Opinion
C.A. No. 07A-03-001 (RBY).
Submitted: October 11, 2007.
Decided: November 2, 2007.
Upon Review of Justice of the Peace Court No. 16, Remanded Order, REVERSED.
James G. McGiffin, Jr., Esq., Community Legal Aid Society, Inc., Dover, Delaware for Petitioner.
Jeffrey J. Clark, Esq., Schmittinger Rodriguez, P.A., Dover, Delaware for Respondent.
OPINION AND ORDER
Upon remand by this Court following review of a prior order of eviction, Justice of the Peace Court No. 16 reconvened to analyze its prior order. That Court, then, affirmed its prior decision of eviction.
Subsequent to that, Petitioner Howell applied for further review of the matter by this Court. The first basis of Petitioner's application is that the analysis of the J.P. Court is intrinsically flawed, because it finds that the activity in which Petitioner partook was shown to have negative impact upon only Petitioner's children, if such impact existed at all. That, Petitioner asserts, necessitates the result that the threat to the health and safety of Petitioner's children from having to witness "criminal activity" demands that Petitioner's children will now be homeless. In Petitioner's view, the thought that the observation of a fracas trumps a life without a roof over one's head as a cause of threat to health or safety is preposterous. As a philosophical matter, Petitioner's point is reasonably argued.
Further, Petitioner notes that the J.P. Court is possessed of equitable authority to avoid fatuous results. The question here, however, is not whether the J.P. Court had authority to disregard the letter of a statute to find in favor of a position asserted to be either more equitable or more logical. The limited question before this Court is whether the outcome announced by the J.P. Court has or does not have as its basis sufficient fact to support its decision.
Hence, a review of Petitioner's claim (that the J.P. Court's finding is unsupportable) is called for. Initially, Petitioner must confront the circumstance that the J.P. Court's decision is not limited to a finding of deleterious effect upon only Petitioner's children. The J.P. Court specifically found that the evidence presented demonstrated "clearly criminal activity," which "threatened the right to peaceful enjoyment of the other residents," to wit: "Ms. Howell's neighbors." Specifically, "this activity was observed by other residents," in particular "children residing at 26 Clark's Corner." Further, the J.P. Court concluded that Petitioner's "criminal activity took place . . . in front of her rental unit in the public housing community [which] threatened the health, safety and right to peaceful enjoyment . . . by the other tenants." Thus, the findings of the J.P. Court clearly and specifically transcended effects exclusively upon Petitioner's own family.
Petitioner, in reference to those findings, however, declares that they were merely convenient conclusions, devoid of evidentiary foundation. Thus, Petitioner believes that evidence of specific negative impact on identified tenants must be presented to the J.P. Court. Of course, the "other party" in the "criminal activity," Ms. Ennalis, was directly found to have sustained "burst blood vessels in her eye" as a result of the fight. On the other hand, Ms. Ennalis was not a tenant of the community. Nevertheless, as the J.P. Court points out, the contractual requirement of a lessee demands assurance that a tenant, i.e. Petitioner, will not engage in "any criminal activity thatthreatens the . . . right to peaceful enjoyment . . . by other residents."
The J.P. Court, upon review of the evidence, came to the conclusion that "the totality of the circumstances" presented to it demonstrated that the right to peaceful enjoyment of the public housing community was indeed threatened by Petitioner's actions. The evidence described included Petitioner's having been consuming alcohol "throughout the day"; her engaging in a "tumultuous" fight; her oral and physical resistence to police efforts to "settle things down;" her being charged with crimes of violence; and her engagement in, at least part of, the foregoing outside of her own housing confines, as witnessed by, at least, two neighborhood children.
Nevertheless, Petitioner's position returns to principles discussed in this Court's opinion dated July 10, 2007 regarding the concept of strict liability. The J.P. Court has, in its September 14, 2007 decision, described in much greater detail its findings of Petitioner's actions. It does not, though, reflect, the presence of any evidence of actual negative impact.
As this Court's earlier opinion described referencing D.C. Housing Authority v. Whitfield and Powell v. Housing Authority of the City of Pittsburgh , the requirements of 42 USC § 1437 f(d)(1)(B)(iii) demand a demonstration that an action is taken as a threat by those sought to be protected, to wit: other tenants.
At pp 15-18.
2004 WL 1789912 (D.C. Super).
812 A. 2d. 1201 (Pa. 2002)
In this situation, the Respondents could have solicited evidence to determine that at least one tenant was actually threatened. Both decisions of J.P. Court, however, reflect no such finding. The mere presence of actions which a deliberative body could (and, here, evidently did) find might well threaten a person's peaceful enjoyment. It is, however, equally evident that the J.P. Court was not presented with any evidence that anyone was, in fact, threatened. In the utter absence of any such evidence, the J.P. Court has demonstrated the presence of actions which could threaten, but has not found any resultant threat taken by anyone.
There being no reason to believe that the J.P. Court upon any further remand would be exposed to any evidence that it did not fully describe in its September 14, 2007 Order, the decision of the J.P. Court is REVERSED.
Judgment for Possession in favor of Petitioner Luciel Howell is, therefore, ORDERED.