Opinion
C/A 22-1532-BHH-PJG
01-17-2024
Daniel T. Huneycutt, Plaintiff, v. Vasiliy Chernyak, Jr.; Wantonta N. Golden; Bryan Stirling; John Does, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
PAIGE J. GOSSETT, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Daniel T. Huneycutt filed an Amended Complaint in this civil rights action following the court's dismissal of his original claims against Defendants Wantonta N. Golden and Bryan Stirling. This matter is before the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.) for a Report and Recommendation on Golden and Stirling's motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint or, in the alternative, motion for judgment on the pleadings. (ECF No. 68.) Huneycutt filed a response in opposition to the motion (ECF No. 70), and Golden and Stirling filed a reply (ECF No. 71). Having reviewed the record presented and the applicable law, the court concludes the motion to dismiss should be granted.
BACKGROUND
The following allegations are taken as true for purposes of resolving the defendants' motion to dismiss. This case arises from an incident on May 14, 2019 in which Huneycutt, an inmate in the South Carolina Department of Corrections (“SCDC”), was sprayed with chemical munitions by Defendant Vasiliy Chernyak, an SCDC officer. After an investigation, Chernyak was terminated from SCDC and arrested on state charges.
The State Case.
Huneycutt filed a lawsuit in February 2021 against SCDC in the Richland County Court of Common Pleas, raising causes of action for negligence and gross negligence pursuant to the South Carolina Tort Claims Act, SC Code Ann. §§ 15-78-10 et seq. Huneycutt v. S.C. Dep't of Corrs., C/A No. 2021-CP-40-00765. In that lawsuit, SCDC denied in pleadings and discovery responses that Chernyak used excessive force against Huneycutt despite SCDC's own internal investigation showing otherwise. Huneycutt filed a motion to compel discovery responses in light of SCDC's denials. On February 9, 2022, the state court held a hearing on Huneycutt's motion to compel and took the matter under advisement. Huneycutt's motion to compel remains pending in state court and the case is currently stayed pending the resolution of Chernyak's criminal charges. Huneycutt filed a motion to lift the stay on December 5, 2023.
The Federal Case.
On May 13, 2022, Huneycutt filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986 against Chernyak, Golden, and Stirling. Golden is the associate warden at an SCDC facility and Stirling is the Director of SCDC. By order dated September 12, 2023, the Honorable Bruce H. Hendricks, United States District Judge, granted Golden and Stirling's motion to dismiss, finding Huneycutt failed to state a claim against the defendants upon which relief could be granted. Judge Hendricks also granted Huneycutt leave to file an amended complaint.
Huneycutt also names John Doe defendants, but he has not identified any specific individuals. Chernyak has not appeared in this case and is in default. (ECF No. 21.) Huneycutt moved for default judgment against Chernyak on August 10, 2022. (ECF No. 23.) That motion, as well as Huneycutt's motion to compel discovery responses (ECF No. 27), is in abeyance pending resolution of the Golden and Stirling's motion to dismiss.
Huneycutt filed an Amended Complaint raising three causes of action against Golden and Stirling pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983-(1) denial of access to the courts and “remedy for legal injury” in violation of the First Amendment; (2) supervisory liability for violations of the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments; and (3) “conspiracy” to violate Huneycutt's First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Golden and Stirling now seek dismissal of the claims raised against them in the Amended Complaint.
DISCUSSION
A. Applicable Standards
A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) examines the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged on the face of the complaint. Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A claim is facially plausible when the factual content allows the court to reasonably infer that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. When considering a motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). The court “may also consider documents attached to the complaint, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(c), as well as those attached to the motion to dismiss, so long as they are integral to the complaint and authentic.” Philips v. Pitt Cty. Mem'l Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (citing Blankenship v. Manchin, 471 F.3d 523, 526 n.1 (4th Cir. 2006)).
In considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court applies the same standard as for motions made pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Independence News, Inc. v. City of Charlotte, 568 F.3d 148, 154 (4th Cir. 2009). However, the court may also consider the defendants' answers. See Massey v. Ojaniit, 759 F.3d 343, 347 (4th Cir. 2014); see also Void v. Orangeburg Cnty. Disabilities & Special Needs Bd., C/A No. 5:14-cv-02157-JMC, 2015 WL 404247, at *2 n.1 (D.S.C. Jan. 29, 2015).
