Opinion
No. 2 CA-CV 2016-0188-FC
09-28-2017
IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF TIFFANY C. HUDDLESTUN, Petitioner/Appellant, and BRANDON W. CONTI, Respondent/Appellee.
COUNSEL Tiffany C. Huddlestun, Payson In Propria Persona Sloma Law Group, Phoenix By Melinda M. Sloma Counsel for Respondent/Appellee
THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c)(1); Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 28(a)(1), (f). Appeal from the Superior Court in Gila County
No. DO201100087
The Honorable Timothy M. Wright, Judge
VACATED AND REMANDED
COUNSEL Tiffany C. Huddlestun, Payson
In Propria Persona Sloma Law Group, Phoenix
By Melinda M. Sloma
Counsel for Respondent/Appellee
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge Espinosa authored the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Staring and Judge Kelly concurred. ESPINOSA, Judge:
The Hon. Virginia C. Kelly, a retired judge of this court, is called back to active duty to serve on this case pursuant to orders of this court and our supreme court.
¶1 Tiffany Huddlestun appeals the trial court's order modifying her parenting time and legal decision-making authority over school choice. She contends the court failed to make the requisite findings or explain the reasons for its modification. Because we agree the court's findings are insufficient for meaningful review, we vacate the court's modification order and remand for additional findings, as described below.
Factual and Procedural Background
¶2 We view the record in the light most favorable to upholding the trial court's decision. Johnson v. Johnson, 131 Ariz. 38, 44, 638 P.2d 705, 711 (1981). Tiffany Huddlestun and Brandon Conti married in 2006 and have two minor children. They consented to dissolve their marriage in 2011, with "both children to be involved with both parents equally." In 2014, the parties agreed to a parenting plan that afforded each parent equal parenting time and joint legal decision-making authority. The case before us concerns both parents' attempts to modify the 2014 parenting plan.
¶3 After conducting several hearings, including evidentiary hearings on requests for temporary orders, interviewing the minor children in camera, and presiding over a one-day trial in July 2016, the trial court ordered the parties to continue to exercise joint legal decision-making authority. But the court noted that if they could not agree on school choice, one of the issues raised in Conti's petition to modify, Conti was to "have the final decision." The court additionally modified the parenting time order to provide that during the school year the children would reside with Conti during the week.
¶4 On appeal, Huddlestun argues the trial court failed to find a change in circumstances before it modified the parties' parenting time and legal decision-making authority, misapplied the statutory best-interest factors, and misapplied the law regarding school choice. We have jurisdiction over her appeal pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1) and 12-2101(A)(1).
Change in Circumstances
¶5 Huddlestun first contends the trial court erred by failing to find a change in circumstances before modifying her parenting time and decision-making authority. Although the court did not expressly find a change in circumstances, Conti responds that such a finding was implied in the court's factual findings. "The trial court has broad discretion to determine whether a change of circumstances has occurred," and we will not disturb its determination unless there is a clear absence of supporting evidence. Pridgeon v. Superior Court, 134 Ariz. 177, 179, 655 P.2d 1, 3 (1982). An abuse of discretion occurs "if the court commits legal error in reaching a discretionary conclusion." Rasor v. Nw. Hosp., LLC, 239 Ariz. 546, ¶ 22, 373 P.3d 563, 570-71 (App. 2016).
¶6 Before a trial court may modify a parenting time order, it must first "ascertain whether there has been a change in circumstances materially affecting the welfare of the child[ren]." Black v. Black, 114 Ariz. 282, 283, 560 P.2d 800, 801 (1977). Although the under-advisement ruling appealed from in this case lacks that explicit finding, it may be upheld if inferable from the court's factual determinations. See Johnson v. Elson, 192 Ariz. 486, ¶ 11, 967 P.2d 1022, 1025 (App. 1998) (appellate court "may infer additional findings of fact and conclusions of law sufficient to sustain the trial court's order as long as those findings are reasonably supported by the evidence"); Canty v. Canty, 178 Ariz. 443, 448-49, 874 P.2d 1000, 1005-06 (App. 1994) (finding sufficient evidence of changed circumstances though such a finding was absent from court's minute entry).
¶7 Conti cites three specific factual findings made by the trial court as sufficient proof of a changed circumstance: (1) "[t]he Children will greatly benefit from consistency in their lives, especially as it relates to their schooling," (2) "[t]he Children receive more school tardies during their time with [Huddlestun]," and (3) "the children were more physically and emotionally ready for school during [Conti]'s Parenting Time." But these general findings, without more, are insufficient to say with certitude that a change in circumstances materially affecting the well-being of the children was impliedly found by the court.
¶8 First, the trial court's observation that "[t]he Children will greatly benefit from consistency in their lives" does not necessarily indicate a change in circumstances. Rather, that "finding" is merely an observation applicable in nearly all circumstances. Second, absent some quantification of the number of late arrivals to school, and a resulting impact on the children's academic performance, the court's finding that the children receive more tardies when they are with their mother is likewise too non-specific to be the basis for a material change in circumstances. Any suggestion the children are underperforming at school during Huddlestun's parenting time is unsupported in the court's findings and in the record. Although it is undisputed the couple's daughter was diagnosed with a learning disability, Conti testified that other than reading comprehension and speech, their daughter was "typically at . . . or above average" on standardized testing, as was their son.
