[1] It is well settled that damage to land caused, with or without negligence, by the seepage of water from canals of an irrigation district which have been constructed and are maintained to supply water for public use, gives the owner of such land a cause of action in the nature of eminent domain against the district. ( Hume v. Fresno Irr. Dist., 21 Cal.App.2d 348, 354 [ 69 P.2d 483]; Massetti v. MaderaCanal Irr. Co., 20 Cal.App.2d 708, 715 [ 68 P.2d 260]; Ketcham v. Modesto Irr. Dist., 135 Cal.App. 180, 186 [ 26 P.2d 876]; and Tormey v. Anderson-Cottonwood I. Dist., 53 Cal.App. 559 [ 200 P. 814], opinion of Supreme Court on denial of hearing, p. 568.) [2] But the fact that the cause of action is one of that kind does not exclude it from the operation of a claim statute, the terms of which are broad enough to embrace it.

[2] That a grant does not prevent recovery for damage to the grantor's land from all seepage is well established. The rule is stated in Hume v. Fresno Irr. Dist. (1937) 21 Cal.App.2d 348, 351 [ 69 P.2d 483]: "It is undoubtedly the rule that whenever a grant of a right of way is executed by a land owner he thereby estops himself from afterward prosecuting any action for past damages that have occurred or for future damages which might reasonably be expected to occur by reason of the necessary, natural, and ordinary use of the utility or public service for which the right of way is granted. The inhibition of the rule includes the ordinary and natural injury, which might reasonably have been anticipated, that adjacent land suffers from seepage if the land is of such character as to admit of seepage or if it may fairly be declared that there was a reasonable expectation that seepage would occur [citation].

An appellate court should not disturb a general verdict merely because the trial court gave the jury an abstractly correct instruction which the facts before it did not warrant, provided that another theory on which the case was submitted to the jury finds substantial support in the evidence and is unaffected by error. (See Estate of Hellier (1914) 169 Cal. 77, 83 [ 145 P. 1008]; Posz v. Burchell (1962) 209 Cal.App.2d 324, 335-337 [ 25 Cal.Rptr. 896], and cases there cited; see also Tucker v. Landucci (1962) 57 Cal.2d 762, 766 [ 22 Cal.Rptr. 10, 371 P.2d 754]; Gillespie v. Rawlings (1957) 49 Cal.2d 359, 368-369 [ 317 P.2d 601]; Edwards v. Gullick (1931) 213 Cal. 86, 88 [ 1 P.2d 11]; Verdelli v. Gray's Harbor etc. Co. (1896) 115 Cal. 517, 525 [47 P. 364, 778]; Crosett v. Whelan (1872) 44 Cal. 200, 203; Moss v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. (1951) 103 Cal.App.2d 380, 384-385 [ 229 P.2d 802]; Shields v. Oxnard Harbor Dist. (1941) 46 Cal.App.2d 477, 491 [ 116 P.2d 121] (McComb, J.); Hume v. Fresno Irr. Dist. (1937) 21 Cal.App.2d 348, 356-357 [ 69 P.2d 483]; cf. Gordon v. Aztee Brewing Co. (1949) 33 Cal.2d 514, 520 [ 203 P.2d 522]; Blanton v. Curry (1942) 20 Cal.2d 793, 799-800 [ 129 P.2d 1] (per curiam); Gerdes v. Pacific Gas ElectricCo. (1933) 219 Cal. 459, 471-473 [ 27 P.2d 365, 90 A.L.R. 1071]; Christensen v. Malkin (1965) 236 Cal.App.2d 114, 123 [ 45 Cal.Rptr. 836]; Rather v. City County of San Francisco (1947) 81 Cal.App.2d 625, 636 [ 184 P.2d 727].) Although our courts have not always taken this approach (see, e.g., Burks v. Blackman (1959) 52 Cal.2d 715, 719 [ 344 P.2d 301]; Edwards v. Freeman (1949) 34 Cal.2d 589, 594 [ 212 P.2d 883]; Huebotter v. Follett (1946) 27 Cal.2d 765, 770-771 [ 167 P.2d 193]; Oettinger v. Stewart (1944) 24 Cal.2d 133, 139-140 [ 148 P.2d 19, 156 A.L.R. 1221]; Christensen v. Bocian (1959) 169 Cal.App.2d 223 [ 336 P.2d 1018]; Schaffer v. Claremont Country Club (1959) 168 Cal.App.2d 351, 358 [ 336 P.2d 254, 337 P.2d 139], reh. den. 168 Cal.App.2d 358 -359), consistent adherence to the rule

Whether the contractor followed the plans or specifications or not, if plaintiffs' constitutional rights have been adversely affected they are entitled to compensation from the public agency authorizing and supervising the work." (See, also, Newman v. City of Alhambra, 179 Cal. 42, 45 [ 175 P. 414]; Perkins v. Blauth, 163 Cal. 782, 789 [ 127 P. 50]; Eachus v. City of Los Angeles, 130 Cal. 492 [ 62 P. 829, 80 Am.St.Rep. 147]; De Baker v. Southern Cal. Railway Co., 106 Cal. 257, 284 [39 P. 610, 46 Am.St.Rep. 237]; Marin Mun. W.Dist. v. Peninsula P. Co., 34 Cal.App.2d 647, 652 [ 94 P.2d 404]; Hume v. Fresno Irr. Dist., 21 Cal.App.2d 348, 354 [ 69 P.2d 483]; Northwestern Pac. R.R. Co. v. Currie, 100 Cal.App. 173, 175 [ 279 P. 1057].) [10] The settled statement does not show the basis of the court's ruling of exclusion or whether the proffered evidence tended sufficiently to support plaintiffs' claims.

