Opinion
Civil Action No. 21-10859
2022-07-07
Amanda Marie HUIZAR, Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.
Joseph E. Houle, Levine, Benjamin, Southfield, MI, Howard D. Olinsky, Olinsky Law Group, Syracuse, NY, for Plaintiff. Sean Santen, Timothy S. Bolen, Social Security Administration, Boston, MA, Zak Toomey, United States Attorney's Office, Detroit, MI, for Defendant.
Joseph E. Houle, Levine, Benjamin, Southfield, MI, Howard D. Olinsky, Olinsky Law Group, Syracuse, NY, for Plaintiff.
Sean Santen, Timothy S. Bolen, Social Security Administration, Boston, MA, Zak Toomey, United States Attorney's Office, Detroit, MI, for Defendant.
OPINION & ORDER (1) OVERRULING PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTIONS (Dkt. 21); (2) ADOPTING THE RECOMMENDATION CONTAINED IN THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION (R&R) (Dkt. 20); (3) DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Dkt. 17); (4) GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Dkt. 18); AND (5) AFFIRMING THE COMMISSIONER'S DECISION
MARK A. GOLDSMITH, United States District Judge
Plaintiff Amanda Marie Huizar seeks judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying her applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income under the Social Security Act. Huizar and the Commissioner filed cross-motions for summary judgment (Dkts. 17, 18). The magistrate judge issued an R&R recommending that the Court deny Huizar's motion, grant the Commissioner's motion, and affirm the Commissioner's decision (Dkt. 20). Huizar filed objections to the R&R (Dkt. 21), and the Commissioner filed a reply to Huizar's objections (Dkt. 22). For the reasons that follow, the Court overrules Huizar's objection and adopts the recommendation contained in the R&R.
I. BACKGROUND
In her applications, Huizar claimed that she could not work due to the following disabilities: uncontrolled diabetes mellitus type 2, narcolepsy, acute keratitis bilateral, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, major depressive disorder, anxiety, borderline personality disorder, and posttraumatic stress disorder. R&R at 4. Administrative law Judge (ALJ) Timothy Scallen, engaging in the five-step disability analysis, found at steps one and two that Huizar had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date of her disability, and that she had the following severe impairments: history of diabetes mellitus, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, anxiety, and a mood disorder. Id. at 4–5. However, at step three, the ALJ found no evidence that Huizar's impairments met or medically equaled one of the listings in the regulations. Id. at 5. Further, at step four, the ALJ found that Huizar had a residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform light work with certain limitations. Id. At step five, the ALJ denied Huizar's application for benefits, finding that there are a significant number of jobs in the national economy that Huizar could perform. Id.
On appeal, Huizar challenged (i) the ALJ's determination at step two that her narcolepsy is a non-severe impairment; and (ii) the ALJ's determination regarding the jobs that Huizar can perform.
A. Narcolepsy
In making the step two finding, the ALJ identified one of Huizar's asserted disabilities, narcolepsy, as a non-severe impairment. Id. at 12. Huizar challenged this finding as unsupported by substantial evidence. Id. at 11. The magistrate judge disagreed, explaining that the ALJ supported his decision by finding that Huizar "has received no specialized treatment [for narcolepsy ] or made any particular subjective complaints since the amended alleged onset date." Id. at 13 (punctuation modified). The ALJ also supported his decision by adopting the opinion of Dr. Jerilynn Campbell, who explicitly noted Huizar's narcolepsy in her opinion and suggested that Huizar take precautions against unprotected heights. Id. at 13–14. Further, "even if the ALJ erred by excluding narcolepsy from the severe impairment list, the error is harmless." Id. at 14. "Where an ALJ considers a claimant's severe and non-severe impairments after Step Two in the analysis, the Sixth Circuit finds the fact that some impairments were not deemed to be severe at Step Two to be ‘legally irrelevant.’ " Id. (quoting Anthony v. Astrue , 266 F. App'x 451, 457 (6th Cir. 2008) ). Here, the magistrate judge explained, the ALJ found other impairments to be severe. Id. He also considered Huizar's narcolepsy after step two of the analysis, stating in his RFC determination that Huizar "should avoid exposure to unprotected heights" to, among other things, account for her narcolepsy. Id. at 13–14.
