Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 02-7955
May 5, 2003
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Presently before the Court are Plaintiff's Motions to Amend the Complaint (Docket Nos. 11 18). For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff's Motions are denied.
I. BACKGROUND
On October 18, 2002, Plaintiff Hector Huertas, proceeding pro se, filed a complaint against the City of Philadelphia ("City") and Sunbancorp, Inc., alleging violations of his civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The gravamen of the complaint is that Plaintiff was wrongfully accused of robbing a Sunbancorp branch, resulting in his arrest by Philadelphia police officers. Plaintiff also alleges that he sustained injuries due to excessive force used by Philadelphia police officers during his arrest.
In the two motions currently before the Court, Plaintiff seeks to amend his complaint to add seven new defendants. Each of these proposed defendants is associated with the Philadelphia Police Department. They are: Police Officers Riley, Vassalo, Myers, and Quick; Police Detective Adams; Former Police Commissioner John Timoney; and one "John Doe" police defendant. Each of the proposed defendants are new to the proceedings, as Plaintiff failed to charge any "John Doe" defendants in his original complaint.
II. DISCUSSION
Section 1983 claims are governed by the relevant state's residual statute of limitations for personal injury actions. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 280, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985). Under Pennsylvania law, negligence actions are subject to a two-year statute of limitations. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5524(2). The incident giving rise to this case occurred on October 26, 2000. Thus, the applicable limitations period ended on October 26, 2002.
Plaintiff filed both motions to amend after the expiration of the limitations period. The first Motion to Amend was filed on December 30, 2002, and the second Motion to Amend was filed on January 13, 2003. Because the statute of limitations ran before the amended complaints were filed, they must be rejected as time barred, unless they "relate back" to the original complaint as defined by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c).
Rule 15(c) provides that an amendment of a pleading relates back when:
(1) relation back is permitted by the law that provides the statute of limitations applicable to the action, or
(2) the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, or
(3) the amendment changes the party or the naming of a party against whom a claim is asserted if the foregoing provision (2) is satisfied and, within the period provided by Rule 4(m) for service of the summons and complaint, the party to be brought in by amendment (A) has received such notice of the institution of the action that the party will not be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the merits, and (B) knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against the party.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c). Because Plaintiff is seeking to add new defendants outside the applicable limitations period, Rule 15(c)(3) applies. Singletary v. Pa. Dept. of Corr., 266 F.3d 186, 193 (3d Cir. 2001). In Singletary, the Third Circuit held that Rule 15(c)(3) imposes three conditions that must be met in order for an amended complaint to relate back to the filing of the original complaint. Id. at 194.
A. Same Transaction or Occurrence
First, the claim against the new defendants must arise out of the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth in the original complaint. Id. In this case, Plaintiff argues that the potential Defendants used excessive force while arresting him for the Sunbancorp robbery. Plaintiff's original complaint concerns the same events. Accordingly, the first condition is met.
The second and third conditions are found in Rules 15(c)(3)(A) (B), respectively. Both of these conditions must be met within 120 days of filing the original complaint. Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m).
The second condition is that the proposed defendants must have received notice of the suit, within the 120 day period, such that they will not be prejudiced by having to defend the action. Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c)(3)(A). This is known as the "notice" requirement.
The third condition is that, within the 120 day period, the proposed defendants knew or should have known that, but for a mistake in identity, they would have been defendants in the original complaint. Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c)(3)(B). This is known as the "mistake" requirement. Because Plaintiff filed his original complaint on October 18, 2002, the notice and mistake requirements must have been satisfied by February 7, 2003. The burden of proving the notice and mistake requirements lies with the plaintiff. See Singletary, 266 F.3d at 195-201 (requiring plaintiff offer proof of notice and mistake).
B. Notice
For purposes of Rule 15(c)(3)(A), notice may be either actual or constructive. Singletary, 266 F.3d at 195. The Rule does not require that actual service of process be made on the proposed defendants. Varlack v. SWC Caribbean, 550 F.2d 171, 175 (3d Cir. 1977). It is enough that they learn of the suit by informal means. Id. The notice received, however, must be more than mere notice of the events giving rise to the suit. The notice must inform the proposed defendants of the action instituted by the plaintiff. Singletary, 266 F.3d at 195 (citing Bechtel v. Robinson, 886 F.2d 644, 652 n. 12 (3d Cir. 1989).