B. Golden's and Stirling's Motion
A legal action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 allows “a party who has been deprived of a federal right under the color of state law to seek relief.” City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 707 (1999). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). The plaintiff must plausibly allege that he suffered an injury caused by the defendant from whom he seeks damages. See Evans v. Chalmers, 703 F.3d 636, 647 (4th Cir. 2012) (“[C]onstitutional torts . . . require a demonstration of both but-for and proximate causation.”); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 850 (4th Cir. 1985) (“In order for an individual to be liable under § 1983, it must be ‘affirmatively shown that the official charged acted personally in the deprivation of the plaintiff's rights.' ”) (quoting Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 928 (4th Cir. 1977)); see also Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344 n.7 (1986).
1. Denial of Access to Courts
The defendants argue that Huneycutt fails to allege facts that plausibly show they denied him access to the courts. The court agrees.
Prisoners have a fundamental, constitutional right to access the courts. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350 (1996); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 828 (1977). To raise a plausible claim that a prisoner has been unconstitutionally denied access to the courts, he cannot rely on conclusory allegations. See Cochran v. Morris, 73 F.3d 1310, 1317 (4th Cir. 1996). Rather, he must show actual injury or prejudice-specifically, that his efforts to pursue his legal claim were hindered. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351; Cochran, 73 F.3d at 1317 (citing Strickler v. Waters, 989 F.2d 1375, 1384 (4th Cir. 1993)). Further, the plaintiff must show that underlying claim that he was hindered from raising is itself meritorious. As the United States Supreme Court has stated,
Whether an access claim turns on a litigating opportunity yet to be gained or an opportunity already lost, the very point of recognizing any access claim is to provide some effective vindication for a separate and distinct right to seek judicial relief for some wrong. However unsettled the basis of the constitutional right of access to courts, our cases rest on the recognition that the right is ancillary to the underlying claim, without which a plaintiff cannot have suffered injury by being shut out of court. We indicated as much in our most recent case on denial of access, Lewis v. Casey, . . . where we noted that even in forward-looking prisoner class actions to remove roadblocks to future litigation, the named plaintiff must identify a “nonfrivolous,” “arguable” underlying claim, id., at 353, and n. 3, 116 S.Ct. 2174, .... It follows that the underlying cause of action, whether anticipated or lost, is an element that must be described in the complaint, just as much as allegations must describe the official acts frustrating the litigation. It follows, too, that when the access claim . . . looks backward, the complaint must identify a remedy that may be awarded as recompense but not otherwise available in some suit that may yet be brought. There is, after all, no point in spending time and money to establish the facts constituting denial of access when a plaintiff would end up just as well off after litigating a simpler case without the denial-of-access element.Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 414-15 (2002). In other words, in a denial of access claim that seeks compensation for access lost, the claim does not exist until the plaintiff can no longer bring the underlying claim.
Here, Huneycutt can still-and is still-pursuing his claim in state court. Huneycutt argues that the defendants' discovery responses have hindered his ability to prosecute his claim in the state court lawsuit, but the state court may still grant Huneycutt relief in that case. Huneycutt's motion to compel is pending in that case. Unless and until Huneycutt's motion is denied and his state claim is foreclosed, he is indeed enjoying access to the courts. Thus, Huneycutt fails to plausibly allege that he has been injured or prejudiced by the defendants' conduct. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351.
Also, Huneycutt's allegations supporting the denial of access claim are conclusory. See Cochran, 73 F.3d at 1317. Huneycutt alleges only that the defendants “actively participated in, or failed to act and allowed others to, violate Plaintiff's First Amendment rights through the willful and intentional denial of facts known to be true and/or willful and intentional misstatement of facts in responding to the allegations of the Plaintiff's state court action and to Plaintiff's discovery requests in that state court action.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 59, ECF No. 53 at 16.) Even assuming the access to courts claim is not premature, Huneycutt fails to plausibly allege that the defendants acted personally to impede Huneycutt's litigation. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (stating Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, but it requires more than a plain accusation that the defendant unlawfully harmed the plaintiff, devoid of factual support). Therefore, Huneycutt fails to state a denial of access claim upon which relief can be granted.
The claim would appear to be implausible on its face anyway considering SCDC is represented by counsel in that action.
2. Supervisory Liability
The defendants argue that Huneycutt fails to put forth allegations that plausibly support supervisory liability claims in the Amended Complaint. The court agrees.
