Opinion
G054000
03-26-2018
HPT IHG-2 PROPERTIES TRUST et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CITY OF ANAHEIM et al., Defendants and Respondents.
Palmieri, Tyler, Wiener, Wilhelm & Waldron, Michael H. Leifer, Michael L. D'Angelo, Michael I. Kehoe and Erin Balsara Naderi for Plaintiffs and Appellants. Rutan & Tucker, David B. Cosgrove and Peter J. Howell for Defendants and Respondents.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2012-00608509) OPINION Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of Orange County, Thierry Patrick Colaw, Judge. Order affirmed. Request for judicial notice denied. Palmieri, Tyler, Wiener, Wilhelm & Waldron, Michael H. Leifer, Michael L. D'Angelo, Michael I. Kehoe and Erin Balsara Naderi for Plaintiffs and Appellants. Rutan & Tucker, David B. Cosgrove and Peter J. Howell for Defendants and Respondents.
* * *
This is the second time this case has been before us. As set out in our first opinion, HPT IHG-2 Properties Trust v. City of Anaheim (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 188 (HPT1), defendant City of Anaheim (together with defendant City Council of the City of Anaheim, defendants) issued a conditional use permit (CUP 4153) allowing plaintiffs HPT IHG-2 Properties Trust and IHG Management Maryland (plaintiffs) to develop two hotels. Part of CUP 4153 set out the number of required parking spaces for the development.
Defendants took a portion of plaintiffs' property to construct an overpass adjacent to the hotel property. In connection with the taking, CUP 4153 required defendants to build a parking structure on adjoining property (Triangle) and convey the Triangle with the completed parking structure to plaintiffs. After the overpass was built, defendants enacted a second conditional use permit (CUP 5573) allowing defendants to construct a surface parking lot instead of the parking structure and permitted landscaping and setbacks not in conformance with those required for the development.
CUP 5573 was enacted by defendants' Resolution 2012-055. Our references to CUP 5573 include Resolution 2012-055 where appropriate. --------
Plaintiffs then filed a petition for writ of mandate to set aside CUP 5573. The court granted the petition, rendered a statement of decision (HPT1 Statement of Decision and issued the judgment and the writ. (Judgment & writ collectively, Writ.) Defendants appealed and we affirmed.
After remittitur, defendants rescinded CUP 5573 and filed a return stating they had fully complied with the Writ. Plaintiffs then filed a postjudgment motion to compel defendants to construct the parking structure on the Triangle as required by CUP 4153. The court denied the motion, finding in part that plaintiffs were seeking to modify the Writ. It also ruled defendants had complied with the Writ.
Plaintiffs claim this was error. They argue the effect of the HPT1 Statement of Decision was to require defendants to construct the parking structure and the court had the equitable power to order its construction to effect the decision.
We conclude that while the court may have had the discretion to grant the motion, it did not abuse its discretion by refusing to do so. The Writ only required defendants to rescind CUP 5573. Plaintiffs obtained the relief they sought and they could not compel defendants to build the parking structure by way of a postjudgment motion. Consequently we affirm on this narrow procedural ground only. This is without prejudice to plaintiffs enforcing their rights under CUP 4153 by any appropriate action.
We deny defendants' request for judicial notice of a trial brief filed by plaintiffs in the eminent domain action and the minute order reassigning the case to Judge Colaw as they are unnecessary to our decision.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The facts underlying the action are set out in HPT1 and we do not repeat them here.
After defendants' petition for review in HPT1 was denied and three months after our remittitur issued, plaintiffs filed a notice claiming defendants had not complied with the Writ. When the court ordered defendants to file a return to the Writ, defendants adopted Resolution No. 2016-098 to set aside CUP 5573 and filed a return.
