Opinion
No. CV-06-0054-FVS
04-23-2012
LUKE M. HUNTON, Petitioner, v. STEPHEN SINCLAIR, Respondent.
ORDER DENYING PETITIONER'S
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of order regarding remand. (ECF No. 105). Petitioner is represented by Matthew A. Campbell. Respondent is represented by John Joseph Samson.
BACKGROUND
At the time his petition was filed, Petitioner was in custody at the Washington State Penitentiary in Walla Walla, Washington, pursuant to his 2002 Spokane County conviction for second degree robbery. The Court sentenced Petitioner to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole pursuant to Washington's Persistent Offender Accountability Act. On February 16, 2006, Petitioner filed a Petition For Writ of Habeas Corpus in this Court challenging his 2002 Spokane County conviction. (ECF No. 1). His petition was dismissed on December 23, 2008. (ECF No. 41).
On January 8, 2009, Petitioner appealed from the District Court's decision. (ECF No. 43). On July 26, 2011, the Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court finding it had erred by ruling that Petitioner's Brady claim had been exhausted and by concluding the Brady claim was procedurally defaulted. (ECF No. 67). The Ninth Circuit remanded the matter to the District Court to address whether the case should be stayed to afford Petitioner an opportunity to exhaust the claim in state court through a personal restraint petition and to determine whether the Brady claim is procedurally forfeited on other grounds. (ECF No. 67 at 4-5).
On March 27, 2012, the Court dismissed the remanded Brady claim because Petitioner had not properly exhausted the claim and procedural default prevented Petitioner from doing so. (ECF No. 104). Petitioner now moves for reconsideration of that order. (ECF No. 105).
DISCUSSION
Petitioner argues that reconsideration is appropriate in light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. __, 2012 WL 912950 (Mar. 20, 2012).
Reconsideration is available under Rule 60(b) upon a showing of (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence; (3) fraud; (4) a void judgment; (5) a satisfied or discharged judgment; or (6) any other reason justifying relief. Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b).
In Martinez, the Supreme Court has changed the rules relating to procedural default with respect to ineffective assistance of counsel claims. However, as admitted by Petitioner, while the claim at issue in Martinez was an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the claim at issue in the instant matter is a Brady claim. (ECF No. 106 at 5). Contrary to Petitioner's argument that Martinez should apply to Brady claims in the same manner it applies to Strickland claims, the holding of Martinez deals strictly with ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Petitioner fails to persuade the Court that Martinez is applicable to Brady claims.
The Martinez case holds that "[i]nadequate assistance of counsel at initial-review collateral proceedings may establish cause for a prisoner's procedural default of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel." Martinez, 2012 WL 912950 at *5.
Petitioner has demonstrated no new or different facts or circumstances, newly discovered evidence, or mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect to warrant reconsideration. Nor has Petitioner established any other reason justifying relief. Petitioner thus fails to present a valid basis for the Court to reconsider its prior order dismissing the petition.
Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED Petitioner's motion for reconsideration (ECF No. 105) is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED. The District Court Executive is hereby directed to enter this order and furnish copies to counsel for Petitioner and Respondent.
______________________
Fred Van Sickle
Senior United States District Judge