Opinion
1:23-CV-00287-RAL
04-26-2024
RON ALLEN HUNTER JR., Plaintiff v. WARDEN SUTTER, LT. VOLZ, CO. PATTERSON, CAPTAIN SHAWN BOLT, DEPUTY WARDEN BRYANT, DEPUTY WARDEN HOLLMAN, DEPUTY MAJOR WARDEN OF SECURITY SEYMOUR, Defendants
IN RE: ECF NO. 32
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR "RESTRAINING ORDER."
RICHARD A. LANZILLO, CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. Recommendation
It is respectfully recommended that Plaintiff Ron Allen Hunter's motion for a “restraining order” be DENIED.
II. Discussion
Hunter has a filed a motion seeking a “restraining order” against “each individual named in this lawsuit.” ECF No. 32, p. 1. The Court construes this motion as seeking a temporary restraining order. Hunter argues that the Defendants named herein are the same defendants in another case pending before this Court which makes them “not credible” because they “will do anything to lie ... and are willing to threaten people and sexually assault people even at a place they work.” Id. This, he contends, shows “[he is] at risk as an inmate in Erie County jail.” Id.
Four factors must be considered when the Court considers a request for a temporary restraining order. Smith v. Hall, 2009 WL 130422, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 20, 2009). See also Fink v. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 646 F.Supp. 569, 570 (M.D. Pa. 1986). The district court must consider: (1) the reasonable likelihood of success on the merits; (2) the extent of irreparable injury to the movant from the alleged misconduct; (3) the extent of harm to the non-movant; and (4) the effect on public interest. Clean Ocean Action v. York, 57 F.3d 328, 331 (3d Cir. 1995); Opticians Ass 'n of America v. Independent Opticians of America, 920 F.2d 187, 191-92 (3d Cir. 1990). Temporary injunctive relief is “a drastic and extraordinary remedy that is not to be routinely granted.” Intel Corp. v. ULSI Sys. Tech., Inc., 995 F.2d 1566, 1568 (Fed.Cir.1993); see also Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Company. Inc., 903 F.2d 186, 189 (3d Cir. 1990). It is Hunter's burden, as the moving party, to demonstrate both: (1) that he is reasonably likely to succeed on the merits and (2) that he is likely to experience irreparable harm without the injunction. Adams v. Freedom Forge Corp., 204 F.3d 475, 484 (3d Cir.2000).
Hunter's motion fails to allege facts to support either a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits or irreparable harm. That the Defendants in this case have been named as defendants in another action in no way supports that he is likely to succeed in either case or represent a threat of immediate irreparable harm to Hunter. Hunter' allegation that he is “at risk” is devoid of factual support and speculative, at best. See Rosario v. Wetzel, 2024 WL 1677489, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 18, 2024) (for injunctive relief, the harm alleged “must not be speculative.”) (quoting Adams, 204 F.3d at 487-88, & n.13). As such, it is insufficient to warrant injunctive relief. See ECRIv. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 809 F.2d 223, 226 (1987).
It is therefore respectfully recommended that Hunter's motion for a restraining order be DENIED.
III. Notice Regarding the Filing of Objections
In accordance with the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), Fed.R.Civ.P. 72((b)(2), and Local Rule 72(D)(2), the parties are permitted to file written objections in accordance with the schedule established in the docket entry reflecting the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Failure to timely file objections will waive the right to appeal. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n. 7 (3d Cir. 2011). Any party opposing objections may file their response to the objections within fourteen (14) days thereafter in accordance with Local Civil Rule 72(D)(2).