Plaintiffs then filed a postjudgment motion to compel defendants to comply with the Writ and HPT1, seeking an order requiring them to construct the parking structure in compliance with CUP 4153 and convey the Triangle with the completed parking structure to plaintiffs. The court denied the motion, characterizing it as an attempt "to modify a writ/Judgment long-since final." It ruled defendants "did precisely as directed, [they] set aside [CUP] 5573." The court found neither the trial court nor this court ordered defendants "to specifically perform" but only "implied [defendants] should comply with all the details of the CUP 4153 which it unanimously adopted." Rather, the minute order stated, the court had "long ago concluded that the [defendants'] misconduct would most appropriately be addressed" by money damages in the eminent domain proceeding. The court stated evidentiary and other rulings in the eminent domain action were made on that basis.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs claim the HPT1 Statement of Decision, the Writ, and our decision in HPT1 require defendants to comply with the Ultimate Site Plan set out in CUP 4153, that is, to build the parking structure on the Triangle and then convey the as-developed Triangle as developed to plaintiffs. They quote extensively from the HPT1 Statement of Decision, highlighting passages to the effect that plaintiffs had a fundamental vested property right in the Ultimate Site Plan set out in CUP 4153; the Ultimate Site plan required defendants to build a parking structure on the Triangle and then convey the Triangle to plaintiffs; and defendants were estopped to unilaterally change the Ultimate Site Plan or fail to perform their obligations under CUP 4153. Plaintiffs further rely on language in HPT1 where we held defendants were "estopped from enacting and relying on CUP 5573 to eliminate their obligation to construct the Parking Structure on the Triangle." (HPT1, supra, 243 Cal.App.4th at p. 210.)
Plaintiffs make two arguments based on this language. First, the Writ required defendants to construct the parking structure on the Triangle and then convey it to plaintiffs, and the court should have required them to do so. Second, if the Writ did not specifically contain such a requirement, the court should have used its equitable power to amend the Writ to make such an order. In effect, plaintiffs seek specific performance of defendants' obligations under CUP 4153. Neither argument persuades.
As to the first argument, citing La Mar v. Superior Court (1948) 87 Cal.App.2d 126 disapproved on another ground in Phelan v. Superior Court (1950) 35 Cal. 2d 363, 371, plaintiffs assert the "judgment must conform to the [HPT1 S]tatement of [D]ecision." (Underscoring omitted.) Relying on the passages noted above, plaintiffs contend the HPT1 Statement of Decision requires defendants to construct the parking structure and convey the Triangle. Thus, they conclude, the Writ does so as well. We disagree. Nothing in the HPT1 Statement of Decision or the Writ ordered defendants to construct the parking structure and convey the Triangle as so developed.
Further, La Mar is factually distinguishable. There, although an interlocutory divorce decree awarded $2,500 in cash to the husband as his share of community property, it did not order the wife to pay it. Therefore the superior court was ordered to amend the judgment to give plaintiff judgment against wife in that amount, in conformance with the decree. (La Mar v. Superior Court, supra, 87 Cal.App.2d. at p. 134.) The circumstances in our case are not comparable. Construction of the parking structure is not necessary to effect the Writ requiring defendants to rescind CUP 5573.
Plaintiffs also rely on City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. Board of Supervisors (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 964 for the proposition that if a judgment is uncertain or ambiguous, the court must follow the HPT1 Statement of Decision to give effect to the judgment. But here the Writ is neither ambiguous nor uncertain. It plainly requires defendants to set aside CUP 5573 and nothing more. Construction of the parking structure is wholly different.
Regarding the second argument, we do not quarrel with the general principle the trial court has the authority to amend a judgment, even after appeal, to ensure it conforms to the statement of decision. (Summit Media, LLC v. City of Los Angeles (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 171, 182) But there was no reason to amend the Writ here. It conformed to the HPT1 Statement of Decision.
As a corollary plaintiffs assert the court's equitable powers gave it discretion to order defendants to perform pursuant to CUP 4153 "in order to ensure complete justice and prevent further litigation." (Underscoring omitted.) Cases allow a court to modify a judgment to effect its holding. But here the Writ petition did not seek and the Writ did not order defendants to build the parking structure. And affirmance of the Writ in HPT1 did not go beyond the provisions of the Writ. Plaintiffs have not cited any authority requiring the court to go beyond what they sought and what was thereafter ordered in the Writ.
Ordering defendants to construct the parking structure and convey the Triangle is not a remedy incident to the petition requiring defendants to rescind CUP 5573. (See South Shore Land Co. v. Petersen (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 725, 741.) Equity "defines itself" and is dependent upon the particular circumstances of each case. (Smith v. ExxonMobil Oil Corp. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1407, 1416.) The circumstances here do not support amendment of the Writ to compel defendants to construct the parking structure and convey the so-improved Triangle.
