Opinion
Docket No. 000022-2012
02-04-2013
Re: C. Robert Howarth v. Township of Mantua
Ronald P. Sierzega, Esq. Puff & Cockerill, LLC James P. Pierson, Esq. Angelini, Viniar & Freedman, LLP
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT APPROVAL OF
THE TAX COURT COMMITTEE ON OPINIONS
Patrick DeAlmeida
Presiding Judge
Ronald P. Sierzega, Esq.
Puff & Cockerill, LLC
James P. Pierson, Esq.
Angelini, Viniar & Freedman, LLP
Dear Counsel:
This letter constitutes the court's opinion with respect to defendant's motion for summary judgment. For the reasons explained more fully below, defendant's motion is granted and the Complaint is dismissed. The court concludes that the Gloucester County Board of Taxation correctly rejected plaintiff's late attempt to appeal the denial of farmland assessment for his property for tax year 2011.
I. Findings of Fact and Procedural History
Plaintiff C. Robert Howarth is the owner of real property located in defendant Township of Mantua. The property is designated by the Township as Block 172, Lot 6 and Lot 6.05 and is known as 577 Mantua Boulevard. For many years the subject property was assessed and taxed as farmland pursuant to the Farmland Assessment Act of 1964. N.J.S.A. 54:4-23.1, et seq.
On July 26, 2010, plaintiff filed an application for farmland assessment for the subject property for tax year 2011. The application states that the property is 13.87 acres in size. The application describes 2 acres as "[l]and under and used in connection with farmhouse" and the remaining 11.83 acres as "[a]ll other land not devoted to agricultural or horticultural use." It is not clear from the record whether .04 acre is not accounted for in the application or if the description of the property as 13.87 acres is incorrect. In either event, the .04-acre discrepancy in the application figures is not material to the outcome of this motion.
On October 25, 2010, the municipal tax assessor denied plaintiff's farmland assessment application for tax year 2011. The assessor explained that the denial was based on her conclusion that less than 5 acres of the subject property were actively devoted to agricultural or horticultural use and that "[f]arming has stopped. Greenhouses being demolished on Lot 6.05. Lot 6 not being used for potting soil."
The assessor's notice informed plaintiff that he "has the right to appeal an adverse ruling to the Gloucester County Board of Taxation on or before April 1st of the tax year and the necessary forms may be obtained from their office at Clayton Complex, Clayton, New Jersey." A phone number for the county board of taxation was also provided. It is undisputed that plaintiff received a copy of the assessor's denial. Plaintiff did not file an appeal from the assessor's decision. He instead paid the taxes assessed against the property as non-farmland.
In September 2011, the assessor filed a Complaint with the Gloucester County Board of Taxation seeking the assessment of rollback taxes on the subject property for tax years 2008, 2009 and 2010, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 54:4-23.8 (authorizing rollback taxes "[w]hen land which is in agricultural or horticultural use and is being valued, assessed and taxed [as farmland], is applied to a use other than agricultural or horticultural . . . .").
On September 27, 2011, the county board issued a Judgment denying the assessor's application for the assessment of rollback taxes. The reason for the board's decision is not stated on the Judgment.
Although the board's Judgment is dated September 27, 2011, it states that it was mailed to the parties on September 2, 2011. It appears that the mailing date is a typographic error.
On November 29, 2011, plaintiff filed Petitions of Appeal with the county board, one for each lot, seeking reversal of the assessor's decision to deny plaintiff's tax year 2011 farmland assessment application. A letter from plaintiff's counsel accompanying the Petitions states that "while active farming was not going on" at the time that the application was filed "the property was still intended to be farmland and was not being farmed due solely to vandalism which had occurred on the property and led to a lawsuit. The property is and was being farmed in 2011." In addition, the letter states that "Mantua Township has agreed that the farmland assessment will apply to 2012, but has refused to make an adjustment for 2011."
On December 5, 2011, the Gloucester County Tax Assessor issued a letter rejecting the Petitions of Appeal as untimely. As the County Assessor correctly explained, the board's September 2011 decision concerned only the assessment of rollback taxes for tax years 2008, 2009 and 2010 and that the "taxpayer should have filed an appeal by April 1, 2011 asking for reclassification" from non-farmland to farmland for tax year 2011. The County Assessor concluded "[t]he Board is not able to make a decision for reclassification for 2011 as an appeal was not timely filed. I would suggest that you forward this matter to State Tax Court but I can offer no guarantee that they will hear this matter for the same reasons stated above."
