Opinion
CV 02-6280-HA.
September 17, 2004
Clayton Howard, SID #5838277, Oregon State Penitentiary, Salem, Oregon, Plaintiff Pro Se.
Hardy Myers, Attorney General, Kathryn A. Cottrell, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, Oregon, Attorneys for Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
The motions pending before the court are 1) Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (#23); 2) Plaintiff's motion for temporary restraining order; preliminary injunction (#24); and 3) Defendants' motion for summary judgment (#42).
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, an inmate at Oregon State Penitentiary, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for declaratory and injunctive relief against prison officials. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his First, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution as a result of their actions and application of administrative rules in prison disciplinary proceedings. Plaintiff alleges the following claims: 1) that Defendants issued a misconduct report on a matter which had previously been dismissed for lack of evidence; 2) that Defendants unlawfully confiscated $750.00 from him; 3) that Defendants unconstitutionally fined him for the violation of prison rules; and 4) that Defendants unconstitutionally sanctioned him for possession of a controlled substance after he tested positive on a drug test.
FACTS
Plaintiff is an inmate at the Oregon State Penitentiary located in Salem, Oregon.
On August 13, 2000, Oregon Department of Corrections Inspector Peter Hayes monitored a telephone conversation at the penitentiary between Plaintiff and his visitor. Hayes concluded that Plaintiff and his visitor had conspired to smuggle illegal drugs into the penitentiary. The following day, Hayes was notified that the visiting room staff had observed Plaintiff's visitor pass an item to Plaintiff during their visit. Hayes interviewed the visitor and Plaintiff. Hayes had a drug-sniffing dog inspect the contents of Plaintiff's pockets. Based upon the interviews and the positive response of the dog, Hayes believed that Plaintiff had engaged in smuggling illegal drugs into the penitentiary. On August 14, 2000, Hayes issued a misconduct report to Plaintiff for distribution of contraband. Plaintiff was required to submit a urine sample on August 15, 2000, which tested positive for THC, the active ingredient in marijuana. Plaintiff was issued a separate misconduct report for possession of contraband.
On August 22, 2000, Hearings Officer Terrence Anderson opened a hearing against Plaintiff in the two misconduct cases for alleged distribution of contraband and alleged possession of contraband. Plaintiff requested an investigation, and the hearing was continued to September 18, 2000. When the hearing reconvened, Anderson recommended that Plaintiff be found in violation of possession of contraband for having a controlled substance in his urine and recommended that the charge of distribution be dismissed for insufficient evidence. The Superintendent approved these recommendations.
Between August 14, 2000 and November 16, 2000, additional investigation was conducted into Plaintiff's drug smuggling activities by Inspector Hayes. On November 16, 2000, Inspector Hayes issued another misconduct report to Plaintiff for violation of rules prohibiting drug distribution. This misconduct report was based on a clearer transcript of Plaintiff's earlier telephone conversation, interviews with Plaintiff and his visitor, Plaintiff's positive drug test, and information supplied by a confidential informant.
On November 21, 2000, Hearings Officer Barbara Cooney initiated a hearing into the drug distribution charge. The hearing was postponed to allow Cooney to review the evidence. On November 30, 2000, the hearing reconvened, and Cooney found that Plaintiff had a controlled substance distributed to him and recommended a variety of sanctions which were approved by the Acting Superintendent.
On November 15, 2001, Inspector Robert Knodel found outgoing mail from Plaintiff regarding unauthorized money transfers from Plaintiff's inmate trust account to the trust accounts of other inmates, a direct violation of the prison rules. Knodel reviewed outgoing mail from Plaintiff informing his mother that he was sending her $5,000.00 from his inmate trust account, and later correspondence from Plaintiff to his mother directing her to deposit $1,000.00 of that money in the trust account of other inmates. Knodel knew that this transfer of money was a common way for inmates to pay for illegal drugs and ordered Plaintiff to submit a urine sample for testing. Plaintiff's urine sample submitted on November 16, 2001 tested positive for THC. On November 26, 2001, Plaintiff was issued a misconduct report for possession of contraband based upon the positive drug test.
On November 29, 2001, Hearings Officer Cooney conducted a disciplinary hearing regarding the misconduct report issued to Plaintiff for the presence of contraband in his urine in violation of prison rules. Cooney concluded that Plaintiff violated the contraband rule by providing a urine sample on November 16, 2001 which tested positive for THC, a controlled substance. Plaintiff's request for an investigation was denied, and Plaintiff was found to have violated the drug-related rules for the fifth time in four years.