In this case, Plaintiff offers no facts demonstrating that the proposed defendants received actual notice of the instant suit. Instead, he states only that the police officers "should have been aware" of the internal affairs investigation resulting from his arrest. See Pl.'s Mem. at 2. Plaintiff also states that former Commissioner Timoney should have known about Plaintiff's allegations against the individual officers. Id. Plaintiff provides no proof, however, that any of the officers were aware of this suit prior to February 7, 2003. Moreover, Plaintiff does not provide any certificate of service indicating that he served his amended complaints on any of the officers. Thus, Plaintiff fails to demonstrate actual notice for purposes of Rule 15(c)(3)(A).
Because there is no evidence of actual notice, Plaintiff must show that the proposed defendants had constructive notice of this suit. In Singletary, the Third Circuit described two methods of constructive notice: (1) the "shared attorney" method; and (2) the "identity of interests" method. 266 F.3d at 196-200. As discussed below, Plaintiff cannot establish constructive notice under either of these tests.
1. Shared Attorney Method
Under the shared attorney method, notice is imputed to the new defendants if they are represented by the same attorney as an original defendant. Id. at 196; Lockwood v. City of Philadelphia, 205 F.R.D. 448, 452 (E.D.Pa. 2002); Garvin v. City of Philadelphia, No. Civ.A. 02-2214, 2002 WL 3179948, at *3 (Dec. 6, 2002). This method is based on the theory that an attorney representing both parties is likely to have communicated the existence of the suit to the unnamed party. Singletary, 266 F.3d at 196. The applicable test is whether the new defendants are currently represented by the same attorney, not whether they may potentially have such representation. Singletary, 266 F.3d at 196-97; Garvin, 2002 WL 31739948, at *4.
In this case, there is no evidence that the City's counsel, Michele L. Dean, is representing any of the proposed defendants. The City's counsel specifically entered her appearance on behalf of the City. In Lockwood and Garvin, the plaintiffs sought to replace "John Doe" defendants with named police officers after the limitations periods had run. 205 F.R.D. at 450; 2002 WL 31739948, at *1. In those cases, the City of Philadelphia Law Department was representing the City as a Defendant. In both cases, the courts found that there was no evidence demonstrating that the City Law Department was representing the unnamed officers. 205 F.R.D. at 452; 2002 WL 31739948, at *4. In this case, Plaintiff failed to name any John Doe police defendants. As such, it is even less likely that the City's counsel would have communicated the existence of the suit to any police officers. Thus, Plaintiff fails to establish imputed notice under the shared attorney method.
2. Identity of Interests Method
Under the identity of interests method, notice is imputed to new defendants if they "'are so closely related in their business operations or other activities that the institution of the action against one serves to provide notice of the litigation to the other.'" Singletary, 266 F.3d at 197 (citing 6A Charles A. Wright, et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 1499, at 146 (2d ed. 1990)). In Singletary, the Third Circuit held that, absent other evidence of constructive notice, "non-management employee[s] . . . d[o] not share a sufficient nexus of interests with [their] employer so that notice given to the employer can be imputed to the employee for Rule 15(c)(3) purposes." 266 F.3d at 200.
In this case, Plaintiff has not provided any evidence that the proposed defendants are management employees of the City. Although it is arguable that former Police Commissioner Timoney was a management level employee of the City when Plaintiff's arrest occurred, he was not Police Commissioner when this suit was filed. As stated above, it is knowledge of the civil action, rather than knowledge of the underlying events, that is imputed under this test. Accordingly, because Commissioner Timoney was not a management-level employee when the suit was filed, such knowledge cannot be imputed to him under this test.
In Lockwood and Garvin, as in this case, the plaintiffs sought to add several police officers as defendants after the limitations period. Also, in both cases, the City of Philadelphia was a defendant. Both courts, applying the identity of interests method as enunciated in Singletary, found that police officers are non-management employees who cannot be said to have imputed knowledge of a suit that was served only on the City of Philadelphia. Similarly, in this case, without further evidence of constructive notice, the Court cannot impute knowledge of this suit on the proposed defendants. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to meet his burden under the identity of interests method.
III. CONCLUSION
Because Plaintiff fails to meet the notice requirement of Rule 15(c)(3), this Court follows the lead of the Third Circuit in Singletary and does not reach the mistake requirement. The amended complaints do not related back to the original complaint. Thus, the amended complaints cannot survive the statute of limitations. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motions to Amend are denied.
An appropriate Order follows.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 5th Day of May, 2003, upon consideration of Plaintiff Hector L. Huertas' First Motion to Amend Complaint (Docket No. 11) and Second Motion to Amend Complaint (Docket No. 18), IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motions are DENIED.