In response, the Commonwealth contends, "an appellate court 'must rely on the transcript as certified to [it] by the trial court.'" (Quoting Huntt v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 737, 738 n.2 (1972)). This Court agrees with the Commonwealth.

(2-3) Under the bad check statute, the gravamen of the offense is the intent to defraud. Huntt v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 737, 739, 187 S.E.2d 183, 185 (1972). Intent to defraud means that the defendant intends to "deceive another person, and to induce such other person, in reliance upon such deception, to assume, create, transfer, alter, or terminate a right, obligation or power with reference to property."

Patterson contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction because there was no direct evidence that he cashed or uttered the checks. He relies on Huntt v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 737, 187 S.E.2d 183 (1972), and Rosser v. Commonwealth, 192 Va. 813, 66 S.E.2d 851 (1951), but these cases do not support his position. Code Sec. 6.1-115, in pertinent part, provides:

In response, the Commonwealth contends, "an appellate court 'must rely on the transcript as certified to [it] by the trial court.'" (Quoting Huntt v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 737, 738 n.2 (1972)). This Court agrees with the Commonwealth.

Code § 18.2-181 "requires the Commonwealth to establish both the intent to defraud and knowledge of insufficient funds in order to convict the defendant." Huntt v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 737, 739, 187 S.E.2d 183, 185 (1972) (interpreting former Code § 6.1-115, the predecessor to Code § 18.2-181). "Such intent is an indispensable element of the crime and the burden is upon the Commonwealth to prove its existence at the time of drawing or uttering the check."

In an appropriate case, the presumption provided by Code Sec. 18.2-183 may aid in establishing intent. Huntt v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 737, 739, 187 S.E.2d 183, 185 (1972). Intent to defraud means that the defendant intends to "deceive another person, and to induce such other person, in reliance upon such deception, to assume, create, transfer, alter or terminate a right, obligation or power with reference to property."

Nonetheless, an appellate court "must rely on the transcript as certified to us by the trial court." Huntt v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 737, 738 n.2 (1972). Based on the clear conflict between the videos and the transcript, we conclude any finding that the substance was "beta iodine" is plainly wrong.

First, while not the subject of this appeal, there is ample evidence in the record demonstrating Watkins's intent to defraud Gateway. Specifically, the statutory presumption of fraudulent intent applies given that Watkins received notice that her check was returned for insufficient funds and still failed to make payment to Gateway. See Huntt v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 737, 739, 187 S.E.2d 183, 186 (1972) (holding that the statute creates "a rebuttable presumption of the necessary intent and knowledge if a dishonored check is not paid within five days after giving of the notice specified in the statute"). Further, Watkins admitted that she wrote the $2,500 check for the deposit knowing that there were insufficient funds in her account to cover the check, that representatives from Gateway had repeatedly tried to contact her after the check was returned for insufficient funds, and that she lied when she had texted an employee at the dealership telling her that she had obtained a certified check to cover the cost of the deposit.

Instead, the term "prima facie evidence," as used in the statute, is merely an evidentiary rule that provides the Commonwealth with a rebuttable presumption. See Charles E. Friend & Kent Sinclair, The Law of Evidence in Virginia § 5-5 (7th ed. 2012) (stating that "statutes often utilize the term prima facie" and that "[t]hese are usually construed to create a rebuttable presumption, thereby shifting the burden of producing evidence to the defendant" (citing Huntt v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 737, 739, 187 S.E.2d 183, 186 (1972))).

I agree with the majority that Code § 18.2-183 creates a rebuttable presumption. See Huntt v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 737, 739, 187 S.E.2d 183, 186 (1972) (interpreting Code § 6.1-117, the predecessor statute to Code § 18.2-183); Sykes v. Commonwealth, 42 Va. App. 581, 588, 593 S.E.2d 545, 548 (2004). However, the constitutionality of the rebuttable presumption created by Code § 18.2-183 also turns upon the classification of the presumption as mandatory or permissive.