Inspector Knodel continued his investigation of Plaintiff's money transfers. Plaintiff was informed in mid-December, 2001 by prison officials that transferring funds from one inmate account to another was prohibited inmate conduct. On December 28, 2001, Plaintiff wrote a letter giving directions that money be deposited in other inmates' trust accounts. On February 7, 2002, Knodel issued a misconduct report to Plaintiff for disobeying an order in connection with the money transfers to the trust accounts of other inmates.
On April 30, 2002, a disciplinary hearing was conducted by Hearings Officer Cooney regarding the rule violation based upon the money transfers. Cooney found a violation of the rule and recommended sanctions, including a recommendation that the $750.00 which Plaintiff had deposited in the trust accounts of other inmates be deposited into the Inmate Welfare Fund. Plaintiff requested review of the decision. The decision was reviewed and affirmed.
APPLICABLE LAW
Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The moving party bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis of its motion and identifying those portions of "`the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)).
"If the moving party meets its initial burden of showing `the absence of a material and triable issue of fact,' `the burden then moves to the opposing party, who must present significant probative evidence tending to support its claim or defense.'" Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident Indem. Co., 952 F.2d 1551, 1558 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Richards v. Neilsen Freight Lines, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1987)). The nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and designate facts showing an issue for trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23. All reasonable doubt as to the existence of a genuine issue of fact must be resolved against the moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-88 (1986). The court should view inferences drawn from the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. T.W. Elec. Serv. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630-31 (9th Cir. 1987).
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff contends that he is entitled to summary judgment in his favor because the evidence permits only the conclusion that he should prevail. Defendants contend that they are entitled to qualified immunity because the evidence establishes that Defendants did not violate Plaintiff's clearly established constitutional rights.
The defense of "qualified immunity" protects "government officials . . . from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). This rule "`provides ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.'" Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 494-95 (1991) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)). The purpose of qualified immunity is to "ensure that defendants `reasonably can anticipate when their conduct may give rise to liability' by attaching liability only if `[t]he contours of the right . . . [are] sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.'" United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 270 (1997) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)).
Qualified immunity "is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability; . . . it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial." Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (emphasis in original). As such, "a defendant is entitled to a ruling on qualified immunity `early in the proceedings so that the costs and expenses of trial are avoided where the defense is dispositive.'" Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 909 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001)).
The required first step in a qualified immunity analysis "is to consider the materials submitted in support of, and in opposition to, summary judgment, in order to decide whether a constitutional right would be violated if all facts are viewed in favor of the party opposing summary judgment." Jeffers, 267 F.3d at 909 (citing Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201). "If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity." Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201.
Claim One — November 16, 2000 Misconduct Report
Plaintiff asserts that the misconduct report issued on November 16, 2000 violated his rights under the First, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution because it relied upon conduct which had been dismissed for insufficient evidence in an earlier misconduct report. Defendants assert that the violation resulted from an investigation and hearing which was not procedurally flawed and did not violate any constitutional protection.
On September 22, 2000, the Superintendent approved a recommendation from Hearings Officer Anderson that the charge of drug distribution issued in the August 14, 2000 misconduct report be dismissed for insufficient evidence. After this charge was dismissed, Investigator Hayes continued to conduct an investigation into Plaintiff's drug smuggling activities. On November 16, 2000, Inspector Hayes issued another misconduct report for drug distribution to Plaintiff based upon further investigation and additional evidence. A disciplinary hearing was held, a violation was found, and Plaintiff was sanctioned. The new disciplinary proceedings did not violate any constitutional rights to due process or any constitutional protections against double jeopardy. Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's Claim One.
Claims Two and Three — Confiscating $750.00
Plaintiff contends that the order that the $750.00 which he had transferred to the trust accounts of other inmates be placed in the Inmate Welfare Fund violated his constitutional rights. Plaintiff asserts that he wrote to his mother to inform her that he would be sending her funds from his prison account and asked her to forward these funds to relatives and friends as Christmas gifts; that he received a misconduct report; and that he lost his money to confiscation. Plaintiff contends that he is entitled to an injunction declaring the confiscation of his $750.00 unconstitutional.
Defendants contend that Plaintiff lacks standing to bring a claim regarding the return of the $750.00 because Plaintiff transferred the money into the trust accounts of other inmates. Defendants further contend that Plaintiff has stated no facts which could form the basis for a violation of his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Article III of the United States Constitution limits the judicial power of the federal courts to cases and controversies. At a minimum, Article III requires a party invoking the authority of the federal court to show actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982). In this case, the prison officials ordered that money which had been placed in the prison accounts of prisoners other than Plaintiff be placed in the Inmate Welfare Fund. Plaintiff has no personal claim to money in other inmates' account and cannot claim any injury, constitutional or otherwise, as a result of this order. Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's Claim Two and Claim Three.