In § 1983 suits, supervisory officials may not be held liable under a respondeat superior theory of liability for the unconstitutional actions of their subordinates; but a supervisor's “indifference or tacit authorization of subordinates' misconduct may be a causative factor in the constitutional injuries they inflict on those committed to their care.” Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368, 372 (4th Cir. 1984). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has adopted the following test to determine whether the plaintiff can demonstrate supervisory liability:
(1) that the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that his subordinate was engaged in conduct that posed “a pervasive and unreasonable risk” of constitutional injury to citizens like the plaintiff;
(2) that the supervisor's response to that knowledge was so inadequate as to show “deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of the alleged offensive practices”; and
(3) that there was an “affirmative causal link” between the supervisor's inaction and the particular constitutional injury suffered by the plaintiff.Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994). The behavior that poses a risk of constitutional injury must be “widespread” or at least have occurred on “several different occasions,” but single or isolated incidents are not enough. Id. Specifically as to the second element, the plaintiff bears a “heavy burden of proof in establishing deliberate indifference,” but it may be shown by showing the supervisor's “continued inaction in the face of documented widespread abuses.” Id. (quoting Slakan, 737 F.2d at 372-73.) In light of the potentially limitless number of officials who could ultimately be liable, the “outer limits” of supervisory liability are determined by “pinpointing the persons in the decisionmaking chain whose deliberate indifference permitted the constitutional abuses to continue unchecked.” Slakan, 737 F.2d at 373.
Here, Huneycutt again uses conclusory allegations without supporting facts to assert that Stirling and Golden should have been aware of Chernyak's conduct and that the there is a link between their response or lack of response to his conduct. While providing a list of Chernyak's bad conduct, Huneycutt baldly asserts that the defendants “knew and/or should have known” about it and that the defendants “had [a] duty to supervise” Chernyak. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 68-71, ECF No. 53 at 17-19.) Similarly, Huneycutt alleges the defendants “either actively participated in, or personally failed to act and allowing [sic] subordinates to [] fail to adequately supervise and/or train subordinates.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 73, ECF No. 53 at 20.) These allegations merely repeat the elements of a supervisory liability claim without providing specific facts that explain how the defendants are responsible for Chernyak's conduct. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (stating Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure does not require detailed factual allegations, but it requires more than a plain accusation that the defendant unlawfully harmed the plaintiff, devoid of factual support). Therefore, Huneycutt fails to state a supervisory claim upon which relief can be granted against the defendants.
3. Conspiracy
The defendants argue Huneycutt fails to state a conspiracy claim upon which relief can be granted because the allegations supporting the claim are conclusory. The court agrees.
Initially, it is unclear what cause of action Huneycutt raises here. The Amended Complaint lists the cause of action as “Violation of Federal Civil Rights 42 U.S.C. § 1983-Conspiracy to Violate Plaintiff's First, Eighth[,] and Fourteenth Amendment Rights.” (Am. Compl., ECF No. 53 at 20.) Previously, the court dismissed Plaintiff's conspiracy claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985, finding the claims were conclusory. The defendants construe the Amended Complaint as raising a separate “civil conspiracy” claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which Huneycutt does not dispute. To the extent such a claim is cognizable, Huneycutt again fails to plausibly allege that the defendants acted in concert and deprived Huneycutt of a constitutional right. See, e.g., Hinkle v. City of Clarksburg, W.Va., 81 F.3d 416, 421 (4th Cir. 1996). Again, Huneycutt repeats only the elements of the claim-“conspiracy,” “participated,” “agreeing” (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 86-89, ECF No. 53 at 22)-without providing specific facts. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Moreover, because the court already concluded that Huneycutt fails to plausibly allege an underlying constitutional violation, Huneycutt cannot plausibly show that any purported conspiracy deprived him of a constitutional right. See, e.g., Nance v. City of Albemarle, N. Carolina, 520 F.Supp.3d 758, 801 (M.D. N.C. 2021) (dismissing a civil conspiracy claim for failure to plausibly allege an underlying constitutional violation). Consequently, Huneycutt fails to state a § 1983 conspiracy claim upon which relief can be granted.
RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing, the court recommends Golden's and Stirling's motion to dismiss be granted. (ECF No. 68.) Consequently, if this recommendation is adopted, Huneycutt's motion to compel discovery responses from Golden and Stirling should be denied as moot. (ECF No. 27.)
If this report and recommendation is adopted in full, Huneycutt's motion for a default judgment against Chernyak would remain pending. (ECF No. 23.) Absent contrary instruction by the assigned district judge, the case should be recommitted to the undersigned for a further report and recommendation on this motion.
The parties' attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.' ” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).