The County Assessor's letter is dated December 5, 2012. It is clear from the other documents in the record and the timing of the filing of the Complaint that the County Assessor's letter was issued on December 5, 2011 and contains a typographical error.
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On January 11, 2012, plaintiff filed a Complaint in this court seeking to reverse the assessor's denial of plaintiff's farmland assessment application for tax year 2011.
On December 18, 2012, defendant moved pursuant to R. 4:46-2 for summary judgment, arguing that the county board of taxation correctly denied plaintiff's late appeal of the tax assessor's denial of farmland assessment. Plaintiff opposed the motion. The court thereafter heard oral argument from counsel.
II. Conclusions of Law
Summary judgment should be granted where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law." R. 4:46-2 (c). In Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 142 N.J. 520, 523 (1995), our Supreme Court established the standard for summary judgment as follows:
[W]hen deciding a motion for summary judgment under Rule 4:46-2, the determination whether there exists a genuine issue with respect to a material fact challenged requires the motion judge to consider whether the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party in consideration of the applicable evidentiary standard, are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party."The express intent of the Brill decision was to 'encourage trial courts not to refrain from granting summary judgment when the proper circumstances present themselves.'" Township of Howell v. Monmouth County Bd. of Taxation, 18 N.J. Tax 149, 153 (Tax 1999)(quoting Brill, supra, 142 N.J. at 541). The court concludes that this matter is ripe for decision by summary judgment. There are no material facts in dispute between the parties and the validity of the county board's action rejecting plaintiff's Petitions of Appeal as untimely can be determined by application of the law to the undisputed facts. A. Jurisdiction of the Tax Court to Review the County
Board of Taxation's December 5, 2011 Action.
The "Tax Court is vested with limited jurisdiction" defined by statute. McMahon v. City of Newark, 195 N.J. 526, 546 (2008)(citing N.J.S.A. 2B:13-2 and Union City Assocs. v. City of Union City, 115 N.J. 12, 23 (1989)). "'The right to appeal a real property assessment is statutory, and the appellant is required to comply with all applicable statutory requirements.'" Macleod v. City of Hoboken, 330 N.J. Super. 502, 505 (App. Div. 2000)(quoting F.M.C. Stores Co. v. Borough of Morris Plains, 195 N.J. Super. 373, 381 (App. Div. 1984), aff'd, 100 N.J. 418 (1985)). The statutory scheme establishing this court's jurisdiction is "one with which continuing strict and unerring compliance must be observed . . . ." McMahon, supra, 195 N.J. at 543.
Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2B:13-2(a)(3), "[t]he Tax Court shall have jurisdiction to review actions or regulations with respect to a tax matter of . . . [a] county board of taxation[.]" In addition, N.J.S.A. 54:51A-1a provides that "any party who is dissatisfied with the judgment, action or determination of the county board of taxation may seek review of that judgment, action or determination in the Tax Court by filing a complaint in the Tax Court, pursuant to rules of court." N.J.S.A. 54:51A-9 establishes time limits for filing a Complaint in this court from an "adjudication or judgment" of the county board of taxation, as well as for direct appeals from assessments. The statute also provides that "[a]ll real property tax cases not provided for herein shall be taken in the manner and time prescribed for such appeals by the rules of the tax court." N.J.S.A. 54:51A-9(c).
The present appeal does not challenge an adjudication or judgment of the county board and is not a direct appeal from an assessment. Instead, plaintiff challenges an action of the board - the refusal to accept what the board determined to be untimely Petitions of Appeal. Rule 8:4-1(a)(2) provides that "[t]he time within which a complaint may be filed in the Tax Court is as follows: [e]xcept for the review of a judgment, pursuant to N.J.S. 54:51A-1, a complaint to review an action of the County Board of Taxation shall be filed within 45 days after the date of the action to be reviewed."
The action for which plaintiff seeks review was issued on December 5, 2011. The Complaint seeking review of that action was filed on January 11, 2012, within 45 days. Plaintiff established jurisdiction in this court to review the action of the Gloucester County Board of Taxation rejecting the Petitions of Appeal as untimely. B. Validity of the December 5, 2011 Action of
the Gloucester County Board of Taxation.