B. Jobs
The Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) defines jobs available in the national economy by reasoning level. Higher levels represent higher levels of reasoning development. Matelski v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. , No. 97-3366, 1998 WL 381361, at *6 (6th Cir. June 25, 1998). Under the DOT, "reasoning level one represents the ability to carry out one- to two-step jobs." Id.
In making the RFC determination, the ALJ utilized the opinion of Dr. George Starrett, a psychological consultant. R&R at 7. Dr. Starrett opined that Huizar could perform "simple one-to-two step tasks"—which Huizar suggests necessarily means jobs requiring level one reasoning—and found that Huizar has "severe mental impairments that preclude multi-step tasks that require sustained concentration over extended periods." Id. (punctuation modified). The ALJ found Dr. Starrett's opinion to be "generally persuasive" due to its overall consistency with the medical evidence. Id. at 7–8 (punctuation modified). The ALJ concluded that Huizar could perform "simple, routine, and repetitive tasks," and, therefore, the ALJ found Huizar capable of performing jobs requiring level two or three reasoning. Id. at 8 (punctuation modified).
Huizar argued that the ALJ's RFC determination was not supported by substantial evidence. Specifically, she asserted that the ALJ failed to reconcile his rejection of Dr. Starrett's recommendation of a limitation of simple, one-to-two step tasks with the ALJ's determination that Huizar could perform reasoning level two or three jobs. Id. at 7–8. Put differently, Huizar contended that the ALJ should have found her capable of performing only jobs requiring level one reasoning.
The magistrate judge found that the ALJ's RFC determination was supported by substantial evidence, explaining that "[a]lthough ALJs are responsible for assessing RFC based on their evaluation of the medical and non-medical evidence, they are not required to rely on medical opinions." R&R at 9 (citing Rudd v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 531 F. App'x 719, 728 (6th Cir. 2013) ). "The most important factors for an ALJ to consider are supportability, or degree to which objective medical evidence supports the opinion, and consistency, or degree to which the opinion is consistent with other evidence." Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c) ). The ALJ clearly considered the supportability and consistency of Dr. Starrett's opinion, summarizing Dr. Starrett's opinion and the medical record and ultimately concluding that Dr. Starrett's opinion was generally consistent with the medical evidence, but that Dr. Starrett's opinion on Huizar's social abilities "insufficiently accounted for Huizar's difficulty with socializing," based on a previous psychological evaluation. Id. at 10.
1 Huizar's contention ostensibly derives from her belief that the DOT reasoning levels require the conclusion that Dr. Starrett's recommended limitation of simple one-to-two step tasks equates to a recommended limitation of level one reasoning jobs. See DOT, 1991 WL 688702 (1991) (defining level one reasoning as requiring the ability to perform "simple one- or two-step instructions"). Huizar's argument is, therefore, premised on her assumption that the Commissioner is bound to make RFC determinations based on DOT reasoning levels. However, as the magistrate judge explained, the DOT reasoning levels are " ‘merely advisory in nature’ "; the Commissioner is not bound to follow them in making disability determinations. R&R at 10 (quoting Matelski , 1998 WL 381361, at *6 ). Put differently, "there is no precedent that requires the Commissioner to align DOT ‘reasoning levels’ with RFC classifications." Monateri v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. , 436 F. App'x 434, 446 (6th Cir. 2011). Further, the magistrate judge noted, courts in this circuit have held that the ability to perform simple one-to-two step tasks—i.e., the tasks that Dr. Starrett believed Huizar could perform—are consistent with jobs requiring level two reasoning. R&R at 10 (citing Padilla v. Saul , No. 3:18-CV-580-CHB, 2020 WL 1651227, at *10 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 3, 2020) ; Russell v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin. , No. 1:13-CV-291, 2014 WL 1333262, at *13–14 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 31, 2014) ). Here, the ALJ identified a significant number of jobs available in the national economy with level two reasoning, consistent with both Dr. Starrett's opinion and the "ALJ's RFC of ‘simple, routine, and repetitive tasks.’ " Id. (citing DOT, 1991 WL 688702 (1991) ).