Cases on which plaintiffs rely to support this claim are inapt. For example, in Sears v. Rule (1945) 27 Cal.2d 131 the plaintiffs sought to impose a trust on certain assets. As part of the judgment the court ordered an accounting of a broader class of assets than the plaintiffs prayed for. The appellate court affirmed, stating a court of equity "will adjust all the differences between the parties arising from the cause of action in order to do complete justice and prevent further litigation, whether or not the particular relief was requested." (Id. at p. 149.) The challenged relief was a natural outcome resulting from the action. Ordering defendants to construct the parking structure and convey the Triangle is not a natural or logical outcome of a petition to invalidate CUP 5573. It is beyond what plaintiffs sought.
Plaintiffs also cite Coons v. Henry (1960) 186 Cal.App.2d 512, 519 for the proposition that in an equitable action the court will "grant the relief which the proof warrants as within the equities of the entire case." (Ibid.) But plaintiffs do not direct us to any evidence that construction of the parking structure was tried. Nor did plaintiffs seek such relief at the time the Writ was issued. Nothing in the record shows they objected to the limited version of the Writ solely requiring defendants to rescind CUP 5573. While a court sitting in equity has broad powers, it does not have the authority to grant relief that is not "conformable to the case made by the pleadings and the evidence." (Sonnicksen v. Sonnicksen (1941) 45 Cal.App.2d 46, 52.)
Although the court is not strictly limited to the precise form of relief prayed for, it cannot expand the relief beyond the confines of the action. Plaintiffs' prayer here for other and further relief was not sufficient to require the court to order construction of the parking structure and then conveyance of the Triangle.
For these reasons, even if the court may have had discretion to order the relief plaintiffs seek, which we do not decide, it did not abuse its discretion in refusing to do so. (Gunderson v. Wall (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1060, 1065 [whether or not to exercise equitable powers reviewed for abuse of discretion].) Nor did it abuse its discretion in ruling defendants had complied with the Writ. (Summit Media, LLC v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at p. 182 [decision whether party has complied with writ reviewed for abuse of discretion].)
Contrary to plaintiffs' contention, our affirmance of the court's ruling does not allow defendants to "accomplish through inaction what [the HPT1 Statement of Decision] and [HPT1] previously proscribed by estoppel." It does not deprive plaintiffs of a remedy. It merely and narrowly holds only that plaintiffs cannot compel defendants to build the parking structure and convey the developed Triangle using the postjudgment motion in this Writ proceeding as the vehicle.
Likewise, we reject plaintiffs' claim defendants' "refusal to act as required" (italics omitted) changes the Ultimate Site Plan and deprives plaintiffs of their fundamental vested property rights. Plaintiffs still have all the rights set out in the statement of decision and HPT1, including their fundamental vested right in the Ultimate Site Plan encompassed in CUP 4153. Those fundamental vested rights include both compensating plaintiffs for the property taken to build the overpass and defendants' construction of the parking structure on the Triangle, using the same setback requirements.
By this decision we are not denying that defendants are bound by the provisions of CUP 4153. Nor are we denying that defendants are estopped from changing the Ultimate Site Plan approved in CUP 4153. This is all the law of the case. (Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1495, 1505 [doctrine prevents parties from relitigating issue already decided "'absent some significant change in circumstances'"].) So our decision is without prejudice to plaintiffs taking any appropriate action to enforce their rights under CUP 4153.
Further, the propriety of any rulings in the companion eminent domain action (City of Anaheim v. HPT IHG-2 Properties Trust (Super. Ct. Orange County, No. 30-2009-00125412)) are not before us and we express no opinion on them. The eminent domain action is a separate case without a final judgment. None of the rulings in that action is the basis for our decision in this appeal. Nor, in HPT1, did we rely on or base our decision on any rulings in the eminent domain action.
Finally, each side here accuses the other of changing positions or attempting to avoid arguments made in documents filed in the trial, appellate and supreme courts in both this and the eminent domain action, i.e., "blowing hot and cold" and "playing fast and loose with the courts" to obtain an unfair advantage. We are not persuaded by any of these arguments and do not base our decision on them.
DISPOSITION
The postjudgment order is affirmed. The request for judicial notice is denied. Defendants are entitled to costs on appeal.
THOMPSON, J. WE CONCUR: O'LEARY, P. J. MOORE, J.