Howell by Howell v. Waterford Pub. Sch.

10 Citing cases

  1. Krueger v. United States

    Case No. 17-cv-10574 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 14, 2017)   Cited 4 times

    Exhaustion of administrative remedies is a threshold requirement to a reviewing Court's exercise of subject matter jurisdiction. Howell by Howell v. Waterford Pub. Sch., 731 F. Supp. 1314, 1315 (E.D. Mich. 1990). Therefore, in response to a factual challenge to subject matter jurisdiction, a court has discretion to consider matters outside of the pleadings in determining whether exhaustion has occurred, and the Plaintiff has the burden of establishing exhaustion.

  2. A.J.T. v. Osseo Area Schs.

    96 F.4th 1058 (8th Cir. 2024)   Cited 1 times

    Monahan has been questioned. See, e.g., Knox Cnty. v. M.Q., 62 F.4th 978, 1002 (6th Cir. 2023); Mark C. Weber, Accidentally on Purpose: Intent in Disability Discrimination Law, 56 B.C. L. Rev. 1417, 1455-64 (2015); AP ex rel. Peterson v. Anoka-Hennepin Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 11, 538 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1145-46 (D. Minn. 2008); Howell ex rel. Howell v. Waterford Pub. Schs., 731 F. Supp. 1314, 1318-19 (E.D. Mich. 1990). But for the time being, it remains the law of our circuit.

  3. Alston v. District of Columbia

    561 F. Supp. 2d 29 (D.D.C. 2008)   Cited 48 times
    Finding allegations that plaintiff "is a qualified individual with a disability under the ADA . . . that the defendants . . . prevented her from participating in DCPS's Program of Indirect Services . . . that the defendants denied [plaintiff] the benefits of an appropriate academic placement 'solely by reason of her disability' . . . more than enough to state a claim upon which relief may be granted" under Title II of the ADA

    The federal courts are consistently clear that the IDEA is such a comprehensive scheme. A.W. v. Jersey City Public Schs., 486 F.3d 791, 802 (3d Cir. 2007) (reviewing precedent from other courts and concluding the IDEA precludes § 1983 relief); see also Diaz-Fonseca v. Puerto Rico, 451 F.3d 13, 29 (1st Cir. 2006) (requiring that "where the underlying claim is one for violation of the IDEA, plaintiffs may not use § 1983 . . . in an attempt to evade the limited remedial structure of the IDEA); Bradley v. Ark. Dept. of Educ., 301 F.3d 952, 957 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding that remedies not available under the IDEA may not be sought under § 1983); but cf. Howell v. Waterford Pub. Schs., 731 F. Supp. 1314, 1319 (E.D. Mich. 1990) (rejecting similar reasoning and allowing a § 504 claim to remedy an alleged failure to provide a FAPE). This is true even though the IDEA contains a savings clause, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l), which provides: "Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to restrict or limit the rights, procedures, and remedies available under the Constitution, the [ADA], [the Rehabilitation Act], or other Federal laws protecting the rights of children with disabilities." A.W., 486 F.3d at 802 (concluding in light of the Supreme Court's decision in City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113 (2005), that § 1415(l) does not apply to § 1983 suits).

  4. Macy v. Hopkins County Bd. of Educ

    429 F. Supp. 2d 888 (W.D. Ky. 2006)   Cited 8 times

    Most commonly, parents and the local education agency work together to formulate a § 504 Individualized Accommodation Plan for each handicapped child's education. See e.g. Howell By Howell v. Waterford Public Schools, 731 F.Supp. 1314 (E.D. Mich. 1990). Here, one of the school psychologists and/or a special ed teacher suggested a § 504 Individualized Accommodation Plan be developed to address Macy's needs due to her closed head injuries (DN 46, Exhibit 1, Macy Deposition at 18-20; DN 46, Exhibit 3, Zellich deposition at 58-60).

  5. Robinson v. Kansas

    117 F. Supp. 2d 1124 (D. Kan. 2000)   Cited 17 times
    In Robinson, the court held that the governor, in his official capacity, was the proper party in a suit claiming that allocation of public education funds under Kansas law was unconstitutional because the Kansas Constitution made the governor responsible for the enforcement of Kansas law.

    Furthermore, as plaintiffs point out, at least one federal district court has opined that the language of Monahan is no longer good law in light of the 1986 amendments to the Education of the Handicapped Act. See Howell v. Waterford Public Schools, 731 F. Supp. 1314, 1318 (E.D.Mich. 1990). See also discussion, supra, note 17.