II. ANALYSIS
234 The Court reviews de novo those portions of the R&R to which a specific objection has been made. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) ; Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court's "review is limited to determining whether the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence and was made pursuant to proper legal standards." Ealy v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. , 594 F.3d 504, 512 (6th Cir. 2010) (punctuation modified). "Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Lindsley v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. , 560 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 2009) (punctuation modified). In determining whether substantial evidence exists, the Court may "look to any evidence in the record, regardless of whether it has been cited by the ALJ." Heston v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. , 245 F.3d 528, 535 (6th Cir. 2001). "[T]he claimant bears the burden of producing sufficient evidence to show the existence of a disability." Watters v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin. , 530 F. App'x 419, 425 (6th Cir. 2013).
In her objections to the R&R, Huizar again challenges the sufficiency of the ALJ's finding that her narcolepsy is a non-severe impairment as well as the ALJ's determination of jobs that Huizar can perform. The Court separately addresses Huizar's two objections.
A. Narcolepsy
5 As noted above, the ALJ found Huizar's narcolepsy to be a non-severe impairment. The magistrate judge, in turn, determined that the ALJ's finding was supported by substantial evidence and, even if it were not, any such error was harmless. R&R at 11–14. Huizar contends that the magistrate judge erred because (i) "the ALJ [did not] adequately consider[ ] [her] ...narcolepsy," and (ii) this failure "would [not] be harmless." Objections at 4. Regarding the former point, Huizar acknowledges that, as the magistrate judge stated, the ALJ's decision adopts the opinion of Dr. Campbell, who noted Huizar's narcolepsy. Id. However, Huizar complains that "Dr. Campbell only commented on physical limitations"; "she did not discuss the applicability of narcolepsy to mental limitations." Id. Huizar makes no attempt to develop her latter point regarding the harmfulness of the purported error.
6 Even if the magistrate judge incorrectly determined that the ALJ's finding of a non-severe impairment was supported by substantial evidence, Huizar utterly fails to explain any error in the magistrate judge's alternative holding that "even if the ALJ erred by excluding narcolepsy from the severe impairment list, the error is harmless." R&R at 14. Undeveloped, conclusory objections do not constitute proper objections to an R&R. See Riggins v. Cook , No. 2:20-cv-110, 2022 WL 815282, at *2 (W.D. Mar. 17, 2022) (overruling objection that the plaintiff "fail[ed] to develop" and "merely alleged in a conclusory fashion" as an "[im]proper objection to the R&R's findings"). Moreover, Huizar "does not specify any additional work-related functional limitations the ALJ should have, but did not, include in the RFC assessment resulting from [her alleged] ... mental impairments." Turvey v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. , No. 12-12388, 2013 WL 3271194, at *5 (E.D. Mich. June 27, 2013) (rejecting the plaintiff's RFC challenge where he did not specify any such additional work-related functional limitations). Accordingly, Huizar's objection is overruled.
B. Jobs
Huizar takes issue with the magistrate judge's treatment of the ALJ's determination of the jobs that Huizar can perform, arguing that the ALJ failed to justify the material difference between (i) his determination that Huizar could perform jobs requiring reasoning levels two or three; and (ii) Dr. Starrett's opinion, which, Huizar suggests, limited her to performing reasoning level one jobs. Objections at 1–3.
Huizar, however, acknowledges the magistrate judge's assessment that the ALJ adequately assessed the supportability and consistency of Dr. Starrett's opinion. R&R at 3.
7 Huizar's objection is premised on her inaccurate assumption that Dr. Starrett's opinion is necessarily inconsistent with the ALJ's determination of the jobs that Huizar can perform. As noted above, the ALJ determined that Huizar could perform a number of jobs, including level two reasoning jobs. Huizar assumes that Dr. Starrett's recommended limitation of simple one-to-two step tasks must be interpreted as a recommended limitation of level one reasoning jobs, because this is how the DOT defines level one reasoning jobs. However, as the magistrate judge explained, an ALJ is not required to align DOT reasoning levels with RFC classifications. See R&R at 10; Monateri , 436 F. App'x at 446. Moreover, caselaw supports that Dr. Starrett's recommended limitation—simple one-to-two step tasks—is consistent with level two reasoning jobs. R&R at 10 (citing Padilla , 2020 WL 1651227, at *10 ; Russell , 2014 WL 1333262, at *13–14 ). Because Dr. Starrett's opinion is not necessarily inconsistent with the ALJ's determination of the jobs that Huizar can perform, Huizar's objection fails and is overruled.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court overrules Huizar's objections (Dkt. 21) and adopts the magistrate judge's recommendation (Dkt. 20). Accordingly, the Court denies Huizar's motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 17), grants the Commissioner's motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 18), and affirms the Commissioner's decision.
