Appellee has never used this well, has no intention of doing so, and in fact did not even know it was on the Lentz lease at the time of acquisition. It would strain the English language as well as the statute defining an operator to conclude that appellee is the operator of this well. In Humble Oil Refining Co. v. Cook, 215 S.W.2d 383, 387 (Tex.Civ.App. — Austin 1948, writ ref'd n.r.e.), the court had before it the situation where the owners of a well had damaged the well and failed to repair and operate it. In refusing to hold that the owners had abandoned the well the court said: "An intention to abandon involves an intention not to return and reoccupy the property.
Plaintiff's corporate officer, on the other hand, denied any intention to abandon the premises, although it must be conceded, he did not offer any evidence of affirmative intent or overt act to reopen the business. As plaintiff points out, the language found in Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Cook, 215 S.W.2d 383, 387 (Tex.Civ.App.--Austin 1948, writ ref'd n.r.e.), is pertinent: 'The most that can be said of the well is that the owners, having damaged the well, failed to repair and operate it.
Appellants take the further position that since L G agreed to plug and abandon the wells the action of the Commission was arbitrary in not considering the agreement, on the other hand the Commission says that there is ample evidence to show that there was no intent to abandon these permits. Humble Oil Refining Co. v. Cook, Tex.Civ.App., 215 S.W.2d 383, err. ref., n. r. e. The agreement referred to herein is dated December 5th, 1963, and sets out in detail the history of and ownership of the land and wells thereon, and in part reads:
The mere non-use of an oil well does not constitute abandonment. Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Cook et al., Tex.Civ.App., 215 S.W.2d 383. The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the cause remanded.
"Abandonment" is principally a matter of intention which must be established by clear and satisfactory evidence. Humble Oil Refining Co. v. Cook Tex.Civ.App., 215 S.W.2d 383, 384. The abandonment of a contract is a matter of intent.
Section 12(b) of Article 911b makes provision for the revocation of any certificate after notice and hearing. Humble Oil Refining Co. v. Cook, Tex.Civ.App., 215 S.W.2d 383, (er. ref. n. r. e.). No such proceedings as contemplated by Section 12(b) were ever had.
This does not necessarily mean that a plugged well cannot be opened and put back in production. That this may be done upon proper application to the Commission and upon proper evidence was held by us in Humble Oil and Refining Co. v. Cook, Tex.Civ.App., 215 S.W.2d 383 (Writ Ref.N.R.E.). Until this is done, however, the order plugging the well is in full force and effect and appellant has no right, as a matter of law, to unplug or redrill such well. Appellant makes no point that the order of the Commission is not reasonably supported by substantial evidence and we, therefore, do not discuss the evidence.
The notice stated that the application was for a permit to drill one well on Lot 19, with requested location, and the permit was granted to prevent confiscation of property to drill well No. 1, Paul Alois Skarda Lot 19, Block 2, L. A. Camperon Addition, as shown by plat submitted. The permit, therefore, was applied for and granted to prevent confiscation, not on the entire tract (2 lots) as it originally existed, but upon a subdivision thereof (Lot 19), and is not valid; and the trial court's judgment should be affirmed, but without prejudice to an application for a permit to drill a well on the entire unit (2 lots), such well to be located by the Commission. Gulf Land Co. v. Atlantic Refining Co., 134 Tex. 59, 131 S.W.2d 73; Humble Oil Refining Co. v. Cook, Tex.Civ.App., 215 S.W.2d 383; Railroad Commission v. Miller, Tex.Civ.App., 165 S.W.2d 504; Humble Oil Refining Co. v. Potter, Tex.Civ.App., 143 S.W.2d 135. The oil and gas lease executed by Monta E. Harvey individually (who had no interest in the property-see Amerada Petroleum Corporation v. Cheesman, Tex.Civ.App.,