  6. Reed v. Lincoln-Way Community H.S. Dist. No. 210

    No. 98 C 4934 (N.D. Ill. May. 26, 2000)

    See 755 ILCS 5/11a-14.1. Ms. Reed, however, failed to raise this argument during the due process hearing before Wolter and thereby forfeited her opportunity to present it here. See Bruschini v. Board of Educ. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 911 F. Supp. 104, 107 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (opportunity to present additional evidence to the federal court does not extend jurisdiction to matters not raised at the administrative level); Howell v. Waterford Pub. Sch., 731 F. Supp. 1314, 1315 (E.D. Mich. 1990) (refusing to consider sub-issues not presented at the administrative hearing below); David D. v. Dartmouth Sch. Committee, 775 F.2d 411, 424 (1st Cir. 1985) (issues must first be presented to the administrative hearing officer in order to preserve the issues for judicial review). Even if the Court were to reach the merits of Ms. Reed's Illinois Probate Act argument, it would be denied.

  7. Doe v. Arlington County School Bd.

    41 F. Supp. 2d 599 (E.D. Va. 1999)   Cited 23 times
    Holding school district entitled to summary judgment on claims under Section 504 and ADA which were based on allegation student deprived of FAPE under IDEA, where plaintiff failed to establish IDEA violation.

    As with IDEA claims, the exhaustion rule also bars consideration of claims under § 504 not raised below. E.g., Howellby Howell v. Waterford Pub. Schools, 731 F. Supp. 1314, 1316 (E.D.Mich. 1990) (dismissing § 504 claims as waived, and stating that "only allegations of plaintiffs' amended complaint which have been administratively exhausted" may be pursued) (emphasis in original); Ciresoli v. Maine Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 22, 901 F. Supp. 378, 387 (D.Me. 1995) (barring special education related claims under § 504 and ADA which were not presented in the administrative hearings below). An issue raised in the initial due process hearing, but not argued and briefed on appeal, is deemed waived.

  8. Bruschini v. Bd. of Educ., Arlington Ctr.

    911 F. Supp. 104 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)   Cited 16 times

    Coe v. Michigan Dept. of Educ., 693 F.2d 616 (6th Cir. 1982). Field v. Haddonfield Bd. of Educ., 769 F. Supp. 1313 (D.N.J. 1991), Johnson v. Lancaster-Lebanon Intermediate Unit 13, Lancaster City School Dist., 757 F. Supp. 606 (E.D.Pa. 1991), Howell by Howell v. Waterford Public Schools, 731 F. Supp. 1314 (E.D.Mich. 1990), Max M. v. Thompson, 585 F. Supp. 317, amended 592 F. Supp. 1450 (D.C.Ill. 1984). As the aforementioned claims were not raised the administrative proceedings below they are not properly before this Court.

  9. Drinker v. Colonial School Dist.

    888 F. Supp. 674 (E.D. Pa. 1995)   Cited 8 times

    The same is true as between appeals panels and district courts: a district court generally cannot consider claims not presented to an appeals panel. See D.R. v. East Brunswick Bd. of Educ., 838 F. Supp. 184,194 (D.N.J. 1993) ("Pursuant to IDEA, failure to raise an issue at the administrative level will result in waiver of that issue on appeal."); Johnson v. Lancaster-Lebanon Intermediate Unit, 757 F. Supp. 606, 617 (E.D.Pa. 1991) (excusing the failure to raise a claim below only after finding that it would have been futile to raise the claim); Howell by Howell v. Waterford Public Schools, 731 F. Supp. 1314, 1316 (E.D.Mich. 1990) ("Were federal courts to set themselves up as the initial arbiters of handicapped children's educational needs before the administrative process is used, they would endanger not only the procedural but also the substantive purposes of the Act.") (citation omitted). The leading administrative law treatise states a similar "general rule":

  10. Stauffer by Demarco v. William Penn Sch.

    829 F. Supp. 742 (E.D. Pa. 1993)   Cited 12 times
    Requiring exhaustion where plaintiff failed to request a due process hearing or pursue other administrative remedies and where school district was responsive to mother's requests for help

    Exhaustion of administrative remedies is not futile simply because it may be time consuming. Howell v. Waterford Pub. Sch., 731 F. Supp. 1314, 1316 (E.D.Mich. 1990). Thus, in Kerr Center Parents Ass'n v. Charles, 897 F.2d 1463 (9th Cir. 1990) and Quackenbush v. Johnson City Sch. Dist., 716 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1071, 104 S.Ct. 1426, 79 L.Ed.2d 750 (1983), for example, failure to exhaust administrative remedies was not a bar to the actions because resort to the Administrative process would have been futile.