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Hrisinko v. Bd. of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of N.Y.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department, New York.
Dec 6, 2012
101 A.D.3d 451 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012)

Opinion

2012-12-6

In re Diana HRISINKO, Petitioner–Appellant, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT OF the CITY OF NEW YORK, et al., Respondents–Respondents.

The White Rose Group, LLC, Jackson Heights (Jesse C. Rose of counsel), for appellant. Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel, New York (Fay Ng of counsel), for respondents.



The White Rose Group, LLC, Jackson Heights (Jesse C. Rose of counsel), for appellant. Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel, New York (Fay Ng of counsel), for respondents.
TOM, J.P., MAZZARELLI, MOSKOWITZ, ABDUS–SALAAM, FEINMAN, JJ.

Appeal from order, Supreme Court, New York County (Joan B. Lobis, J.), entered August 19, 2011, which denied petitioner's motion for an order holding respondents in contempt of an order, same court (Marilyn G. Diamond, J.), entered March 3, 2010 (the prior order), unanimously dismissed, without costs.

The 2011 order is not appealable as of right, as it was “made in a proceeding against a body or officer pursuant to [ CPLR] article 78” (CPLR 5701[b][1]; see Matter of Storman v. New York City Dept. of Educ., 95 A.D.3d 776, 777, 945 N.Y.S.2d 281 [2012],appeal dismissed19 N.Y.3d 1023, 951 N.Y.S.2d 718, 976 N.E.2d 247 [2012] ). We decline to grant petitioner leave to appeal from that order in the interest of justice.

Were we to review the 2011 order, we would find that the motion court providently exercised its discretion in holding that respondents should not be held in contempt ( see Storman, 95 A.D.3d at 777, 945 N.Y.S.2d 281;Richards v. Estate of Kaskel, 169 A.D.2d 111, 122, 570 N.Y.S.2d 509 [1991],lv. dismissed in part, denied in part78 N.Y.2d 1042, 576 N.Y.S.2d 210, 582 N.E.2d 593 [1991] ). Although the prior order declared that petitioner had “been a tenured teacher of ‘Commercial Art’ ” since September 2, 2005, it did not reference the “Commercial Art” position, or any other specific teaching assignment, in its mandate, instead directing only that petitioner be reinstated “to her position as a tenured teacher.” “Any ambiguity in the court's mandate should be resolved in favor of the would-be contemnor” ( Kaskel, 169 A.D.2d at 122, 570 N.Y.S.2d 509). Accordingly, we find that, in reinstating petitioner to the position of tenured teacher and assigning her to serve as an absent teacher reserve, respondents did not violate any “clear and unequivocal” mandate ( Storman, 95 A.D.3d at 777, 945 N.Y.S.2d 281 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Department of Envtl. Protection of City of N.Y. v. Department of Envtl. Conservation of State of N.Y., 70 N.Y.2d 233, 240, 519 N.Y.S.2d 539, 513 N.E.2d 706 [1987] ).


Summaries of

Hrisinko v. Bd. of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of N.Y.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department, New York.
Dec 6, 2012
101 A.D.3d 451 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012)
Case details for

Hrisinko v. Bd. of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of N.Y.

Case Details

Full title:In re Diana HRISINKO, Petitioner–Appellant, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the…

Court:Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department, New York.

Date published: Dec 6, 2012

Citations

101 A.D.3d 451 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012)
955 N.Y.S.2d 579
2012 N.Y. Slip Op. 8431

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