No. 05-04-00986-CR
Opinion issued February 28, 2005. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex.R.App.P. 47.
On Appeal from the 292nd Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. F03-73831-PV. Affirmed.
Before Justices BRIDGES, O'NEILL, and MAZZANT.
AMOS L. MAZZANT, Justice.
A jury convicted Christopher Demond Houston of capital murder. The trial judge assessed a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment and made an affirmative finding that appellant used or exhibited a deadly weapon, a firearm, during the commission of the offense. In a single point of error, appellant contends the evidence is both legally and factually insufficient to support the conviction. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Background
At approximately 2:00 a.m. on August 3, 2003, Renika Wright was shot once in the right temple with a .22-caliber gun as she sat in Nikita Hall's car. Wright and Hall, who were cousins, had been driving around Lamar Street in downtown Dallas area "just hanging out." Hall saw appellant waving at them from a parking lot. Wright, who was in the front passenger seat, had her purse hanging on her left shoulder. When Hall pulled into the parking lot, appellant approached the passenger side of the car, standing close to Hall's car. Eric Black was on the driver's side, but he stood about twenty-five feet away from the car. Appellant said something to Wright through the open passenger-side window. Hall did not hear what appellant said because she was watching Black, who was "kind of looking, peeping around the corner." Hall said it "didn't seem right" to her. When Hall turned her head to look at Wright, and "the guy had snatched her purse by that time." Hall felt Wright's arm "slop down on the rest in the middle of the car," and she heard a "firecracker sound." Hall saw appellant run in front of the car at the same time she saw Wright slump in the seat with her head back and her eyes closing. Appellant and Black ran from the scene. A month or two after the shooting, a detective showed Hall a photographic lineup and individual photographs. Hall was not able to identify the assailant in those photographs. At trial, however, Hall identified appellant as the shooter. She said she was absolutely certain appellant was the person who shot Wright and took Wright's purse. Lashanda Robertson, who had been a friend of appellant for about eight months, testified that in the early morning hours of August 3, 2003, she was standing outside an all-night convenience store when she saw appellant and Black walking toward the store. Appellant appeared to be high from smoking "wack," which is a marijuana cigarette soaked with PCP and embalming fluid. Robertson testified appellant acted nervous, so she asked him what was wrong. Appellant said he had something to tell her but he did not know how. The next day, Robertson read in the newspaper that a woman had been shot and killed in her car during a robbery. Two days later, appellant told Robertson he had shot that woman. Appellant claimed he did not mean to do it. Appellant told Robertson he and the woman wrestled for the woman's purse and the gun "just went off." Robertson initially testified she did not see appellant with a gun that night, but she later admitted that in her written statement to the police she had said she saw appellant with a .22-caliber pistol the night of the shooting. Lashunda Sims, who is the mother of appellant's daughter, testified appellant came to her house in the late afternoon of August 3, 2003. Appellant told her he was in some trouble and that he had tried to "jack a female and accidently shot her." Appellant was later arrested at Sims's house. Eric Black testified he was given immunity from prosecution on this offense in exchange for his truthful testimony. Black testified that on August 3, 2003, he and appellant had been at the convenience store for several hours when appellant said he wanted to "go hit a lick," that is, to rob someone. They walked from the store to the area of Lamar Street. En route, appellant showed Black a .22-caliber pistol. Black testified that when appellant showed him the gun, he knew appellant was going to use it during the robbery. When they reached Lamar Street, Black and appellant stood around for about forty-five minutes smoking "wack." They saw two women walk to a car, get in, and begin to drive down the street. Appellant walked up to the car; Black stood on Lamar Street about twenty feet away from the car and acted as a "lookout." Appellant walked to the passenger side of the car. After a few minutes, Black heard a gunshot, but he did not see appellant fire the gun. After hearing the gunshot, Black fled the scene. Detective Phil Harding testified he showed Hall three different photographic lineups that contained a picture of either appellant or Black, but Hall was not able to identify anyone from those lineups. Harding said it is not unusual for a witness to be unable to pick a photograph of the suspect out of a lineup but to later be able to identify the person in court. Harding also went to Houston to interview two witnesses who had been at the scene of the shooting, and he showed them a photographic lineup. One of the witnesses identified appellant's picture as the person he saw shoot Wright. The witness wrote his initials and the time he viewed the lineup beneath appellant's photograph. A forensic pathologist with the Dallas County medical examiner testified that a .22-caliber bullet was recovered from Wright's left frontal lobe during the autopsy. There was no evidence of soot or stippling around the wound, which indicated the muzzle of the gun was more than three to four feet from the surface of Wright's skin when it was discharged. A trace evidence examiner with the Southwestern Institute of Forensic Sciences testified there were no gunpowder particles or other residue found on hair samples around the wound. This could mean the gun was three feet or more from the victim, something was between the gun and the victim, or the blood from the wound washed away any residue that might have been deposited. Applicable Law
In reviewing a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment, and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Sanders v. State, 119 S.W.3d 818, 820 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003). The standard is the same for both direct and circumstantial evidence cases. Edwards v. State, 813 S.W.2d 572, 575 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1991, pet. ref'd). In reviewing the factual sufficiency of the evidence, we view all of the evidence in a neutral light to determine whether the jury was rationally justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Zuniga v. State, 144 S.W.3d 477, 484 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004); Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000). In examining a factual sufficiency challenge, we defer to the fact finder's determination of the credibility of the evidence. See Johnson, 23 S.W.3d at 7. The State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant intentionally caused the death of Renika Wright while in the course of committing or attempting to commit robbery. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. §§ 19.02(b)(1), 19.03(a)(2) (Vernon 2003 Supp. 2004-05). Discussion
Appellant argues the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the finding that he intentionally caused Wright's death. Appellant contends the evidence shows that while he was trying to rob Wright, they struggled over her purse and the gun was accidently fired. Appellant asserts he did not have the specific intent to kill Wright, he did not know Wright had died until several days after the incident, and two witnesses testified that appellant had told them the shooting was accidental. The State responds the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the conviction and that intent is a fact question for the jury. We agree with the State. In a murder prosecution, the defendant's state of mind is a question of fact that must be determined by the jury. See Brown v. State, 122 S.W.3d 794, 800 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003). The jury may infer intent from any facts in evidence that it determines proves the existence of such intent to kill, such as the use of a deadly weapon. See id. Appellant cites Turner v. State, 805 S.W.2d 423, 430 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991), for the proposition that "the mere intent to pull the trigger of a firearm" does not satisfy the requirement that a defendant had the specific intent to cause death in order to be convicted of capital murder. However, the facts of this case do not reflect a situation in which appellant merely pulled the trigger. There was testimony presented that appellant planned to commit a robbery, he brought a loaded .22-caliber pistol with him to do the robbery, and he chose to rob Wright. During the course of the robbery, appellant shot and killed Wright. There were also two witnesses who testified appellant told them he accidently shot Wright as he and Wright "wrestled" over the purse. However, the jury was the exclusive judge of the facts provided and of the weight to be given the testimony, and the jury resolved any conflicts in the evidence. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.04 (Vernon 1979). Having reviewed all of the evidence under the proper standards, we conclude it is legally and factually sufficient to support the conviction. We overrule appellant's point of error. We affirm the trial court's judgment.