¶9 Likewise, the trial court's third finding that the children are "more physically and emotionally ready for school" when they are with their father does not necessarily imply that the children are not ready for school when with their mother, nor does it suggest an impediment to the children's ability to function in the learning environment. Accordingly, because we cannot confidently infer a change in circumstance from the trial court's factual findings, we remand to the trial court to determine whether changed circumstances materially affecting the welfare of the children were found, and if so to identify them.
Our disposition of this matter does not reflect any opinion concerning the resolution the trial court should reach in proceedings on remand.
Best-Interest Findings
¶10 In a contested legal decision-making or parenting time case, the trial court is required not only to make specific findings on all relevant statutory factors, but to state, on the record, the reasons its decision is in the best interests of the children. A.R.S. § 25-403(B). Huddlestun concedes the court here made specific findings, but argues it committed reversible error by failing to provide the reasons the findings warranted a modification. A failure to make required statutory findings is an abuse of the court's discretion. See Owen v. Blackhawk, 206 Ariz. 418, ¶ 12, 79 P.3d 667, 670-71 (App. 2003).
¶11 Here, the trial court made factual findings as to those statutory factors it found relevant and set forth twenty additional "Other Findings." The court did not, however, specify which factors weighed in favor of which parent, and, other than the finding that "the children were more physically and emotionally ready for school during [Conti]'s Parenting Time," it appears the findings generally placed equal blame on the parties' inability to effectively co-parent the minor children. Despite these neutral findings, the court modified the parenting plan to give Conti sole weekday parenting time during the school year and final decision-making authority on school choice. It did not explain why its decision was in the best interests of the children.
¶12 The statutory requirement that a trial court explain its reasoning not only aids the reviewing court should the order be appealed, but helps assure both the parties and the trial court that the current and future best interests of the children are being met. A.R.S. § 25-403(B); Gutierrez v. Fox, 242 Ariz. 259, ¶ 34, 394 P.3d 1096, 1104-05 (App. 2017). Additionally, a detailed recitation of findings and reasoning provides a baseline against which the parties' future petitions for modification based on changed circumstances can be measured. See Reid v. Reid, 222 Ariz. 204, ¶ 18, 213 P.3d 353, 358 (App. 2009).
¶13 In Owen, this court reversed a trial court's relocation decision when the court's order made detailed findings not favoring either parent but did not explain how the findings supported the decision. 206 Ariz. 418, ¶ 12, 79 P.3d at 670-71. Because the evidence in that case weighed "both in favor of and against relocation," and because we could not "say that the trial court did not focus too much attention on" one statutory factor "to the exclusion of other[s]," we remanded for further development of its findings and reasoning. Id.
¶14 The record in this case similarly exhibits factors both in favor of and against modification. Conti argues "the Court was clear that the minor children would benefit greatly from consistency, especially as it relates to their schooling and that the children receive more tardies during their time with [Huddlestun]." But, as previously discussed, the fact that the children would benefit from consistency does not necessarily weigh in any one party's favor, and that the children received an undisclosed number of tardies, without a finding of their extent and how the children's best interests were affected, is, we think, insufficient to support the court's modification.
Although the trial court correctly observed that it "must consider the factors in A.R.S. §§ 25-403 and 403.01 and the best interests of the children when making decisions related to Parenting Time and Legal Decision Making," and there is evidence in the record from which the court's best-interest finding could be supported, we cannot ignore the mandatory directive of the statutory scheme and speculate or substitute our own judgment for the trial court's reasoning. See A.R.S. § 25-403(B) ("the court shall make specific findings on the record about all relevant factors and the reasons for which the decision is in the best interests of the child"); Nold v. Nold, 232 Ariz. 270, ¶ 11, 304 P.3d 1093, 1096 (App. 2013) (when physical custody contested, trial court must comply with statutory requirement and make specific findings regarding reasons why its decision is in best interest of children; failure to do so is abuse of discretion). --------
¶15 Because the trial court's order lacks any explanation of why the modification would be in the best interests of the children, and also because we cannot confidently say the court did not place undue weight on any one specific factor, if the court finds sufficiently changed circumstances on remand, it should elaborate its reasons supporting the modification of the parties' previously agreed-upon parenting plan.
School Choice
¶16 Finally, Huddlestun argues the trial court erred when it "did not apply the child's best interest standard to resolve the dispute over school placement," citing Jordan v. Rea, 221 Ariz. 581, 212 P.3d 919 (App. 2009). That case, however, is inapposite as the court here eliminated the parties' "obligat[ion] to work together," Jordan, 221 Ariz. 581, ¶ 2, 212 P.3d at 922, and instead allowed Conti to "have the final decision" on school choice. We therefore do not address this issue further.
Disposition
¶17 For the foregoing reasons, the trial court's order modifying legal decision-making and parenting time is vacated, and the case is remanded for the court to determine whether there was a change in circumstance materially affecting the welfare of the children. If the court so finds, it shall further state on the record the reasons it found modification to be in the best interests of the children.