The Legislature established a procedure through which a property owner may challenge a tax assessor's denial of an application for farmland assessment. The statute, which is part of the Farmland Assessment Act of 1964, provides:
[w]here an application for valuation hereunder has been filed by the owner of land within the time provided herein, the assessor of the taxing district in which such land is situated shall, on or before November 1 of the pretax year, forward to such owner a notice ofThis is the only statutorily authorized avenue through which plaintiff could challenge the tax assessor's denial of his tax year 2011 farmland assessment application for the subject property. He failed to meet the deadline established in N.J.S.A. 54:4-23.13b. Plaintiff elected instead to forgo an appeal and pay the taxes assessed against the property for tax year 2011.
disallowance by regular mail when a claim has been disallowed. The assessor shall set forth . . . reason or reasons therefore together with a statement notifying the landowner of his right to appeal such determination to the county board of taxation on or before April 1 of the tax year. An appeal made pursuant to this section shall be governed by the procedures provided for appeals in R.S. 54:3-21.
[N.J.S.A. 54:4-23.13b.]
It was not until November 29, 2011, nearly eight months after expiration of the appeal deadline, and approximately one month before the close of the 2011 tax year, that plaintiff attempted to file an appeal of the denial of farmland assessment with the county board of taxation. The board correctly rejected plaintiff's appeal as untimely.
In opposition to the municipality's motion, plaintiff argues that it would be inequitable to apply "technical rules concerning the time to appeal" in light of the township's decision to assess the property as farmland in the years before and after tax year 2011. The statutory deadlines for challenging decisions of taxing authorities, however, are not "technical rules." The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the necessity of complying with filing deadlines in the area of taxation. As the Court explained in the context of Tax Court jurisdiction, "failure to file a timely appeal is a fatal jurisdictional defect." F.M.C. Stores v. Borough of Morris Plains, 100 N.J. 418, 425 (1985). "The timeliness of a tax appeal is critical." Prime Accounting Dept. v. Township of Carney's Point, __ NJ. _, 2013 N.J. Lexis 11 at *30 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Jan. 17, 2013). Strict adherence to statutory filing deadlines is of particular concern in tax matters, given "the exigencies of taxation and the administration of local government." F.M.C. Stores, supra, 100 N.J. at 424 (citing Princeton Univ. Press v. Borough of Princeton, 35 N.J. 209, 214 (1961)). The Legislature "'has attempted to set out a well organized time-table for the purpose of enabling a municipality to ascertain the amount of taxable ratables within the jurisdiction in order that it might adopt a responsible and fairly accurate budget.'" Id. at 425 (quoting Township of Galloway v. Petkevis, 2 N.J. Tax 85, 92 (Tax 1980)). "By incorporating a strict deadline in N.J.S.A. 54:3-21, the Legislature intended to ensure that municipalities receive timely notice that a particular property's valuation is subject to challenge." Prime Accounting, supra, 2013 N.J. Lexis at *31.
The same considerations are true with respect to the statutory deadline established in N.J.S.A. 54:4-23.13b for challenging a denial of a farmland assessment application before the county board of taxation. The boards of taxation, like this court, are statutory creatures constrained to act within the scope of their legislative authority. They may not accept appeals beyond the deadline established by statute. In addition, as is the case with Tax Court appeals, the taxing district has an important governmental interest in the timely identification of which assessments in the taxing district are subject to review, and possibly modification, to facilitate sound fiscal decision making during the tax year. Here, plaintiff did not notify the municipality that it objected to the denial of farmland assessment for the subject property for tax year 2011 until November 29, 2011, approximately a month before the end of the tax year.
Nor is the court persuaded by the precedents cited by plaintiff in support of his request to extend the filing deadline for his challenge to the denial of farmland assessment. Hovland v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 204 N.J. Super. 595 (App. Div. 1985), certif. denied, 102 N.J. 400 (1986), upon which plaintiff relies, is inapposite. In that case, the court reviewed a decision by the Director, Division of Taxation denying an untimely homestead property tax rebate application. N.J.S.A. 54:4-3.87, since repealed, provided that the Director "shall, for good cause shown extend the time of any applicant to file a claim for a homestead rebate for a reasonable period." The court determined that the taxpayer had demonstrated good cause for the late filing and was entitled under the express language of the statute to an extension of the filing deadline. Id. at 598-600. Here, no statutory provision authorizes the county board of taxation to accept late challenges to the denial of farmland assessment for good cause or any other reason.