(10) It is well settled that "where several issues in a cause are tried and submitted to a jury for its determination, a general verdict may not be disturbed for uncertainty, if one issue is sustained by the evidence and is unaffected by error. [Citations.] When a situation of this character is presented it is a matter of no importance that the evidence may have been insufficient to sustain a verdict in favor of the successful party on the other issues or that reversible errors were committed with regard to such issues." ( Hume v. Fresno Irr. Dist. (1937) 21 Cal.App.2d 348, 356-357 [ 69 P.2d 483].) While this rule has generally been applied in cases involving a general verdict, we conclude that it should apply as well to a situation as here where a special verdict is rendered on two causes of action.

" ( Sutro Heights Land Co. v. Merced Irr. Dist., supra, 211 Cal. 670, at p. 700, italics added.) IID contends the just-quoted language of Sutro Heights Land Co., supra, and that of Hume v. Fresno Irr. Dist. (1937) 21 Cal.App.2d 348 [ 69 P.2d 483], which similarly held a district bound by statute to provide drainage whenever necessary or proper, or beneficial to lands affected by the district's irrigation practices, is inapposite. It argues these cases interpreted section two of the Drainage Act of 1907 (1907 Act) which contains different language from that in the present section 22098.

Cases imposing liability on an irrigation district primarily involve instances where seepage from the district's canals results in damage to adjacent land because of negligent construction or maintenance of a canal, or a taking of property under article I, section 19, of the California Constitution. (See, e.g., Curci v. Palo Verde Irr. Dist. (1945) 69 Cal.App.2d 583 [ 159 P.2d 674]; Hume v. Fresno Irr. Dist. (1937) 21 Cal.App.2d 348 [ 69 P.2d 483]; Ketcham v. Modesto Irr. Dist. (1933) 135 Cal.App. 180 [ 26 P.2d 876].) (3) Also, absent a statutory ground for relief against a district, an aggrieved landowner may sue a property owner who irrigates to such an extent that water percolates onto and damages his land.

On this basis, defendant Dodgers asserts that the verdict in its favor should not be disturbed because on one issue, unaffected by any error, it is supportable. Hume v. Fresno Irr. Dist., 21 Cal.App.2d 348, 356-357 [ 69 P.2d 483], is cited and quoted as follows: "The rule is settled in this state that where several issues in a cause are tried and submitted to a jury for its determination, a general verdict may not be disturbed for uncertainty, if one issue is sustained by the evidence and is unaffected by error. [Citations.] When a situation of this character is presented it is a matter of no importance that the evidence may have been insufficient to sustain a verdict in favor of the successful party on the other issues or that reversible errors were committed with regard to such issues. ( Big Three Min. Mill. Co. v. Hamilton, 157 Cal. 130, 141 [ 107 P. 301, 137 Am. St. Rep. 118].)

The Supreme Court of the state has held that when there is a general verdict and a plaintiff has sued on two causes of action, the judgment in favor of a plaintiff must be affirmed if one of the causes of action is supported by ample evidence and there is no error in the record with respect to such cause of action even though there are errors with respect to the other cause of action. ( Gillespie v. Rawlings, 49 Cal.2d 359 [ 317 P.2d 601]; Tucker v. Landucci, 57 Cal.2d 762 [ 22 Cal.Rptr. 10, 371 P.2d 754]; Moss v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 103 Cal.App.2d 380, 384 [ 229 P.2d 802]; Estate of Hellier, 169 Cal. 77, 83 [ 145 P. 1008]; Shields v. Oxnard Harbor Dist., 46 Cal.App.2d 477, 491 [ 116 P.2d 121]; Hume v. Fresno Irr. Dist., 21 Cal.App.2d 348, 356 [ 69 P.2d 483]; King v. Schumacher, 32 Cal.App.2d 172, 179 [ 89 P.2d 466]; Rather v. City County of San Francisco, 81 Cal.App.2d 625, 636 [ 184 P.2d 727]; Posz v. Burchell, 209 Cal.App.2d 324, 335 [ 25 Cal.Rptr. 896].) Objections to the underlying theory of these cases have been made previously but have been overruled by the Supreme Court.

)" In an opinion written by Mr. Justice McComb in Shields v. Oxnard Harbor Dist., 46 Cal.App.2d 477, 491 [ 116 P.2d 121], it is said: "A general verdict imports findings in favor of the prevailing party on all material issues and, if there is substantial evidence to sustain a verdict on one count which is unaffected by error, the fact that there is not sufficient evidence to sustain the necessary findings of fact upon another count to support a verdict, or that there have been errors in connection with such other count, will not justify a reversal of the general verdict ( Hume v. Fresno Irr. Dist., 21 Cal.App.2d 348, 356 [ 69 P.2d 483]; King v. Schumacher, 32 Cal.App.2d 172, 179 [ 89 P.2d 466]; see also 2 Cal.Jur. [1921] 1029)." The rationale of this holding may perhaps be traced back to Estate of Hellier, 169 Cal. 77, 83 [ 145 P. 1008], where it is said: "The contestant, defending against the note, had the right to set up inconsistent defenses and offer evidence in support thereof.