Opinion
No. HHD CV 09-5033971S
January 26, 2011
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
By complaint dated September 29, 2009 and returnable on November 10, 2009, the plaintiff, Wilberto Huertas, alleges that he was improperly discharged from his employment by exercising his rights to claim workers' compensation benefits in violation of Connecticut General Statute § 31-290a.
The relevant facts are that the plaintiff began his employment with the defendant on or about July 30, 1997. Prior to the time of his employment, he had suffered a non-work related injury to his right ankle. In 2006, while in the employ of the defendant, he had surgery on the same ankle which did not result in a workers' compensation claim or in the payment of any workers' compensation benefits. In 2007, he again had surgery on the same ankle. He did not make application or receive any workers' compensation benefits with regard to the 2007 surgery.
On or about March 16, 2008 the plaintiff claims he suffered an exacerbation of that same injury while working, and that he reported the injury to a supervisor. In an affidavit filed as an addendum to his objection to summary judgment, the plaintiff claims that he saw his doctor on March 18, 2008 and his doctor opined that he had suffered an injury to that same ankle while working. Mr. Huertas states in his complaint that "[t]his is consistent with what I told [my employer]." The defendant claims that on April 1, 2008 the plaintiff refused a delivery which action was contrary to company policy. The defendant further alleges that on or about April 9, 2008 there was a meeting between Mr. Huertas and his supervisor to discuss that incident. He was terminated on April 14, 2008. (The plaintiff alleges a termination date of April 9, 2008.)
Mr. Huertas alleges that his termination stemmed from the injury and the reporting of same and was "an attempt to avoid or short circuit a potential claim by [the plaintiff]." His supervisor denies any knowledge of an exacerbation of the plaintiff's ankle injury and further denies any knowledge that the plaintiff intended to file a workers' compensation claim. The plaintiff denies being at work on the dates upon which the defendant claims he refused a delivery. The plaintiff did ultimately file a workers' compensation claim on September 15, 2008.
The defendant moves for summary judgment. Pursuant to Practice Book § 17-49, "summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Brown v. Soh, 280 Conn. 494, 500-01, 909 A.2d 43 (2006).
In the case of Mele v. Hartford, 270 Conn. 751 (2004), the Connecticut Supreme Court adopted the standard for cases alleging employment discrimination, and based that standard on the United States Supreme Court case of McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). The court stated that "The plaintiff bears the initial burden of proving, by the preponderance of the evidence, a prima facie case of discrimination . . . In order to meet this burden, the plaintiff must present evidence that gives rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination . . . If the plaintiff meets this initial burden, the burden then shifts to the defendant to rebut the presumption of discrimination by producing evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions . . . If the defendant carries this burden of production, the presumption raised by the prima facie case is rebutted, and the factual inquiry proceeds to a new level of specificity . . . The plaintiff then must satisfy her burden of persuading the factfinder that she was the victim of discrimination either directly by persuading the [fact finder] . . . that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Diaz v. Housing Authority, 258 Conn. 724, 730, 785 A.2d 192 (2001); Mele v. Hartford, supra, 270 Conn. 751, 768 (2004).
The defendant asserts that the plaintiff must affirmatively exercise a right to workers' compensation benefits in order to be protected under the terms of the statute. The defendant cites a case entitled Aponte v. Alinabal, Inc., No. AANCV054003670S (May 29, 2008) in support of this proposition. In that case, the Superior Court observed that an employer's mere knowledge of the employee's work-related injury does not constitute the employee's exercise of the rights afforded to him pursuant to the Workers' Compensation Act, and thus the employer's knowledge alone is insufficient to afford an employee the protection of the statue. The analysis in Aponte is based on a reading of an earlier appellate court opinion in which the court held that a prima facie case had been pleaded under the statue where defendant employer received a note from a physician directing the suspension of plaintiff's employment. The employer realized that a workers' compensation claim might arise and the court concluded that the employer's concern about his liability for a workers' compensation claim was a highly significant fact in the decision to terminate the employee. Loftus v. Vincent, 49 Conn.App. 66 (1998). The Aponte court found that the decision in Loftus was inconsistent with the decision in Mele. Mele states that "[k]nowledge of a work-related injury, without more, is not, as a matter of law, knowledge that a claim was filed for the injury or that any other right afforded by the act had been exercised." Mele v. Hartford, supra, 778. In Mele, the court found that there was insufficient evidence for the Commissioner to have found that the plaintiff had exercised her rights under the act, that the defendant had any such knowledge, or that she was discharged as a result of such knowledge. However, Mele does not overrule Loftus, nor is it necessarily inconsistent. (See McFarland v. Department of Developmental Services et al., 115 Conn.App. 306, 971 A.2d 853 (2009).)
The Mele analysis does not lead to the granting of summary judgment in this case. The allegations of the plaintiff's complaint would support more than the mere "knowledge of a work-related injury." The facts of the present case may be distinguished from those of the Mele and Aponte cases. Consequently, in this case, the court finds that the plaintiff has pleaded and/or presented facts sufficient to satisfy the initial burden of proof. If the plaintiff's allegations are taken in their most favorable light, the plaintiff received a workplace injury, he told the employer of such injury, and informed the employer of his intention to seek medical attention and his intention to file a workers' compensation claim. While the defendant claims that the reason for the plaintiff's termination is the violation of company policy, that claim is disputed, and further the plaintiff argues in response that the motivation for his firing was his intention to seek workers' compensation benefits, which intention was communicated to the defendant.
The court having found that the allegations of the plaintiff's complaint are sufficient to state a course of action under the terms of § 31-290a, the defendant's motion for summary judgment is hereby denied.