Hurley v. Hinckley

21 Citing cases

  1. State v. Jordan

    53 Haw. 634 (Haw. 1972)   Cited 3 times
    In State v. Jordan, 53 Haw. 634, 636, 500 P.2d 560, 563 (1972), this court adopted the analysis of Hurley v. Hinckley, 304 F. Supp. 704, 709 (D. Mass. 1969), aff'd sub. nom., Doyle v. O'Brien, 396 U.S. 277 (1970), which construed a remarkably similar provision of Massachusetts statutory law.

    The fact that an individual, as a member of the public, has an interest in all public property does not mean that such an individual cannot commit a trespass on certain publicly owned property where his presence is not authorized. In relation to this point we adopt the analysis of the court in Hurley v. Hinckley, 304 F. Supp. 704, 709 (D. Mass. 1969), aff'd, 396 U.S. 277 (1970), in construing a similar statute: A reading of ยง 771-1 in its entirety lends support to the position that "lands of another" includes public land.

  2. Strahan v. Frazier

    No. CIV. A. 00-12355-WGY (D. Mass. Aug. 1, 2001)   Cited 7 times
    Finding a reasonable inference existed that the police forcibly hand-cuffed the plaintiff

    As used in the trespass statute, the words 'without right' expressly save constitutional rights.Hurley v. Hinckley, 304 F. Supp. 704, 710 (D. Mass. 1969) (Murray, J.),aff'd sub nom. Doyle v. O'Brien, 396 U.S. 277 (1970) (per curiam); see also Commonwealth v. Wolf, 34 Mass. App. Ct. 949, 951 (1993) ("The words 'without right' in the trespass statute . . . connote the absence of any right, permission, or license recognized by law as permitting an entry into an area described by the statute."

  3. Alexis v. McDonald's Restaurants of Mass

    67 F.3d 341 (1st Cir. 1995)   Cited 213 times
    Holding that McDonald's manager who called police officer into a restaurant and encouraged him to remove plaintiff did not jointly participate in the plaintiff's unlawful arrest

    It has been held, of course, and we do not question, that a Massachusetts business property owner may not violate the constitutional or statutory rights of its business licensees under the shield of the Massachusetts trespass statute. See Hurley v. Hinckley, 304 F. Supp. 704, 710 (D.Mass. 1969) ("The words 'without right' in the context of the historical concept of trespass can only mean: [']without any legal right; without any right, permission or license recognized by law as permitting an entry into the area described in the statute.['] . . . The concept [of] legal right in the context of today's constitutional developments includes any right of the plaintiffs, individually or collectively, found in the Constitution of the United States . . . ."), aff'd mem., 396 U.S. 277 (1970); Smith v. Suburban Restaurants, Inc., 373 N.E.2d 215, 218 (Mass.

  4. State v. N. Williams

    238 N.W.2d 302 (Iowa 1976)   Cited 22 times
    Holding phrase โ€œwithout legal justificationโ€ expressly allowed and protected entry on public property for the purpose of reasonably exercising First Amendment rights

    The First Amendment has never licensed destruction of property or imprisonment of public officials. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554-555, 85 S.Ct. 453, 464, 13 L.Ed.2d 471, 484 (1965); Hurley v. Hinckley, 304 F. Supp. 704, 709-710 (D.Mass. 1969), aff'd, Doyle v. O'Brien, 396 U.S. 277, 90 S.Ct. 603, 24 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970). Ordinarily one to whom a statute is constitutionally applied will not be allowed to attack the statute on the grounds it might be unconstitutionally applied to others.

  5. Government of Canal Zone v. Castillo

    568 F.2d 405 (5th Cir. 1978)   Cited 5 times
    In Government of the Canal Zone v. Castillo, 568 F.2d 405 (5th Cir. 1978), relied upon by the trial court, the vagrancy statute upheld had two elements: (1) that the defendant be found within or loitering about a building, structure, vessel, railroad car, or storage yard, and (2) that he have no authority or permission to be in such locations.

    The words "authority or permission" in the context of a trespass prohibition can have only one meaning: right, permission, or license recognized by law as permitting an entry into the areas described in the statute. See Hurley v. Hinckley, D.Mass., 1969, 304 F. Supp. 704, aff'd sub. nom., Doyle v. O'Brien, 1970, 396 U.S. 277, 90 S.Ct. 603, 24 L.Ed.2d 469. We hold that this language affords both potential offenders and those charged with the statute's enforcement sufficient information as to the conduct that is prohibited to satisfy the Fifth Amendment due process notice requirements and to avoid conflict with the Fourth Amendment principles of probable cause.

  6. Albany Welfare Rights Organization v. Wyman

    493 F.2d 1319 (2d Cir. 1974)   Cited 47 times
    Holding unconstitutional an absolute ban on leafletting in welfare offices where such leafletting had been permitted previously

    Cox v. Louisiana, supra, 379 U.S. at 555, 85 S.Ct. 453; LeClair v. O'Neil, supra. In that respect, we accept as a proper enunciation of relevant principle the conclusion of Judge Pettine in his well-reasoned opinion in Unemployed Workers Union v. Hackett, 332 F.Supp. 1372 (D. R.I. 1971), and the dictum of the three-judge court in Hurley v. Hinckley, 304 F.Supp. 704, 711-712 (D.Mass. 1969), aff'd sub nom., Doyle v. O'Brien, 396 U.S. 277, 90 S.Ct. 603, 24 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970). See also Indiana Consumers and Workers Union et al. v. Swaim, Civ. No. 72F5 (D.C.Ind., July 12, 1972) (unreported).

  7. Spanish Church of God of Holyoke v. Scott

    794 F. Supp. 2d 304 (D. Mass. 2011)   Cited 1 times

    Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 266, ยง 120. Plaintiffs, of course, do not assert that the statute is unconstitutionally vague under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution; that challenge has long been rejected. See Hurley v. Hinckley, 304 F.Supp. 704 (D.Mass.1969), aff'd. sub nom.

  8. Greenberg v. Woodward

    Civil Action No. 01-CV-10166-GAO (D. Mass. Dec. 12, 2001)

    . . ." Hurley v. Hinckley, 304 F. Supp. 704, 712 (D.Mass. 1969), aff'd per curiam sub nom. Doyle v. O'Brien, 396 U.S. 277 (1970).

  9. Hall v. Board of School Com'rs of Mobile

    496 F. Supp. 697 (S.D. Ala. 1980)   Cited 1 times

    Although physical presence in a public building with a specific public use is not pure speech, it may be protected by the First Amendment. Shanley v. Northeast Indep. School Dist., 462 F.2d at 971 n. 8; Hurley v. Hinckley, 304 F. Supp. 704 (D.Mass. 1969), aff'd mem. sub nom. Doyle v. O'Brien, 396 U.S. 277, 90 S.Ct. 603, 24 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970) (per curiam)

  10. Bridges v. Pittsburgh Community Broadcasting Corp.

    491 F. Supp. 1330 (W.D. Pa. 1980)   Cited 1 times

    Thus we cannot find that the exclusion was unlawful. Accordingly, the Defendant's threat to treat Plaintiff's entrance onto the property as a trespass fails to entitle Plaintiff to any relief. Hurley v. Hinckley, 304 F. Supp. 704 (D.Mass. 1969), aff'd per curiam sub nom Doyle v. O'Brien, 396 U.S. 277, 90 S.Ct. 603, 24 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970). Our holding here should not be construed as affecting Bridges' right to the due process hearing ordered by Judge McGowan in the state court action based on a denial of membership rights, nor plaintiff's right to proceed with her racial or sex discrimination claims before the Human Relations Commission.