SO ORDERED.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Jonathan J.C. Grey United States Magistrate Judge
Amanda Marie Huizar seeks judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner") denying Huizar's applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income under the Social Security Act. Huizar filed a motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 17), the Commissioner filed a response and cross-motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 18), and Huizar replied (ECF No. 19).
For the following reasons, the Court RECOMMENDS that Huizar's motion for summary judgment be DENIED , that the Commissioner's motion for summary judgment be GRANTED , and that the decision of the Commissioner be AFFIRMED .
I. Background
A. Procedural History
In March 27, 2017, Huizar filed a (1) Title II application for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits and (2) Title XVI application for supplemental security income. (Tr. 1049.1 ) In both applications, the claimant alleged that her disability began on June 15, 2009. Id. Huizar later amended her alleged onset date to March 27, 2017. (Tr. 271.) On December 18, 2017, both applications were denied. (Tr. 1049.) Huizar requested a hearing, and on August 13, 2019, she appeared with an attorney before Administrative Law Judge Timothy C. Scallen ("ALJ"), who reviewed the case de novo. (Tr. 164–78, 1069–98.) In a January 28, 2020 decision, the ALJ found that Huizar was not disabled. (Tr. 1049–61.). The Appeals Council initially denied review on February 10, 2021. (Tr. 8–13.) The Appeals Council set aside its February 10, 2021 denial to consider additional information and re-denied review on April 23, 2021, which made the ALJ's decision final. (Tr. 1–7; Wilson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. , 378 F.3d 541, 543–44 (6th Cir. 2004).)
B. The ALJ's Application of the Disability Framework
Under the Social Security Act, disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income are available only for those who have a "disability." Colvin v. Barnhart , 475 F.3d 727, 730 (6th Cir. 2007). "Disability" means the "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A) (definition used in the disability insurance benefits context); see also 20 C.F.R. § 416.905(a) (definition used in the social security income context).
The Commissioner determines whether a claimant is disabled through a five-step sequential analysis. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. First, if the claimant is engaged in significant gainful activity, no disability will be found. Second, if the claimant does not have a severe impairment or combination of severe impairments for a continuous period of at least 12 months, no disability will be found. Third, if the claimant's severe impairment meets or equals one of the impairments listed in the regulations, the claimant will be found disabled. Fourth, if the claimant can perform their past relevant work or has residual functional capacity ("RFC"), no disability will be found. Fifth, even if the claimant is unable to perform their past relevant work, benefits are denied if the claimant can adjust to other work in view of their age, education, and work experience. If the Commissioner "makes a dispositive finding at any point in the five-step process," the evaluation will not proceed to the next step. Colvin , 475 F.3d at 730.
The claimant bears the burden of proof through step four, in which they must show "the existence and severity of limitations caused by [their] impairments and the fact that [they] are precluded from performing [their] past relevant work." Jones v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. , 336 F.3d 469, 474 (6th Cir. 2003). At step five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner in which the Commissioner must show that "other jobs in significant numbers exist in the national economy that [the claimant] could perform given [their] RFC and considering relevant vocational factors." Rogers v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. , 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007).
Huizar, born on April 28, 1979, was 39 years old on the alleged disability onset date. (Tr. 212.) She has a tenth-grade education and past relevant work as a home attendant and day worker. (Tr. 295, 1059.) She alleges she cannot work because of uncontrolled diabetes mellitus type 2, narcolepsy, acute keratitis bilateral, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, major depressive disorder, anxiety, borderline personality disorder, and post-traumatic stress disorder. (Tr. 429.)