Claim Four — Possession of a Controlled Substance
Plaintiff contends that he is entitled to an injunction declaring the Department of Correction rule on drug testing unconstitutional with respect to the testing process used to collect samples, test samples, and process samples. Plaintiff further contends that the consumption of a controlled substance does not constitute possession of a controlled substance because the person cannot exercise control over the substance already in his system.
Defendants contend that Plaintiff has not claimed that his disciplinary hearing was unfair or procedurally flawed, and that the record demonstrates that Plaintiff's procedural due process rights have been preserved.
On December 3, 2001, Hearings Officer Cooney found that Plaintiff violated Rule 1d(D), Contraband I. Attachment 3 to Affidavit of Barbara Cooney, p. 2 (attached as Exhibit 105 to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment). The misconduct report explains that Plaintiff was given the order to provide a urine sample; that the sample proved positive for THC, a controlled substance in the prison testing system; and that the urine sample was taken to the Legacy Lab for confirmation and was confirmed positive. Id. at 4.
The facts, taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, establish that Plaintiff suffered no violation of his right to due process as a result of the testing process. The requirements of due process are satisfied if some evidence supports a decision by a prison disciplinary board. Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985). Plaintiff's prior positive drug tests, along with the results of the tests performed on his urine sample within the prison system and confirmed by the outside lab, provide strong evidence that Plaintiff violated Contraband I by having a "controlled substance . . . in his . . . urine." OAR 291-105-0015(1)(d)(D) (Attachment 1 to Affidavit of Barbara Cooney, p. 5).
Plaintiff asserts that the prison rule is unconstitutional in light of State v. Daline, 175 Or. App. 625 (2001). In Daline, the Oregon Court of Appeals reaffirmed a prior holding that possession of a controlled substance in one's bloodstream did not constitute the crime of possession of a controlled substance in violation of Or. Rev. Stat. § 475.992. See also State v. Downes, 31 Or. App. 1183 (1977). Prison disciplinary proceedings serve the remedial goals of maintaining institutional order and encouraging compliance with prison rules in a situation "`where good order and discipline are paramount because of the concentration of convicted criminals.'" See United States v. Brown, 59 F.3d 102, 105 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v. Newby, 11 F.3d 1143, 1145 (3rd Cir. 1993). The misconduct rule, that an inmate commits Contraband I if he has any controlled substance in his urine, does not violate any constitutional right and promotes the remedial goals of the institution. Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's Claim Four.
Plaintiff's Motion for Temporary Restraining Order; Preliminary Injunction
Plaintiff contends that he is entitled to an order prohibiting Defendants from hearing any of his misconduct reports and imposing any fines against him, and an order declaring the Oregon Department of Corrections' rules relating to fines unconstitutional and ordering the return of all funds forfeited.
Defendants contend that Plaintiff's request for a temporary or preliminary injunction should be denied because there are no facts in the record to support any claim that he suffered disciplinary sanctions without constitutionally adequate process or that he is in danger of suffering any unconstitutional deprivations in the future.
To obtain a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff generally must satisfy one of two tests. The traditional test requires a plaintiff to show "(1) a strong likelihood of success on the merits, (2) the possibility of irreparable injury to plaintiff if the preliminary relief is not granted, (3) a balance of hardships favoring the plaintiff, and (4) advancement of the public interest (in certain cases)." Johnson v. California State Bd. of Accountancy, 72 F.3d 1427, 1430 (9th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted). In the alternative test, "a court may issue a preliminary injunction if the moving party demonstrates either a combination of probable success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury or that serious questions are raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in his favor." Id. (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted). The two formulations under the alternative test "represent two points on a sliding scale in which the required degree of irreparable harm increases as the probability of success decreases." AM Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1013 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In order to obtain equitable relief, a plaintiff must show that he has sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the challenged official conduct and that the injury or threat of injury is both real and immediate, not conjectural or hypothetical. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 103 (1983).
Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the court concludes that Plaintiff has not demonstrated any likelihood of success on the merits or threat of injury. Plaintiff is not entitled to prevail on any claim for declaratory or injunctive relief.
CONCLUSION
Viewing the evidence presented by Defendants and Plaintiff in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the court concludes that Defendants did not violate any constitutional right of Plaintiff. No further inquiry is necessary in order to conclude that Defendants are entitled to judgment in their favor.IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that 1) Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (#23) is DENIED; 2) Plaintiff's motion for temporary restraining order; preliminary injunction (#24) is DENIED; and 3) Defendants' motion for summary judgment (#42) is GRANTED. The court will enter judgment in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff.