In these circumstances, and since a finding that plaintiff was feigning amnesia would not have been unreasonable, the jury was entitled to draw the strongest inference against plaintiff permitted by the evidence ( see Noce v. Kaufman, 2 NY2d 347, 353). In the posture of this case, where plaintiff was unable (or unwilling) to recall the traffic conditions, how fast he was driving, whether or not his vehicle had pulled out from the curb abutting any of the stores near the intersection immediately prior to the collision, or what, if any, evasive action he took to avoid broadsiding defendant's vehicle, the jury logically could have concluded that plaintiff's negligence was the sole proximate cause of the accident and rationally resolved the fact-laden causation issue in defendants' favor ( see Skowronski v. Mordino, 4 AD3d 782; Di Leone v. Hasan, 274 AD2d 410; Hoynacki v. Cummings, 127 AD2d 941; but cf. Salazar v. City of New York, 302 AD2d 580). Nor, on this record, would it have been "sheer speculation" (dissenting opn, at 6) for the jury to determine that plaintiff was speeding as he approached and entered the intersection and that he failed to use reasonable care to avoid hitting the defendant's car which was already in the process of turning.
In these circumstances, and since a finding that plaintiff was feigning amnesia would not have been unreasonable, the jury was entitled to draw the strongest inference against plaintiff permitted by the evidence ( see Noce v. Kaufman, 2 NY2d 347, 353). In the posture of this case, where plaintiff was unable (or unwilling) to recall the traffic conditions, how fast he was driving, whether or not his vehicle had pulled out from the curb abutting any of the stores near the intersection immediately prior to the collision, or what, if any, evasive action he took to avoid broadsiding defendant's vehicle, the jury logically could have concluded that plaintiff's negligence was the sole proximate cause of the accident and rationally resolved the fact-laden causation issue in defendants' favor ( see Skowronski v. Mordino, 4 AD3d 782; Di Leone v. Hasan, 274 AD2d 410; Hoynacki v. Cummings, 127 AD2d 941; but cf. Salazar v. City of New York, 302 AD2d 580). Nor, on this record, would it have been "sheer speculation" (dissenting op at 29) for the jury to determine that plaintiff was speeding as he approached and entered the intersection and that he failed to use reasonable care to avoid hitting the defendant's car which was already in the process of turning.
We disagree. A jury verdict in favor of a defendant should not be set aside unless the jury could not have reached the verdict on any fair interpretation of the evidence (see, Tannor v Pierce Coach Line, 131 A.D.2d 658, 659; Hoynacki v Cummings, 127 A.D.2d 941, 942; Nicastro v Park, 113 A.D.2d 129, 134). No evidence was adduced at trial to show that a municipal employee caused the defect or that the city had actual notice that the stop sign was missing.
We must also reject plaintiff's contention that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. In order for plaintiff to succeed with this argument, it must appear that the verdict cannot be supported by any fair interpretation of the evidence (Hoynacki v Cummings, 127 A.D.2d 941, 942). As indicated, the issues were in sharp dispute, many of which resulted from varying opinions of expert witnesses.
Against defendant's contention that it had no notice of the allegedly dangerous condition and that plaintiff's injury was not reasonably foreseeable, we conclude that defendant's duty as landlord is to maintain its property in a reasonably safe condition in the circumstances and to guard against the risk of injury reasonably to be foreseen (Basso v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233). Defendant was found by the jury to have breached that duty and that the breach proximately caused plaintiff's injuries. In order to set aside such verdict on the ground that it is against the weight of the evidence, it must appear that the verdict cannot be supported by any fair interpretation of the evidence (Hoynacki v Cummings, 127 A.D.2d 941, 942); defendant has failed to meet its burden in this regard. Contrary to defendant's contention, prior notice of the condition is not required where defendant has constructed the ramp in question and its president visited the store weekly.
ion * * * that is damaging or detrimental to the Company's business". We note, however, that there was evidence adduced at trial which indicated that plaintiff was unable to gain the respect of the employees and that this had resulted in low morale among the workers; generally displayed poor business judgment and, on at least one occasion, had negotiated a deal which resulted in a net loss to Rushmore Weber; had incorrectly stated Rushmore Weber's policy concerning warranties on used trucks at a sales meeting; and had been charged with driving while intoxicated in a company vehicle he had not been authorized to use and had concealed this incident until it came out in the newspapers and he was confronted by Weber. Based on the foregoing, we cannot say that the jury's verdict, finding that plaintiff had been discharged for cause as defined in the employment contract, was unsupported by any fair interpretation of the evidence (see, e.g., Kerwin v County of Broome, 134 A.D.2d 812, 814; Hoynacki v. Cummings 127 A.D.2d 941, 942). Accordingly, the jury verdict may not be disturbed.