The ALJ applied the five-step disability analysis and found at step one that Huizar had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date of March 27, 2017. (Tr. 1051.) At step two, the ALJ found that Huizar had the following severe impairments: history of diabetes mellitus, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, anxiety, and a mood disorder. (Tr. 1051.) At step three, the ALJ found no evidence that Huizar's impairments met or medically equaled one of the listings in the regulations. (Tr. 1052–54.) Next, the ALJ determined that Huizar has the RFC to perform light work with certain limitations:
After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except she can sit for a total of six hours, stand for a total of four hours, and walk for a total of four hours in an eight-hour workday. She can frequently reach, handle, finger, feel, and push and pull bilaterally. She can frequently climb stairs and ramps, but can never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. She can frequently balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. She must avoid unprotected heights and vibrations. She must avoid concentrated exposure to moving machinery, extreme temperatures,
humidity, wetness, and pulmonary irritants including fumes and dust. She can perform simple, routine, and repetitive tasks, which means tasks requiring little judgment and which can be learned in a short amount of time. She can have occasional interaction with the public, coworkers, and supervisors.
(Tr. 1054.) At step four, the ALJ found that Huizar was unable to perform any past relevant work. (Tr. 1059.) At step five, the ALJ denied Huizar benefits, finding that there were jobs in significant numbers in the national economy that Huizar can perform. (Tr. 1060–61.)
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court has jurisdiction to review the Commissioner's final administrative decision. The Court "must affirm the Commissioner's conclusions absent a determination that the Commissioner has failed to apply the correct legal standard or has made findings of fact unsupported by substantial evidence in the record." Longworth v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. , 402 F.3d 591, 595 (6th Cir. 2005) (citations and internal quotations omitted). Substantial evidence is "more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Rogers , 486 F.3d at 241. In determining whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision, the Court does "not try the case de novo, resolve conflicts in evidence, or decide questions of credibility." Bass v. McMahon , 499 F.3d 506, 509 (6th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted); see also Rogers , 486 F.3d at 247 ("It is of course for the ALJ, and not the reviewing court, to evaluate the credibility of witnesses, including that of the claimant.").
If the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence, it "must be affirmed even if the reviewing court would decide the matter differently ... and even if substantial evidence also supports the opposite conclusion." Cutlip v. Sec'y of Health & Hum. Servs. , 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). The substantial evidence standard "presupposes ... a zone of choice within which the decisionmakers can go either way, without interference by the courts." Mullen v. Bowen , 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted). Moreover, the ALJ is not required to discuss every piece of evidence in the administrative record. Kornecky v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. , 167 F. App'x 496, 508 (6th Cir. 2006).
The Court's review is limited to an examination of the record. Bass , 499 F.3d at 512–13. The Court "may look to any evidence in the record, regardless of whether it has been cited by the Appeals Council." Heston v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. , 245 F.3d 528, 535 (6th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).
B. Analysis
Huizar contends that the ALJ committed reversible legal error because (1) the ALJ did not reconcile his persuasive finding of Dr. George Starett's opinion in the RFC determination and (2) the ALJ's finding that narcolepsy is a non-severe impairment lacks substantial evidence. (ECF No. 17.) The Commissioner counters that the ALJ's decision should be affirmed because Huizar failed to demonstrate prejudicial error by the RFC determination and the ALJ adequately accounted for Huizar's narcolepsy in his analysis. (ECF No. 18.)
1. The ALJ's RFC Determination
Dr. Starrett, psychological consultant, opined that Huizar could perform simple one-to-two step tasks with reasonable independence, and found that Huizar has "severe mental impairments that preclude multi-step tasks that require sustained concentration over extended periods." (Tr. 113.) The ALJ found this opinion to be "generally persuasive" for its consistency with the medical evidence except for Dr. Starrett's findings on Huizar's social abilities. (Tr. 1059.) In the RFC determination, the ALJ concluded that Huizar can perform "simple, routine, and repetitive tasks, which means tasks requiring little judgment and which can be learned in a short amount of time." (Tr. 1054.)
The Department of Transportation assigns each job a General Educational Development (GED) score, which considers the reasoning, mathematical, and language development required for satisfactory job performance. See Dictionary of Occupational Titles , Components of the Definition Trailer, 1991 WL 688702 (1991). Reasoning development is divided into six levels. Id.
