Opinion
Civil Action 22-cv-3673
07-28-2023
NICHOLAS AUSTIN HOYLE, Petitioner, v. LAURA K. WILLIAMS, et al., Respondents.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
CRAIG M. STRAW, U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Petitioner Nicholas Austin Hoyle (“Hoyle” or “Petitioner”) filed the instant pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging his pre-trial detention by claiming his preliminary hearing was tainted with constitutional and state law violations. Hoyle is currently incarcerated at George W. Hill Correctional Facility in Delaware County, Pennsylvania. Hoyle requests the Court release him from custody as he awaits trial.
For the following reasons, I recommend Hoyle's petition be dismissed with prejudice as to his non-cognizable claims and without prejudice as to his unexhausted claims.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On October 4, 2021, around 9:17 a.m., Police Officer James MacIntosh of the Collingdale Borough Police Department discovered the dead body of Dwayne Williams inside a Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (“SEPTA”) trolley stop at Woodlawn Avenue and Macdade Boulevard in Collingdale, Pennsylvania. Doc. 12, at 3, Affidavit of Probable Cause. The medical examiner determined the cause of death as a single gunshot wound to the chest. Id.
Citations to the record are to the CM/ECF filing pagination of the documents on the docket, not to the page numbers for each individual document.
SEPTA station surveillance video showed Williams talking with another individual around 1:00 a.m. on October 4, 2021. Id. Additional surveillance videos from local businesses placed the same individual at a Wawa location on Macdade Boulevard around 12:30 a.m on October 4, 2021. Id. After watching the video and noticing the individual using a card at checkout, Corporal Patrick Cozier, also of the Collingdale Borough Police Department, emailed a Wawa representative to obtain a receipt of the transaction. Id. at 4. The receipt identified the card used as an Electronic Benefit Transfer (“EBT”) card with the number 60076030012544397. Id. Corporal Cozier requested a search warrant for information of the EBT card user. Id. The search identified Hoyle as the individual. Id. Subsequently, Hoyle was arrested. See Docket, Commonwealth v. Hoyle, No. CP-23-CR-0005081-2021, at 3 (hereinafter “Del. CP Docket”).
There is a discrepancy in the record regarding Hoyle's arrest date. Corporal Cozier testified he arrested Hoyle on October 6, 2021. Doc. 6, at 5. However, the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas docket indicates Hoyle's arrest date was October 4, 2021. Del. CP Docket, at 1. Meanwhile, the Magisterial District Judge signed the search warrant request and the criminal complaint on October 7, 2021. Doc. 6, at 4. We do not attempt to resolve the discrepancy because it does not have any material effect on our recommended disposition of Hoyle's claims.
Hoyle was subsequently charged with first degree murder, 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2502(a), third degree murder, 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2502(c), possession of a prohibited weapon, 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6105(a)(1), carrying a firearm without a license, 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6106(a)(1), and possession of an instrument of crime, 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 907(a). Del. CP Docket, at 3.
On August 31, 2022, Hoyle filed his § 2241 petition in this Court. Doc. 1. Shortly thereafter, Hoyle filed a motion for appointment of counsel, which was denied. Docs. 4 & 5. On October 26, 2022, the matter was reassigned to me for a Report and Recommendation. Doc. 9.
Hoyle's petition is signed and dated August 30, 2022 and acknowledges it was placed in the prison mail system on August 31, 2022. The docket, however, indicates a filing date of September 12, 2022. Because petitioner is a prisoner, the “prisoner mailbox rule” applies, and this Court deems the petition filed on August 31, 2022-the date it was placed in the prison mail system. See Burns v. Morton, 134 F.3d 109, 112-13 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 278 (1988); see also Moody v. Conroy, 762 Fed.Appx. 71, 72 (3d Cir. 2019) (noting under the prison mailbox rule, a document may be deemed filed on date it was signed absent contrary evidence; however, evidence showed prisoner dated document two days before he delivered it to prison officials and therefore the later date was used as the filed date) (citation omitted).
District Court Judge Mark A. Kearney denied the motion. Doc 5.
The Honorable Mark A. Kearney originally referred the matter to the Honorable Elizabeth T. Hey. Doc. 5.
The petition raises several challenges to Hoyle's pre-trial detention. First, Hoyle alleges that his due process rights under the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions were violated because the evidence used against him at the preliminary hearing was based on hearsay. Doc. 1, at 6-7. Second, Hoyle asserts “irreparable misidentification,” which denied him his due process rights and violated Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence Sections 900-903. Id. at 6-7. He claims the identification procedures used at the preliminary hearing were “impermissibly suggestive” because the police did not have a positive identification of the suspect in the surveillance videos and testified “based off suspicion and conjuncture and mere speculation.” Id. at 7. Third, Hoyle asserts that his counsel was ineffective at the preliminary hearing because Hoyle and his appointed counsel did not agree on what issues to present at trial and counsel did not object to damaging hearsay testimony. Id. In his fourth claim, Hoyle contends the affidavit of probable cause was falsified. Id. at 8.
