Hurley v. Painter

9 Citing cases

  1. State v. Jackson

    772 P.2d 747 (Kan. 1989)   Cited 12 times

    "This [subsection (j)] broadens our former case law in the realm of declarations against interest by those not parties to the action nor in privity with a party to the action, as exceptions to the hearsay rule. Formerly there was a requirement of unavailability of the declarant as a prerequisite for reception of this character of testimony, and declarations were limited to those against the pecuniary or proprietary interest of the declarant ( Hurley v. Painter, 182 Kan. 731, 324 P.2d 142). Now, the statute dispenses with the requirement of unavailability and expands the interests to include penal or social. "The statute does, however, require, as a preliminary measure of trustworthiness, that the trial judge, prior to admission of such a declaration, make a finding that the character of the declaration was of such nature a reasonable man would not make it unless he believed it to be true. Probability of veracity is the safeguard sought; the reasonable man test is the criterion to be used. The judge may in a particular case be faced with a difficult decision where caution should be exercised; in making it he necessarily must be vested with a wide discretion.

  2. Thompson v. Norman

    424 P.2d 593 (Kan. 1967)   Cited 34 times

    This broadens our former case law in the realm of declarations against interest by those not parties to the action nor in privity with a party to the action, as exceptions to the hearsay rule. Formerly there was a requirement of unavailability of the declarant as a prerequisite for reception of this character of testimony, and declarations were limited to those against the pecuniary or proprietary interest of the declarant ( Hurley v. Painter, 182 Kan. 731, 324 P.2d 142). Now, the statute dispenses with the requirement of unavailability and expands the interests to include penal or social. The statute does, however, require, as a preliminary measure of trustworthiness, that the trial judge, prior to admission of such a declaration, make a finding that the character of the declaration was of such nature a reasonable man would not make it unless he believed it to be true. Probability of veracity is the safeguard sought; the reasonable man test is the criterion to be used. The judge may in a particular case be faced with a difficult decision where caution should be exercised; in making it he necessarily must be vested with a wide discretion.

  3. Pickering v. Hollabaugh

    401 P.2d 891 (Kan. 1965)   Cited 4 times

    This was the only prohibition against a party to a transaction with a person since deceased testifying as to his statements or declarations. In Hurley v. Painter, 182 Kan. 731, 324 P.2d 142, we stated at page 733 of the opinion: ". . . Moreover, in the exhibit, Ellen by declaring that she had given all her property to her son disavowed her proprietary interest in the property.

  4. Henderson v. Kansas Power Light Co.

    380 P.2d 443 (Kan. 1963)   Cited 2 times

    They shall be given such a construction, if possible, as will bring them into harmony with the general verdict. ( Kitchen v. Lasley Co., 186 Kan. 24, 29, 348 P.2d 588; Hurley v. Painter, 182 Kan. 731, 736, 324 P.2d 142; King v. Vets Cab, Inc., 179 Kan. 379, 384, 295 P.2d 605, 56 A.L.R.2d 1249; Cain v. Steely, 173 Kan. 866, 252 P.2d 909; Hubbard v. Allen, 168 Kan. 695, 701, 215 P.2d 647.) In considering answers of the jury to the special questions, the court is not permitted to isolate one answer and ignore others, but all are to be considered together, and if one interpretation leads to inconsistency and another to harmony with the general verdict, the latter is to be adopted.

  5. Ater v. Culbertson

    372 P.2d 580 (Kan. 1962)   Cited 4 times

    ". . . Under all our decisions a general verdict imports a finding upon all the issues of the case not inconsistent with the answers to special questions submitted, and such special findings are to be given such a construction, if possible, as will bring them into harmony with the general verdict. See Giltner v. Stephens, 166 Kan. 172, 200 P.2d 290; Hubbard v. Allen, 168 Kan. 695, 701, 215 P.2d 647; Cain v. Steely, 173 Kan. 866, 252 P.2d 909; Hurley v. Painter, 182 Kan. 731, 736, 324 P.2d 142. For numerous other decisions of like import see West's Kansas Digest, Trial § 343. . . ." (p. 29.)