Huizar argues that the ALJ erred by omitting Dr. Starrett's recommendation to limit Huizar to one-to-two step tasks. (ECF No. 17, PAGEID.1188–1192.) Specifically, Huizar asserts that the jobs the ALJ found Huizar can perform in Step Five are inconsistent with the omission of Dr. Starrett's recommendation. According to Huizar, one such job (that of a mail clerk) has a Level Three GED reasoning score, which requires more than a Level One ability to "apply commonsense understanding to carry out simple one-or two-step instructions" Dictionary of Occupational Titles , Components of the Definition Trailer, 1991 WL 688702 (1991). At this stage, Huizar bears the burden to demonstrate that she has a more restrictive RFC than that found by the ALJ. See Her v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. , 203 F.3d 388, 391–92 (6th Cir. 1999) ; see also Jones , 336 F. 3d at 474.
Although ALJs are responsible for assessing RFC based on their evaluation of the medical and non-medical evidence, they are not required to rely on medical opinions. Rudd v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. , 531 F. App'x 719, 728 (6th Cir. 2013) ("[T]o require the ALJ to base her RFC finding on a physician's opinion, ‘would, in effect, confer upon the treating source the authority to make the determination ... and thus would be an abdication of the Commissioner's statutory responsibility.’ "). Additionally, in considering medical opinions, an ALJ will not defer or give any specific evidentiary weight to any medical opinions. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a).
The most important factors for an ALJ to consider are supportability, or degree to which objective medical evidence supports the opinion, and consistency, or degree to which the opinion is consistent with other evidence. Id. at 404.1520c(c). This analysis requires "sufficiently detailed articulation" of application of those factors in which the ALJ must "show [their] work, i.e., to explain in detail how the factors actually were applied ... to each medical source. Hardy v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. , 554 F.Supp.3d 900, 909-09 (E.D. Mich. 2021) (finding that the ALJ failed to discuss the supportability and consistency factors).
Here, the ALJ considered the supportability and consistency of Dr. Starrett's opinion. Prior to finding Dr. Starrett's opinion generally persuasive, the ALJ summarized the record for approximately four pages. (Tr. 1055–58.) The ALJ further found that Dr. Starrett's opinion on Huizar's social abilities insufficiently accounted for Huizar's difficulty with socializing, citing a previous psychological evaluation. (Tr. 1059.)
Moreover, the Sixth Circuit states that the reasoning development requirements are "merely advisory in nature." Matelski v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. , 149 F.3d 1183 (6th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). In Matelski , the Sixth Circuit found that the ALJ's reliance on a vocational expert's testimony that contradicted the reasoning development requirements was not error. Id. Although the vocational expert here did not testify as to the one-to-two step limitation, the Court finds Matelski ’s reasoning persuasive.
First, in Step Five, the ALJ listed other jobs that do not require Level Three reasoning, including small products assembler I and electrical equipment sub-assembler as Level Two reasoning jobs. (Tr. 1060.) Second, the ALJ's RFC of "simple, routine, and repetitive tasks" is consistent with Level Two jobs, which represent an ability to "[a]pply commonsense understanding to carry out detailed but uninvolved written or oral instructions." (Tr. 1054; Dictionary of Occupational Titles , Components of the Definition Trailer, 1991 WL 688702 (1991).) Other courts in the Sixth Circuit have reached the same conclusion. E.g. , Padilla v. Saul , No. 3:18-CV-580-CHB, 2020 WL 1651227, at *10 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 3, 2020) ("[T]he ALJ's finding that Plaintiff could perform simple one to three step tasks is consistent with the ability to perform jobs requiring level two reasoning."); Russell v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin. , No. 1:13-CV-291, 2014 WL 1333262, at *13–14 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 31, 2014) ("[T]he undersigned finds that Plaintiff's limitation to simple one-or two-step instructions, simple routine tasks ... is not inconsistent with the ability to perform jobs with reasoning Level 2.").
Finally, the identified Level Two jobs together provide 102,000 positions in the economy, which constitutes a significant number of available jobs. (Tr. 1059); Taskila v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. , 819 F.3d 902, 905 (6th Cir. 2016) (finding that 6,000 jobs nationwide constitute a significant number of available jobs). The ALJ thus identified a significant number of jobs available in the national economy with reasoning levels that are consistent with the ALJ's RFC determination.