Hoyle amended his petition three times. See Docs. 8, 11 & 24. His fifth claim contends that his Fourth Amendment rights and rights under the Pennsylvania Constitution were violated because the police did not acquire a search warrant to seize the EBT card number from Wawa, nor was Wawa authorized to provide it to the police. Doc. 8, at 1-2. The sixth claim asserts his arrest was unlawful because the Magisterial District Judge did not sign the affidavit for probable cause before Hoyle was arrested. Doc. 11, at 1. Finally, Hoyle's seventh claim asserts his right to a speedy trial has been violated because he has been held without bail for eighteen months and has yet to stand trial, which is currently scheduled for September 25, 2023. Doc. 24, at 1; Del. CP Docket, at 2.
Hoyle filed three separate letters requesting to amend his original petition. Docs. 8, 11 & 24. The Court granted Hoyle's requests to add his fifth, sixth, and seventh claims. See Docs. 10, 29 & 25.
Hoyle asks this Court to release him from custody while he awaits trial. See Doc. 1, at 8. Respondents ask the Court to dismiss the petition because Hoyle's claims are unexhausted and unreviewable. See Doc. 18, at 1.
Respondents addressed Hoyle's first through fourth claims and sixth claims in their response. Doc. 18. Respondents were advised by court order they could file a response to the seventh claim. Doc. 25. Respondents opted not to file a supplemental response addressing the fifth and seventh claim.
II. DISCUSSION
A federal habeas corpus petition is most often a post-conviction remedy. Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 60 (1967). However, under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, a district court has jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus before a state court criminal judgment has been issued in certain circumstances. See Moore v. DeYoung, 515 F.2d 437, 442 (3d Cir. 1975). Specifically, § 2241 authorizes a federal court to issue a writ of habeas corpus petition to a pretrial detainee who is in custody in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treatises of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2241; see Duran v. Thomas, 393 Fed.Appx. 3, 4 (3d Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (quotations and citations omitted). The general rule barring pretrial intervention into pending state criminal proceedings through habeas review is based on the notion of comity, a principle of deference and “proper respect” for state governmental functions in the federal system. Evans v. Court of Common Pleas, Del. Cnty., Pa., 959 F.2d 1227, 1234 (3d Cir. 1992) (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971)). Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”),
a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). As such, only claims asserting a violation of the federal Constitution or federal law are cognizable on habeas review. Id.; see also Walker v. Kerestes, No. 10-2009, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162755, at *19 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 25, 2012), approved and adopted, Nov. 13, 2012 (citing Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41 (1984)) (“It has long been held that claims raising only issues of state constitutional or statutory law are not cognizable on habeas review.”); Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) (“We have stated many times that federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law.”).
A prisoner in custody must exhaust all available state remedies before seeking relief in federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See Moore, 515 F.2d at 442 (“[A]lthough there is a distinction in the statutory language of §§ 2254 and 2241, there is no distinction insofar as the exhaustion requirement is concerned.”). The petitioner bears the burden of proving he has exhausted the available state remedies. Boyd v. Warden, 579 F.3d 330, 367 (3d Cir. 2009). State courts must be given a full opportunity to resolve any constitutional or procedural issues through the established appellate review process before those claims are presented to the federal court. O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999). In Pennsylvania, this means presenting the claim through the Superior Court on direct or collateral review. See Lambert v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 210, 233-34 (3d Cir. 2004).
A court should “exercise its pretrial habeas jurisdiction only if petitioner makes a special showing of the need for such adjudication and has exhausted state remedies.” Moore, 515 F.2d at 443. In some cases, however, “pretrial, pre-exhaustion habeas corpus relief” is available if petitioner can prove extraordinary circumstances during ongoing state court proceedings. Id. at 447. To prove extraordinary circumstances, a petitioner must show allegations amounting to “delay, harassment, bad faith, or other intentional activity . . . .” Id. at 447 n.12. Only the most extraordinary circumstances will excuse the exhaustion requirement in the pre-trial context. Id. at 443; see Story v. Kindt, 26 F.3d 402, 406 (3d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1024 (1994) (finding a delay of nine years by the state court sufficient to constitute extraordinary circumstances and excuse exhaustion because it rendered defendant's attempts to exhaust state remedies futile).
Turning to Hoyle's claims, several of his claims are not cognizable. Hoyle's first, second, and fourth claims do not assert violations of the federal Constitution, laws, or treatises of the United States. See Walker, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162755, at *19. While Hoyle alleges his due process rights were violated because of evidentiary errors (claim one) and irreparable misidentification (claim two), these two claims are alleged errors of state law which do not become cognizable claims under the guise of the Due Process Clause. See Smith v. Horn, 120 F.3d 400, 414 (3d Cir. 1997) (“errors of state law cannot be repackaged as federal errors simply by citing the Due Process Clause”) (quotations and citations omitted); see also Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 438 n.6 (1983) ("The Due Process Clause does not permit the federal courts to engage in a finely tuned review of the wisdom of state evidentiary rules"). Hoyle's fourth claim (alleging a falsified affidavit) also does not assert a violation of the federal Constitution, laws, or treatises of the United States. See Roulhac v. Lawler, No. 08-5124, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125864, at *13-15 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 30, 2009), approved and adopted, Nov. 23, 2009 (finding petitioner's evidentiary claim not cognizable on federal habeas review because it would require the court to re-examine a question of state law). Furthermore, even if claims one, two, and four were cognizable, Hoyle has failed to exhaust any of them in state court. See Moore, 515 F.2d at 442. While Hoyle has filed a motion in state court to suppress certain video evidence, he concedes in his original habeas petition he has never appealed any state court decision regarding claims one through four as he was unaware how to file an appeal. See Doc. 1, at 2-3.
