Humanes v. General Electric Transportation Services, Inc.

Full title: RENE HUMANES, Plantiff, v. GENERAL ELECTRIC TRANSPORTATION SERVICES, INC.…

Court: United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division

Date published: Jul 24, 2000

No. 99 C 4528 (N.D. Ill. Jul. 24, 2000)

Opinion

No. 99 C 4528

July 24, 2000

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

WAYNE R. ANDERSEN, United States Judge.

Plaintiff Rene Humanes ("Humanes") brings this negligence action against General Electric Transportation Services Inc. ("GETS"). Defendant GETS has filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1), (5), and (6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons set forth below, the court grants GETS motion to dismiss.

BACKGROUND

Defendant GETS is a Delaware Corporation. Plaintiff Humanes is a resident of Texas. On July 12, 1996, Humanes was the owner and passenger of a vehicle being driven by Armando Santillano, in a southerly direction on 1-57, in the Township of Neoga, County of Cumberland, and State of Illinois. The vehicle collided with a concrete wall allegedly injuring Humanes. Humanes alleges that Armando Santillano, a resident of New Mexico, was the authorized agent/employee of GETS. Humanes alleges a case of vicarious liability against GETS.

DISCUSSION

A motion to dismiss should not be granted unless it "appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claims which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). We take the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint as true and view them, as well as reasonable inferences therefrom, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Ellsworth v. City of Racine, 774 F.2d 182, 184 (7^th Cir. 1985), cert. denied 475 U.S. 1047 (1986).

In its motion to dismiss, GETS presents two arguments. First, GETS argues that service of process was improper. Second, GETS argues that the complaint was not filed within the applicable statute of limitations period.

I. Service of Process

Defendant GETS has moved to dismiss the first amended complaint claiming that the plaintiff did not obtain timely service on it. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m) sets forth the time limits for service in federal cases. Specifically, the rule states:

If service of the summons and complaint is not made upon a defendant within 120 days after filing of the complaint, the court, upon motion or on its own initiative after notice to the plaintiff, shall dismiss the action without prejudice to the defendant . . . provided that if the plaintiff shows good cause for the failure, the court shall extend the time for service for an appropriate period.

In the instant case, we believe that Humanes has shown good cause for the delay in obtaining service on GETS. This suit was filed on June 9, 1999. Service on GETS was attempted in Fort Wayne, Indiana. However, the return indicated that the officers had moved. On November 23, 1999, this Court granted an additional 30 days to the plaintiff to perfect service. Service was then perfected on December 8, 1999, within the applicable 30-day extension.

Accordingly, GETS was timely served within the applicable time extended to Humanes by this Court. Thus, the motion to dismiss for failure to timely serve GETS is denied.

II. Statute of Limitations

GETS next claims the case should be dismissed because the suit is barred by the two-year statute of limitation for personal injury actions in Illinois, pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/13-202. Humanes argues that the court should apply the longer three-year statute of limitations period of either Indiana or New Mexico. Plaintiff contends Indiana's statute of limitations is appropriate because GETS had a place of business in Indiana at the time of the accident. In the alternative, Humanes argues that the New Mexico statute of limitation is applicable because the driver of the vehicle, Santillano, resided in New Mexico at the time of the accident.

Because jurisdiction in this case rests on diversity of citizenship, we must decide the issues presented as though we were an Illinois state court. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496, 61 S.Ct. 1020, 1021, 85 L.Ed. 1477 (1941). A federal court sitting in diversity will apply the substantive law of the state in which it sits. Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 82 L.Ed. 1188, 58 S.Ct. 817 (1938). Illinois conflict-of-law principles require courts to apply the law of the state where the injury occurred for substantive issues and the law of the forum state for procedural issues. Macias v. Inland Steel Company, 147 Ill. App.3d 411 (1^st Dist. 1986). Statute of limitation questions are procedural in Illinois. Kalmich v. Bruno, 553 F.2d 549, 553 (7^th Cir. 1977).

The plaintiff urges us to embark on a conflict-of-law-analysis. However, this is only appropriately used to settle a question concerning what jurisdiction's substantive law applies. In the instant case, there is no conflict between the relevant substantive law of Illinois and any other state. The law of the state where the injury occurred and the law of the forum state are both Illinois. Therefore, there is no conflict-of-law and the law of Illinois clearly applies.

Even under a conflict of law analysis, however, we would still apply the law of Illinois. In tort cases, Illinois has adopted the "most significant relationship" test of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Law. Miller v. Long Airdox Co. 914 F.2d 976 (7^th Cir. 1990). Generally, Illinois law presumes that the law of the state where the injury occurred will govern a personal injury claim unless another state has a more significant relationship to the parties. Id.

In the instant case, the entire occurrence took place in Illinois. Indiana does not have a substantial connection with this suit. GETS is not a resident of Indiana. Humanes merely alleges GETS was doing business in Indiana at the time of the crash. New Mexico has an even more tenuous relationship with this suit. Armando Santillano, the driver of the vehicle, who is not a party to this suit, was a resident of New Mexico at the time of the accident. Illinois has an extensive connection with the legal action because the collision that caused the legal action occurred solely and entirely in Illinois. The law of Illinois accordingly governs this claim.

Once the Illinois statute of limitations is applied, the result is clear. Illinois law provides a 2-year limitation for personal injury actions. 735 ILCS 5/13-202. In this case, the occurrence took place on July 12, 1996 and the complaint was not filed until nearly 3-years later, on July 9, 1999. Therefore, the action is barred, and this case must be dismissed.

CONCLUSION

For the above stated reasons, the court grants the motion of defendant General Electric Transportation Services, Inc. to dismiss the action in its entirety with prejudice. This is a final and appealable order. This case is hereby terminated.

It is so ordered.