Huizar did not meet her burden to demonstrate that she has a more restrictive RFC than that found by the ALJ. Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the ALJ's RFC determination.
2. The ALJ's Step Two Analysis
Huizar argues that the ALJ's Step Two finding that Huizar's narcolepsy is not severe is not supported by substantial evidence. (ECF No. 17.) At this stage, Huizar bears the burden to demonstrate the severity of the limitations caused by her impairments. Jones , 336 F.3d at 474 ; see also Higgs v. Bowen , 880 F.2d 860, 863 (6th Cir. 1988).
Pursuant to § 404.1520(c) and § 404.1521, a claimant must have a severe impairment to establish disability. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c) ; § 404.1521. The Sixth Circuit construes these Step Two severity regulations as a de minimis hurdle in which "an impairment can be considered not severe only if it is a slight abnormality that minimally affects work ability regardless of age, education, and experience." Higgs , 880 F.2d at 862 (citation omitted). A non-severe impairment is "[a]n impairment or combination of impairments is not severe if it does not significantly limit your physical or mental ability to do basic work activities." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1522(a). Basic work activities include physical activities like walking, standing, and sitting, as well as the capacity for seeing, hearing, and speaking. Id. at § 404.1522(b). An ALJ's failure to find an impairment severe is not reversible error if the ALJ found another impairment to be severe and continued with the five-step evaluation process. E.g. , Fisk v. Astrue , 253 F. App'x 580, 584 (6th Cir. 2007) ; Anthony v. Astrue , 266 F. App'x 451, 457 (6th Cir. 2008).
Here, the ALJ identified narcolepsy as a non-severe impairment. (Tr. 1052.) In support of her argument, Huizar argues that the ALJ "did not mention tiredness" in the Step Three or the RFC determination, simultaneously finding the ALJ's "brief nod to narcolepsy" to be insufficient. (ECF No. 17, PAGEID.1193.) Huizar also highlights parts of the record in which Huizar self-reported sleep issues after her alleged onset date. (Id. at PAGEID.1193.)
The ALJ's decision shows that he considered Huizar's narcolepsy. During Step Two, the ALJ explained his finding that narcolepsy is not severe: "The claimant has a long-standing prescription for Provigil from her primary care physician to address [narcolepsy ] ... She has received no specialized treatment or made any particular subjective complaints since the amended alleged onset date."2 (Tr. 1052.) The ALJ noted that Huizar reported having sleep difficulty in January 2015 and that Dr. Chadi Mansour, Huizar's primary care physician, once prescribed medication for these issues in April 2018. (Tr. 1057.) In the RFC determination, the ALJ included:
She must also avoid exposure to unprotected heights, as she has described a history of suicidal thoughts. This restriction also accounts for the claimant's non-severe vision impairments and her narcolepsy, as reduced vision and a tendency to fall asleep at inopportune times would not be consistent with exposure to unprotected heights.
(Tr. 1059.) Finally, the ALJ adopted Dr. Jerilynn Campbell's opinion as persuasive, finding it to be consistent with the medical evidence and supported by citations. (Tr. 1058.) Dr. Campbell explicitly noted Huizar's narcolepsy in her opinion and suggested that Huizar take precautions against unprotected heights. (Tr. 1037–39.)
Moreover, even if the ALJ erred by excluding narcolepsy from the severe impairment list, the error is harmless. Where an ALJ considers a claimant's severe and non-severe impairments after Step Two in the analysis, the Sixth Circuit finds the fact that some impairments were not deemed to be severe at Step Two to be "legally irrelevant." Anthony , 266 F. App'x at 457. Here, as discussed above, the ALJ identified several severe impairments and considered Huizar's narcolepsy after Step Two, continuing with the five-step evaluation process.
The ALJ's failure to find Huizar's narcolepsy to be severe is not a reversible error and is supported by substantial evidence.
III. Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, the Court RECOMMENDS that Huizar's motion for summary judgment be DENIED , that the Commissioner's motion for summary judgment be GRANTED , and that the decision of the Commissioner be AFFIRMED .