Hoyle's other claims (claims three, five, six, and seven) alleging purported Constitutional violations are not reviewable at this time because he has failed to exhaust the proper state remedies. Hoyle has not presented these claims through one complete round of the state's “established appellate review process.” See O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 844. In fact, his state criminal trial has not occurred yet and is currently scheduled for September 25, 2023. Del. CP Docket, at 2. A state trial will allow Hoyle to exhaust his cognizable claims, and appellate review will remain available. See Moore, 515 F.2d at 445; see also Chambers v. Bogan, No. 194131, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7823, at *2-3 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 17, 2019), approved and adopted, Jan. 16, 2020 (dismissing petition without prejudice when petitioner sought immediate release from Philadelphia County jail, when claims are unexhausted and a “multitude of state court remedies” were available to petitioner, such as raising issues in “pre-trial motions, during trial, and in post- trial proceedings”). As a result of the ongoing state court proceedings, Hoyle's third, fifth, sixth, and seventh claims are barred from habeas review at this time for failure to exhaust.
Furthermore, Hoyle has not alleged nor demonstrated any extraordinary circumstances amounting to delay, harassment, bad faith, or other intentional activity on the state's part exist that would justify waiving the exhaustion requirement for his cognizable claims. See Reese v. Warden Phila. FDC, 904 F.3d 244, 246 n.2 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Moore, 515 F.2d at 447 n.12) (finding that while neither the Supreme Court nor Third Circuit have delineated specific circumstances that might qualify as “exceptional” in Section 2241 context, petitioner's “run-of-the-mill challenges to indictment, arrest, interrogation, and denial of pre-trial release” were not exceptional under any plausible definition of the word). Although Hoyle claims the Commonwealth contributed to violating his right to a speedy trial by requesting several continuances, this does not constitute an extraordinary circumstance. See Moore, 515 F.2d at 447 (finding the alleged denial of a speedy trial is not an extraordinary circumstance warranting pretrial habeas relief). Hoyle attempts to bypass state criminal proceedings by filing his pre-trial habeas petition directly with the federal court, which is not permitted. See Wilson v. Sec'y, Pa. Dep't of Corr., 782 F.3d 110, 118-19 (3d Cir. 2015) (affirming plaintiff must exhaust speedy trial claims in state court before petitioning to federal court for habeas review); see also United States ex rel. Lowry v. Case, 283 F.Supp. 744, 746 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (“I have found no case in which federal habeas was invoked for failure of a speedy state trial in advance of the trial.”). Therefore, I recommend dismissing Hoyle's third, fifth, sixth, and seventh claims without prejudice for failure to exhaust.
III. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Generally, a certificate of appealability will only be issued “if an applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). If the district court
denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner's constitutional claims, a COA should issue when the prisoners shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
Hoyle has not established that reasonable jurists would conclude that the Court is incorrect for dismissing Hoyle's federal habeas petition with prejudice as to his non-cognizable claims and without prejudice as to his unexhausted claims. Accordingly, a certificate of appealability should not issue.
IV. CONCLUSION
Claims one, two, and four are not cognizable habeas claims. Claims three, five, six and seven have not been exhausted nor has Hoyle demonstrated any extraordinary circumstances on the state's behalf to warrant waiving the exhaustion requirement. Accordingly, I recommend Hoyle's § 2241 petition for writ of habeas corpus be dismissed with prejudice as to his non-cognizable claims and without prejudice as to his unexhausted claims. See Banks v. Horn, 126 F.3d 206, 213 (3d Cir. 1997). A certificate of appealability should not be issued because no reasonable jurist would conclude that the Court is incorrect for dismissing Hoyle's federal habeas petition with prejudice as to his non-cognizable claims and without prejudice as to his unexhausted claims.
For the foregoing reasons, I make the recommendation set forth below.
RECOMMENDATION
AND NOW, on this 28th day of July 2023, it is respectfully recommended that the petition for writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as to Hoyle's non-cognizable claims (claims one, two, and four) and DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as to his unexhausted claims (claims three, five, six, and seven). It is further recommended that there is no probable cause to issue a certificate of appealability. Petitioner may file objections to this Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy. See generally Local Civ. R. 72.1. Failure to file timely objections may constitute a waiver of any appellate rights. See Leyva v. Williams, 504 F.3d 357, 364 (3d Cir. 2007).
Because jurists of reason would not debate my recommended procedural finding regarding Hoyle's petition, I recommend that a certificate of appealability should not be granted. See Slack, 529 U.S. at 484.