Summary
interpreting agreement as a whole as not intending to obligate the husband's estate to pay alimony after his death, despite general provision that agreement's terms were binding on the parties' legal representatives
Summary of this case from Williams v. WilliamsOpinion
Rehearing Denied Feb. 20, 1974.
Faricy, Tursi, Phelps & Shepherd, Dale P. Tursi, Pueblo, for appellant.
Predovich & Ward, Lester L. Ward, Jr., Pueblo, for claimant-appellee.
SMITH, Judge.
In 1962, Harold Houston, decedent, and his wife, Harriet Houston, entered into a marital settlement agreement. The couple was subsequently divorced, and the settlement agreement was incorporated into the divorce decree. Following the death of decedent in 1972, claimant, on the basis of the 1962 settlement agreement, filed claims against decedent's estate demanding 'alimony' based on her life expectancy in the sum of $102,166.91 and medical and hospital insurance payments in the sum of $5,940.60. The probate court allowed these claims after concluding that the parties to the settlement agreement intended that the payments should continue beyond decedent's death. The estate appeals from that order. We reverse.
The first issue posed is whether the periodic payments of maintenance and support, designated as 'alimony ' in the settlement agreement, were intended by the parties to extend beyond the death of the husband and are thus enforceable against decedent's estate. The pertinent provision provides:
'Alimony (Monthly Payments).-- The Husband agrees that commencing on the first day of November, 1962, and on the first day of each and every month thereafter until the death or remarriage of the Wife, whichever shall occur first, he will pay to the Wife alimony in the sum of Four Hundred Fifty-Eight Dollars and Thirty-Three Cents ($458.33) for the support and maintenance of the Wife, with the express understanding that Fifteen (15) years after the effective date of this Agreement the amount of said monthly payments shall be reduced to the sum of Four Hundred Sixteen Dollars and Sixty-Seven Cents ($416.67).'
Generally a husband's duty to provide support and maintenance to a former wife is personal in nature and terminates at his death. Doll v. Doll, 140 Colo. 546, 345 P.2d 723. However, the husband may, by contract, expressly, or by clear implication, provide that the payments shall continue after his death. In re Estate of Kettering, 151 Colo. 202, 376 P.2d 983; See International Trust Co. v. Liebhardt, 111 Colo. 208, 139 P.2d 264.
It is the position of the appellant that the agreement contains no express provision providing that alimony or periodic support payments shall continue after the death of the husband and that none can be clearly implied either from the specific provision or from the agreement as a whole. We agree.
Claimant-appellee refers us to certain general provisions of the agreement which she asserts manifest the intention of the parties that monthly alimony or support payments should extend beyond the husband's death. In the preamble to the agreement there appears the recitation that 'it is the desire of the husband to make adequate provision for the support and maintenance of the wife.' The agreement, in its general provisions, further declares that its terms are binding on the parties' legal representatives and that 'each of the parties waives any additional rights which such party has, or may have, by reason of their marriage, including rights of dower or curtesy, except the rights saved or created by the terms of this agreement.' Claimant suggests that these provisions taken together manifest the requisite intention. She asserts that this is particularly true when these provisions are read with the phrase contained in the specific alimony or support provision 'until the death or remarriage of the wife whichever shall occur first.'
Although the trial court interpreted the contract in the manner in which claimant-appellee urges, this court is not bound by that interpretation. See Helmericks v. Hotter, 30 Colo.App. 242, 492 P.2d 85. Our sampling of the multitudinous Colorado cases interpreting agreements such as this convinces us that these general phrases and expressions relied upon by claimant are common, in substance, to most agreements of this nature, irrespective of the manner in which alimony or support is handled, and have little, if any, bearing upon the specific issue before us.
We note that in that portion of the agreement dealing with property division the decedent agreed to deliver promissory notes to the claimant in the amount of $30,000 to be paid on an installment basis. It was agreed that payment of these promissory notes was to be secured by a life insurance policy, the proceeds of which were to be used to liquidate these obligations in the event of the husband's death. The fact that the parties, by express agreement, made provision for payment of certain obligations following the husband's death indicates that such eventuality was taken into consideration during the drafting of the agreement. Thus, had a continuation of alimony (support) payments which involved a substantially larger amount of money been intended, such intention would have been manifested by express provision of the agreement, and the failure to do so evidences, in our view, a contrary intention.
Reading the agreement as a whole, the document is consistent with the general rule that alimony (support) payments terminate at the husband's death and the provisions of the agreement cited by plaintiff are insufficient to overcome the presumption stated in Kettering, supra.
Appellant next urges that the lower court erred in allowing the claim for medical and hospital insurance payments under the provision of the agreement which states:
'The Husband agrees to pay for and maintain in good standing, During the remainder of the Wife's life (the medical and hospital insurance now held by the wife) or equivalent medical and hospital insurance coverage . . ..' (emphasis added).
This provision is also essentially one for maintenance or support falling within the rule established in Kettering, supra. Standing alone, the phrase, 'during the remainder of the Wife's life,' does not clearly manifest the parties' intention to bind the husband's estate following his death.
We therefore reverse the trial court's order granting appellee's claims against decedent's estate for alimony and medical and hospital insurance payments and remand the cause.
ENOCH and PIERCE, JJ., concur.