  6. Taylor v. Johnson

    352 P.2d 436 (Kan. 1960)   Cited 5 times

    They shall be given such a construction, if possible, as will bring them into harmony with the general verdict. If there are ambiguous special findings, then they should be given an interpretation that will sustain the general verdict. ( Kitchen v. Lasley Co., 186 Kan. 24, 29, 348 P.2d 588; Hurley v. Painter, 182 Kan. 731, 736, 324 P.2d 142; King v. Vets Cab, Inc., 179 Kan. 379, 384, 295 P.2d 605, 56 A.L.R.2d 1249; Cain v. Steely, 173 Kan. 866, 252 P.2d 909; Hubbard v. Allen, 168 Kan. 695, 701, 215 P.2d 647; Davis v. Kansas Electric Power Co., 159 Kan. 97, 108, 152 P.2d 806; Simeon v. Schroeder, 170 Kan. 471, 474, 227 P.2d 153; MacElree v. Wolfersberger, 59 Kan. 105, 52 P. 69.) In considering answers of the jury to the special questions, the court is not permitted to isolate one answer and ignore others, but all are to be considered together, and if one interpretation leads to inconsistency and another to harmony with the general verdict, the latter is to be adopted.

  7. Kitchen v. Lasley Co.

    348 P.2d 588 (Kan. 1960)   Cited 15 times
    Holding that it is an "established rule of this jurisdiction that, absent any objection to a verdict until after the jury is discharged, a litigant is deemed to have waived any objections he might have thereto and cannot urge them for the first time upon a motion for a new trial or on appeal"

    The test to be announced in determining this question is well-established. Under all our decisions a general verdict imports a finding upon all the issues of the case not inconsistent with the answers to special questions submitted, and such special findings are to be given such a construction, if possible, as will bring them into harmony with the general verdict. See Giltner v. Stephens, 166 Kan. 172, 200 P.2d 290; Hubbard v. Allen, 168 Kan. 695, 701, 215 P.2d 647; Cain v. Steely, 173 Kan. 866, 252 P.2d 909; Hurley v. Painter, 182 Kan. 731, 736, 324 P.2d 142. For numerous other decisions of like import see West's Kansas Digest, Trial § 343. Applying the rule and with the special questions construed, as heretofore, indicated, as a finding of negligence which, under the jury's verdict, did not constitute the proximate cause of injury and/or damage to the plaintiff, there is no inconsistency between the answers to such questions and the general verdict. Indeed such questions are in harmony with the verdict.

  8. Thomas, Administrator v. Kansas Power Light Co.

    340 P.2d 379 (Kan. 1959)   Cited 11 times
    In Thomas v. Kansas Power and Light Company (1959) 185 Kan. 770, 340 P.2d 379, involving accidental electrocution, one juror borrowed a book on electricity and studied the arcking characteristics of electricity which he relayed to the jury, and a new trial was granted upon a holding, [9] page 386, that the misconduct in question permeated the verdict and that it affirmatively appeared that the defendant's rights were prejudiced.

    There would be little virtue or finality in verdicts if they could be impeached and overthrown by the evidence of jurors and litigants. It has been said that such a situation would result in perjury and bribery and there would be no end to litigation in cases tried before juries. ( State v. Buseman, 124 Kan. 496, 499, 260 P. 641; Ohlson v. Power Co., 105 Kan. 252, 254, 182 P. 393; Jones v. Webber, 111 Kan. 650, 652, 207 P. 837; Henderson v. Deckert, 160 Kan. 386, 162 P.2d 88; Newell v. City Ice Co., 140 Kan. 110, 112, 113, 34 P.2d 558; Anderson v. Thompson, 137 Kan. 754, 22 P.2d 438; Hurley v. Painter, 182 Kan. 731, 736, 324 P.2d 142.) In Anderson v. Thompson, supra, 758, Mr. Justice Rousseau Burch, speaking for the court, said:

  9. Chute v. Old American Ins. Co.

    6 Kan. App. 2d 412 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981)   Cited 13 times
    In Chute, a panel of this court held that an insurer is relieved of all liability under a life insurance policy if it can prove that the policy was procured by a beneficiary who at the time the beneficiary secured the insurance intended to murder the insured.

           "This (K.S.A. 60-460(j )) broadens our former law in the realm of declarations against interest by those not parties to the action nor in privity with a party to the action, as exceptions to the hearsay rule. Formerly there was a requirement of unavailability of the declarant as a prerequisite for reception of this character of testimony, and declarations were limited to those against the pecuniary or proprietary interest of the declarant (Hurley v. Painter, 182 Kan. 731, 324 P.2d 142). [6 Kan.App.2d 425] Now, the statute dispenses with the requirement of unavailability and expands the interests to include penal or social.        "The statute does, however, require, as a preliminary measure of trustworthiness, that the trial judge, prior to admission of such a declaration, make a finding that the character of the declaration was of such nature a reasonable man would not make it unless he believed it to be true.