New Concepts for Living, Inc. v. City of Hackensack, 376 N.J. Super. 394 (App. Div. 2005), and Center for Molecular Medicine and Immunology v. Township of Belleville, 19 N.J. Tax 193 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 165 N.J. 677 (2000), also cited by plaintiff in opposition to defendant's motion, provide no support for the notion that extension of the April 1st statutory filing deadline is warranted. In Center for Molecular Medicine, the tax assessor sent notice of an assessment to an incorrect address and the notice was not in the possession of the taxpayer until the day before the April 1st filing deadline established in N.J.S.A. 54:3-21. Id. at 195-198. The Appellate Division held that the taxpayer "was deprived of procedural due process because it did not receive adequate notice for a meaning opportunity to be heard on its claim of statutory exemption . . . ." Id. at 198. As a result, relaxation of the statutory filing deadline was justified.
Similarly, in New Concepts for Living, the municipality sent notice of the removal of an existing tax exemption to an address the tax assessor knew to be incorrect. 376 N.J. Super. at 396-397. Once the taxpayer received notice that the exemption had been removed, the time in which to appeal that decision had passed. Id. at 397. Municipal officials thereafter engaged in discussions with the taxpayer creating the impression that the matter could be resolved informally without the need for an appeal to the Tax Court. Id. at 398-399. Relying on these discussions, the taxpayer did not file an appeal within a reasonable time after receiving notice that the exemption had been removed. It was not until after the tax assessor announced his position that the taxpayer was time barred from challenging the removal of the exemption that an appeal was filed with this court. The Appellate Division, finding that the municipality had lulled the property owner into foregoing an appeal, held that the square corners doctrine barred the municipality from asserting that the Complaint was untimely. Id. at 401-405 (citing W.V. Pangborne & Co. v. Department of Transportation, 116 N.J. 543 (1989)).
Here, it is undisputed that plaintiff received timely notice of the assessor's decision to deny the farmland assessment application. The notice contained express instructions regarding the filing of an appeal, including a notation of the April 1st filing deadline and information on how to obtain the forms necessary to challenge the decision. Plaintiff was in possession of the assessor's notice of denial more than five months before the filing deadline. In addition, the record contains no hint of untoward behavior by municipal officials that would justify application of the square corners doctrine to bar an untimeliness defense. On its face, plaintiff's application for farmland assessment stated that farming activity on the subject property had ceased. Based on that representation, the tax assessor denied the application, provided timely notice of her decision and later sought, as she is authorized to do by law, imposition of rollback taxes. Plaintiff was fully apprised of each step of the proceedings and elected not to file an appeal with the county board of taxation by the April 1st statutory deadline.
As a final note, the court rejects plaintiff's request for relief pursuant to R. 1:1-2(a), which allows the court to dispense with or relax any court rule where doing so would avoid an injustice. It is not clear from which rule plaintiff seeks relief. Rule 8:4-1(a)(2) establishes the 45-day filing deadline for appeals to this court from actions of the county board of taxation. Plaintiff filed his complaint within that timeframe, obviating any perceived need to relax R. 8:4-1(a)(2). The filing deadline plaintiff missed, the period for filing an appeal of the tax assessor's denial of farmland assessment, is established by statute, N.J.S.A. 54:4-23.13b. Rule 1:1-2(a) does not authorize the court to relax a statutory filing period. It is, of course, the province of the Legislature to establish and alter statutory filing deadlines. While due process and other equitable considerations may warrant the late filing of legal actions, as discussed above, the legal precedents cited by plaintiff in support of such relief are unpersuasive. A court rule, standing alone, is an insufficient ground for extending the 45-day period established in N.J.S.A. 54:4-23.13b.
An Order granting defendant's motion is enclosed. The court will enter Judgment dismissing the Complaint.
Very truly yours,
Patrick DeAlmeida, P.J.T.C.