaintiff provides testimony from O'Keefe stating that plaintiff could schedule her own trainings in advance of trainings, id. at 9, ¶ 59, which contradicts the District's assertion that providing 24 hours notice to plaintiff would be an undue administrative burden. For the reasons stated above, the Court agrees with plaintiff that a dispute exists on whether the District would be burdened by providing notice. This dispute, however, does not contradict the District's belief that plaintiff could not perform essential job functions of the Medicaid Coordinator role with reasonable accommodations.
Lastly, plaintiff identifies inconsistencies in defendant's final termination decision. She states that, when the District was supposedly searching for a position to reassign plaintiff to that was fully remote, it sent someone to collect plaintiff's office equipment. Id. at 12, ¶ 7. Drawing inferences in plaintiff's favor, a reasonable juror could conclude that removing plaintiff's equipment indicated that the District was planning to terminate plaintiff while simultaneously searching for new positions within the District. This evidence, however, is not enough to connect plaintiff's protected activity to her termination. Because plaintiff has failed to show evidence of pretext, the Court will grant the District's motion and dismiss plaintiff's claim for retaliation.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is
ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 25] is GRANTED. It is further
ORDERED that plaintiff's claims are DISMISSED with prejudice. It is further
ORDERED that this case is closed.